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Abstract
This thesis examines the changing role of Nigeria’s state system in integrated rural development, 
the post-war global effort to draw peasant producers irretrievably into commercial agriculture. The 
thesis analyzes policy and programme interventions by the state, or by international development 
institutions acting through the state, to promote capital-intensive agriculture as well as expand 
market-based exchange relations in rural Nigeria. The study’s structural context is provided by 
southwestern Nigeria’s experience in state-led agrarian change since the 1940s. Its immediate 
empirical referents are the Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project (EAADP) and the Ondo 
State Agricultural Development Project (ODSADEP), implemented successively in cocoa-growing 
Ondo State in the 1980s with World Bank assistance.
Agricultural change in southwestern Nigeria since the 19th century has been conceived in terms of 
the near-total absence of state intervention or its ubiquity; high turnover of multiple, conflicting 
policies, strategies and implementing agencies; and class-based conflict between state, capital, and 
peasantry. While these conceptions still capture the essence of state action in rural Western Nigeria, 
they have occasionally oversimplified reality. Existing analyses have also had a predominantly 
national and/or regional focus and reinforced established policy biases by emphasising export-crop 
agriculture to the near-total exclusion of food-cropping.
The present study attempts a historical and structural analysis of the state’s role since the 1940s, 
focusing on small-scale food farming at sub-regional and project levels. Quantitative and qualitative 
methods are applied to a data base comprising archival material; official documents and project 
reports; interviews with farmers and with officials; as well as a survey of farmers in four villages 
in north-eastern Ondo State, to analyze policy and socio-technical constraints to commercial 
agriculture, and to assess EAADP and ODSADEP s operations.
The thesis concludes that state activism in rural Ondo State has produced mixed results. The reason, 
however, is not so much because small farmers have been unremitting opponents of capitalist 
methods as because local realities have been ignored in the design and implementation of official 
strategies. One policy implication of this is that the ‘blueprint model’ of planning must be 
reconstructed to promote greater local influence on development thinking. Another is the need to 
redefine the scale of development projects in favour of programmes with more modest objectives 
and performance targets. Above all, policy and political processes have to be opened up to 
autonomous farmers’ groups.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Problem -
This thesis examines continuity and change in state activism in agriculture and rural 
development in southwestern Nigeria since 1945. Specifically, the study analyzes attempts 
by the Nigerian state to actualize global ‘post-war initiatives [to make] machines rather 
than the skills of the small-holder.. .the cutting edge of agricultural change.’  ^ Rural 
development has been conceived in this context as interventions by the state, or by 
international development agencies acting through the state’s machinery, to increase 
capital-labour ratios on small farms and expand market-based exchange relations in rural 
society as a whole.^ Such interventions have been expected also to stimulate structural 
change in the wider economy on account of their linkage effect with urban as well as 
rural non-agrarian sectors, especially industry.^
‘ Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (1985), p. 13. Prominent examples of globally- 
sourced prescriptions for Nigerian agriculture and rural development include World Bank, The Economic 
Development o f Nigeria (Baltimore, 1955), PAO, Agricultural Development in Nigeria 1965-80 (Rome, 
1966); and World Bank, Nigeria: Options for Long-Term Development (1974).
 ^ Only a sample of the extensive literature could be cited here. On the concept and nature of rural 
development, see Raymond E. Dumett and Lawrence J. Brainard (eds.). Problems o f Rural Development 
(Leiden, 1975); John M. Cohen, ‘Integrated Rural Development: Clearing Out the Underbrush’, Sociologia 
RuraliSy XX, 3 (1980), pp. 195-212; and Lars-Erik Birgegârd, ‘A Review of Experiences with Integrated 
Rural Development’, MPD, IV, 1 (1988), pp. 4-27. For a historical account, see Vernon W. Ruttan, 
‘Integrated Rural Development: A Historical Perspective’, WD, 12, 4 (1984), pp. 393-401. On programme 
design, see Uma Lele, The Design o f Rural Development (1975), and Bruce P. Johnston and William C. 
Clark, Redesigning Rural Development (1982). For a critique and agenda, see Robert Chambers, Rural 
Development (1983) and Hans Gsanger, The Future of Rural Development (1993). For more radical 
commentaries, see the editors, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-15 and Gavin Williams, ‘The World Bank and the 
Peasant Problem’, pp. 16-51 in Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts, and G. Williams (eds.). Rural Development 
in Tropical Africa (1981). On Nigeria, see H. M. A. Onitiri, ‘A Proposal for Nigerian Rural Development’, 
NJESS, 8, 1 (1966), pp. 3-8; NES, Rural Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1973); and Dupe Olatunbosun, 
Nigeria’s Neglected Rural Majority (Ibadan, 1975). Also G. Williams, ‘Taking the Part of Peasants: Rural 
Development in Nigeria and Tanzania’, in P. C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.). The Political 
Economy o f Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills, 2nd ed. 1985), pp. 144-180; G. Williams, ‘The World 
Bank in Rural Nigeria, Revisited: A Review of the World Bank’s Nigeria: Agriculture Sector Review 198T, 
ROAPE, 43 (1988), pp. 42-67; and A. Olam-ewaju and Toy in Falola (eds.). Rural Development Problems 
in Nigeria (Aldershot, 1992). For comparative overview of experiences, see Diana Conyers, Paul Mosley 
and Dermis M. Warren (eds.), ‘Integrated Rural Development Projects’, Special Issue, MPD, IV, 1 (1988).
 ^ For early role specification, see Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor, ‘The Role of Agriculture 
in Economic Development’, AER, 51, 4 (1961); the editors, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-5, William H. Nicholls,
1
The state is not conceived here in the most abstract sense as the hegemonic leviathan. As 
the available literature suggests clearly, attempts at institutionalised domination in Nigeria 
and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa have been feeble and largely unproductive. This is 
in part because ‘the colonial state in Africa was in many respects alien; it did not grow 
from the soil but was built on the surface of indigenous society...’;'^  in part because 
state-consolidation in colonial and post-colonial Africa has been oriented primarily 
towards the short-term;^ and in part because of attendant state ‘softness’, the generalised 
weakness of the post-colonial state’s institutions vis-a-vis indigenous society.^ The state 
is thus conceived here in its disaggregated form, as a network of intricate power and
‘The Place of Agriculture in Economic Development’, pp. 11-44, and editors, ‘Some Aspects of the Process 
of Change in Agriculture’, pp. 203-213 in Carl Richer and Lawrence Witt (eds.). Agriculture in Economic 
Development (New York, 1964); cf. contributions in Herman M. Southworth and Bruce F. Johnston (eds.). 
Agricultural Development and Economic Growth (1967). For a review of the literature, see Bruce F. 
Johnston, ‘Agriculture and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries: A Survey of Research’, 
JEL, 3, 2 (1970), pp. 369-404. For an historical update to the 1970s, see the editors, ‘Agricultural 
Development Ideas in Historical Perspective’, in Carl K. Richer and John M. Staaz (eds.). Agricultural 
Development in the Third World (Baltimore, 2nd ed. 1990), pp. 3-38. For comparative historical analysis, 
see Bruce F. Johnston, ‘Agricultural Development and Economic Transformation: A Comparative Study 
of the Japanese Experience’, FRIS, III, 3 (1962), pp. 223-276; and ‘Agriculture and Economic 
Development: The Relevance of the Japanese Experience’, FRIS, VI, 3 (1966), pp. 251-312.
D. K. Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-80 (1986), p. 55; cf. Peter Ekeh, Colonialism and Social 
Structure (Ibadan, 1983); Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Why African States Persist: the 
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood’, WP, 35, 1 (1982), pp. 1-24; and Basil Davidson, The Black 
Man’s Burden (1992).
 ^ For a historical view of ‘makeshift’ policy responses in the economic realm, see Cyril Ehrlich, 
‘Building and Caretaking: Economic Policy in British Tropical Africa, 1810-1960’, EHR, 2nd ser., XXVI, 
4 (1973), pp. 649-667 and Anne Phillips, The Enigma o f Colonialism (1989). See also James S. Scarritt 
and Shaheen Mozaffar, ‘Change and Continuity in the British Colonial State in Africa: Integrating 
Theoretical Perspectives’, in Edward S. Greenberg and Thomas F. Mayer (eds.). Changes in the State 
(1990), pp. 149-166. On the developmental impact of state power in the short-term, arbitrary sense and in 
the long-term, ‘infrastructural’ sense, see Richard Grabowski, ‘The State and Economic Development’, 
SCID, 29, 1 (1994), pp. 3-17.
® For divergent views on state softness, compare Donald Rothchild, ‘Hegemony and State Softness: 
Some Variations in Elite Responses’, in Zarki Ergas (ed.). The African State in Transition (Basingstoke, 
1987), pp. 117-148; and Thomas Callaghy, ‘The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative 
State in Africa’, ibid., pp. 87-116, with Robert Eaton Jr., ‘The State of African Studies and Studies of the 
African State: The Theoretical Softness of the "Soft State"’, JAAS, XXIV, 3-4 (1989), pp. 170-187 and S. 
N. Sangmpam, ‘Neither Soft nor Dead: The African State is Alive and Well’, ASR, 36, 2 (1993), pp. 73- 
94. On the moral foundations of state weakness, see Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in 
Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, CSSH, 17, 1 (1975), pp. 91-112. For a survey of the literature, see John 
Lonsdale, ‘States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey’, ASR, 24, 2/3 (1981), pp. 
139-225. For more recent work, see Jean-François Bayait, The State in Africa (1993). On Nigeria’s 
experience, see Richard Joseph, ‘Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria’, JCCP, 21, 3 (1983), pp. 
21-38.
influence relationships between state agencies and institutions on the one hand, and 
between these agencies and social groups and interests on the other/
Such relationships often involve conflict and cooperation between all concerned parties, 
and could facilitate or hinder government’s as well as society’s development objectives. 
For example, state agencies or their representatives are almost always engaged ‘in the 
management of tension between...organisational certainty and operational flexibility’, in 
bargaining over the distribution between departments and/or programmes of state 
revenue, and in debates on policy objectives and/or strategies.* Bhaduri has also 
remarked that ‘contradiction and not harmony is the basis of agrarian change...Policies 
for agrarian reforms intended to produce...structural transformation [from backward 
agriculture]...have to create disjunction and sharper contradiction between forced 
commerce and productive accumulation’ while promoting interaction between agrarian 
classes and interests.^ Relations between state and society thus reflect a mix of conflict 
and cooperation, with the balance varying between societies and between historical epochs 
in the same society. Whatever this might be, ‘conflicts and contradictions within society 
are never fully resolved’ social structures also ‘tend to be redefined and added to and 
patched as seems expedient, rather than cleanly superseded.
The project approach has compounded the cycle of institutional renewal and decay in 
many important respects. In the 1950s and 1960s, development projects were regarded 
as
., .privileged particles of the development process.. .that, however small, still evoke direct 
involvement by high, usually the highest, political authorities...a special kind of
 ^ Sangmpam, ‘Neither Soft’, p. 84; Otwin Marenin, ‘The Managerial State in Africa: A Conflict 
Coalition Perspective’, in Ergas, African State, note 2, p. 79; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist 
Society (1969), pp. 46ff.
* Scarritt and Mozaffar, ‘Change’, p. 161.
 ^Amit Bhaduri, The Economic Structure o f Backward Agriculture (1983), p. 139.
Scarritt and Mozaffar, ‘Change’, p. 152.
" Lonsdale, ‘States’, p. 141.
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investment [that] connotes purposefulness, some minimum size, a specific location, the 
introduction of something new, and the expectation that a sequence of further 
development moves will be set in motion.*^
Hirschman is correct on the political significance of projects but betrays the excessive 
expectations of the 1960s in respect of other project attributes. Criticism of the project 
approach has intensified since the advent in the 1970s of integrated rural development 
(IRD) projects. The project approach, it is now widely agreed, has neither strengthened 
nor replaced established government departments and societal institutions, including 
markets. On the contrary, development projects have been associated with ‘temporary 
artificial working conditions’ which have ‘create[d] jealousies that later undermine[d] 
project implementation...and support[ed] the view that nothing can be done within the 
[existing] system .Explanations for the failure of expectations are not hard to seek. 
According to Cemea,
.. .projects concentrate resources on selected priorities, focus on circumscribed geographic 
areas, and can address specific population groups and constraints on development. 
Projects can also be intensive social laboratories that use an innovative approach on a 
limited scale to gain experience for larger-scale efforts. [But] projects are only segmented 
units of intervention; they often bypass overall structures, develop atypically.. .tend to 
create enclaves, siphon resources from parallel non-project activities, and may not 
generate sustainable development beyond their limited time frame...[T]he sudden, large 
infusion of external resources into a rural society reverses the natural processes by which 
resources for development are internally created and gradually accumulated, 
commensurate with the inherent capability of the socioeconomic structure to generate, 
absorb, and use surplus.*®
Economy or sector-wide instruments have been no less problematic. Hence, development 
practice has been alternating between sectoral programmes and projects in a ‘never-
Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, 2nd ed. 1995), p. 1.
Cf. K. D. S. Baldwin, The Niger Agricultural Project (Oxford, 1957).
George Honadle and Jay Rosengard, ‘Putting ‘Projectized’ Development in Perspective’, PAAD, 3, 
4 (1983), p. 301; cf. Eric Clayton, Agriculture, Poverty and Freedom in Developing Countries (1983), chp. 
9.
*® Editor, ‘Sociological Knowledge for Development Projects’, in Michael Cemea (ed.). Putting People 
First (New York, 1991), p. 4; p. 6.
ending process of constructing models [of solutions] and discarding them’.^  ^ State 
agencies have also had to cultivate the support of relevant social groups both for the 
legitimacy of the agencies as well as their outputs, and in order to facilitate the 
institutionalisation of socio-economic and political relations encapsulated in the state 
system. Continuity and change in state policy and action thus reflect the ‘mobilisation 
of b i a s ' i n  favour of a mixture of political and economic priorities in each historical 
conjuncture. State efforts may then be conceived not as a series of spectacular successes 
(in respect of say, class formation) or eminent failures (e.g. to ‘capture’ the 
peasantry) rather a complex mix of successes and failures on different points on a 
continuum of objectives which also change over time.
The present study covers nearly five decades from 1945 to 1992. This period is long 
enough to suggest historical patterns in state-agrarian relations; both 1945 and 1992 also 
have added significance in the present context. The year 1945 marked the beginning of 
the end of formal colonialism in Nigeria, stimulating a political transition that resulted 
in expanded nationalist influence on policy and culminated in formal independence in 
1960. 1945 also corresponds roughly with the advent of state-led development generally 
and specific policy structures and processes to be explored here. By 1992, Nigeria had 
experimented with both state-led development and market-inclined structural adjustment 
programmes. Although ADPs straddle both strategies, all three have produced mixed 
results in Western Nigeria. The choice of 1992 as terminal date offers an opportunity to 
comment on the political-economic significance of all three strategies in the context of 
a historical perspective on agricultural change in post-colonial Western Nigeria.
This study shall analyze post-colonial state action to increase total factor productivity and
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York, 1965), p.
32.
On public policies as instruments of legitimation in Nigeria, see Jonathan Zwingina, Capitalist 
Development in an African Economy (Ibadan, 1992).
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, ‘The Two Faces of Power’, APSR, 56, 4 (1962); Murray 
Rothbard, Power and Market (California, 1970), chp. 2,
Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (1980).
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induce structural change by involving small-scale farmers more closely and irreversibly 
in capitalist-inclined production and accumulation. Its general thrust is the increasing 
involvement of local urban interests and international agencies, especially the World Bank 
and global agribusiness, in the setting of the agrarian agenda in post-1945 Nigeria. But 
the analysis emphasises the internal policy and social dimensions of the urban-rural 
influence process without losing sight of its ultimately global roots. The study’s 
immediate empirical referent, therefore, is the Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development 
Project (EAADP), a food production project inaugurated in five local government areas 
in northern Ondo State (i.e. Ekiti Central, Ekiti East, Ekiti North, Akoko North and 
Akoko South EGAs) in 1981 with substantial World Bank support (see map 1 on p. xvi). 
The operations of the Ondo State Agricultural Development Project (ODSADEP), Ekiti- 
Akoko’s state-wide successor inaugurated in 1989, are also examined.
My choice of case study can be justified easily. Ekiti-Akoko is probably the least 
remarked in the academic literature on Nigeria’s enclave agricultural development 
projects (ADPs).^° I have found only two published articles on the project. Mordi 
analyses EAADP’s organisational structure in the context of a wider discussion on 
corporate strategies in Nigeria’s rural development agencies.In  turn, Fasoranti offers 
an empirical review of the project’s production and commercial goals and outcomes. 
Fasoranti’s analysis was slightly superficial, however, because he asked leading questions 
from respondents. For example.
[i]n response to [the] question "Do you always seek expert advice before the 
commencement of every agricultural season?"...178 [or 89%] of the [200] respondents 
showed that they sought expert advice before [the] planting season. The remaining 11 %
Other enclave ADPs and their start-up dates are: Funtua (Kaduna State, 1975); Gusau (Sokoto, 
1975); Gombe (Bauchi, 1975); Ayangba (Benue, 1978); Lafia (Plateau, 1979); Bida (Niger, 1979); Ilorin 
(Kwara, 1980); and Oyo North (Oyo, 1981). Federal Department of Rural Development, ‘A Decade of 
ADPs: Ten Years of Progress’ (Lagos, 1986).
Olajumoke Mordi, ‘Organisation of ADP Management in Nigeria: Ekiti-Akoko ADP Case Study’, 
in A. O. Sanda (ed.). Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1988), 
pp. 89-95.
“  O. O. Fasoranti, ‘Agriculture and Rural Development: Lessons from the Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural 
Development Project (ADP) Experience’, in S. A. Olomola and A. C. Nwosu (eds,). Rural Development 
Strategies in Nigeria (Lagos?, 1992), pp. 81-96.
used their initiative to cultivate the inputs bought from the ADP, All the respondents 
signified that they always looked for innovation in terms of better yielding varieties and 
farming techniques from the ADP...[All] respondents had witnessed some demonstration 
projects. They described the [demonstration] projects as "very efficient" and "very 
innovative"’ [my italics].
Fasoranti’s inferences are clearly untypical of Nigeria’s ADPs and too hagiographie as 
a depiction of the transition process in rural Ondo State. The challenge, however, is to 
attempt a more realistic appraisal of small-farmer responses to EAADP’s programmes.
Two unpublished essays by Elebute and Arabi are also known to me. Elebute explores 
the project’s socio-economic impact in a single local government area. '^  ^Arabi surveyed 
cropping patterns among 60 respondents from all parts of the Ekiti-Akoko area.^  ^ All 
respondents were however selected by the project’s extension agents, perhaps because the 
author was a senior extension officer at the time. While this raises questions about the 
representativeness of Arabi’s findings, the overall usefulness of his essay and others is 
not thereby diminished. These studies however amount to a small body of academic 
sources on a project designed to affect 100,000 farming families directly and indirectly 
and worth US $32.5 million in costs and investment, including World Bank credit. It is 
necessary, therefore, to evaluate EAADP’s operations in relation to its own goals and the 
wider developmental needs of its beneficiaries and host community.
The seeming lack of research interest in EAADP is no less significant in a historical- 
comparative sense. The quantity and perhaps analytical depth of the literature on EAADP 
contrasts sharply and unfavourably with that on ADPs located in northern Nigeria. Like 
Ekiti-Akoko, for example, Funtua, Lafia, and Kano ADPs were implemented in the 
1970s and the 1980s. Unlike EAADP, however, all three have been researched by well-
23 Ibid., p. 90.
^  Adebayo Elebute, ‘The Socio-Economic Impact of Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Project in Ekiti North 
Local Government Area of Ondo State’, B.Sc Honours Essay, Department of Geography, University of 
Ilorin (1985).
“  Rufus Arabi, ‘Cropping Practices of Farmers in the Ekiti-Akoko ADP Area, Ondo State, Nigeria’, 
M.Sc Dissertation, Department of Agronomy, University of Ibadan (1985).
known scholars or been the subject of doctoral dissertations.^^
Ekiti-Akoko ADP s nondescript position in the academic literature also illustrates the 
near-total reversal of Western Nigeria’s preeminence in policy and research on Nigerian 
agriculture prior to the oil boom. For example, Nigeria’s first botanical garden was 
established near Lagos in 1887.^  ^ Six years later, in 1893, a Department of Botanical 
Research was instituted with headquarters in Olokemeji, also in Western Nigeria.Both 
agencies provided institutional bases for research and extension in colonial agriculture and 
forestry. They also served as forerunners of what became a research station at Moor 
Plantation, Ibadan in 1905 and ultimately. Southern Nigeria’s Department of Agriculture, 
established in 1910 and merged with its northern counterpart in 1922, when Nigeria’s 
first Director of Agriculture was appointed.
The historical literature suggests clearly that Yoruba farmers had responded with 
enthusiasm to new food-crops and associated practices obtained through northern trade
“  Doctoral theses include R. A. Dunmoye, ‘The State and the Peasantry: The Politics of Integrated 
Rural Development Projects in Nigeria’, University of Toronto, Canada (1986); D. L. Eyoh, ‘State, Capital 
and Agrarian Transformation in Nigeria: Politics and Production in Lafia’, University of York, Canada 
(1989); and Maikudi Karaye, ‘Hausa Peasants and Capitalism: A Case Study of Rural and Agricultural 
Development in Kano State in Nigeria’, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1990). Journal articles include 
Brian C. D’Silva and M. Rafique Raza, ‘Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: The Funtua Project’, 
FF, 5, 4 (1980), pp. 282-297; idem, ‘Equity Considerations in Planning and Implementing Rural 
Development Projects in Nigeria: An Evaluation of the Funtua Project’, in Bruce L. Greenshields and M. 
A. Bellamy (eds.). Rural Development (Aldershot, 1983), pp. 101-106; Akin L. Mabogunje, ‘The Funtua 
Integrated Rural Development Project’, in R. P. Misra (ed.). Rural Development (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 
175-273; and McDonald P. Benjamin, ‘Nigeria- Funtua Agricultural Development Project’, in idem. 
Investment Projects in Agriculture (1985), pp. 178-216. On Lafia ADP, see Eyoh, ‘Structures of 
Intermediation and Change in African Agriculture: A Nigerian Case Study’, ASR, 35, 1 (1992), pp. 17-39; 
and ‘Reforming Peasant Production in Africa: Power and Technological Change in Two Nigerian Villages’, 
DaC, 23, 2 (1992), pp. 37-66. See also three contributions in Uzo Igbozurike and R. Raza (eds.). Rural 
Nigeria (Ilorin, 1983) viz: A. J. Adejo, ‘The Impact of Agricultural Development Projects on Quality of 
Life in Rural Areas’, pp. 193-203; J. A. Ukoje and J. M. Baba, ‘The Impact of the Ayangba Agricultural 
Development Project on the Quality of Rural Life’, pp. 204-251; and S. G. Nwoko and A. F. Mabawonku, 
‘Welfare Indicators for Farmers in Lafia Agricultural Development Project Area’, pp. 252-260. For a 
general analysis, see Dunmoye, ‘The Political Economy of Agrarian Production in Nigeria: State, Capital, 
and the Peasantry’, PS, 16, 2 (1989), pp. 87-105.
R. E. Dennett, ‘Agricultural Progress in Nigeria’, JAS, XVIII, LXXII (1919), pp. 266-289.
S. K. T. Williams, Rural Development in Nigeria (Ile-Ife, 1978), p. 95.
Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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routes and subsequent contact with Europe through the coast since c. 1450s.Berry has 
described how Yoruba peasants had adapted existing practices on land, labour and credit 
or created new institutions to establish cocoa farms in the Ife and Ondo areas between the 
1870s and the 1930s.Cocoa cultivation became a significant agricultural activity in 
Ondo area in the 1920s and has since remained the most economically valuable 
agricultural enterprise in rural Western Nigeria. By locking Yoruba peasants firmly onto 
the global market, cocoa-growing unlocked a ‘vent for surplus’ that was to be realised 
subsequently through ‘a more intensive application of labour reserves to the land’.^  ^
Along with other export crops, cocoa-induced commerce generated effective demand for 
locally produced and imported goods and an expanded fiscal base for the colonial 
administration in the 1930s and 1940s.^  ^But cocoa-growing has also created conditions 
that have turned present-day Ondo State into a food-deficit area since the 1930s to this 
day.^'^
In the 1950s and 1960s, Western Nigeria provided institutional and strategic leadership 
on state-led development.^^ It was in fact the first region to publish an agricultural 
policy in 1952^  ^ and a ‘White Paper on Integrated Rural Development’ one decade 
l a t e r . I n  between, the ‘cocoa barons of the West’ provided necessary evidence of the
“ s. A, Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria 1850-1910’, in I. A. Akinjogbin and S. 
O. Osoba (eds.), Topics in Nigerian Economic and Social History (Ile-Ife, 1980), pp. 128-145.
Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford, 1975),
Anthony Hopkins, ‘Economic Aspects of Political Movements in Nigeria and in the Gold Coast’, 
JAM, VII, I (1966), p. 134, For a qualified critique of vent for surplus with respect to cocoa farming, see 
Sara Berry, ‘Cocoa and Economic Development in Western Nigeria’, in Carl Eicher (ed.). The Growth and 
Development o f Nigeria’s Economy (East Lansing, 1970), pp. 16-29.
”  G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, 
1966), p. 557.
^  Annual Report on the Southern Provinces o f Nigeria for the Year 1927 (Lagos, 1928), p. 52; C. 
Rowling, Report on Land Tenure in Ondo Province (Lagos, 1952), p. 72.
O. Teriba, ‘Development Strategy, Investment Decision, and Expenditure Patterns of a Public 
Development Institution: the Case of Western Nigeria Development Corporation, 1949-1962’, NJESS, 8, 
2 (1966), pp. 235-258.
^  Agricultural Policy for the Western Region, Nigeria (Ibadan, 1952).
Official Document N® 5 of 1963 (Ibadan, 1963).
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presumed correlation between export-crop production and economic well-being at the 
household level .This ‘mutual benefit’ view of export agriculture was supported by the 
World Bank.^^ Western Region’s ambitious land settlement‘s  scheme also became the 
reference point for other regions.
Similarly, the reform of marketing boards by the federal government in the early 1970s 
leaned heavily on Western State’s experience,not least because cocoa producers were 
taxed more heavily than other export-crop growers to fund government’s urban-based 
development in the 1950s and the 1960s.Finally, and not surprisingly, rural Western 
Nigeria provided the context for the Àgbék^à  (literally ‘farmers reject hardship’) riots 
in the late 1960s,‘^  as yet post-colonial Nigeria’s most violent expression of peasant 
resentment at state ‘interference with their efforts to accumulate and exclusion from state- 
controlled resources and opportunities outside the agricultural e c o n o m y . I n  short. 
Western Nigeria was nearly a microcosm of all the possibilities of state-led change in a
Douglas Rimmer, ‘Development in Nigeria: An Overview’, in Henry Bienen and V. P. Diejomaoh 
(eds.), The Political Economy o f Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), p. 39. For an economic 
survey of cocoa farmers’ incomes, see R. Galletti, K, D, S. Baldwin and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa 
Farmers (1956), chp. 12.
World Bank, The Economic Development o f Nigeria (Baltimore, 1955).
WRN, ‘Future Policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources’, Sessional Paper N® 9 
0/7959 (Ibadan, 1959).
Jerome Wells, Agricultural Policy and Economic Growth in Nigeria 1962-68 (Ibadan: GUP, 1974), 
p. 244; cf. Mordechai E. Kreinin, ‘The Introduction of Israel’s Land Settlement Plan to Nigeria’, JFE, 45, 
3 (1963), pp. 535-546; Oladejo Okediji, ‘Some Socio-Cultural Problems in the Western Nigeria Land 
Settlement Scheme: A Case Study’, NJESS, 7, 3 (1965), pp. 301-310; Dupe Olatunbosun, ‘Western Nigeria 
Farm Settlements: An Appraisal’, JDA, 5, 3 (1971), pp. 417-428.
H. M. Onitiri and Dupe Olatunbosun (eds.). The Marketing Board System (Ibadan, 1974).
G. K. Helleiner, ‘The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigeria’s Economic Development’, EcJ, 
LXXIV, 295 (1964), pp. 582-610; cf. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 
1981), pp. 138-145, for updated figures.
^  Christopher Beer, The Politics o f Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria (Ibadan, 1975); Gavin Williams 
and Beer, ‘The Politics of the Ibadan Peasantry’, in Williams (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and Society (1976), 
pp. 135-158.
Sara Berry, ‘Oil and the Disappearing Peasantry: Accumulation, Differentiation, and 
Underdevelopment in Western Nigeria’, in Michael Watts (ed.). State, Oil and Agriculture in Nigeria 
(Berkeley, 1987), p. 206.
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peasant setting up to the 1960s.
Yet, the economic literature on rural Western Nigeria has lacked explicit state or political 
focus. Research on rural Western Nigeria has been dominated by economic historians and 
agricultural economists, or by social scientists inclined to ignore or assume away the 
significance of the state’s infrastructural power in economic change. Olatunbosun’s book, 
Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority, was a partial exception, as an agricultural 
economist’s account written amidst development economics’ crisis of identity in the 
1970s: hence its somewhat populist inclination. Economic historians of Western Nigeria 
have shown even less explicit interest in the reasons of state. This is because market 
frameworks were believed to reflect day-to-day rural livelihoods more usefully than non- 
market approaches,'^^ and because the expansion of export-crop production in the late 
19th century was achieved through autonomous action by peasants, religious and 
communal associations.'^^ The early colonial state in turn held the ring between ‘the 
"invisible" hand of the market.. .the peasantry.. .merchant capital and a network of agents 
and b u y e r s . I t s  role has been conceived, therefore, in largely minimal or spectator 
terms.
The state emerged as a manager of economic interests in the 1920s, partly in response 
to worsening market conditions and the Depression. But this was a precursor to the 1950s 
and 1960s, when scholars and development agencies helped design government 
programmes to encourage capital investment and skills acquisition and to support or 
subsidise local entrepreneurs in order to promote economic growth, create employment 
opportunities in urban centres, and check urban-rural migration. This had given rise to
^  A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History o f West Africa (1973), p. 5; ‘Comment’, AEH, 2 (1976), pp. 
81-83; and ‘African Economic History: the First Twenty-Five Years’, JAM, 30, 1 (1989), pp. 160-162. Cf. 
R. O, Ekimdare, An Economic History o f Nigeria 1860-1960 (1973) and Paul Collier, ‘Africa and the Study 
of Economics’, in Robert Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O’Barr (eds.), Africa and the Disciplines 
(1993), pp. 73-74.
Sara Berry, ‘Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa-Growing in Ibadan and Ondo’, JHSN, IV, 3 (1968), 
pp. 439-451.
Tom Forrest, ‘Agricultural Policies in Nigeria, 1900-78’, in Heyer, Roberts and Williams, Rural 
Development, p. 223.
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the state-as-entrepreneur with a finger in every major economic pie. The apparent 
visibility of the new post-colonial regime and cocoa-induced welfare spending by the 
regional government had also encouraged Western Nigeria’s general public to associate 
big government with economic prosperity. Yet, the view of state agencies as ‘purveyors 
of welfare and engineers of development’^ ^^ had been mistaken, for it assumed that the 
‘benevolent social guardian’ will ‘selflessly seek the welfare of the people, even when the 
people themselves did not know what was in their self-interest, and would unerringly and 
effortlessly know how to achieve their best interests. Economic development had also 
been conceived in the Western Nigeria literature as state-led or market-based rather than 
as different and shifting combinations of both.^^
Since the 1970s, academic interest in rural Western Nigeria has shifted to the analysis of 
federal policy initiatives and institutions and/or expanded on existing research on the 
export sub-sector. The former comprise mimeographs, articles in journals and in edited 
volumes, details of which are not necessary here.^^ Relevant examples of the latter 
include Clarke’s dissertation on the impact of expanded commercial production in 
Okeigbo, near Ondo,^  ^ and Deustch’s on the origins of state-controlled cocoa
Rimmer, ‘Development’, p. 41.
Anne Krueger, Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries (1993), p, 55.
An early critique of the state’s economic role in West Africa is Peter Bauer, West African Trade 
(Cambridge, 1954), On contradictions and complementarities in state-market relations, see Mrinal Data- 
Chaudhuri, ‘Market Failure and Government Failure’, JEP, 4, 3 (1990), pp. 25-39; cf. Shehu Yahaya, 
‘State Intervention versus the Market: A Review of the Debate’, AD, XVI, 3/4 (1991), pp. 55-74; John 
Toye, Dilemmas o f Development (Oxford, 2nd ed. 1994); and contributions in C. Colclough and James 
Manor (eds.), States or Markets? (Oxford, 1991).
s^To cite but few examples: S. O. Olayide et. al.. Quantitative Analysis o f Food Requirements, Supplies 
and Demands in Nigeria, 1968-1985 (Lagos, 1972); S. Olayide, J. Eweka, and V. Bello-Osagie (eds.), 
Nigerian Small Farmers (Ibadan, 1980); Adeniyi Osuntogim and Olufemi Oludimu, ‘Extending Agricultural 
Credit through Public Institutions in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the Ondo State Agricultural Credit 
Corporation and the Ogun State Agricultural Development Corporation’, OAS, X (1981), pp. 85-97; Olu 
Omopariola, ‘Financing Agricultural Development: A Case Study of the Ondo State Agricultural Credit 
Corporation’, in Sanda, Corporate Strategy, pp. 97-108; O. A. Famoriyo and P. B. Imoudu, ‘A Critical 
Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Financing in Nigeria’, ARMFB, 1 (1988), pp. 37-53; and M. A. O. 
Oladokun and A. G. Daramola, ‘Nigerian Cocoa Development Programme: A Comparative Efficiency of 
Fund Utilisation’, SaD, XIV, 2 (1990), pp. 175-184.
Robert J. Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production in a Rural Yoruba Community’, Ph.D thesis. University 
of London (1979). Clarke’s views are expressed also in ‘Agricultural Production’; and ‘Some Problems in
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marke t i ng .The single major publication on agrarian change in Western Nigeria since 
the 1970s has been Berry’s second book, Fathers Work for their Sons.^^ This is, 
however, concerned more with the relative lack of peasant reproduction among cocoa­
growing Yoruba families in Ife and Osun areas and with Yoruba peasants’ attempts to 
diversify their accumulation strategies outside agriculture than with state activism in rural 
society. Fathers Work for Their Sons therefore reinforced the existing research focus on 
export crops and their impact on the national or regional economy directly and indirectly, 
without offering an explicit evaluation of the food-crop sub-sector.
Indeed, research on Western Nigeria’s food-crop economies has been less remarkable 
than, and in some cases ancillary to, research on export crops. Galletti’s survey examined 
food production by Yoruba farmers as part of the analysis of the economic environment 
of cocoa-farming.^^ Glisten emphasised output and trade in foodstuffs in all parts of 
Western Nigeria but was less concerned with small-farmer production conditions or their 
specific responses to capitalist agriculture as such.^  ^Bamisaye, a political scientist, has 
highlighted some of these issues but implied, mistakenly, that the state has confronted 
rural society as an undifferentiated entity and vice v e r s a .Bamisaye’s predominantly 
macro-societal focus has also ignored the politics of food production at the local level. 
A slightly different kind of study is Atte’s analysis of the social-cultural context of
the Conceptualization of Non-Capitalist Relations of Production’, Critique of Anthropology, 2, 8 (1977); 
‘Peasantization and Landholding: A Nigerian Case Study’, in Martin A. Klein (ed.), Peasants in Africa 
(1980), pp. 177-219; and ‘Households and the Political Economy of Small-Scale Cash Crop Production in 
SW Nigeria’, Africa, 51, 4 (1981), pp. 807-823.
^  Jan-Georg Deutsch, ‘Educating the Middlemen: A Political and Economic History of Statutory Cocoa 
Marketing in Nigeria’, Ph.D thesis. University of London (1991).
(Berkeley, 1984).
Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Farmers.
Rolf Glisten, Studies in the Staple Food Economy o f Western Nigeria (München, 1968).
Olajire Bamisaye, ‘The State and Agricultural Policy in Nigeria with particular reference to the 
Second Republic’, Odu, New ser., 26 (1984), pp. 44-67; ‘An Evaluation of the Operation Feed the Nation 
Policy in Nigeria’, NJESS, 27, 1 (1985), pp. 75-95; and ‘The Crisis of Green Revolution Programme in 
Nigeria: The Need for a Rural Development Policy’ in Ajibade Ogunjumo et al. (eds.), Nigeria’s Economic 
Recovery (Ile-Ife, 1988), pp. 12-27.
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decision-making by food-fanners in northern Yoruba coun t ry .At t e ’s study area, 
Kabba, in present-day Kogi State, is outside the cocoa belt, but his material illuminates 
the thinking of Yoruba food farmers generally, highlighting the social origins of some 
key problems associated with state food production initiatives.
Shifts in the research agenda on rural Western Nigeria could be attributed to two main 
factors. The primary reason concerns changes in the locus of institutional control over 
agricultural policy in Nigeria after 1966.^ Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
proverbial regional tail wagged the federal dog, Nigeria’s federal bureaucracy had by the 
1970s assumed a dominant position in agricultural policy initiation and implementation. 
This shift had been facilitated by a variety of political and economic factors, including 
the collapse of commodity markets in the 1960s; difficulties with Nigeria’s post­
independence constitutional settlement and the advent of military rule in 1966; the 
emergence of food shortages in urban centres, attendant strategic shift from export to 
food crops, and federal government-controlled oil-based expenditure on ADPs, irrigation 
schemes and large-scale farms from the m id-1970s.These developments, and military 
rulers’ preference for ‘tidy’, administrative solutions, had in effect strengthened the 
federal government’s policy-making role and made compliant partners of state 
governments.^^ In particular, ADPs’ blueprint origins and uniform structures have 
reinforced existing tendencies in Nigeria for centralized policy and structural design as 
well as funding. Since research agendas almost always reflect policy shifts and funding 
agencies’ p r i or i t ie s , i t  is not surprising that more research attention has been 
channelled to federal government institutions since the 1970s.
D. O. Atte, ‘Resources and Decisions: Peasant Farmer Agricultural Management and its Relevance 
to Rural Development Planning in Kwara State, Nigeria’, Ph.D thesis. University of London (1980).
“  P. S. Idachaba, ‘State-Federal Relations in Nigerian Agriculture’, MADIA Discussion Paper 8 
(Washington, 1989).
Robert Shenton, ‘Nigerian Agriculture in Historical Perspective’, in Watts, State, pp. 34-57.
“  Sam E. Oyovbaire, Federalism in Nigeria (1985), pp. 231-232.
“  G. Williams, ‘Ideologies and Strategies for Rural Development: A Critique’, in his State and Society 
in Nigeria (Idanre, 1980), p. 145; originally published as ‘Rural Underdevelopment’, in E. O. Akeredolu- 
Ale (ed.). Social Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1977), pp. 251-275.
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The second reason for the shifts in research focus on rural Western Nigeria is analytical 
and specifically relevant to EAADP. This is that northern Nigeria-based material and 
perspectives have dominated political-economic research on Nigerian agriculture since the 
1970s.^ For example, Watts’ important collection, State, Oil, and Agriculture in 
Nigeria, falls short of depicting small-farmer responses to oil-induced expenditure on 
large-scale farming in post-1975 Nigeria. In one sense, this merely reflects the 
distribution of ADPs between northern and southern Nigeria. The north’s flatter terrain 
and lower tree densities are more conducive to large-scale mechanized farming of the 
ADP variety and provided appropriate ecology for Nigeria’s pilot ADPs. By 1981, seven 
of nine ADPs that were either operational or ready for start-up were based in the north.
However, these ecological and statistical considerations have encouraged a selective bias 
in agrarian analysis in post-1970 Nigeria. In particular, the discourse on Nigeria’s ADPs 
has reflected the north’s productive resource profile and encouraged a determinate view 
of state-peasant relations. To be sure. Northern Nigeria’s ‘feudal’ traditions have 
informed colonial state-building strategies'^ and have featured in attempts since the 
1950s to expand or consolidate Nigeria’s post-colonial state system.^ The same 
traditions have also narrowed access to farmland by northern Nigeria’s peasants and 
blended with the centralising tendencies of Nigeria’s agricultural development strategy 
since the 1970s .The  problem, however, is that comparatively little is known about 
how ADPs have performed in southwestern Nigeria, where relatively flexible rules of 
access to farmland^* have promoted greater peasant manoeuvring and made state-peasant
^  Editor, ‘Introduction’, in Watts, State, p. 22.
® (Lord) Frederick Lugard’s views on indirect rule are published in Lugard and the Amalgamation of 
Nigeria, compiled and introduced by A, H. M. Kirk-Greene (1968). For comparative experiences on land, 
see Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, Africa, 62, 
3 (1992), pp. 327-355.
“  Paul Francis, ‘"For the Use and Common Benefit of all Nigerians": Consequences of the 1978 Land 
Nationalisation’, Africa, 54, 3 (1984), pp. 3-28.
See relevant contributions in Michael Mortimore et. al. (eds.). Perspectives on Land Administration 
and Development in Northern Nigeria (Kano, 1986); cf. Bjom Beckman, ‘The World Bank and the Nigerian 
Peasantry: An Outline’, mimeo (1981).
“  For an early accoimt, see Cyril Punch, ‘Land Tenure and Inheritance in Yoruba’, in H. Ling Roth, 
Great Benin (1903), pp. xxi-xxiv. See also Rowling, Land Tenure-, P. C. Lloyd, ‘Some Problems of
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relations more inconclusive and less predictable.^^ Very little has also been said on the 
political economy of food-crop farming in southwestern Nigeria since the 1970s, or 
specifically, about how Yoruba farmers have reacted to oil-based spending on food-crop 
production projects. Even less empirical research has been done on small-farmer 
strategies and choices in Western Nigeria’s food-crop sub-sector in the 1980s, by which 
time scholars had come to regard the post-colonial African state as an obstacle to 
agricultural growth and economic development.^®
The present study evaluates EAADP and ODSADEP’s programmes in the context of the 
wider debate on state-peasant relations in Nigeria generally and of food-crop production 
in cocoa-growing Western Nigeria in particular. What is attempted, therefore, is not 
project analysis in the conventional sense of that term.^  ^ This is not to suggest that the 
strictly economic approach to project evaluation, which compares ‘the situation with the 
investment and that without it...by deducting the flow of costs and benefits without 
investment from the flow representing the situation with investment’ is less useful in 
itself. Nor is it to question the legitimacy of expectations of profit, by the World Bank 
or by other investors, from capital invested in peasant agriculture. It is to suggest, 
however, that strictly economic considerations relate more to the capital invested than to 
projects themselves or to their social and technical objectives. As analytical tools, 
efficiency and turnover ratios as well as internal rates of return may help to provide
Tenancy in Yoruba Land Tenure’, African Studies, XII, 3 (1953), pp. 93-103; R. O. Adegboye, ‘Farm 
Tenancy in Western Nigeria’, NJESS, 8, 3 (1966), pp. 441-453; and Segun Famoriyo, ‘Principles of Rural 
Tenure Systems in Nigeria’, NGJ, 20, 1 (1977), 45-58. On the problems of creating and sustaining private 
property in land, see Clarke, ‘Peasantization’; and Francis, ‘Land Nationalization’, pp. 17-24,
® Sara Berry, ‘Inconclusive Encounters: Farmers and States in the Era of Planned Development’, in 
her No Condition is Permanent (1993), pp. 43-66.
Michael Watts and Thomas Bassett, ‘Crises and Change in African Agriculture: A Comparative Study 
of the Ivory Coast and Nigeria’, ASR, 28, 4 (1985), p. 4. For a review of the wider literature, see Richard 
C. Cook, ‘Farmers and the State’, in Douglas Rimmer (ed.). Rural Transformation in Tropical Africa 
(1988), pp. 116-139.
On which see Lyn Squire, ‘Project Evaluation in Theory and Practice’, in H. Chenery and T. N. 
Srinivasan (eds.). Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. II (North-Holland, 1989), pp. 1093-1137.
^  Christopher Willoughby, ‘Ex post Project Evaluation- the Bank’s Experience’, FaD, 14, 1 (1977), 
p. 29. Emphases in original.
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statistical justification for the investment decision, and perhaps some assurance of the 
security of the investment.
However, conventional project analysts have often assumed, perhaps unwittingly, that 
project financiers’ values, or the values encapsulated in respective projects, are widely 
shared in host communities; or alternatively, that value aspirations in host communities 
would change early enough to make cost-benefit projections real ist ic.The economic 
analysis of projects thus says nothing about the difficulties occasioned by the introduction 
of new technologies to rural communities. Nor could it fully grasp the social nature and 
implications of the adoption of new technologies in small-scale, cash-poor farms. 
Observers have therefore questioned the methodology as well as relevance to developing 
countries of standard project analysis.^^ In Nigeria, where a tradition of ‘planning 
without facts’ and macro-economic instability has given rise to generally unreliable - and 
in some cases irreconcilable - official statistics, and the widespread perception of 
government data as poor indicators of reality, the use of statistical projections based on 
shadow pricing or other improvised data must be doubtful indeed.
Above all, agricultural change in a peasant society invariably involves value change, a 
phenomenon which cannot be measured or portrayed adequately by monetary profit or 
efficiency ratios.Agricultural development policies must distinguish between the
Hirschman, Development Projects, chp. 5.
Peter E. Hildebrand and Edgar G. Luna, ‘Unforeseen Consequences of Introducing New 
Technologies in Traditional Agriculture’, in Hildebrand (ed.). Perspectives on Farming Systems Research 
and Extension (Boulder, 1986), pp. 69-74.
Compare Uma Lele, Design, p. 129; Cheryl Payer, The World Bank (New York, 1982), pp. 77-81; 
and Ronald E. Nelson, ‘Review of Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries by I. M. D. 
Little and J. A. Mirrlees’, JDA, 9, 2 (1975), pp. 282-284.
Wolfgang Stolper, Planning Without Facts (Cambridge, 1966); Paul Mosley, ‘Policy-Making Without 
Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1986-1990’, Æ4, 91 (1992), 
pp. 227-240. On the wider question of disciplinary relevance, see S. Tomori, ‘The Relevance of Economic 
Science to Nigerian Economic Development’, NJESS, 21, 1-3 (1979), pp. 33-56. Cf. Polly Hill, ‘A Plea 
for Indigenous Economics: The West African Example’, EDCC, 15, 1 (1966), pp. 10-20; Development 
Economics on Trial (Cambridge, 1986).
^  These points have been made with respect to the Philippines in James Frideres et. al,, ‘From Peasants 
to Capitalists’, CDJ, 28, 2 (1993), pp. 129-140.
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private and social benefits of technical change and emphasise the latter initially. As 
Ruthenberg has observed,
.. .development policies [must] aim explicitly at activating peasants, mobilizing all existing 
resources, and creating and introducing technical progress. A development policy that is 
solely directed at high direct returns to investment misjudges the role of agriculture in the 
development process. The main task lies in the introduction of technical progress into 
existing agricultural production systems, in the implementation of institutional reforms, 
and thereby in the mobilization of existing performance reserves. The ultimate aim must 
be to reduce the discrepancy between the obsolete traditional forms of production being 
followed and the more productive ones now available.^®
Ruthenberg’s description of traditional farming is slightly debatable, but this is immaterial 
now. Suffice it to say that it is unrealistic for public agencies responsible for promoting 
agricultural development in peasant societies to seek economic returns and technological 
change simultaneously.
My concern, then, is a political-economic analysis of how Nigeria’s state system has so 
far encouraged and, perhaps unwittingly, discouraged increased production and 
productivity in small-scale agriculture by putting ‘one foot on the accelerator and one foot 
on the b r a k e . I t  is assumed that ‘the arena of social relations, rather than the 
availability or non-availability of technological breakthroughs... ’ constitutes the most 
profitable approach to the analysis of ‘the speed and nature of the transition’*® to 
commercial agriculture in post-1945 Nigeria. The study examines policy shifts between 
export and food crops since the 1920s and 1930s, re-focuses attention on Yoruba 
peasants’ resource circumstances and changing responses to capital-intensive production, 
assesses the impact on agriculture of Nigeria’s macro-economic and political 
circumstances in the 1980s, and ascertains how all these affected, and were affected by, 
EAADP and ODSADEP’s operations. I also emphasise the interface between project 
objectives and outcomes in order to account for the socio-technical constraints beneath
Hans Ruthenberg, Innovation Policy for Small Farmers in the Tropics, ed. Hans Jahnke (Oxford, 
1985), p. 3.
Odin Knushen et al., ‘Redefining the Role of Government in Agriculture for the 1990s’, World Bank 
Discussion Paper N® 105 (Washington, 1990), p. 3.
John Sender and Sheila Smith, Poverty, Class, and Gender in Rural Africa (1990), p. 75.
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the 'Satanic gap between cup and lip’*^ at policy and farm levels. Finally, I stress how 
these wider constraints have fed on the state’s management capacity, and on its ‘ability 
to penetrate society and interact in a productive maimer with interest g r o u p s i n  the 
context of the transition. But first, an outline of Ondo State’s political economy.
1.2 Introduction to Ondo State
Ondo Province*^ was formally proclaimed on 1 January 1914, the same day the 
Southern and Northern Provinces were amalgamated, and Nigeria became a single colony 
under British rule. The province was a component unit of Western Nigeria until April 
1976, when it became one of three new states (the others being Oyo and Ogun) carved 
out of the Western State. The province has often been remarked for the variety of its 
ecology, climate and agricultural potential. For example.
Ondo is unique amongst the Southern Provinces in that it extends from the sea-board to 
the boundary between the northern and southern administrations...Stretching thus from 
the sea some 140 miles into the interior, [the province] posseses a variety of climate, 
vegetation, and cultivation. For forty miles from the coast, the ground is mainly swamp 
intersected by numerous creeks, with small villages on every available piece of dry land. 
Rain forest covers the succeeding twenty mile belt from the northern side of which rise 
the precipitous hills and ridges of the Ekiti and Akoko countries.^
Ondo State occupies some 21,000 sq. kilometres or 2% of Nigeria’s land mass. By 1929, 
the province comprised four divisions, namely Ekiti, which included Akure, the present 
capital; Ondo; Owo; and Okitipupa.
According to the 1963 census, Ondo State had an estimated population of 2.77 million, 
about 27% of Western Nigeria’s population. This figure was expected to double by 
1992,85 preliminary returns from the 1991 census have suggested a lower figure of
** Niyi Osundare, ‘The Ogunbiyi Phenomenon’, Newswatch (Lagos), 9 March 1992, p. 38.
^  Grabowski, ‘State’, p. 4, Emphasis added.
”  Ondo Province has retained its essential socio-spatial attributes in spite of changes in boundaries and 
nomenclature over the years. Hence, province and state will be used interchangeably in this study.
^ Annual Report on the Southern Provinces of Nigeria for the Year 1927 (Lagos, 1928). p. 48.
^ National Population Bureau, ‘Mid-Year Population Projections by States, 1963-2000’, mimeo (Lagos,
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3.8 million. The population was and is predominantly Yoruba, with about 82% speaking 
the Yoruba language in 1931. Of the balance, 7.5% were Edo, 1.5% Ijaw, while another 
7.5% was unclassified.*^ Today, about three-quarters of the state’s population are 
probably united by the Yoruba language, even though dialectical differences, some of 
which have been traced to links with Benin and Oyo historical traditions, exist among and 
within the major groups.*^ On balance, Ondo has been and probably remains one of the 
most ethnically homogenous states in Nigeria. It is also predominantly rural, with four- 
fifths of the estimated population living in communities of 5,000 inhabitants and below 
in 1963. By 1975, an estimated 79% of the province’s rural population earned a living 
directly from agriculture,** though actual figures are likely to be higher.
Ondo State and its people are widely associated with four main political-economic issues. 
These are a liking for the fabian variety of big government that prevailed under Obafemi 
Awolowo’s premiership in Western Region during the 1950s; a generalised desire for 
formal education; cocoa production; and recurrent food shortages. These attributes are 
not necessarily peculiar to Ondo State. Forrest has suggested, for example, that 
perceptions of the expansive state are largely positive in Western Nigeria.*^ Sara Berry 
has also linked the quest for formal education or training outside agriculture by cocoa 
farmers’ offspring with the generalised desire for social mobility and with diversified 
accumulation strategies among the Yoruba peasantry.^ Finally, cocoa has been the 
dominant export crop in Western Nigeria since the turn of the century; the shift of 
productive resources, especially land and labour, from food production cannot be unique
1984).
“  H. B. Cox, Census o f Nigeria, 1931 Vol. Ill (1932).
^  M. A. Oguntuyi, History o f Ekiti: From the Beginning to 1939 (1979); S. A. Akintoye, ‘The North- 
Eastern Yoruba Districts and the Benin Kingdom’, JHSN, IV, 4 (1969), pp. 539-553.
WSN, Report o f Agricultural Survey in the Western State o f Nigeria 1975 (Ibadan, 1976), Table 3,
p. 3.
Tom Forrest, The Advance o f African Capital (Edinburgh, 1994).
^  Berry, Fathers.
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to Ondo Sta te .But  Ondo is likely to have betrayed the more negative connotations of 
these attributes than other parts of Western Nigeria.
The Yoruba inclination for big government is expressed, perhaps, in their characterization 
by Ken Post as ‘the most politically active citizens’ in Nigeria during the 1950s.The 
people of Ondo State have sustained that inclination well into the 1990s. In all general 
elections held between 1952 and 1993, Ondo State’s voting public have consistently 
returned large bloc votes for Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987), veteran nationalist 
politician and leader of the Action Group (AG) Party (1948-66) as well as the Unity Party 
of Nigeria (UPN) in 1978-83, or for his political proxies .Ondo has indeed been 
described as a ‘captive’ state where ‘the general public did not bother to separate the 
person of Papa [Awolowo] from that of the Unity Party of Nigeria...[and]...had 
prejudged everything UPN as perfect because it carried the tag of Awo.’^  Electoral 
contests have been won and lost in Ondo State, therefore, not so much because of 
cahdidates’ personal credibility or social standing but because they had been adopted or 
disowned, severally or jointly, by Awo’s political machine.
Awolowo’s cult image is intimately linked with the apparently insatiable quest for formal 
education in Ondo State. For members of the state’s general public, especially those who 
participated in the cocoa economy of the 1950s and 1960s, Western Region has known 
socio-economic prosperity and development only under /two. As a result of the AG party 
government’s free primary education programme, instituted in 1955, primary school 
enrolment in the region rose by 78% to 811,432 in 1956 and doubled to 1.04 million in 
1958.^  ^ Post-primary (modem) school enrolment also increased by 600% in two years
Memorandum 2758/DA/6A of 16 May 1938, CSO/26/4/34277, NAI, p. 2. 
^  K. W. J. Post, Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 (Oxford, 1963), p. 353.
93 Dudley, Introduction, pp. 211- 219.
^  S. T. Labode, UPN’s senior accountant, calls this the ‘Awolowo Connection’ in his Party Power 
(Abeokuta, 1988), p. 16.
^  Awolowo’s political life and times are examined in O. Oyelaran et. al. (eds.), Obafemi Awolowo (Ile- 
Ife, 1988).
^  Data in this paragraph are extracted from Western Nigeria Development Plan 1962-68 (Ibadan, 1962),
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to 30,602 in 1957 and peaked at 75,138 in 1960. Between 1978 and 1983, Awolowo and 
the UPN once again made free education a national political issue. As expected, the UPN 
won a decisive majority of votes in Ondo State, with its candidate winning the 
governorship in 1979 and 1983.^
A large proportion of the education programme’s beneficiaries in Ondo State were 
offspring of small-scale farmers. Many of them have since occupied key public and 
private sector positions in Nigeria and elsewhere, and would have been less fulfilled, if 
at all, without the free primary education programme. However, their remarkable 
individual gains have been attained at great social cost, for the free education programme 
has been associated with a variety of backwash effects, including shortfalls in the supply 
of auxiliary farm labour; labour migration to urban centres; low-level peasant 
reproduction, and above all, the decline in Western Nigeria’s agricultural economy.
Ondo State has been a major cocoa-producing area since the 1950s, about three decades 
after cocoa-growing became an important agricultural activity in the area. As I show 
later, Ondo accounted for between one-fifth and half of Western Nigeria’s cocoa crop in 
1955-70, a remarkable contribution not matched by state-led development in the area. 
However, cocoa-growing has been more profitable in the forest areas of Ondo State than 
in the savanna areas to the north-east. Several decades of policy and research bias has 
also reinforced the mistaken view that identifies the entire state, rather than parts of it, 
with cocoa-growing, shifting attention away from food-crop production and from 
recurrent food shortages. In fact, Ondo Province has been a food-deficit area since the 
1930s,^ the people depending on yams imported from Nigeria’s middle-belt states to 
obtain lyân (pounded yam), their traditional staple, once the harvest season is over.^ °®
Appendix I, p. 65.
^  On voter behaviour in Nigeria, see Dudley, Introduction, pp. 211-222; and Oyeleye Oyediran, 
‘Voting Behaviour’ in O. Oyediran (ed.). The Nigerian 1979 Elections (1981), pp. 93-110.
Güsten, Studies, p. 23; Adekunle Folayan, Agriculture and Economic Development in Nigeria (New 
York, 1983), pp. 80-86.
”  Reuben Udo, ‘Food-Deficit Areas of Nigeria’, GR, 61, 3 (1971), pp. 415-430.
Güsten, Studies, p. 247; S, A. Olusuyi, ‘Some Farmers’ Problems that must be attended to before
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1.3 The Ekiti-Akoko Project
In spite of variations in form and nomenclature, official response to Ondo’s food 
situation, or similar cases elsewhere in post-colonial Nigeria, has been consistent in 
substance. This has been to seek increases in total factor productivity and promote access 
to the market through measures that encourage intensive methods of exploiting available 
resources, promote the adoption of more efficient inputs, and reduce transaction 
costs.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP falls within the above framework and was designed to assist 100,000 
farming families directly and indirectly over an initial five-year period from 1981. As an 
integrated rural development (IRD) project, EAADP sought to ‘co-ordinate...the supply 
of inputs and services needed by the small farmer to achieve higher productivity’ ®^^ 
with the provision of physical infrastructure to reduce the transaction costs of access to 
essential inputs, technical advice, and crop marketing.^*” Its underlying goal was to 
stimulate changes in the social and technical conditions of rural production through the 
standard strategy that emphasised farm and crop development, infrastructure 
development, and institutional support.
Crop development, the defining programme component, was to be pursued by 
encouraging small-scale farmers to adopt high yielding variety (HYV) seeds, seedlings, 
or stem cuttings; simple labour-saving technology; and cultural practices like mono 
cropping and crop rotation. If farmers adopted these prescriptions and followed project 
advice faithfully, and other things remained equal, these changes were expected to issue 
in ‘increased yields per unit of land area’, increased returns to the farmer, and ultimately.
Farmers can play their rightful Role in Economic Viability of Ondo State’, in G, T, Fatunla (ed.), 
Economic Viability o f Ondo State (Akure, 1984), p. 38.
101 Forrest, ‘Agricultural Policies’.
A. A. Abdullah, ‘Discussion’ of M. Yudelman, ‘The Role of Agriculture in Integrated Rural 
Development: The Experience of the World Bank’, in T. Dams and K. E. Hunt (eds.), Decision-Making 
and Agriculture (1977), p. 460.
Mabogunje, ‘Funtua’, p. 197.
Karaye, ‘Hausa Peasants’, p. 106.
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to ‘induce crop substitution and increases in extent of area of crop cultivated.
Infrastructure development has been a soft target for IRD projects in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, primarily because results have been ‘easier and quicker to achieve and more 
v i s i b l e t h a n  in say, crop development. Ekiti-Akoko ADP was expected to provide 
essential physical infrastructure to facilitate production as well as the evacuation of the 
increased output from farm locations to market centres. Hence EAADP’s infrastructure 
development programme included the building of thirty-five earthen dams as well as the 
construction and/or maintenance of a network of rural roads, culverts, and bridges.
Institutional support, the final element of the ADP strategy, expresses Ekiti-Akoko’s 
underlying objectives most forcefully. Institutional support encompasses two project 
goals. The first was to transform more small-scale farmers in the project area into rural 
capitalists proper: by stimulating surplus production and increasing marketed output from 
small-farm production, and, hopefully, strengthening the profit motive in rural 
society. The second goal concerns the introduction of economic fees for services 
provided by public sector agricultural agencies as a prelude to ultimate state withdrawal 
from the provision of basic facilities and services in agriculture. Both goals underscore 
the centrality of the market as the prime instrument of Bank involvement in small-scale 
agriculture as well as the strategic spearhead of what Feder called the World Bank’s 
desire to achieve the ‘self-liquidation of the third world peasantry’.^®®
Ekiti-Akoko ADP s quest for a market-led food sub-sector was not to be restricted to 
beneficiaries. On the contrary, it was to spearhead a far-reaching review of state policies 
on subsidies on farm inputs and credit. According to the Bank, subsidies paid by the
105 aPMEPU, Ekiti-Akoko ADP Completion Report, Vol. I Main Report, p. 72.
Diana Conyers and Dennis M. Warren, ‘The Role of Integrated Rural Development Projects in 
Developing Local Institutional Capacity’, MFD, IV, 1 (1988), p. 32,
107 Cheryl Payer, The World Bank (New York, 1982), p. 220.
Ernest Feder, ‘The New World Bank Programme for the Self-Liquidation of the Third World 
Peasantry’, JPS, 3, 3 (1976), pp. 343-354; cf. M. Yudelman, ‘Agriculture in Integrated Rural 
Development: The Experience of the World Bank’, Food Policy, 1, 5 (1976), pp. 367-81.
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Nigerian state on fertilizer and other inputs had become remarkable for ‘encouraging 
inefficient resource use, discouraging the development of farm support services by the 
private sector and straining Federal and State governments’ fiscal and administrative 
r e s o u r c e s . O n  available evidence, the Bank’s position was valid, for subsidies 
accounted for between 75% and 100% of the economic value of major inputs in the 
1970s. In 1976 alone, fertilizer subsidies cost the federal government some N23.7 million 
in current terms, rising by 187% to N68 million in 1982 and further to N2,000 million 
in 1990.^^° The uncertainties of the oil market in the 1980s, and their impact on public 
sector revenue in Nigeria, have clearly made blanket subsidies on farm inputs 
economically unsustainable.
The Bank thus expected EAADP to serve as stimulant as well as exemplar of state 
retreat, desubsidisation, and privatisation, attributes that became central to Nigeria’s 
political economy during the late 1980s. The project was to stimulate private enterprise 
in the distribution and marketing of farm support services, it being expected that public 
agencies would withdraw gradually from active involvement in the procurement and 
marketing of major farm inputs and support services. Project activities were also 
expected to become self-sustaining or at least break even after the five-year investment 
phase. It was anticipated, for example, that its poultry demonstration farms would reach 
economic maturity in 1985. Seed and grain processing, agricultural research stations, and 
training and information were to follow one year later, while extension services, 
workshops, monitoring and evaluation were to become profitable by 1988. Farm Service 
Centres were expected to become self-sustaining in 1988, while staff housing, the 
project’s least commercially-oriented activity, would follow suit in 2005. Most of the 
costs deemed recoverable in the project plan were to be passed on to farmers.
World Bank, EAADP Staff Appraisal Report (Washington, 1980), p. 5.
G. O. Evbuomwan, ‘A Review of the Federal Government Fertilizer Subsidy Scheme in Nigeria’, 
EFR, 29, 3 (1991), p. 272.
V. A. P. Naik, ‘Commercial Services Division’, in APMEPU, Project Completion Report, Vol. II,
p. 36.
Jens Christensen, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), 
pp. 135-136.
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It is all too easy to attribute the foregoing to the World Bank’s blueprint approach to 
rural development, or to a state captive to pressure from the Bank or international 
agribusiness. As Dunmoye’s otherwise brilliant attempt has shown, however, direct 
linkages between the Bank and developments in Nigerian agriculture are difficult to 
justify empir ical ly.The present study does not deny the importance of international 
influences on policy design and outcomes. But it locates EAADP and ODSADEP’s 
fortunes in domestic socio-economic and institutional conditions, including the 
management capacity of the Nigerian state.
The argument is pursued at two main levels. First, the study links past and present in 
state agrarian action in post-colonial Nigeria, and draws from available accounts of the 
impact of IRD programmes generally to show that in theory and practice, EAADP’s 
progranunes ignored small farmers’ socio-technical circumstances or at least suited 
middle peasants and businessmen-farmers more than small-scale p roducer s . I f ,  as 
Watts has argued, the ADP strategy is ‘an elaborate mechanism to redistribute oil rents 
through state patronage and to therefore cement critical class alliances within the state 
i t s e l f smal l - f a rmer  production is likely to have been affected only marginally, if at 
all, because official credit and/or subsidies have been channelled to urban businessmen 
and/or middle peasants. It is proposed, therefore, that small-scale farmers who need 
official assistance have been involved in official extension schemes only so far as new 
practices and techniques promoted by the schemes accorded with their own calculations 
of risk and profit. A related proposition is that some traditional farming techniques have 
been reinforced in spite (or because) of official extension programmes.
The study also explores the relationship ‘between increased oil revenues, increased 
government spending on agriculture, and the crisis in [Nigerian] agriculture’ with
Dunmoye, ‘Political Economy’; B. B. Bkong, ‘The Role of the World Bank in Nigerian Agricultural 
Policy’, AD, XVII, 3 (1992), pp. 65-98.
Cf. IBRD, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1981), p. 53.
Michael Watts, Silent Violence (Berkeley, 1983), p. 491.
Michael Lipton, ‘Agricultural Research and Modem Plant Varieties in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Generalisations, Realities and Conclusions’, JID, 1, 1 (1989), p. 171.
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particular reference to Ondo S t a t e . I t  is argued that EAADP’s operations amounted 
to a struggle with largely negative macro-economic developments in Nigeria during the 
1980s. Specifically, EAADP’s design was based on Nigeria’s buoyant economic 
circumstances of the mid-1970s and could not be adjusted to worsening conditions in the 
1980s. Like other enclave projects, EAADP’s structures had been concluded with 
Nigeria’s military administration, leaving civilian politicians with a bequest they would 
have loved to re-design but for the possible political costs. To project its own political 
identity and reward local supporters, the Ondo State Government (ODSG) promoted 
opticoms (i.e. optimal communities), an improved version of the 1960s farm settlement 
scheme. The implied competition between opticoms and EAADP easily left the latter with 
little financial or policy support by the state government. The analytical strategy therefore 
is to combine low level description and analysis of results published by the projects 
themselves or by other agencies with historical records as well as farmers’ views on 
project-specific and wider issues regarding the nature and impact of state presence in 
rural Ondo State.
1.4 A Note on Sources of Data
The data base for this study comprises primary and secondary sources. Major primary 
sources are archival material, village survey and interview data obtained during two field 
trips to Nigeria between November 1991 and July 1992, and September/October 1992. 
My search at the National Archives, Ibadan, related mainly to post-colonial files, 
correspondence, and reports of ministries, departments and extra-departmental bodies 
concerned with policy shifts between food and cocoa-growing, the organisation of 
production and farmers’ groups. Unpublished material (especially theses) based at the 
Obafemi Awolowo University, lle-lfe, the University of Ibadan, and the Federal 
University of Technology, Akure, were explored.
A questionnaire-based survey was conducted in Ayede and three neighbouring villages
Gavin Williams, ‘Agriculture in Nigeria, 1979’, in his State and Society in Nigeria (Idanre, 1980), 
p. 158. Cf. H. Bienen, ‘Oil Revenue and Policy Choice in Nigeria’, World Bank Staff Working Papers N® 
592 (Washington, 1983); reprinted in his Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria (1985), pp. 
8-63.
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in north-eastern Ondo State, within what was Ekiti-Akoko project area. Ayede was 
founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Esubiyi, a former soldier-slave who 
became prominent in the military campaigns of the time.^^* Ilafon and Imojo started as 
outposts of Ishan and Itaji respectively, older villages which also featured in the same 
campaigns.Ayede had an estimated population of 13,300 in 1963, while Imojo and 
Ilafon’s populations were estimated at 450 and 837 respectively. Igede started as a 
government farm settlement in the late 1960s and had 22 settlers at some point. Only 
two of the founding settlers were still resident by 1992, one year after Igede formally 
became a village with the appointment of a local settler as Baale (chief) by the local 
council. In short, Ilafon and Imojo are small villages by present-day standards, but 
they do represent the long tradition of economic and political adaptation in northern 
Yoruba country. Ayede is less typical of settlements in the area by virtue of its recent and 
distinctive origins, while Igede has been at the cutting edge of modem farming, a shining 
example, as it were, of the problems and prospects of modem agriculture in a peasant 
society. The survey sample is therefore untypical of the project area, but the farmers’ 
interviews (described below) indicate the range of responses from a variety of farmers 
in each village, and in Ayede, each Àdûgbd (precinct) and include richer, middle and 
poorer farmers. Together, all four villages present interesting historical and analytical 
possibilities well beyond the present study’s immediate requirements.
My survey questions cover the whole range of activities engaged in by small-scale 
farmers. Information was elicited on respondents’ social-technical conditions, cropping 
patterns, and access to credit as well as project and non-project extension. Respondents
Daniel May, ‘Journey in the Yoruba and Nupe Countries in 1858’, JRGS, 30 (1860), p. 225; A. 
C. C. Sway ne, ‘Intelligence Report on the Ayede District, Ekiti Division, Ondo Province’, CSG 26/31014, 
NAI., p. 5.
N. A. C. Weir, ‘Intelligence Report on Itaji District, Ekiti Division, Ondo Province’, CSO 
26/29800, NAI., p. 2.
‘20 Federal Census Office, ‘Population of Nigeria: Combined National Figures, Vol III’, (Lagos, 1963), 
pp. 31-55.
ODS, Digest o f Agricultural Statistics, 1976 (Akure, n.d.), p. 35.
Interview with the founding settlers, Amos Akinyemi and Julius Ayegbusi, 15 April 1992.
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were also encouraged to express opinions on government programmes in agriculture and 
rural development and indicate those issues or problems on which they required 
assistance. Farmer interviews were conducted in the vernacular by me and two assistants 
while informal discussions were handled by me, in some cases in a mixture of vernacular 
and English. One of my research assistants was a university graduate while the other was 
a third-year undergraduate. Both were recruited partly because they knew the survey area 
very well (one had just completed an assignment as an enumeration officer in the 1991 
census); were able to employ their contacts with traditional chiefs or prominent farmers 
in the villages to good advantage; and had no problems translating farmers’ viewpoints 
to English and vice versa.
The questions (see Appendix) are similar to those in the baseline survey of the project 
area by Nigeria’s Agricultural Projects Monitoring, Evaluation, and Planning Unit 
(APMEPU). This was to facilitate comparison between APMEPU s findings and my own 
smaller-scale survey returns and to enable me draw inferences with wider empirical 
bases. Unfortunately, ODSADEP’s monitoring and evaluation unit had not processed its 
raw data by my last visit to Nigeria in October 1992. I hope to be able to explore this 
wider analytical lead in future.
Another constraint on the survey’s outcome emerged from the refusal of interviews by 
many potential female respondents. Most of the women concerned admitted to having 
cultivated separate food farms; but they insisted, nonetheless, that their husbands or 
respective household heads would sufficiently represent their views. It is not clear if this 
was because all interviewers were male, or indeed whether the inclusion in the interview 
team of at least one female research assistant could have generated different responses 
from women. There were no religious reasons, however: muslims constitute probably less 
than 5% of the total population of the survey villages. The most probable reason was, 
therefore, cultural: gender-related considerations that males generally, and household 
heads in particular, could and should speak for the entire household on the one hand; and 
more widespread viewpoints discouraging the open discussion of personal socio-economic
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attributes on the o t h e r A s  I shall show in chapter 2, the latter has been, and remains, 
a major consideration in the debate about the reliability of Nigeria’s official censuses and 
surveys, including agricultural surveys.
The strategy adopted for the present study was to interview as many household heads or 
residents as cooperated in all cases. This yielded 164 respondents, comprising 92% male 
and only 8% female. Twenty-five respondents (or 15.2% of total) came from Ilafon, 18 
(11%) from Imojo, and 13 (7.9%) from Igede. Ayede’s 108 respondents (65.9% of the 
total) reflect its relative population in the area. The total number of formal respondents 
could have increased by 20-30% if women had agreed to be interviewed. Their refusal 
is likely to have weighed on responses concerning enterprise combinations, the use of 
wage labour, and access to extension. But it highlights continuing difficulties with 
conceptualisations of the household and the individual’s place in it in rural Ondo 
State.
Popular perceptions of the state as a distributor of welfare, to which reference has been 
made, were reflected in respondents’ requests during the survey. At Ayede, one farmer 
insisted that his address be noted on the questionnaire. In his estimation, the survey 
heralded a probable distribution to farmers of free fertilizer or other inputs and it was 
only proper that his share was not diverted or hijacked by someone else. The issue of 
personal benefit to my survey respondents came up recurrently at Ilafon and Imojo, 
where respondents insisted that particular views be put on record, perhaps in the belief 
that such views could improve their chance of benefiting from pay-offs occasioned by, 
or deriving from, the survey.
The situation at Igede differed slightly. Unlike in other locations, respondents requested 
immediate assistance on the formation of a cooperative society in the village. I liaised 
with the local cooperative union and nearly succeeded in pulling off an exploratory
The socio-political origins of Nigeria’s statistical problem are discussed in S. A. Aluko, ‘How Many 
Nigerians: An Analysis of Nigeria’s Census Problems, 1901-63’, JMAS, 3, 3 (1965), pp. 371-392.
See Eleanor Fapobunda, ‘The Nuclear Household Model in Nigerian Public and Private Sector 
Policy: Colonial Legacy and Socio-Political Implications’, DaC, 18, 2 (1987), pp. 281-294.
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meeting with settlers. These requests most certainly resulted from a misconception of the 
research process and could have encouraged reaction formation by respondents, but they 
also indicate the lack of effective interest-articulation structures at the local level. I have 
endeavoured to control for reaction formation in two distinct ways. First, extensive 
informal discussions were held with farmers within and outside the project area to cross­
check formal respondents’ claims with wider experiences. Secondly, my field data have 
been reported and analyzed alongside existing government and/or independent 
information. Both measures have helped to prevent dramatic inferences being drawn on 
the bases of respondents’ exaggerated claims.
Interviews with state functionaries, former and serving project officials, and officers of 
farmers’ bodies constitute the final element of my primary sources. At the Ministry of 
Agriculture, my principal sources included a former Commissioner (i.e. political head), 
the Director of Agricultural Services who also served as EAADP’s Project Manager after 
1984, the Director of Produce Services, and Assistant Directors. At ODSADBP, I held 
formal and informal discussions with the directing staff at the Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Unit, with the Chief Extension Officer, and the Chief Administrative Officer. 
I also spoke to a large number of intermediate and village-level extension officers at 
Akure and at two fortnightly meetings of extension staff at Owo and Ikole in early 1992. 
Issues discussed at these meetings included farmers’ concerns about ODSADEP’s 
packages, the administration of its programmes, career prospects for staff seconded to 
the project from the Ministry of Agriculture, and general staff welfare questions.
At the Cooperative Societies Division, I interviewed the Director of Cooperative 
Services, three Deputy Directors (including the Principal of the Training Institute), and 
three Assistant Directors. Relatively non-governmental perspectives were provided by 
sources in the Ondo State Cooperative Federation, the Cocoa Association of Nigeria, and 
the Ondo State Farmers’ Congress. Among other things, these interviews have suggested 
interesting contrasts in official perceptions of operational and policy problems between 
agencies responsible for agriculture and rural development in Ondo State, but the details
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are not explored in subsequent chapters. 125
Three categories of official documents were consulted. The first comprised publications 
of international development institutions, especially the World Bank. Some of these 
examine the Bank’s experiences across the board, while others focus on region or 
country-specific issues, or on regional differences within a single country like Nigeria. 
The second group comprised published and unpublished policy papers; internal 
memoranda; rural surveys, and evaluation reports issued by federal, regional, and state 
governments and/or agencies within Nigeria, as the case might be. These provided 
essential back-up for the analysis of historical and policy contexts in Part II of the study. 
Finally, specific reports and documents issued by the projects themselves, or by other 
agencies, provided a sharper focus on EAADP and ODSADEP’s operations.
The third and final category of documents was crucial to the analysis, in part because 
most of the documents are not published in the strict sense of that word, in part because 
they addressed on-going issues yet to be assessed with the full benefit of hindsight, and 
above all because there are as yet no independent sources against which they could be 
cross-checked. Of course, the reliability of information obtained from project documents 
might be open to question. As noted above, however, this is also true of data published 
by most government or quasi-govemment agencies in Nigeria and elsewhere. But the 
research process affords a nearly indefinite opportunity for review; hence, it should be 
possible in future to compare project data analyzed in this study with wider information 
as and when they become available.
Finally, a wide range of secondary sources were consulted. These include published 
articles in journals and edited collections in UK-based libraries, especially the London 
School of Economics, School of African and Oriental Studies, the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, Birkbeck College, and the University of London’s Senate House 
library. These were combined with published material collected during my fieldwork. The
See Olufemi A. Akinola, ‘The Politics of Farmer Organisation in Ondo State, Southwestern Nigeria 
in the 1980s’, paper presented at the International Conference on Cocoa and Economic Development in the 
19th and 20th Centuries, London, September 1993.
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scope of the secondary sources reflects research interest in rural Western Nigeria before 
the oil boom as well as the near-universal applicability of some of the questions addressed 
in the study. Information was obtained by manual and electronic methods in all cases. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods were also applied to all data, the particular mix in 
each case being a function of its nature and the question(s) being addressed.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the study contains eight chapters organised in two parts. Part II comprises two 
background chapters while Part III examines project and policy outcomes in six chapters, 
including the conclusion. Each chapter discusses a specific analytical or empirical theme, 
introduces relevant historical research, and locates this study within the existing literature. 
This results in overlapping citations but makes for simpler structuring of the evidence as 
well as analysis.
Chapter 2 discusses Tate development’ in Ondo State in terms of the cocoa-food 
imbalance and policy responses to it up to the 1970s. The chapter’s argument is that 
Ondo’s farmers have provided productive resources to urban centres both before and after 
formal colonialism, and that policy responses to the food-export crop imbalance had 
encouraged more of the same urban-inclined strategies. Chapter 3 evaluates the 
constitutive and regulative environment of World Bank presence in Ondo State in the 
1980s.
Part III offers a detailed analysis of the outcomes of EAADP and ODSADEP’s operations 
and of wider agricultural policy in Ondo State since the 1980s. Chapter 4 discusses 
infrastructure development, regarded variously as a prerequisite for rural development 
and as necessary justification for the ‘integrated’ nature of ADP programmes. Chapter 
5 provides a detailed account of traditional, small-farmer agronomy in the Ekiti-Akoko 
area and highlights elements of syncretism between traditional and modem cultural 
practices. Chapter 6 examines agricultural extension in EAADP and ODSADEP against 
the background of ‘competing rationality’ between the projects and their beneficiaries. 
Chapter 7 assesses food-crop and livestock production and the poor response to EAADP’s 
version of the seed-fertilizer revolution. Project-induced farm mechanisation, defined to
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include simple labour-saving devices, is evaluated in chapter 8. In conclusion, chapter 
9 discusses the implications of the study for policy and research on agriculture and rural 
development in Africa and beyond.
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Chapter 2 
The Commercial Transition and Cocoa-Food Imbalance 
in Western Nigeria, to the 1970s
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses some of the intra-regional dimensions of the commercial transition 
in Western Nigeria from c. 1870s to the 1970s. The commercial transition is conceived 
here not in terms of ‘peasantization’, the change from subsistence to market-based 
exchange.^ The foundations of a peasant agricultural economy had been established in 
Yoruba country by the 1850s.^ ‘Internal exchange economies' /  or markets limited as 
much by low-level functional specialisation as by the physical distance between towns and 
villages and the lack of vehicular transport, have existed for much longer, according to 
anthropological and missionary accounts.'^ The transition is conceived, therefore, in 
terms of the shift from production for internal exchange to production mainly for export, 
especially of farm produce with very little, if any, consumption value to the producing 
families.
Two main themes of the commercial transition have been emphasised in the literature on 
southwestern Nigeria. The first is the change from the slave mode of production to 
commodity production, a change prompted as much by the technical and cost advantages 
of small over large-scale oil-palm production as by aggressive British intervention in
' For a theoretic-analytic framework, see Ken Post, ‘"Peasantization" and Rural Political Movements 
in Western Africa’, European Journal o f Sociology, XIII, 2 (1972), pp. 223-254.
 ^S. A. Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria 1850-1910’, in I. A. Akinjogbin and S. O. 
Osoba (eds.). Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History (Ile-Ife, 1980), pp. 131-132.
 ^ Darryl Forde, ‘The Native Economies’, in Forde and R. Scott, The Native Economies o f Nigeria 
(1946), p. 32.
 ^E.g., Daniel May, ‘Journey in the Yoruba and Nupe Countries in 1858’, JRGS, 30 (1860), p. 213; 
cf. Akin L. Mabogunje and M. B. Cleave, ‘Changing Agricultural Landscape in Southern Nigeria: The 
Example of Egba Division, 1850-1950’, NGJ, 7, 1 (1964), pp. 1-15. On the organisation of trade in the 
19th century, see Toyin Falola, ‘The Yoruba Caravan System of the Nineteenth Century’, UAHS, 24, 1 
(1991), pp. 111-132.
35
Yoruba society from the 1880s/ As Clarke observed,
...the colonial invasion [of Yoruba country] seems to have been precipitated by a 
combination of military and commercial concerns. Merchants wished to maintain profit 
levels and reduce prices by removing what they regarded as illegitimate, politically 
imposed costs. The concern of the merchants was not so much with large scale slave 
production, but with the costs added after production by tolls and transport. They were 
concerned more to eliminate the toll-gate and the African middle-man than to encourage 
the development of a category of small-scale commodity producers.®
The second theme is the advent and growth of cocoa production, initially in Agege, near 
Lagos, and subsequently in Ibadan, Ife, Ilesha, and Ondo from the 1870s.^ Unlike small- 
scale oil-palm production where farmers colonised wild palm trees scattered over Yoruba 
forests, cocoa farms had to be started from the scratch, requiring considerable social- 
institutional and strategic changes in the local economy.® According to Sara Berry,
[t]he establishment of a new cocoa farm requires the expenditure of resources on clearing 
land, planting young trees, and maintaining them for seven years or more before the farm 
yields enough to cover annual maintenance costs. Although little physical capital 
equipment is required for cocoa cultivation, the farmer must provide working capital- 
either to maintain himself and his dependants while they are establishing the farm, or to 
hire labourers. During the first two or three years food crops may be grown among the 
young cocoa trees, but once the canopy forms, the farm is too shady for food crops. 
Thus, for the latter part of the maturation period the farmer cannot even derive foodstuffs 
from the young cocoa farm, but must find alternative means to satisfy his subsistence 
requirements as well as other consumption needs. Moreover, in so far as labour must be 
bid away from alternative uses, the costs of employing it in cocoa cultivation are not
® Compare A. G. Hopkins, ‘Economic Imperialism in West Africa: Lagos, 1889-92’, EHR, 2nd ser. 
XXI, 3 (1968), pp. 580-606; with J. F. A. Ajayi and R. A. Austen, ‘Hopkins on Economic Imperialism 
in West Africa’, EHR, 2nd ser., XXV, 3 (1972), pp. 303-306. For a recent and wider review of the 
literature, see Robin Law, ‘The Historiography of the Commercial Transition in Nineteenth-Century West 
Africa’, in Toyin Falola (ed.), African Historiography (1993), pp. 91-115.
® Robert J. Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production in a Rural Yoruba Community’, Ph D thesis. University 
of London (1979), p. 91. On tolls in 19th century Yoruba trade, see Toyin Falola, ‘The Yoruba Toll 
System: its Operation and Abolition’, JAH, 30 (1989), pp. 69-88.
 ^Sara Berry, ‘Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa-Growing in Ibadan and Ondo’, JHSN, IV, 3 (1968), 
pp. 439-451; and Cocoa, Customs, and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford, 1975), 
pp. 37-53.
* Sara Berry, ‘The Concept of Innovation and the History of Cocoa Farming in Western Nigeria’, JAH, 
XV, 1 (1974), pp. 83-95; A. G. Hopkins, ‘Innovation in a (Colonial Economy: African Origins of Nigerian 
Cocoa-Farming Industry, 1880-1920’, in C. Dewey and Hopkins (eds.). The Imperial Impact (1978), pp. 
83-96.
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negligible.’
In short, cocoa-growing has been a veritable example of autonomous peasant response 
to external market opportunities. Historical and economic research has been nationally 
or regionally oriented, emphasising trade with the global market, or at the local level, 
linkages between cocoa and economic affluence,“ institutional adaptation, and 
government finance. In the 1930s and 1940s, cocoa provided ‘the cash income [that] 
was perhaps the most important source of demand for locally produced goods and 
services, and also for imported g o o d s . . . T h e  crop also accounted for between 23% 
and 47% of the regional government’s revenue and up to 61% of total finances in the 
1950s and 1960s. Eclipsed by the post-1945 self-defeating fiscal regime which 
culminated in the Àgbékoyà riots in the late 1960s^  ^ and by oil rents in the 1970s, 
cocoa’s income value has been restored since the advent in 1986 of structural adjustment 
policies.Litt le wonder that cocoa is described locally in venerable terms as Olôjà 
gbogbo igi rôko, ‘the most chiefly of all trees’ or, more precisely, the most economically
’ Berry, Cocoa, p. 6.
For example, R. O. Ekundare, An Economic History o f Nigeria 1860-1960 (1973).
" R. Galletti, K. D. S. Baldwin and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers (1956).
Berry, Cocoa, chps. Ill and IV; summarised in ‘Migrant Farmers and Land Tenure in the Nigerian 
Cocoa Belt’, in Onigu Otite and Christine Okali (eds.). Readings in Nigerian Rural Society and Rural 
Economy (Ibadan, 1990), pp. 85-100; Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production’, chp. 5.
G. K. Helleiner, ‘The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigeria’s Economic Development’, EcJ, 
LXXIV, 295 (1964), pp. 582-610; H. M. Onitiri and Dupe Olatunbosun (eds.). The Marketing Board 
System (Ibadan, 1974).
Jan-Georg Deutsch, ‘Educating the Middlemen: A Political and Economic History of Statutory Cocoa 
Marketing in Nigeria, 1936-1947’, Ph.D thesis. University of London (1991), pp. 15-16.
O. Olakanpo and O. Teriba, ‘Fiscal, Monetary and Investment Implications of the Marketing 
Boards’, in Onitiri and Olatunbosun, Marketing Board, pp. 185-186.
C. E. F. Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria (Ibadan, 1976); Gavin Williams 
and Beer, ‘The Politics of the Ibadan Peasantry’, in Williams (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and Society (1976), 
pp. 135-158.
Paul Dorosh and Bola Akanji, ‘Impacts of Exchange Rate Changes on the Cocoa-Food Crop Farming 
Systems of Southwest Nigeria’, mimeo (Ibadan, 1988); and Akanji, Cocoa Marketing Under Nigeria’s 
Structural Adjustment Programme, NISER Monograph Series N® 1 (1992).
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valuable tree crop as yet.
The above has however encouraged a relative neglect of cocoa’s backwash effects on food 
crop production, or on producing communities generally. As long-term investments, 
cocoa farms have tended to acquire a life-world of their own. Specifically, they have 
given rise to enduring and supra-individual social and institutional processes which have 
in turn diminished the scope of the individual’s ‘autonomous’ choice, reduced the 
available options, or presented individuals with difait accompli. Thus a short-term decline 
in farmers’ terms of trade may not necessarily serve as a disincentive to increase the rate 
of new plantings or other investment on cocoa farms. To quote Berry again.
the rate of new cocoa plantings sometimes rose in periods of declining farmers’ terms of 
trade. This happened both because farmers were able to mobilize resources for 
agricultural investment through non-market mechanisms, and also because cocoa trees 
have such a long life that relatively short-run changes in market conditions probably do 
not exert a decisive influence on farmers’ expectations of lifetime earnings from cocoa 
farms.*®
What follows examines the impact of cocoa-induced economic expectations on Western 
Nigeria’s food economies up to the 1970s, focusing on Ondo State as part of the 
analytical specification of ‘late development’ in the state, and as a historical and policy 
backdrop to the advent of Ekiti-Akoko ADP. It is argued that ‘the growing demand for 
money and the belief that no food grower can make as much as the cocoa farmer’ have 
since the 1930s turned Ondo State into one of Nigeria’s ‘rural districts that [have] 
depend[ed] on other rural districts for a considerable part of their basic food 
requirements’ Two specific tasks are attempted. The first is to show how farmers in 
the state have sought ‘quick returns’ by allocating more land to cocoa than to food 
production. Such shift of resources, it is shown, has been more pronounced in Ekiti and 
Akoko areas, where a mixture of guinea and derived savanna conditions make land more
** Berry, Cocoa, p. 204.
Forde, ‘Native Economies’, p. 87.
“  Reuben Udo, ‘Food-Deficit Areas of Nigeria’, GR, 61, 3 (1971), p. 415; Memorandum 2758/D A/6A 
of 16 May 1938, CSO/2614/34177, NAI, p. 2.
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suitable for food farming, than in Ondo Division, with a forest vegetation most 
appropriate for cocoa cultivation. The second is to describe how, on the one hand, policy 
responses to the food-cocoa imbalance in the 1930s and 1940s were scuttled by in­
fighting and inertia in the colonial agricultural bureaucracy; and on the other, how 
official support for cocoa-growing between the 1950s and the 1970s virtually precluded 
concern for food crops, setting the stage for Nigeria’s food crisis of the 1980s.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to specify the nature and analytical implications of the 
evidence presented below. As noted previously, present-day Ondo State did not become 
a policy-making unit until 1976. Notwithstanding the steady increase in the local flavour 
of policy since the 1950s, the state had no direct control over policy for nearly all of the 
period covered by this chapter. The policy response of the 1930s and 1940s was 
formulated while colonial Nigeria was administered as two groups of provinces, north 
and south. In turn, policy initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s were those of the first 
indigenous government of post-colonial Western Region. As a result, food production 
policy had addressed Ondo State’s specific circumstances less directly than it could 
presumably be. The urban inclination of policy in both cases was also unmistakable, an 
inclination that became more explicit in the wake of government-led development in the 
1950s and 1960s.
One of the far-reaching effects of that inclination has been the lack of official interest in 
the food sub-sector. Unlike cocoa and other internationally tradeable crops, such as oil- 
palm, there has been a near-total absence of data on the size of the state’s food crop 
output during and after the colonial period. Hence the data to be presented below relate 
more to cocoa than to food crops and in most cases to the 1930s and 1940s than to more 
recent times. The impact of cocoa-growing on food production, including food imports 
from neighbouring areas, shall be inferred - directly from data on cropped areas (and 
therefore labour use) up to the 1940s, and thereafter from relatively general survey data.
Finally, as indicated earlier, Nigerian government statistics lack general credibility. In 
particular, official farm size and output survey data are widely regarded as poor 
indicators of rural realities. This problem derives partly from a historically-determined
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perception of the state in Nigeria as a predatory institution, and social surveys as essential 
elements of the state’s tax and fiscal imperatives; and partly from deeper cultural controls 
on the disclosure of information about the individual’s well-being, size of family, or 
number of offspring. In 1931, for example, a senior administrative officer ‘of long 
experience in the Eastern Provinces’ commented as follows;
[i]t is contrary to all usage to ask a man or woman to state the number of children bom 
to them or the number of their livestock.. .There can be little doubt that for a man to give 
a tmthful reply to such questions...is a challenge to Providence. The envious deities or 
spirits will hear the reply given and will seek to deprive those rash enough to boast of 
what is most precious to them.^*
The above remarks could have been written about Western Nigeria, or any other part of 
Nigeria for that matter, in 1931 or perhaps now.^  ^ The point, however, is that they 
depict clearly prevailing attitudes to social-demographic inquiries, including social 
research surveys, explaining, at least in part, why Nigerians have often provided false 
responses to survey questions on farm size, output, income, etc. Government agencies 
have most probably adopted more rigorous field measurement and interview procedures 
since the 1950s, as Agboola has no ted .B u t complex tenurial arrangements have meant 
that the same cocoa farm (but not food farm) could be owned by more than one farmer - 
an indication of local perceptions of property rights in cocoa land.^ ^^  Survey estimates 
have been shown also to include ‘abandoned or immature [cocoa] acreage’ or ignore 
cases where the same individual owned cocoa land in different villages.^ Reaction 
formation among respondents, in the form of under or over-reporting of key variables 
(e.g. land holdings) according to individual expectations of advantage, including possible
‘Memorandum’, attached as Appendix 1 to H. B. Cox, Census o f the Southern Provinces (1932), p.
16.
“  See, e.g., S. A. Aluko, ‘How Many Nigerians: An Analysis of Nigeria’s Census Problems, 1901- 
63’, JMAS, 3, 3 (1965), pp. 371-392.
S. A. Agboola, ‘The Collection of Agricultural Statistics in Nigeria: The Example of the Agricultural 
Censuses, 1960-65’, NAJ, 2, 2 (1965), pp. 53-60; snàhxs An Agricultural Atlas o f Nigeria (Oxford, 1979),
pp. 1-6.
Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, pp. 148-149.
“  C. W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure in Ondo Province (Lagos, 1952), p. 72.
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tax uses of respective surveys, has not necessarily subsided. Above all, pressure has 
apparently mounted on officials to justify their positions by presenting to relevant publics 
evidence of ‘progress’ on their respective departmental functions. In short, the existence 
of multiple, irreconcilable agricultural data sets, to which Mosley referred most 
recently ,m ay well indicate the depth of the problem as much as civil servants’ desire 
to get by. Hence, information from agricultural surveys, including those on export crops, 
need to be interpreted with utmost circumspection. The approach here shall be to indicate 
the limitations on each data set (or table) in so far as those limitations have a bearing on 
inferences from the data and on the general argument pursued here, namely, that Ondo 
State has depended on ‘imported’ foodstuff during the hungry season, in spite of its 
remarkable agrarian endowment.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three main sections. Section two describes 
Ondo State’s agrarian economy in some detail, examining the differential allocation of 
land, and by implication, labour, between cocoa and food production in the 1920s and 
1930s. Section three examines how a presumably sincere attempt in the 1930s to redress 
the cocoa-food imbalance was overwhelmed by jurisdictional squabbles in Nigeria’s 
colonial administration. Since government’s romance with the fiscal benefits of cocoa 
cultivation in the 1950s and 1960s is well researched, section four only summarises 
elements of the anti-food bias in Western Nigeria’s agricultural development schemes of 
that period. Finally, section five concludes the analysis.
2.2 Food or Cocoa? Agricultural Production Patterns
Ondo State is a classic example of a peasant-dominated agrarian economy. According to 
the 1931 census, agriculture was the ‘principal occupation’ of 71% of the labour force, 
with an additional 1% making a living as pastoralists. Only one-fifth (19.4%) of the 
labour force was employed as craftsmen while 2.3% was engaged in trade and 
com m erce.W ith about 111,000 persons cultivating 580.3 square miles out of the
Paul Mosley, ‘Policy-Making Without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment 
Policies in Nigeria, 1986-1990’, AA, 91 (1992), pp. 227-240.
^  H. B. Cox, Census of Nigeria, 1931 Vol. Ill, (1932), Table 9(1), p. 34.
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province’s 8,211 square miles of land, up to three-quarters of the working population was 
engaged on less than one-tenth of cultivable land in 1931. As recently as 1975, 79% of 
the state’s rural population earned a living in agriculture while an estimated 28% of its 
total land area was farmed.
Average holding per cultivator has been and remains small. The 1931 census data suggest 
3.38 acres (1.4 ha.) per capita for the province, but this is likely to have been overstated. 
Subsequent surveys at regional and local levels have shown that farmers have often 
cultivated fragmented plots totalling between 0.40 ha. and 2.0 ha. each. According to a 
survey of tenurial practices conducted in 1965/66 through 1967/68, average holding per 
household stood at 1.1 acres (0.45 ha.) in Western State in 1965/66 and in 1966/67, 
declining to 1.0 acre (0.4 ha.) in 1967/68.^^ By 1980/81, about 89,000 farming 
households in Ondo State reported close to 150,000 farms totalling 74,000 ha. of 
cultivated land or 0.82 ha. per household. But the average number of farms per 
household declined slightly from two in 1965-68 to 1.66 in 1980/81.^® These statistical 
inferences may or may not reflect changes in the scope of the surveys or their sample 
sizes, but they do suggest that average farm sizes have been small.
More specific data on Ondo State support the view that farm holdings have tended to be 
small and fragmented, and that farmland has averaged 1.0 ha. per capita. A survey of 
360 farmers (fifteen in each of 24 villages) in Ondo State in 1976 suggest that only 1.2% 
of an estimated 256,000 food crop growers held between 2.0 ha. and 4.0 ha. on average. 
The corresponding figures were 7.1% and 10.5% for tree crop farmers and mixed crop 
growers respectively. Expressed in relation to the total estimated number of farmers, this 
means that only 3.5% of the state’s farmers (n= 349,000 in 1976) held 2.0 ha. and above 
either as sole or mixed crop growers. About half (47%) of the remaining farmers held
WSN, Report o f Agricultural Survey in the Western State o f Nigeria 1975 (Ibadan, 1976), p. 3; p.
18.
The surveys, conducted in 34 Western Nigerian villages, involved 1,020 households in 1965/66, 
1,080 in 1966/67, and 540 in 1967/68. Nigeria, Rural Economic Survey o f Nigeria: Consolidated Report 
of the Land Tenure Inquiries, 1965/66, 1966/67 and 1967/68 (Lagos, 1972), p. 7.
^  Nigeria, Report o f Rural Agricultural Sample Survey 1980/81 (Lagos, 1983), p. 20.
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0.40-2.00 ha.; 32% held 0.20-0.40 ha., while 17% cultivated 0.2 ha. and below. 
Together, the estimated 349,000 farmers cultivated about 185,000 ha. or 0.53 ha. each 
in 1976.^'
Many of these findings have been supported by a more extensive survey in 1978 of 
respondents from 48 villages, three from each of the state’s 17 local government areas 
then e x is tin g .A  weighted distribution of farmers by farm size and crop patterns, 
computed from the 1978 survey returns, has suggested that the modal farm size has been 
between 0.4 ha. and 2.0 ha. per capita; that average holdings are likely to be larger 
among tree crop growers than among food crop producers; and above all, that the 
average farmer is more likely to be a mixed crop farmer than a sole crop producer (Table 
2 . 1).
Table 2.1
Distribution of Ondo State’s Farmers, 1978 (by Farm Size and Crop Pattern)
Farm size (ha.) N® of farmers % distribution
Food crops only Tree crops only Mixed crops
Under 0.10 22,604 7.8 _
0.10-0.20 49,823 16.8 3.6 0.3
0.20 - 0.40 95,118 31.1 19.5 1.0
0.40 - 2.00 209,590 38.7 65.8 97.0
2.00 - 4.00 12,972 3.6 9.0 1.1
4.00 - 6.00 6,838 2.0 2.1 0.6
Total 396,945 100.0 100.0 100.0
Computed from: CDS, Rural Economic Survey 1978 (Akure, n.d.), Table 5.
In fact, the state’s farmers produce a variety of arable and tree crops but are better 
known to the outside world as cocoa-growers. Of the major food crops grown in the area, 
some varieties of yams are believed to be indigenous to West A fr ic a .In  turn, maize 
is believed to have been introduced through contacts with the Portuguese from about the
ODS, Rural Economic Survey 1976 (Akure, n.d.), various tables.
ODS, Report on Rural Economic Survey 1978, (Akure, n.d.), p. vi.
S. A. Agboola, ‘Patterns of Food Crop Production in South-Western Nigeria’, NGJ, 11,2 (1968), 
pp. 136-137; Mabogunje and Cleave, ‘Agricultural Landscape’, p. 5.
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fifteenth century, while rice and cassava were added to the indigenous crop system in 
early or mid-nineteenth century.Subsidiary crops like pepper, okra, and vegetables 
are also cultivated in varying intensities and combinations according to ecological 
conditions in different parts of the state.
Still, the most important food crop in the state has been yam, the main ingredient for 
making lyân (pounded yam). In 1978, about three-quarters of the state’s food crop 
farmers were engaged in yam cultivation; some 302,000 farmers (of all categories) also 
reported an estimated 82,450 ha. of land under yams (Table 2.2). By contrast, an 
estimated 99,500 ha. of cocoa was reported by 127,000 farmers in 1978. The figures 
suggest an average holding per farmer of 0.27 ha. for yams and 0.78 ha. for cocoa, and 
may very well reflect different production possibilities and economies of scale as of 1978. 
But they also point up one endemic legacy of the commercial transition in Ondo State, 
namely, the expansion of cocoa acreage at the expense of food production.
Table 2.2
Estimated Cropped Land per Farmer in Ondo State, 1978 (by Crop Type)
Crops N® of farmers' Total cropped 
land (ha.)
Cropped land per 
farmer (ha.)
Food Crops
Yam 301,890 82,444 0.27
Maize 178,510 39,634 0.22
Cassava 77,984 32,445 0.42
Rice 65,545 28,254 0.43
Cocoyam 59,966 17,890 0.30
Cash crops
Cocoa 127,015 99,494 0.78
Oil Palm 3,933 2,473 0.63
Rubber 1,348 453 0.34
Kolanut 866 639 0.74
Coffee 736 328 0.45
Note: “Overlapping responses per farmer because of multiple cropping.
Source: Ondo State Statistical Abstract 1978/79 (Akure, 1980), Tables 4,9 and 4,10.
Cocoa was introduced to Nigeria in the 1870s through Femado Po, and experimented
^ S, A. Agboola, ‘The Introduction and Spread of Cassava in Western Nigeria’, NJESS, 10, 3 (1968), 
pp. 369-385; and ‘Agricultural Changes’.
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with in Bonny and Onitsha in eastern Nigeria without success. It was introduced into 
Ondo Province through subsequent and more successful experiments in Agege, Ibadan, 
and possibly Ilesha in the late 18th century or early 19th century. Cocoa-growing has 
been associated with Christian proselytization. Cocoa-farming falls squarely within the 
civilizing mission of 1841, intended to make Nigerians abandon ‘heathenism’ and material 
poverty by growing crops needed in British factories while adopting the Christian way 
of life.^  ^The Church Missionary Society, and latterly the African Church, became part 
of this design by training itinerant preachers to spread the gospel of ‘coffee, cocoa, cotton 
and work as well as the scriptures’^  ^ in the hinterland. Initial difficulties about the 
linkage between spiritual and material rewards were overcome once people began to see 
for themselves the material rewards of cocoa cultivation. Since ‘Christian converts were 
often the first individuals in a community to practice cocoa farming’, their relative 
material comfort helped to persuade the local population to embrace cocoa growing. 
Such Christian converts most certainly included former ‘workers on the Agege plantations 
(who) carried back with them into the interior on their return home knowledge of the new 
cocoa crop and the methods of preparing it for export.
In Ondo Province, cocoa is believed to have been planted first in Okeigbo by ‘a 
hunter...named Kolajo (who) encountered cocoa on a farm near Ilesha.A ccording to 
Berry, Kolajo sought advice from Rev. Charles Phillips who encouraged Kolajo by saying 
that ‘he and his children would never suffer’ if he planted cocoa. Kolajo subsequently 
obtained ‘a few pods from his friend at Ilesha and planted them in his compound at 
Okeigbo. ’ Reverend Phillips was an Anglican clergyman who was himself experimenting 
with cocoa and rice in the 1880s and had advised Christian converts in a village in
C. C. Ifemesia, ‘The Civilizing Mission of 1841: Aspects of an Episode in Anglo-Nigerian 
Relations’, JHSN, 2, 3 (1962), pp. 291-310; J. B. Webster, ‘The Bible and the Plough’, JHSN, 2, 4 
(1963), pp. 418-434.
“  Mojola Agbebi, cited in Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, p. 135.
Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 450.
Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, p. 135.
Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 443.
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January 1895 ‘to take up farm work and manufacture of palm oil and planting of cocoa 
and c o f f e e .A t  this stage however, Ondo farmers were not inclined to cocoa growing, 
partly because of the natural resistance to change, because the pressure to change over 
to export agriculture was still less than overwhelming, or because ‘verbal exhortation is 
not the most effective inducement to innovation.'^  ^ This initial reluctance was less 
prevalent in Okeigbo and Ajebamidele, where some people had planted cocoa in the 
1890s. It is likely that cocoa spread further north of the forest zone at this stage, for it 
had been accepted throughout the province by the turn of the century. Cotton was also 
grown in the province, but only in central and northern parts of Ekiti Division.
The adoption and subsequent expansion of cocoa-growing in Ondo Province has reflected 
general structural factors and specific historical experiences. As part of Western Nigeria’s 
‘land surplus economies’ land supply in Ondo Province has been limitless in relation 
to existing needs and available labour power. As indicated above, less than 10% of the 
province’s land area was cultivated in 1931. In 1955-60, less than 1% of 4,800,000 acres 
covered by a sample survey was classified ‘non-agricultural’; 13% was divided almost 
equally between food and tree crops; 17% was in reserve, while 69% was fallow, 
uncultivated bush or plantations.Increasing urbanisation in western Yorubaland since 
the turn of the century has meant that Ondo State still has more uncultivated land suitable 
for cocoa-growing than any other parts of Western Nigeria in the 1980s.
Labour supply has been more problematic. The household has been and still is the basic 
unit of production, with labour provided mainly by the household head, his wive(s) and 
grown-up children and occasionally by members of the extended family.Household
^  Wid.
Ibid., p. 444.
G. K. Helleiner, ‘Typology in Development Theory: The Land Surplus Economy’, FRIS, 6, 2 
(1966), pp. 181-194.
WSN Statistical Abstract, XII, 1&2 (1970), p. 114.
On difficulties with the conceptualization of the household, see Robert J. Clarke, ‘Households and 
the Political Economy of Small-Scale Cash Crop Production in Southwestern Nigeria’, 51,4 (1981),
pp. 807-823; for wider analysis, see Jane Guyer, ‘Introduction’, DaC, 18, 2 (1987), pp. 197-214.
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labour has been augmented at various times by other modes of labour supply, including 
slave labour, wage labour, and pawnship/^ Slave labour was employed in virtually all 
parts of the province in the nineteenth century. Clarke had noted that Okeigbo, settled 
initially by migrants from Ile-Ife, developed a slave economy concurrently with Ibadan 
in the nineteenth century.Agboola suggested that the use of slave labour was extensive 
in the forest zone (i.e Ondo, Okeigbo and southern Ekiti areas), where the task of 
clearing virgin land was more daunting than in the savannah. Agboola observed also that 
farmlands tended to be larger in the savannah than in forest zone on account of this 
difficulty and of ‘the limited efficacy of iron tools then a v a ila b le .In  the 1870s, civil 
and military chiefs in north-eastern Ekiti country acquired and maintained large slave- 
based households, but these were employed more to support the Ekitiparapo campaign 
than to advance individual economic standing or promote agricultural production 
g en era lly .In  short, slave labour was part of the initial stages of the commercial 
transition in Ondo Province. But the province’s farmers were not to replicate the size or 
structural attributes of Agege’s plantations.
Clearly, Agege plantations derived their unique form and organisation primarily from 
their proprietor’s deep-seated anti-colonial inclination and desire to establish an 
indigenous counterpoint at entrepreneurial and social lev e ls .A s Agboola observed.
the plantation idea was alien to Yoruba agriculture, capital and labour resources at the 
disposal of the majority of farmers were inadequate for large-scale farming, and the 
recognition of risk involved in the adoption of new crops ruled out the cultivation of 
cocoa in anything but small parcels of land belonging to individual farmers.
Cf. Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 450.
^  Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production’, p. 115.
Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, p. 131.
S. A. Akintoye, ‘The Economic Background of the Ekitiparapo 1878-1893’, Odu, 4, 2 (1968), pp. 
45-48; Andrew Apter, Black Critics and Kings (Chicago, 1992), pp. 88-89.
Hopkins, ‘Innovation’.
Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, p. 136.
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Indeed, cocoa cultivation was to be grafted onto existing social and productive structures 
in Ondo Province. According to Berry,
[i]n both Ibadan and Ondo...farmers planted cocoa in small, scattered plots which were 
used simultaneously for food crops. The trees were randomly spaced and close together; 
farmers used traditional tools and methods of organizing labour.^^
At a more specific level, Ondo Province had few internal regenerative economic 
opportunities vis-a-vis its resource endowment in the 19th century. This is partly because 
the province comprised former slave fields and vassal or quasi-tributary states where ‘the 
peaceful but mundane business of economic production’ had been secondary to military 
pursuits for several decades; and partly because its terms of trade were controlled by 
external in terests.P rior to the opening of the Ondo road in the 1870s, commercial 
traffic between Lagos and the hinterland was the near-exclusive preserve of Ijebu and 
Ibadan traders.Ibadan also established a military-imperial presence in Ekiti and Akoko 
areas. This was based on a hierarchy of guardian chiefs {Bàbâkékeré) who ‘levied...a 
proportionate tax...on every house, which [had] to be paid every week, or, at farthest, 
fortnight, to the [local] king, who transmit[ted] it’^ ^^ and were ‘entitled to retain some 
portion of the tribute’ for their personal use.^^
Moreover, some of Ibadan’s local representatives (Ajélè) saw their position as an 
opportunity to accumulate wealth. They often retained a large number of otherwise 
‘jobless people who had to be fed by levying the subjects in the colonies’ and were 
inclined to ‘loot, seize foodstuffs and goods from traders, confiscate property and rob on
Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 444.
Bolanle Awe, ‘Militarism and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Country: The 
Ibadan Example’, JAH, XIV, 1 (1973), p. 74; Apter, Black Critics, pp. 88-89.
Toyin Falola, The Political Economy o f a Pre-Colonial State (Ile-Ife, 1984).
^  May, ‘Journey’, p. 221.
S. A. Akintoye, ‘The Economic Foundations of Ibadan’s Power in the Nineteenth Century’, in 
Akinjogbin and Osoba, Topics, p. 63; cf. Bolanle Awe, ‘The Ajele System- A Study of Ibadan Imperialism 
in the Nineteenth Century’, JHSN, III, 1 (1964), pp. 47-60.
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the highway’ to make up for perceived shortfalls in social provisioning.^^ Ondo itself 
was not subject to Ibadan suzerainty and benefited immensely from its location on the 
trade route between Ife, Ibadan and Benin and between Lagos and Ekiti country through 
Ilaje and Ikale and coastal Ijebu countries. But Ondo fought its own local territorial 
battles against neighbouring Okeigbo and Okitipupa to the south; its relative neutrality 
in the Ekitiparapo war also gave Ibadan access to Benin’s ports for imported arms.^  ^ In 
short, Ondo Province experienced what may be called ‘arrested development’ through 
economic transfers occasioned by Ibadan’s ‘colossal, and often irresponsible demands’ 
for men and foodstuffs in times of war and peace alike^* and by the domination of its 
trade by external interests.
The nature of the province’s incipient commercialism was indicated soon after the 
opening of the Ondo road. The increased trade stimulated by the new road had created 
an alternative use for available labour, namely, to convey commodities (i.e. oil palm and 
hand-woven clothes as well as imported manufactures) overland from the Ilaje creeks. 
The enlarged demand was met, however, by increased slave raiding in the hinterland and 
by withdrawing labour from more traditional uses - in short, by transferring labour from 
production to commerce just as opportunities in export agriculture were emerging.^ In 
1939, Captain Wann noted that traders in Ondo town were resented by their neighbours 
for their get-rich quick m entality ,an  early example of directly unproductive activities 
typical of Nigeria’s macro-economic practice since the 1970s.
Falola, Political Economy, p. 149.
Akintoye, ‘Economic Foundations’, p. 64.
Ibid.', Falola, Political Economy, pp. 148-150.
Cf. Akin Mabogunje and Paul Richards, ‘Land and People - Models of Spatial and Ecological 
Processes in West African History’, in Jacob Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.). History o f West Africa 
(3rd. ed, 1985), p. 43.
“  S. A. Akintoye, ‘The Ondo Road Eastwards of Lagos c. 1870-95’, JAH, X, 4 (1969), pp. 587-588.
J. Wann, ‘Travel in Ondo Province’, Nigeria, 18, 1939.
“  See editor, ‘Nigeria: A Political Economy’, in Gavin Williams (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and Society 
(1976), p. 13.
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Partly because of the renewed violence in Ondo Province in the late nineteenth century, 
the expansion of cocoa-growing in the province had to await the large army of ex-soldiers 
and ex-slaves whose military careers had been ended by the cessation of intra-Yoruba 
hostilities and by active British intervention in Yoruba society in the 1890s. These and 
others ‘who found themselves without any occupation after 1893’® either turned to 
‘collecting and selling wild rubber which was available in abundance in Ondo forests’^  
or left their villages in search of employment in construction sites in and around Lagos. 
Some of those in the latter category came in contact with the Agege experiment and 
returned home to establish their own cocoa farms.®
Cocoa-growing became a major agricultural endeavour in the province during the 
1920s.® Output from Ondo Division also became large enough to attract outside 
attention. In 1927, Ondo growers obtained two prizes at an exhibition in Calabar;® two 
trading companies, Messrs Miller Brothers Ltd., and W. B. Maclver Company, also 
opened new agencies at Ondo.® In the 1926/27 crop year, cooperative fermentaries in 
Ondo Division treated 118 tons of cocoa. In 1927/28, the division’s tonnage rose to 179 
even though prices fell by a nominal 33% to £28 per ton.® By contrast, the 80 ibs. of 
cotton purchased in Ekiti Division in 1928 was regarded officially as ‘a very large 
advance from 1927 when the amount brought to the market was almost negligible. 
Cotton output increased to 1,326 ibs. in 1929, but the entire product had to be taken to 
Osogbo for sale owing to the lack of buyers and competition in the local m ark e ts .In
“  Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, pp. 135-136.
^  Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 451.
® Ibid., pp. 443-444; Agboola, ‘Agricultural Changes’, p. 135.
“  Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production’, p. 128; Agboola, Agricultural Atlas, p. 100.
Annual Report, 1927, p. 52.
“  Ibid, p. 53.
® Annual Report, 1928, p. 43.
Ibid.
Annual Report, 1929, p. 28.
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the same year, 220 tons of cocoa were purchased in the province, much of them from 
Ondo Division.
Clearly, cocoa planting increased rapidly in Ondo Province in the 1920s as more and 
more people heard the ‘gospel’. But the above has given prominence to output from Ondo 
Division, and to that extent, masked important trends in the then emerging cocoa 
economy. In fact, cocoa expanded more rapidly in other Divisions, especially Ekiti than 
in Ondo. Farmers in Ondo Division were also likely to have committed less land to cocoa 
after the 1920s than has been implied above. This position is supported by cocoa acreage 
data in the province between the 1920s and the 1940s.
According to official survey estimates, about 50,426 cocoa farms averaging 2.05 acres 
(0.83 ha.) each were recorded in the province by 1948.^  ^This totalled 103,548.3 acres, 
about 5% of the province’s arable land or 3-4% excluding forest reserves.A bout 69% 
of the province’s total acreage belonged to two upper age groups of 11-214- years while 
31 % belonged to two lower age groups of 0-10 years. One-tenth of the proportion in the 
former category (i.e. 6.7% of cropped area, or 6,942.1 acres) belonged to the 21+ age 
group while nine-tenths (62.5% of cropped area, or 64,681.7 acres) was classified in the 
11-20 age group. Of the 31% of total cropped area in the 0-10 year age group, 88% (or 
27% of total acreage) was classified in the 6-10 year age group, leaving only 12% (or 
4% of cropped area) in the 0-5 year group. This suggests that cocoa was planted 
extensively in the province during the 1920s and the 1930s, and that more land was 
brought under cocoa in the 1930s than in the 1920s.
Table 2.3 presents the distribution of this acreage between the three cocoa producing 
divisions. The table suggests that Ekiti had the largest share (36%) of cocoa acreage in 
the province in 1948, followed by Owo with 34% and Ondo with 30%. Ekiti Division
^  Ibid.
^  Rowling, Land Tenure, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 71.
Cf. Berry, Cocoa, pp. 65-66.
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also had the largest share of the acreage in the two upper age groups- with 38% of 
acreage in the 11-20 years group and 56% of total acreage in the over 21 years group. 
In both cases, Ondo Division came second, having recorded 32.4% and 34% of the 
acreage in the 11-20 and 21-h age groups respectively, while Owo Division recorded 
about 30% and 10% of acreage in the same age groups. This pattern is reversed with 
respect to the two other age groups. Of total acreage in the 6-10 age group, 47.3% was 
located in Owo Division, while Ondo and Ekiti had about 26% each. Owo Division also 
had over 55% share of acreage in the 0-5 years age group, while Ekiti had about 38%, 
thus leaving Ondo with only 7%.
Table 2.3
Distribution of Ondo Province’s Cocoa Acreage, 1948 (by Age and Division)
Division Total
acreage
% distribution in age groups
0-5 6-10 11-20 214-
Ekiti 37,304.4 37.5 26.4 38.0 56.0
Ondo 30,991.8 7.1 26.3 32.4 34.0
Owo 35,252.1 55.4 47.3 29.6 10.0
Province 103,548.3 3.8 27.0 62.5 6.7
Source: Rowling, Land Tenure, p. 69.
Data in Table 2.3 suggest also that Ondo Division’s preeminence in cocoa cultivation 
during the 1920s may have been overstated. Clearly, Ekiti Division had the largest share 
of total acreage and of oldest trees. Ekiti also had a significant share of acreage in the 
lower age groups. Its share of acreage in the 0-5 and 6-10 age groups fell below that of 
Owo Division, but was well over Ondo’s in the former and about the same in the latter. 
Owo Division’s higher ratings in the lower age groups would seem to suggest that more 
of its farmland was put under cocoa in later years, and probably that the youngest cocoa 
trees in the province in 1948 were in the Division. But although cocoa cultivation doubled 
in Owo Division between the 1930s and the early 1940s, much of this acreage was in 
Akoko district, where up to 40% of cultivable land may have been put under cocoa by 
the 1940s.^^
76 Rowling, Land Tenure, p. 72.
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The above is perhaps insufficient to question Ondo Division’s historical role in cocoa 
cultivation in eastern Yorubaland. But it does suggest that Ondo possibly had a lower 
percentage of its land under cocoa in 1948 in relation to other Divisions, or in any case 
that Ondo’s farmers were not growing cocoa at the expense of food crops. There is also 
reason to believe that more land has been brought under cocoa in Ekiti Division than in 
other Divisions since the 1920s, and that the seemingly higher response rate of farmers 
in Ekiti Division was maintained for much of the 1930s.
The rate of cocoa expansion in Ekiti was higher, more so if account is taken of ecological 
differences within the province. Ondo is firmly located within the forest zone while Ekiti 
and Akoko areas have significant portions of savanna. Since cocoa cannot grow in 
savannah conditions, a greater proportion of land in and around Ondo has been more 
suitable for cocoa-farming than in Ekiti and Akoko areas. By the late 1940s, however, 
Ekiti Division had more cocoa acreage than Ondo. This suggests clearly that ‘Ekiti and 
Akoko...both...committed themselves [to cocoa-growing] far more deeply 
th a n ...O n d o ...o r , alternatively, that Ondo’s farmers never did put all their eggs in 
the same basket.^* The next section shows how official attempts in the 1930s and 1940s 
to redress the imbalance between cocoa and food production were scuttled by 
jurisdictional arguments and by more primary political priorities.
2.3 Policy Responses I: 1930s and 1940s
Cocoa cultivation undermined food production in at least two ways. First, farmers tended 
to put the most fertile land under cocoa, thereby precipitating a shortage of equally 
suitable land for food cropping. Rowling reported that kin groups at Ikare, Oba, and Oka, 
all in Akoko, were moved to impose restrictions on cocoa planting.Rowling did not 
specify when this took place, but it is likely to have been in the 1930s. In 1928, 
according to Forde, yam plots accounted ‘nearly all the farm acreage’ in Owo Division
^  Ibid.
Wann, Travel’,
Rowling, Land Tenure, p. 72.
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(including Akoko District).*® In Irun, in Akoko District, cocoa-growing had displaced 
oil-palm production in about two decades from the 1920s, with most of the cocoa ‘grown 
by non-residents from I k a r e . I t  is, therefore, a measure of social concern for the rate 
at which cocoa was replacing traditional food crops in the 1930s that some cocoa plants 
were uprooted in Ikare and other Akoko villages to make more land available for food 
cropping, and perhaps also to drive home the point that there could be more to socio­
economic existence than cocoa-growing.
Secondly, given limited labour supplies, cocoa growing encouraged a near-total 
abandonment of food cropping in some areas. In Okeigbo, according to Clarke, 
experimentation with food crops had declined sharply as early as 1910, soon after cocoa 
became a major crop in the area.*  ^ By the 1920s, colonial officials were expressing 
misgivings at the rate of cocoa expansion and its possible backwash effect on food 
production. Rowling reported this trend with regard to Ondo and Ekiti Divisions, citing 
an Assessment Officer’s remark that ‘owing to the high price of cocoa a great many 
farmers are beginning to concentrate almost entirely on this crop to the detriment of their 
staple food crops.’** In 1928, cocoa cultivation was said to be growing so fast in Ondo 
Division that the District Officer ‘expressed some anxiety as to whether it will not cause 
an undue diminution of the production of essential food crops.’*‘‘
The initial policy response to the food situation is, on the whole, half-hearted and 
disappointing. Its primary goal, to re-invigorate food production in areas where export 
crops had become prominent, was soon bogged down by inter-departmental squabbles and 
by concern for the war effort. On 16 May 1938, J. R. Mackie, then Director of 
Agriculture for Nigeria, wrote a memorandum to the Chief Secretary to the Government 
(CSG). In the memorandum, Mackie repeated what District Officers had been saying for
Forde, ‘Native Economies’, p. 81.
Ibid., p. 83.
“  Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production’, p. 130.
“  Rowling, Land Tenure, p. 72; Annual Report, 1927, p. 52. 
^  Annual Report, 1928, p. 43.
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at least two decades, namely, that export crop production had created problems of soil 
fertility and food supply in the Southern Provinces. He also recommended a full-scale 
investigation.*^ No action was taken on Mackie's proposal until 1940, by which time 
the Second World War had started and official interest in a food production campaign had 
shifted significantly.
Official action now took two slightly opposed directions. On the one hand, the British 
economy suffered an acute shortage of foreign exchange in the 1940s, partly because of 
the costs in dollars of essential war and, as it turned out, of post-war economic 
reconstruction.*^ Since proceeds from the cocoa sales in American markets provided just 
such foreign exchange, local colonial administrators became obliged to raise the 
productivity of existing farms in the short term and encourage new planting in the 
medium and longer terms. Secondly, action was taken to keep food imports to the 
minimum in order to reduce pressure on available foreign exchange and food supply in 
Britain.*^ The effect on Ondo State’s farmers of restrictions on food imports into Nigeria 
is likely to have been negligible.
In 1940, government decided to embark on a campaign to boost food production, ‘more 
particularly in Provinces which are not self-supporting and in areas where people hitherto 
have been dependent on export crops.’** To this end, the post of Director of Food 
Production was created with J. R. Mackie as first appointee.*^ A re-organisation of the 
Agriculture Department was also envisaged, most probably to streamline jurisdictions and 
ensure better coordination of government programmes on food production. However, the
“ Memorandum 2758/DA/6A of 16 May, 1938, CSO/26/4/34177, NAI, p. 2.
“  This is one reason why controlled cocoa-marketing was extended and intensified after the war. See 
P. T. Bauer, ‘Origins of the Statutory Monopolies of West Africa’, Business History Review, 28 (1954), 
pp. 199-201; and West African Trade (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 263-275; and A. Olorunfemi, ‘Background 
to the Establishment of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board 1947-48’, Odu, 19 (1979), pp. 59-60.
^  Malcolm McDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies to GAG Nigeria, 31 October 1939, CSO 
26/36378, NAI.
Minute 36378/48, most probably written in June 1940 by A. F. R. Stoddart, Ag. CSG.
Minute 36378/49 of 25 June 1940, CSO 26/36378/S.27, NAI; Government Notice N® 732, Gazette 
43 of 04 July 1940.
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problem remained how to define (or re-define) relations between departments with direct 
or incidental responsibility for food production. A related question was where to locate 
the new Director of Food production within existing arrangements.
These considerations were the subject of a confidential memorandum from Mr. Mackie 
to the Chief Secretary on 28 May 1941. Mackie complained that utter confusion 
characterised functional and jurisdictional arrangements in the Forestry, Veterinary and 
Agriculture departments. Each department, it seemed, embarked on programmes that 
caught the fancy of its principal officers, notwithstanding whether similar programmes 
were being implemented by other departments. The result was an avoidable waste of 
resources occasioned by duplicated programmes. Mackie noted, for example, that the 
Agriculture Department had occasionally dropped its own schemes whenever it became 
clear that ‘the Veterinary Department wished to start similar schemes and have taken over 
lines of work which having been started seemed likely to languish.
Finally, Mr. Mackie undertook a staff review in all three departments, arguing that more 
could be achieved if ‘some degree of amalgamation’ of their disparate efforts be 
permitted. Mackie did not thereby become an advocate of long-term inter-departmental 
collaboration though. For him, collaboration and coordination were necessary only 
because of the severe production and supply requirements occasioned by the war while 
his primary concerns were ‘effectiveness and speed in action...to secure maximum 
effectiveness and speed in developing our food resources and in getting them to the 
consumers, whether civil or mi l i tary.This  implied clearly that each department could 
revert to the status quo ante as soon as hostilities ended. In the meantime, Mackie hoped 
that the war would make possible the emergence of a ‘Rural Development Department’ 
and that all ‘technical departments will be so coordinated that in their contacts with the 
Nigerian people they will speak with one voice.
^  Mackie to CSG, 28 May 1941, p. 9.
Mackie to Chief Secretary, 10 June 1941, p. 21. 
^ Ibid., p. 11.
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Mackie proposed that the role of the Director of Food Production be expanded, and the 
office re-designated as Director of Food Production and Supplies (DFPS). Under this new 
dispensation, the Chief Secretary would refer all questions to the DFPS rather than to 
heads of individual departments concerned. The DFPS was to be superior to the Chief 
Commissioner, at least to the extent that the latter was not to overrule the former without 
reference to the Chief Secretary. By the same token, orders were not to be issued without 
the concurrence of the DFPS.^^ Yet, Mackie was concerned about the ‘difficulty of 
promoting closer co-ordination between Agriculture and Veterinary Departments without 
appearing to connive at the swallowing up of the latter by the former.’^  In particular, 
he expressed apprehension about the way his proposals would be received by officers in 
the Northern Provinces.
In the event, the Administrative Officer in Kano never really cooperated with Mackie. 
Nor did W. W. Henderson, then Director of the Veterinary Department, see any need 
for Mackie’s proposed co-ordinated approach. This put Mackie in the dock, forcing him 
to defend his proposals as they affected the Veterinary Department. On 21 March 1940, 
while expressing reservations about the Veterinary Department’s proposal to make butter 
in Jos, Mackie had to preempt possible charges of jurisdictional ‘territory-building’ by 
stating categorically that he was ‘not concerned in the least with the question of who gets 
credit for these schemes or whose particular job it is to carry them out. On June 7 
1941, Mackie also wrote to the CSG to dispel fears that he was petty with regard to the 
Veterinary Department’s activities^ Having repeated his view that in a war situation, 
‘the only thing which matters is that the food should be produced’, he explained that he 
had drawn up plans for virtually everything but changed course whenever he heard that 
the Veterinary Department proposed to give attention to the same products. He was not 
always informed of plans by the Veterinary Department and only heard about them after
”  Ibid.
^ CSG to Director of Agriculture/Food Production and Supplies, p. 12.
^  Mackie to W. W. Henderson, Director of Veterinary Services, 21 March 1940, in ibid., p. 19. 
^  Mackie to C. C. Woolley, June 7, 1941.
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they had been started.
Approval was given to Mackie’s re-designation proposal by a circular dated 21 June 
1941. Mackie was also granted powers to coordinate government’s food programmes ‘so 
that there may be no overlapping of activities, to authorise the commencement of 
programmes which, in this view, conformed to policy, administer funds provided for such 
programmes, and to ensure that delivery schedules are duly observed once arrangements 
have been made’. The circular made it clear, however, that the DFPS could not redeploy 
technical staff without the authority of the Chief Secretary.A week later, precisely on 
28 June 1941, the Director of Veterinary Services inquired, by a telegram to the Chief 
Secretary, whether by that circular, the Director of Agriculture took over schemes of 
butter, bacon and beef production ‘initiated and.. .operated by the Veterinary Department 
in Plateau Province.’^  The Chief Secretary’s non-committal response was that ‘work 
should be co-ordinated with other a c t iv i t i e s .The  DFPS’s post was finally abolished 
on 20 January 1944. °^  ^ Thus was a seemingly sincere official effort to address an 
important, if unintended, effect of export agriculture undermined and then neutralised 
primarily by vested interests in Nigeria’s colonial administration and, indirectly at least, 
by more primary metropolitan political-economic interests over local concerns in policy­
making.
Meanwhile, the food situation in parts of Ondo Province had moved from bad to worse 
during the 1940s. In 1945, for example, the District Officer for Okitipupa prohibited the 
export of gaari, a staple made from cassava, from Okitipupa and Ondo because 'gari is 
not plentiful and prices in Okitipupa are still at a high l e v e l . L a t e  rains and a
^  Ibid., p. 16.
Circular No. 13/1941 of 21 June 1941.
^  Telegram No. V1729/120, Director of Veterinary Services to Chief Secretary. 
Chief Secretary to Director of Veterinary Services, CSO 26/36378/S.27/33. 
Government Notice N“ 55, Gazette N“ 4, 20 January 1944.
Daily Service (Lagos), 25 August 1945, p. 3.
58
drought in northern Ekiti districts occasioned a 50% fall in yam harvests and a near total 
failure of late m a i z e T h e  drought also caused severe food shortages and sharp price 
increases throughout Ekiti Division, prompting official worries about declining food 
production. According to an official report,
[t]he lack of locally-grown foodstuff is apparent and no one could be found to undertake 
to supply rations to the Ado prison next year at 6d. per diem. 8d. per diem is the lowest 
price tendered. In 1944 the prison contractor accepted 4d, per diem.*°^
Still, the share of arable land under cocoa was increasing steadily. In about three decades 
to 1947, Ondo Province had overtaken other parts of the cocoa belt in terms of acreage, 
its share having increased from about one-tenth in the 1920s to nearly four-fifths in the 
1940s (Figure 2.1). By the 1950s, cocoa accounted for 7.6% of agricultural land in 
Ondo, 10.1% in Ado-Ekiti, 11.9% in Owo, and 12.5% in Akure.^ ®^  In 1950/51, 8.3% 
of available land in the province was devoted to tree crops, mainly but not exclusively 
cocoa. By 1958/59, the proportion of land under cocoa had fallen to 6.9%, just over the 
6.5% share for farm crops. In the same year, Ondo Province accounted for 53% of 
Western Region’s cocoa trees (n=443 million) and 48% of its 274,383 ha. total cocoa 
hectarage. At face value, these ratios compared favourably with the province’s 44% and 
41.4% shares of the region’s cocoyam and yam acreages respectively.^^ But the food 
crops under reference had been grown for much longer and by a larger number of people 
than cocoa. The picture would also change significantly if variations between forest and 
savanna areas of the region were taken into account.
Annual Report, Ekiti Division, 1945, p. 5. Ondo Prof. 1/1/120A, NAT. 
Ibid., p. 8.
Agboola, Agricultural Atlas, p. 62.
WSN Statistical Abstracts, 12, 1/2 (1970), Table 100, p. 115.
Ibid., Table 106, p. 121.
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Fig. 2.1 Cocoa Acreages in WN, 1920-47
(6-year moving average)
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2.4 Policy Responses II: 1950s-1970s
If policy initiatives in the 1930s and 1940s failed to redress the food-cocoa imbalance in 
Western Nigeria, those of the 1950s and 1960s made no pretence about seeking any such 
redress. On the contrary, Western Nigeria’s first post-colonial government simply 
embraced export crops (especially cocoa) for their fiscal and political pay-offs, leaving 
food production under peasant control but also reinforcing existing urban-rural relations. 
Since government’s agrarian activism in the 1950s and 1960s has been well researched, 
only a summary is necessary here to show policy biases in favour of export crops and 
against food crops.
Two main issues dominated government thinking on agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The first is akin to Ernest Feder’s self-liquidation thesis, namely, how to intensify peasant 
production through massive capitalization, including mechanisation, while retaining the
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peasants’ goodwill and support through promises of ‘life more abundant...and the 
establishment of a contented pe a s a n t r y .T h e  second issue was a parallel strategy to 
promote large-scale plantations in various parts of the region. In either case, government 
focused more on export than on food crops, apparently because export crops offered it 
substantial fiscal benefits while expanding the economy’s import capacity. In its first 
agricultural policy published in 1952, the Western regional government expressed its 
commitment to agricultural modernisation through support for efficient cultural practices, 
especially crop rotation and mechanisation. The government also expressed bluntly its 
preference for large-scale farms in the following terms:
The production of staple commodities for the world market is often most economically 
undertaken by large scale enterprise...At the same time...the interests of the community 
will be best served by a balance between both plantation and peasant farming and 
specialised and self-sufficient systems of agriculture...Accordingly, assistance will be 
provided for the formation of large-scale commercialised farms formed by the grouping 
together of small peasant farmers into co-operatives or recognised local farmer’s
associations. 109
This effectively reversed the colonial administration’s rejection of plantations because, 
among other reasons, officials thought it ‘undesirable to turn a peasant owner into a mere 
farm labourer...’ in defiance of his cu s toms .One  result of this policy change was a 
dramatic increase in the number of plantations, with thirty six (or about 82%) of forty- 
four plantations in southern Nigeria in the 1960s established in 1952-62, the ‘plantations 
decade’. I n  Western Nigeria, 15 government farms of up to 150 acres each as well 
as three plantations of between 300 acres and 18,000 acres each, had been established by 
1953.“  ^ In 1962, about half of forty-four plantations in southern Nigeria were based 
in different parts of Western Region, all of them owned or managed solely or jointly with
Nigeria, Agricultural Policy for the Western Region (Ibadan, 1952), p. 4.
Ibid., p. 6; p. 12.
CSO 26/31071/41, NAI., minute dated 1 June 1936 by L.G Shenton, for Acting CSG, p. 43.
R. K. Udo, ‘Sixty Years of Plantation Agriculture in Southern Nigeria: 1902-1962’, EcG, 41,4  
(1965), p. 364.
Annual Report o f the Department of Agriculture, Western Region for the Year 1952-53 (Ibadan,
1957).
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private investors by the regional development corporation. In spite of evidence 
concerning the relative efficiency of peasant-based cocoa production, and early indications 
of failure, including poor site selection and even poorer farmer response,large-scale 
farm projects continued well into the 1960s.
Government’s quest for ‘balance’ between small and large farms emerged in 1959 in the 
form of co-operative farm settlements, designed ostensibly to discourage ‘the excessive 
drift of young school leavers to urban c e n t r e s . . . T h e  emphasis on the structures and 
economics of land settlement itself has however encouraged observers to gloss over the 
scheme’s palpable bias in favour of tree crops and against food crops. In 1959, 
government stated clearly that the settlements would grow mainly tree crops, especially 
cocoa, oil palm, and rubber, with food crops cultivated as subsidiary crops only. The 
acreage of food crops was to be adjusted ‘from time to time to avoid any interference 
with the efficient management of the main c r o p s . . . T h e  government denied that it 
was seeking to promote export crops at the expense of food crops, but it had expressed 
its urban inclinations in 1952, when it stated that ‘all systems should contribute to the 
security and soundness of food supplies for urban d w e l l e r s . T h a t  inclination was 
specified further in the following statement:
Although progress is being made in establishing industry, in the foreseeable future the
113 Udo, ‘Sixty Years’, p. 366.
Annual Report 1952-53, p. 11; p. 19; cf. Lekan Are, ‘An Assessment of Some Plantation Problems 
in Western Nigeria’, TA, 41, 1 (1964), pp. 1-13.
‘Future Policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources’, Sessional Paper N“ 9 o f1959,
p. 10.
Mordechai E. Kreinin, ‘The Introduction of Israel’s Land Settlement Plan to Nigeria’, JFE, 45, 3 
(1963), pp. 535-546; Dupe Olatimbosun, ‘Western Nigeria Farm Settlements: An Appraisal’, JDA, 5, 3 
(1971), pp. 417-428; O. O. Okediji, ‘Some Socio-Cultural Problems in the Western Nigeria Land 
Settlement Scheme: A Case Study’, NJESS, 7, 3 (1965), pp. 301-310; and ‘Some Structvu-al Strains in the 
Change Agent System of the Western Nigeria Land Settlement Scheme’, NJESS, 10, 3 (1968), pp. 387-395; 
A. J. Adegeye, ‘Re-Examination of the Issues involved in the Farm Settlement Scheme of the Western State 
of Nigeria’, OAS, III, 1, new ser. (1974), pp. 79-88.
‘Future Policy’, p. 11.
‘Agricultural Policy’, p. 6.
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greatest increase in the national wealth of Western Nigeria is likely to come from the 
optimum use of the land and its agricultural potentialities. It is from this source that the 
Government looks for the principal means with which to finance its expanding 
development programme, and with which to provide on an increasing scale the social 
services which it has already brought to and will continue to give to the people of 
Western Nigeria.**’
Since fiscal pay-offs to government from the food sub-sector has been and remains low, 
the above statement committed government to increasing export crop cultivation in the 
1950s and 1960s. This period also coincided with what may be called the golden years 
of cocoa production in the Ife-Ijesha-Ondo or eastern zone of Nigeria’s cocoa belt 
generally and in Ondo Province in particular. From about 23 % in 1954/55, the province’s 
share of Western Nigeria’s cocoa crop increased steadily to over 40% during the 1960s, 
and to about 50% in the 1 9 7 0 s . A s  Table 2.4 shows, annual output in the province
Table 2.4
Ondo Province’s Share of Western Nigeria’s Cocoa Output, 1954-90
Sub-period Output (metric tonnes)
Western Region* Ondo Province** Prov. share %
1954/55-1958/59 99,190 25,272 25.5
1959/60-1963/64 170,808 51,203 30.0
1964/65-1968/69 221,168 82,308 37.2
1970/71-1973/74= 225,169 106,399 47.3
1976-1980 167,000 75,903 45.5
1981-1985 154,000 82,204 53.4
1986-1990 187,000 76,826 41.1
Notes: * Annual average based on (i) produce inspection records for 1954-74; and
(ii) aggregate output for 1976-90.
*’ Annual average based on produce inspection records.
® Four observations only; figures for 1969/70 and 1974/75 not available.
Sources: 1954-74: WNMB, Statistical Information on Western State of Nigeria 
Controlled Produce (Ibadan, 1969, 1975).
1976-90: CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1&2 (1990), p. 79 for regional figures; Ondo State 
figures from Dir. of Produce, Ministry of Agriculture.
averaged between 26% and 47% of the regional crop in two decades up to 1974, after 
which it moved back and forth between 40% and 50%. However, regional figures for
**’ ‘Future Policy’, p. 1.
*^° Computed from WNMB, Statistical Information on Western State o f Nigeria Controlled Produce 
(Ibadan, 1969, 1975).
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1976-1990 refer to total output, and could have understated the state’s contribution by 5- 
10%, the latter being the proportion of Nigeria’s cocoa crop that is produced outside 
Western Nigeria’s administrative boundaries. In any case, Ondo State is widely believed 
to be producing half of Nigeria’s cocoa output in the 1980s. The state’s average output 
itself peaked in 1970-74, declined sharply in 1975-80 and moved haphazardly thereafter. 
Seasonal changes in Ondo State’s cocoa output, masked by average figures in Table 2.4, 
are shown more explicitly in Figure 2.2 below.
Fig. 2.2 Ondo State’s Cocoa Tonnage, 
1937-90 (produce inspection data)
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Ondo State’s increasing share of cocoa output since the 1950s can be explained in three 
related ways. First, as indicated above, cocoa was planted extensively in Ondo Province 
from the mid-1920s. As Figure 2.2 shows, output from this planting seemed to have 
peaked in the 1950s, but this suggests that subsequent growth in output could be 
attributed only to new plantings after the initial wave of the 1930s. Second, cocoa 
production and productivity in Ibadan, Ota, and Ilaro had declined dramatically during
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the 1940s. This decline has been attributed to the age and diminishing productivity of 
cocoa trees; the outbreak of swollen shoot disease and the massive tree-cutting measures 
imposed by government; increasing urban settlement and associated demand on available 
farmland; and the general lack of interest in cocoa regeneration. Above all, new land was 
being brought under cocoa in the Ife-Ilesha-Ondo (or eastern) axis of Nigeria’s cocoa belt 
even after 1950.^^  ^ In fact, between 50% and 75% of agricultural land was devoted to 
cocoa in parts of southern Ekiti, Owo, and Ondo in the 1960s.
Available evidence for the 1970s suggests also that cocoa was being planted more actively 
in Ondo State up to the early 1980s than in Ogun and Oyo States. By 1975, cocoa’s share 
of the state’s arable land had increased to 14.5% from less than 10% in the late 
1 9 5 0 s . I n  ten years to 1982, Ondo State accounted for half of 26,673 ha. in new 
cocoa plantings funded with a US $27.2 million IBRD credit while Oyo State accounted 
for about two-thirds of 70,826 ha. of rehabilitated or replanted land.^ "^^  Of the 28,679 
ha. reported for Ondo State, 53% was replanted while 47% was new land. Two-thirds 
of Ogun State’s 16,163 ha. were replanted and one-third was newly planted; in Oyo 
State, 85% of a total of 52,646 ha. was replanted, leaving only 15% of new cocoa 
farmland. As a whole, more new cocoa farms had been established in Ondo (total 
area 13,594 ha.) than in Ogun and Oyo States combined (13,068 ha.). As in the 1920s 
and 1930s, it is likely that this was achieved at the expense of food production, more so 
since the technical conditions of production of both crops had changed very little.
It is difficult to make precise statements about Ondo State’s food economy. Policy and 
research biases in favour of international tradeables have invariably encouraged a 
cumulative neglect of the food sub-sector over the years. More importantly, production
Berry, Cocoa, pp. 58-71.
Agboola, Agricultural Atlas, p. 106.
123 Agboola, Agricultural Atlas, p. 62; WSN Statistical Abstracts, 12, 1/2 (1970), Table 100, p. 115.
M. Oladokun and A. Daramola, ‘Nigerian Cocoa Development Programme: A Comparative 
Efficiency of Fund Utilisation’, SaD, XIV, 2 (1990), p. 182.
>25 Ibid., p. 181.
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has been and still is primarily for consumption rather than sale. Although the latter has 
been increasing steadily, a substantial proportion of trade in foodstuffs has been informal- 
undertaken in the many village markets, farmgates, or roadside spot markets where 
record-keeping has been and still is extremely rare.^^  ^ Available survey evidence 
suggests, nonetheless, that staple foods have been traded over the years between Ondo 
State and Western Nigeria’s urban centres, especially Lagos and Ibadan.
In the nineteenth century, Ibadan relied on its vassal states as much for food supplies, in 
the forms of tribute, booty, or commercial exchanges, as for slaves.Reference has 
been made also to the 1945 order prohibiting gaari exports to Lagos from Okitipupa and 
Ondo Divisions except with the specific permission of the District Officer at Okitipupa. 
The order was prompted by official alarm at supply shortages and rising prices in 
Okitipupa and Ondo. Galletti, Baldwin and Dina remarked the ‘exchange of 
foodstuffs...between the cocoa-producing areas and the provinces neighbouring them on 
the north and east’, but the admittedly limited specific information suggest that Ondo 
Province was importing more yams than it was exporting. In Ikare’s eight-day market, 
‘the largest and possibly second only to Ibadan in the cocoa-producing areas’, for 
example.
[ajbout 900 women were selling yams, which came mainly from Lokoja and probably 
down the Benue river. Fifty per cent, of the yams purchased were destined for Akure and 
Ondo, 20 per cent, for Owo, 5 per cent, for Ipetu-Ijesha, and the balance for other 
places...Ten per cent of the peppers and 80 per cent, of the beans were brought from 
Oshogbo, probably imported from the north. Most of these were for local consumption, 
but 15 per cent, went on to Kabba and Lokoja.*^ ®
Similar comments were made for markets in Ondo and A k u r e . I n  Ilesa, in turn.
Cf. small-scale farming, where record-keeping may have improved slightly as a result of the 
movement into agriculture of teachers, civil servants, etc., who have retired or been sacked from their 
positions since the 1970s. Cf. Jane Guyer, ‘Small Change: Individual Farmwork and Collective Life in a 
Western Nigerian Savanna Town, 1969-88’, Africa, 62, 4 (1992), pp. 465-489.
Falola, Political Economy, p. 145f.
Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, p. 62.
Ibid.
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Galletti, Baldwin and Dina noted
a westward flow of goods to Ibadan and Lagos...Sixty per cent, of the yams from Ekiti 
and the tract north of Oshogbo were going to Ibadan and Abeokuta. Half the mai% from 
Ekiti was going to Ibadan.. .Most of the palm-oil was going to Ibadan and Lagos [as] were 
most of the plantains and rice, both of which were drawn principally from Ekiti.
Glisten surveyed the food trade in Western Nigeria in the 1960s. According to the 
survey, an estimated 356 tonnes of foodstuff were moved both ways over four days in 
1966, between Ondo-Osun/Ife/Ilesa to the west on the one hand, and Ondo-Kabba/Ilorin 
to the north on the o the r .About  15,240 tonnes of foodstuff were moved to Lagos and 
Ibadan from Ondo area (including Auchi and Afenmai Division, now in Edo State) 
throughout 1966. This total figure includes about 4,065 tonnes each of maize and gaari; 
2,540 tonnes of plantain; and 1,015 tonnes each of cassava (including cassava flour) and 
yam.^^  ^ According to Glisten’s estimates, these sales figures amounted to between 2% 
and 4% of estimated total production in each of the four Divisions, a clear indication, 
perhaps, of the potential output of Ondo State’s food sub-sector.
Glisten’s findings cannot be assessed realistically in the absence of more recent data. Nor 
is it possible to determine the size of food trade between Ondo State and urban markets 
and even more importantly, food production and trade within the state. Glisten’s data 
suggested, nonetheless, that only a small proportion of local food output got into major 
urban markets in the 1960s, though foodstuff prices in urban markets had ‘frequently’ 
fallen below those in village markets. It follows, therefore, that more of Ondo State’s 
food output was being consumed internally, and that food self-sufficiency at household 
level has been negligible since the 1960s. Since transport difficulties and transaction costs 
have eased also since then, it is reasonable to infer that the internal foodstuff market has
Ibid., p. 63.
Rolf Glisten, Studies in the Staple Food Economy of Western Nigeria (München, 1968). 
Calculated from ibid., p. 208.
Ibid., p. 249.
'3^  Ibid., note 62, p. 63.
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been substantial, perhaps more so than that between Ondo and other parts of Western 
Nigeria. As recent as the 1970s, according to Sara Berry,
most cocoa farmers [were growing] some food crops, but most of my informants said 
they did not normally produce enough foodstuffs to meet their families’ needs, but 
purchased at least part of the food they consumed.
In theory, that part of local output that is sold outside the state could reduce the size, or 
alter the composition, of food imports if it was sold locally, since local demand exists (in 
form of imports from Ilorin and the north). The key question, therefore, is the co­
existence of food ‘exports’ (defined narrowly) and recurrent shortages in Ondo State. The 
policy response in the 1970s, a spate of short-term official campaigns to encourage 
garden food farms or flood the market with imported food, assured cheap food for urban 
areas by increasing supply and forcing down prices.
The same strategies have dominated official strategies in the 1980s and 1990s. In May 
1992, for example, a Task Force on Food Supply and Distribution was established to 
examine the scarcity of food in Ondo state, establish food distribution outlets, and set up 
strategic food reserves for sale to the public during the annual hungry season. The 
Task Force comprised the most senior officials of the state’s agricultural bureaucracy, 
perhaps indicating the seriousness of the state’s food p r o b l e m . A s  in previous
135 Berry, Cocoa, note 37, p. 71.
Abiodun O. Falusi, ‘Agricultural Development: Operation Feed the Nation’ in Oyeleye Oyediran 
(ed.). Survey o f Nigerian Affairs 1976-77 (Lagos, 1981), pp. 55-68; cf. G. O. I. Abalu and B. D’Silva, 
‘Nigeria’s Food Situation: Problems and Prospects’, FP, 5, 1 (1980), pp. 49-60; and R. K. Udo, Food 
Production Strategies and Agricultural Development in Nigeria (Tokyo, 1982). For wider analysis, see Sara 
Berry, ‘Rural Class Formation in West Africa’ in Robert Bates and Michael Lofchie (eds.). Agricultural 
Development in Africa (New York, 1980), pp. 401-424.
Owena News (Akure), 17-23 May 1992, pp. 1-2.
Ibid. Chaired by the state’s Commissioner for Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Task Force had 
the following as members: Dr. Segun Ige, Acting Managing Director of the state’s Investment Holding Co.; 
Dr. Laoye Adegoke, Marketing Director, Input Supply Co.; Messrs Bisi Taiwo and David Borisade, 
Members of the state elected legislature (1991-1993); and Mr. J. F. Aluko, Director-General (equivalent 
to Permanent Secretary) Cabinet and Political Affairs, Governor’s Office. The Task Force was to be 
assisted by committees on purchasing; price intelligence and monitoring; transportation; sales and 
distribution.
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attempts, however, such measures have provided temporary relief but failed pointedly to 
address the underlying structure of urban-rural relations which gave rise to recurrent food 
shortages in the first place
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the expansion of cocoa cultivation in Ondo State has had far- 
reaching structural implications on local food production. Evidence on productive 
resource allocation in Ekiti and Akoko areas in the 1920s and 1930s suggest clearly that 
land, and therefore labour, was diverted from food to cocoa production, occasioning a 
recurrent food shortage in the state since the 1930s. Government’s initial response to the 
problem, a nation-wide campaign to increase food production in export crop-intensive 
areas, was derailed partly by arguments over jurisdictions and partly by the overarching 
demand on resources of the Second World War. Official concern for the fiscal 
imperatives of state-led development in the 1950s and 1960s virtually precluded 
considerations of balance between food and cocoa production. Besides, food shortages 
have been localised experiences, at least in the sense that politically important urban 
consumers were relatively unaffected until the 1970s, when the proverbial capacity of 
peasant farmers to meet urban food demands collapsed from the burden of an ageing and 
unreproduced peasant population, unfavourable market conditions and ineffectual policy 
incentives.
Economic historians have not been wrong in ascribing the rise of Western Nigeria’s 
cocoa economy to autonomous peasant action. However, subsequent research has been 
largely macro-oriented, emphasising the transition’s near-universal trade effects rather 
than its domestic consequences.^'^ Even Berry and Clarke, whose research has given 
greater analytical leverage to unique historical and structural circumstances, have focused 
ultimately on market-induced institutional adaptation and economic growth. The result has 
been a largely one-sided argument which has ignored the commercial transition’s
Cf. Michael Lofchie and Stephen K. Commins, ‘Food Deficits and Agricultural Policies in Tropical 
Africa’, JMAS, 20, 1 (1982), pp. 1-25.
A. G. Hopkins, ‘African Economic History: the First Twenty-Five Years’, JAH, 30, 1 (1989), pp. 
160-162.
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backwash effects on the local (especially rural) economy. Both analytical perspectives 
have also emphasised changing relations between national socio-economic units or 
between sub-national enclaves and the world market to the near-total exclusion of 
continuity in relations between local urban and rural areas, or between government and 
rural society generally before and after colonialism.
The position assumed here can be challenged on several grounds. It could be argued, for 
example, that in Ondo State’s land surplus economy, cocoa’s displacement effect on food 
production could only have been marginal, if at all significant. Such negative effects as 
existed could have reflected transient labour supply difficulties rather than permanent 
historical patterns. As indicated on page 38, the evidence discussed in the chapter related 
to the 1930s and 1940s, there being little specific evidence on resource allocation in the 
1950s to the 1970s. Since there has been no report so far of large-scale malnutrition or 
famine in Ondo State’s cocoa belt, the case for shortfalls in local food production might 
seem weaker than has been suggested here. It might also appear inconceivable that in the 
1940s and 1950s, small-scale farmers would have sacrificed their consumption needs in 
the pursuit of cash from cocoa production.A bove all, the decision by farmers to shift 
resources from food to cocoa production is economically rational and consistent with crop 
specialisation and division of labour. Their behaviour would have encouraged 
comparative advantage, prompting farmers in the savanna areas to expand food-crop 
production as some accounts of the 1930s and 1940s have suggested. In short, one 
might wonder why so much analytical capital has been made of a problem which the 
price mechanism may have resolved in the fullness of time.
The above criticisms are valid but no less difficult to justify factually than my 
interpretation. The lack of evidence on the allocation of land and labour between cocoa 
and food crops since the 1950s, or on food output and trade in Ondo State over a longer 
time frame, is certainly problematic. But it is part of the wider question of the availability
Cf. Glisten, Studies, p, 62,
Cf. Forde, ‘Native Economies’, pp. 86-87,
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and/or reliability of data on Nigeria’s economy and society, noted in chapter 1/'*^  Still, 
the localised character of food shortages, or the absence of famine and/or malnutrition 
at the wider level, does not make less real the problem of food deficits in Ondo State. 
To assume the contrary is to imply that problems are unreal except at macro-societal or 
regional level, or as a full-blown crisis. If, as available information has suggested, Ondo 
State has relied on food imports year on year, a key question for future research is to 
determine the structural circumstances under which a potential food basket has remained 
a food-deficit area. If substantial trade in foodstuffs exists, as it has in the present case, 
more focused research on local commercial opportunities and the terms of trade with 
urban markets might help explain why Ondo State has moved back and forth between 
plenty and want soon after the harvest season.
It is necessary, in this regard, to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, to 
distinguish real-life experiences from the tools employed by researchers to make sense 
of data generated by or from the experiences. As Sara Berry has remarked, ‘rationality 
reflects the interplay of preferences and expectations, both of which are subjectively 
determined and expressed and, hence, not subject to independent obse rva t i on .The  
comparative advantage principle is equally an analytical tool, more an ex-post facto 
rationalisation of behaviour than a consistent variable in real-life individual economic 
behaviour. Reverend Phillips’ advice to Kolajo, that ‘he and his children would never 
suffer’ if he planted c o c o a , w a s  most probably based on ‘the belief that no food 
grower can make as much [money] as the cocoa farmer’ than on hard-nosed analysis 
of price information. Price information was in any case a luxury in rural Ondo State up
143 Cf. Mosley, ‘Policy-Making Without Facts.
Sara Berry, ‘The Food Crisis and Agrarian Change in Africa: A Review Essay’, ASR, 27, 2 (1984),
p. 70.
For a similar argument, see A. G. Hopkins, ‘Africa’s Age of Improvement’, History in Africa, 7 
(1980), p. 151; and ‘The World Bank in Afdca: Historical Reflections on the African Present’, World 
Development, 14, 12 (1986), p. 1477; cf. Michael Lipton, ‘Game Against Nature: Theories of Peasant 
Decision Making’, in John Harriss (ed.). Rural Development (1982), pp. 258-268.
Berry, ‘Christianity’, p. 443.
Forde, ‘Native Economies’, p. 87.
71
to the 1930s, when cocoa-growing provided many with the one most effective opportunity 
for incorporation and participation in the formal economy. The expansion of market- 
based exchange generally and supportive institutions (e.g. marketing societies) since the 
1930s has reduced transaction costs in the cocoa sub-sector. But pervasive illiteracy; the 
lack of access to, or disregard of, extension advice; and the material benefits of export 
crop over food production have all remained or in some cases intensified. These factors 
have often overshadowed longer-term personal and social costs of cocoa growing, 
encouraging farmers to plant cocoa even in the savanna parts of the state. In any case, 
the choice between cocoa and food production is more likely to have been made more by 
‘satisficing’ than after explicit cost-benefit analysis of the type presumed by academic 
economists . Indeed,  a new wave of cocoa planting (including rehabilitation of 
existing plots) may have started since the mid-1980s, prompted by expectations that the 
large, uncompetitive increases in producer prices occasioned by Nigeria’s structural 
adjustment programme would be sustained in future.
It is true that food crops have been grown on farmland with immature cocoa trees as a 
short-term measure. However, cocoa farms are hardly ever cultivated deeply enough 
to make their yield potential attractive as yam plots (on which more in chapter 5).^ °^ 
Hence, only labour-saving crops, such as cocoyam, plantain, cassava and maize, less 
regarded than yams on the local diet, are usually planted on cocoa p lo t s .S t i l l ,  the 
consumption requirements of cocoa-farming families are likely to have stretched available 
labour supply, more so because Ondo State is a labour-scarce economy and because food 
production among the Yoruba is customarily undertaken by m a l e s . I n  any case.
Cf. S, Tomori, ‘The Relevance of Economic Science to Nigerian Economic Development’, NJESS, 
21, 1-3 (1979), pp. 33-56.
Berry, Cocoa, p. 6; cf. Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers o f Southern Ghana (Cambridge, 
1963), p. 188.
O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), p. 106; O. T. 
Faulkner, ‘Experiments on Ridged Cultivation in Tanganyika and Nigeria’, TA, XXI, 9 (1944), pp. 177- 
178.
Cf. Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, p. 234; p. 183.
Forde, ‘Native Economies’, pp. 78-79; Jane Guyer, ‘Food, Cocoa, and the Division of Labour by 
Sex in Two West African Societies’, CSSH, 22, 3 (1980), pp. 355-373.
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neither division of labour nor crop specialisation could be said to have developed 
substantially in Ondo State’s (or even Western Nigeria’s) cocoa belt. More research 
is in fact necessary to determine whether cocoa-growing is consistent with food 
production in the long term.
Above all, the expansion of cocoa-growing in Ondo State in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
associated activities are epochal economic-historical events, perhaps only second in their 
sweeping impact to colonialism itself. To regard them as transient incidents because of 
the lack of micro-level evidence is to deny the permanence of economic change and, in 
addition, turn one generation of research in Yoruba economic history on its head. It is 
clearly inconceivable that cocoa-induced institutional and strategic innovations by Yoruba 
peasants, about which leading economic historians like Berry and Hopkins have written, 
were prompted by short-term macro-economic considerations and subject to erratic price- 
led change.
To sum up, the substance of urban-rural relations in Western Nigeria has not changed 
significantly since pre-colonial times, regardless of changes in the articles of trade and 
in the socio-political context of trade relations. Between the 14th and 19th centuries, 
various parts of the state were ravaged by externally-induced violence and dominated by 
different imperial powers, including Benin, Ilorin, Ibadan, and Bida.^ '^* As vassal or 
tributary states, Ondo State’s communities transferred productive resources, in the form 
of men taken as slaves or conscripted to fight the invader’s war, food and other supplies 
to support the imperial administration, and economic losses occasioned as much by 
violence as by the external control of trade relations.
One long-term effect of this experience has been late development, defined as a situation 
in which wider historical and structural factors preclude local control over the character 
and speed of socio-economic change in a community. Late development also puts a
153 See e.g., Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Fanners, p. 66.
An extreme example being Itaji country, whose population is said to have been reduced by over ten 
times in as many decades to 1934. N. A. C. Weir, ‘Intelligence Report on Itaji District, Ekiti Division, 
Ondo Province’, CSG 26/29800, NAI, p. 2.
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community ‘one model behind’ its more privileged neighbours, encouraging decision­
makers in the former to conceive their community in the idealized image(s) of the 
latter. Indeed, ODSG did draw ‘from the repertoire of an earlier phase 
o f . . . h i s t o r y i n  the wake of Nigeria’s structural adjustment programme in 1986. 
Among other things, the government established the Ondo State Farmers’ Congress, 
ostensibly as a ‘farmers’ lobby’, authorising it to collect a fixed levy on every 
kilogramme of cocoa sold throughout the state. Proceeds from the levy have been 
employed subsequently to fund real estate development, including a five-star hotel and 
secretariat complex, at Akure, the state capital. In effect, the state government, 
acting through the Congress, re-introduced the fiscal mechanisms of the 1940s and 1950s 
to comer part of stmctural adjustment-induced increases in producer incomes in the 
1980s. As one senior official told me, there was nothing wrong in (re)building Akure, 
the state capital, on the back of cocoa farmers since Ibadan and Ikeja were built by the 
same means!
Cocoa-growing has merely transplanted and reinforced pre-colonial patterns of urban- 
rural relations in colonial and post-colonial Western Nigeria, albeit with the more 
acceptable seal of commerce and trickle down. Rimmer’s reference to ‘the cocoa barons 
of the West’ in support of the World Bank’s ‘mutual benefit’ view of export 
agriculture^^^ depicted popular perceptions of cocoa-induced prosperity in Western 
Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s and again in the late 1980s. Bauer has employed the same 
argument to support the view that colonialism had occasioned an economic miracle in
Jane Guyer, ‘British, Colonial and Post-Colonial Food Regulation, with reference to Nigeria: An 
Essay in Formal Anthropology’, Working Papers in African Studies N“ 158 (Boston, 1991), p. 15,
156 Ibid., p. 2.
Olufemi A. Akinola, ‘The Politics of Farmer Organisation in Ondo State, Southwestern Nigeria in 
the 1980s’, paper presented at the International Conference on Cocoa and Economic Development in the 
19th and 20th Centuries, London, September 1993.
Interview, April 1992.
Douglas Rimmer, ‘Development in Nigeria: An Overview’, in Henry Bienen and V. P. Diejomaoh 
(eds.). The Political Economy o f Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), p. 39.
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Ghana and Nigeria. Such relationships are valid in so far as macro-statistics are 
concerned, but they have failed to take account of the long-term social costs of the 
private benefits associated with export agriculture. They have also masked important 
differences in the distribution of the costs and benefits of cocoa growing between 
different sectors of the economy and between urban and rural areas.
As individuals, Ondo State’s cocoa farmers have benefited in proportion to their 
increasing share of total output in the 1950s and 1960s and of producer prices until the 
1960s. More importantly, perhaps, they or their offspring also benefited from Western 
Region’s welfare programmes of the 1950s and 1960s. Still, the region had the most 
aggressive government-led development programme in Nigeria at the time.^^  ^ The 
programme’s decisive urban inclination also meant that Ondo State had received less as 
a grouping of commodity-producing villages than its cocoa farmers gained as individuals. 
The state has in any case remained a net exporter of surplus to urban centres and 
importer of food. Ekiti-Akoko ADP was designed primarily to address the technical 
aspects of Ondo State’s food production problem. But the World Bank’s participation in 
the project has also reinforced existing patterns of urban-rural relations by adding an 
international dimension to urban-inclined policy initiatives in Ondo State’s food sub­
sector. The remainder of this dissertation highlights the continuing urban bias in official 
responses to the food problem in Ondo State and analyzes small farmers’ responses to the 
entire spectrum of programmes promoted by the Ekiti-Akoko project in the 1980s.
Peter Bauer, ‘The Economics of Resentment: Colonialism and Underdevelopment’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 4, 1 (1969), pp. 51-71.
Compare O. Teriba, ‘Development Strategy, Investment Decision, and Expenditure Patterns of a 
Public Development Institution: the Case of Western Nigeria Development Corporation, 1949-1962’, 
NJESS, 8, 2 (1966), pp. 235-258; with G. K. Helleiner, ‘The Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation: 
a Study in Sources and Uses of Public Development Funds, 1949-1962’, NJESS, 6, 1 (1964), pp. 98-123; 
and ‘A Wide-Ranging Development Institution: The Northern Nigeria Development Corporation, 1949-62’, 
NJESS, 6, 2 (1964), pp. 239-257.
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Chapter 3 
The World Bank in Ondo State, 1981-92
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the constitutive and regulative environment of World Bank 
presence in Ondo State in the 1980s. The literature on Bank activism in Third World 
agriculture and rural development has expanded since the 1970s  ^ and may be classified 
into three main groups. The first is illustrated by articles in Finance and Development, 
the International Monetary Fund’s in-house journal. Contributors have often emphasised 
the Bank’s global viewpoint and those of its associate agencies on urban and rural 
poverty, agriculture and rural development, as well as the sanctity of their procedures on 
project design, appraisal, and evaluation. They have often stressed the need for market- 
oriented policies and have been sanguine about the capability of Bank programmes to 
accelerate institutional change and economic development.^
The second category of literature has been more critical of Bank activities and 
accomplishments. Scholars in this group often examine how structural variables within 
host countries have, in effect, excluded small-farmers from benefiting directly or 
proportionately from Bank investment in agriculture and rural development. The Bank’s 
underlying perception of the poor, it has been argued, has persisted regardless; hence, 
the suggestion by Ernest Feder and Susan George, among other scholars, that the Bank 
and international agribusiness have been policy dictators of sorts or at least engaged in 
a conspiracy against Third World peasants since the 1970s.^ According to Payer,
' For a review, see Gavin Williams, ‘The World Bank and the Peasant Problem’, in Judith Heyer, Pepe 
Roberts, and Gavin Williams (eds,). Rural Development in Tropical Africa (1981), pp. 16-51.
 ^See the following contributions in FaD: M, Yudelman, ‘Integrated Rural Development Projects: the 
Bank’s Experience’, 14, 1 (1977), pp. 15-18; Mahbub ul Haq, ‘Changing Emphasis of the Bank’s Lending 
Policies’, 15, 2 (1978), pp. 12-14; Edward Jaycox, ‘The Bank and Urban Poverty’, 15, 3 (1978), pp. 10- 
13; Warren Baum, ‘The World Bank Project Cycle’, 15, 4 (1978), pp. 10-17; and Leif Christoffersen, ‘The 
Bank and Rural Poverty’, ibid., pp. 18-22.
 ^ Ernest Feder, ‘The New World Bank Programme for the Self-Liquidation of the Third World 
Peasantry’, JPS, 3, 3 (1976), pp. 343-354; Susan George, III Fares the Land (Washington, 1984); and 
Robert Ayres, Banking on the Poor (Cambridge, Mass., 1984).
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...the real aim of [the Bank’s] smallholder programs is the destruction of what is left of 
so-called subsistence production and the integration of all agricultural lands into the 
commercial sector through the production of a "marketable surplus" of cash crops [i.e. 
farm produce sold for cash], for the domestic market or for export.^
The validity of the above position is beyond dispute. But Payer and other proponents of 
similar views may have unwittingly oversimplified the causal chain by ascribing so much 
to Bank influence. Rather than regard it as a policy dictator, the third perspective 
conceives the Bank as a hobbled giant,^ global in outlook but lacking its own executive 
agency as well as ‘the institutional capacity to assist the poorest even if [or where it] had 
wanted to do so.’^  Bank influence on development thinking and policy, the argument 
goes, is invariably effected through or mediated by the state’s machinery. To this extent, 
the Bank is no more effective or efficient than the respective national-state system has 
made it.
Scholars of Nigerian agriculture and political economy differ on the extent to which 
programme outcomes are influenced by the Bank or by local circumstances. The most 
vocal view has been espoused by marxist or marxian academics and supported largely by 
macro data or northern Nigeria material. With varying intensity and analytical rigour, 
these scholars have suggested that the Bank’s increased presence in Nigerian agriculture 
since the 1970s have reflected a global campaign to ‘self-liquidate’ the peasantry in order 
to promote capital-intensive agriculture.^ This implies, however, that Nigerian peasants 
have been, or remain fundamentally opposed to capitalist agriculture, a position neither
 ^Cheryl Payer, The World Bank (New York, 1982), p. 220.
 ^ Stanley Please, The Hobbled Giant (Boulder, 1984).
® Paul Clough and Gavin Williams, ‘Decoding Berg: The World Bank in Rural Northern Nigeria’, in 
Michael Watts (ed.), State, Oil and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1987), p. 171.
’ See J. P. Olinger, ‘The World Bank and Nigeria’, ROAPE, 13 (1978), pp. 101-107; Zuwaqhu Bonat 
and Yahaya Abdullahi, ‘The World Bank, IMF and Nigeria’s Agricultural and Rural Economy’, in Bade 
Onimode (ed.). The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt, Vol. 2 (1989), pp. 153-176; R. A. Alkali, 
‘The World Bank: Financing Rural Development and the Politics of Debt in Nigeria’, AD, XVI, 3/4 (1991), 
pp. 163-179; E. E. Ekong, ‘The Role of the World Bank in Nigerian Agricultural Policy’, AD, XVII, 3 
(1992), pp. 65-98; Maikudi Karaye, ‘Hausa Peasants and Capitalism: A Case Study of Rural and 
Agricultural Development in Kano State in Nigeria’, Ph.D thesis. University of Wisconsin-Madison (1990), 
pp. 103-142; and Okechukwu Ibeanu, ‘The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Peasantry’, in 
Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.). Deadend to Nigerian Development (Dakar, 1993), pp. 124-153.
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wholly supported by the history of export-crop production nor admitted to by most 
proponents. What is commonly acknowledged is that the Nigerian state has exhibited 
considerable autonomy vis-a-vis international agencies since the 1970s.®
A second view has been concerned less with the ideological undercurrents of policy than 
the need to increase total factor productivity in small-scale agriculture. According to this 
view, held by agricultural economists at Ibadan University and other institutions, Bank 
presence might well be a price worth paying to make peasant food-farmers more 
responsive to technical change or to market incentives.^ As Wells has argued, however, 
the above distinctions are different interpretations of similar phenomena and may have 
overstated disagreement on the means rather than the ends of policy. In fact, few have 
questioned the need for technical change in peasant production or the decisive capitalist 
inclination of agricultural policy in post-colonial Nigeria. Bank-assisted food-crop 
programmes have channelled more support to medium and large-scale farmers than to 
peasants, lending further credence to a disaggregated view of Nigerian agrarian policy.
The position adopted here is pragmatic. It is assumed that Bank operations are themselves 
no more promotive or less inhibitive of socio-economic development than local state 
initiatives.^^ Under specific circumstances, either or both could constitute a problem as
® As in (i) the nationalisation of British Petroleum’s production and marketing facilities in 1978, 
following Britain’s ‘intransigence’ on Zimbabwe’s independence, and (ii) negotiations with the International 
Monetary Fund and the Bank on economic reform in the 1980s. On the latter, see T. Parfitt and Stephen 
Riley, ‘Nigeria: The Circuitous Path to Stabilization?’, in idem. The African Debt Crisis (1989), pp. 48-74; 
and Thomas Callaghy, ‘Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, 
Zambia, and Nigeria’, in Joan Nelson (ed.). Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, 1990), pp. 269- 
270; pp. 303-316.
 ^See Jerome Wells, Agricultural Policy and Economic Growth in Nigeria 1962-68 (Ibadan, 1974); S. 
O. Olayide et al.. Perspectives on Benin-Owena River Basin Development (Ibadan, 1979); J. A. Eweka et 
al.. Village Development (Ibadan, 1979); and S. O. Olayide, J. Eweka, and V. Bello-Osagie (eds.), 
Nigerian Small Farmers (Ibadan, 1980).
Gavin Williams, ‘Ideologies and Strategies for Rural Development: A Critique’, in his State and 
Society in Nigeria (Idanre, 1980), pp. 135-136. Originally published as ‘Rural Underdevelopment’, in E. 
O. Akeredolu-Ale (ed.). Social Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1977), pp. 251-275.
Gavin Williams, ‘The World Bank in Rural Nigeria Revisited’, ROAPE, 43 (1988), pp. 42-67.
Cf. John Toye, ‘Can the World Bank Resolve the Crisis of Developing Countries?’, JID, 1, 2 (1989), 
pp. 261-272.
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well as a solution. Effective implementation or delivery systems are not substitutes for 
appropriate policies, but management and administrative constraints could turn carefully 
designed development programmes into spectacular disasters. In any case, bank-funded 
programmes are often initiated by borrower-countries and subject to local macro- 
economic policy decisions. The state also bears primary responsibility for ‘the 
organisation of internal political and economic a f fa i rs ' . I t  seems appropriate, therefore, 
to emphasise state manoeuvring, or the lack of it, within the constraints and opportunities 
offered by Bank loan and project conditions.
What follows analyzes the politics of IRD project design and management in Nigeria, 
with EAADP and ODSADEP as reference points. Four specific tasks are attempted. The 
first is to examine how EAADP’s finances were affected by Nigeria’s declining economic 
fortunes in the 1980s. The second is to consider how measures intended to protect project 
operations from the crisis were affected by relationships between project management and 
the local agricultural and rural development bureaucracy. Third, the strategy of local state 
officials in mobilising popular support for EAADP, and how that strategy encouraged 
unrealistic expectations by the project’s public, are discussed. Finally, the chapter 
explores divergence and convergence between EAADP and ODSADEP on the one hand, 
and between both projects and their contemporaries in other parts of Nigeria on the other. 
It also emphasises how structural arrangements that apparently sprang from lessons of 
experience with earlier ADPs, and were intended to help overcome expected problems 
actually became problematic in EAADP’s circumstances.
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The next section puts EAADP and 
ODSADEP s budgets in the perspective of Bank operational guidelines as well as 
Nigeria’s changing economic fortunes in the 1980s. Section three discusses the populist 
roots of the crisis of expectations on the part of EAADP’s farming public while section 
four describes day-to-day administration and management in the project. A final section 
concludes the discussion.
Keith Hart, The Political Economy of West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1982), p. 2.
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3.2 Financing EAADP and ODSADEP
Ekiti-Akoko ADP was expected to absorb US $80.5 million (N48.2 million at the 1978 
official rate) in running costs and investment over its initial five-year investment period, 
beginning in 1981. Of this sum, costs were estimated at N15.0 million (or 31.1 % of total 
outlay) while investment in buildings, machinery, and other infrastructure was to account 
for N33.2 million or 68.9% of total outlay. Funds were to be contributed in different 
proportions by the Bank, the federal government, and the state government (ODSG). The 
Bank’s 40% share of total expenditure came in form of a loan in foreign exchange. The 
federal government (FGN) was to provide grants amounting to 25% of EAADP’s total 
budget, leaving ODSG with 35%.
Similar cost-sharing arrangements were made for ODSADEP at its launch in 1989. Its 
total budget of US $33.4 million was to be contributed by the Bank, the federal 
government and ODSG but in radically different proportions. The World Bank was to 
provide 73% of ODSADEP s through the International Development Association (IDA), 
its soft-credit arm,^ "* leaving FGN and ODSG with 16% and 9% respectively. Unlike 
in Ekiti-Akoko, however, ‘beneficiaries’ (i.e. farmers) were expected to contribute 1.5% 
of ODSADEP s total costs.
Table 3.1 presents data on funding for EAADP and ODSADEP, allowing preliminary 
comparative inferences to be drawn about both projects and bringing into bold relief the 
financial aspects of changes that swept through Nigerian agriculture in the 1980s. 
Although relatively low, the 1.5% expected contribution to ODSADEP s funds by its 
‘beneficiaries’ reflects movement away from administrative to market-based funding; it 
also signals the introduction into Nigerian agriculture of the efficiency principle of user 
fees.^  ^ The problem, though, is that the change was prompted more by official cost- 
cutting than by the quest for greater fiscal discipline in the public sector. Small-farmers 
were thus likely to be worse off, since the abuses occasioned by privileged access to
R. T. Libby, ‘International Development Association: A Legal Fiction Designed to Secure an LDC 
Constituency’, International Organisation, 29, 4 (1975), pp. 1065-1072.
David Leonard, ‘African Practice and the Theory of User Fees’, in John Howell (ed.). Recurrent 
Costs and Agricultural Development (1985), pp. 130-145.
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official channels by middle peasants and business-farmers would have remained intact.
Table 3.1
Sources of EAADP and ODSADEP’s Funds (US $ million)
(1) Agency (2) EAADP (3) ODSADEP (4) Combined budget
Budget % Budget % Total %
World Bank* 32.4 40.0 24.4 73.0 56.8 49.9
FGN 20.2 25.0 5.5 16.4 25.6 22.5
ODSG 27.9 35.0 3.0 9.1 30.9 27.2
Beneficiaries - - 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.4
Total 80.5 100.0 33.4 100.0 113.9 100.0
Note: '  Bank assistance for ODSADEP routed through International Development Association. 
Sources:
Col. (2): EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP from Inception to October 1986.’
Col. (3): ODSADEP, ‘Ondo State Implementation Strategy for the Achievement of the 
National Agricultural Policy’, Internal Briefing Paper (1992), p. 2.
Col. (4): Computed.
Bank contribution also increased dramatically between the two projects, from 40% to 
73%. Its share of total planned expenditure for both projects averaged 50%. Increasing 
Bank financial commitment to IRD in Ondo State also coincided with the reduction in 
FGN and ODSG’s share of costs. The federal government’s 25% share of EAADP’s 
budget declined to about 16% for ODSADEP and averaged 22% for both projects. The 
state government’s projected contribution declined even more sharply from 35% for 
EAADP to 9% for ODSADEP, averaging 27% for both projects. The Bank’s increased 
financial commitment to ODSADEP is also likely to have been matched out by its higher 
structural leverage on Ekiti-Akoko ADP.
Funds from each source were tied to specific expenditure items or categories. The 
state government’s contributions were to be used to pay local staff salaries, procure basic 
infrastructure and meet other recurrent expenses while federal grants were earmarked for 
capital development and input procurement, including the cost of local transport and 
subsidies. The latter costs were to be shared with the state government. Major foreign 
currency-denominated expenses, such as input procurement and capital costs, were to be
Cf. Adefolu Akinbode and J. Y. Yayock, ‘Recurrent Financing of Agricultural Services in Nigeria’s 
Agricultural Development Projects’, in Howell, Recurrent, p. 192.
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funded jointly by FGN and the Bank. But proceeds from Bank credit were to be expended 
on a higher proportion of capital expenditure on infrastructure and technical equipment, 
including plants, vehicles, and spare parts; and on consultancy fees, etc.
Table 3.2
Allocation of EAADP’s Credit (by expenditure category)
N= Loan/Expenditure Category SAR® 
allocation 
(US $m)
Reimburse­
ment rate 
(%)"
% of total 
credif
% of total 
planned 
expenditure
i. Civil works 7,8 40 24,0 9,7
ii. Plant, vehicles, road making 
equipment, spare parts 7,2 90-100 22,2 8,9
iii. Salaries and allowances of 
international staff, consultancy 
services, overseas training 6,7 100 20,6 8,3
iv. Fertilizer, chemicals, agricultural 
equipment, other farm implement 7,5 85-100 23,1 9,3
V. Unallocated 3,3 - 10,2 4,1
Total 32,5 63 100,1 40.3
Notes: * Staff Appraisal Report, the World Bank’s preview of project operations.
Proportion of expenditure refundable by the Bank in respect of each item or category. 
Entries do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Christensen, EAADP Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), p. 133,
Table 3.2 sets out the allocation of Bank credit for EAADP and suggests three important 
points. The first concerns the distribution between the Bank and the respective 
governments of the proportion of expenditure to be borne by each in respect of agreed 
items. The salaries and allowances of internationally recruited staff, consultancy services 
and overseas training [item iii in Table 3.2] had 100% reimbursement rate. 
Corresponding rate for plants, vehicles, and spare parts [item ii] was between 90% and 
100%; that of fertilizer, chemicals and other inputs was 85%-100%. At only 40%, civil 
works had the lowest reimbursement rate but accounted for 24% of loan funds and about 
10% of total planned expenditure. Yet, by their very nature, the construction of 
buildings, roads, culverts and bridges offered immediate benefit to locals, including wage 
employment and expanded demand for food. It seemed therefore that more foreign funds 
were allocated to the project’s internal needs than to its public - necessary evidence for
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the view that a project’s primary task is to channel aid to programme components that 
best promote donor countries’ supply capacity/^
Secondly, disbursements from the project loan were available only as counterpart or 
matching funds, or as reimbursement for expenses already incurred on project activities. 
This is a standard condition in Bank loan agreements which has enabled the Bank to 
determine when and under what conditions to make funds available to which 
borrower(s).^® Since the counterpart clause was unknown in earlier Bank agreements 
with Nigeria, for example the second cocoa project in 1974, it must be assumed that it 
became operative from the 1980s, when declining oil incomes forced Nigeria to reduce 
funding for ADPs.^^ By 1981/82 fiscal year, insufficient funding for Nigeria’s ADPs 
had become so commonplace that the Bank sought and obtained more stringent 
conditions, including an undertaking by some state governments to allow the Federal 
Government to deduct subventions due to their ADPs from source. This arrangement was 
subsequently written into ADP loan agreements between Nigeria and the Bank.^ ® 
Designed ostensibly to protect ADPs from politically-motivated denial of funds, the 
arrangement created a lien on the incomes of the state governments concerned.
The counterpart arrangement applied at EAADP, and the Bank did not create a lien on 
Ondo State’s share of federally-allocated revenue. But severe cash shortages occasioned 
largely by ODSG’s poor disbursement rate occasioned greater difficulties for the project. 
By 1982, eighteen months into project operations, the state government had disbursed 
only Nl.O million, about 30% of its share of project budget for the first year. In turn, 
the federal government exceeded projected disbursement rates by 39%, providing the bulk 
of EAADP’s hinds for the year. By the end of 1982, only 14% of credit projected for
Hans Gsanger, The Future o f Rural Development (1993), p. 7; G. Honadle and Jay K. Rosengard, 
‘Putting ‘Projectized’ Development in Perspective’, PAAD, 3, 4 (1983), p. 302.
** IBRD, ‘Loan Regulations No. 3, Applicable to Loans made by the Bank to Member Governments’, 
February 15, 1961 as amended February 9, 1967, pp. 6-7.
Akinbode and Yayock, ‘Recurrent’, p. 192.
“  Ibid., p. 194.
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the year had been drawn, though another document put the figure at 19.5%.^^ Either 
way, four-fifths of credit earmarked for EAADP’s operations in 1981/82 remained 
unwithdrawn by the end of the period. By the end of 1982, the situation had become 
precarious enough to force a re-negotiation of the project budget with the Bank.
In February 1983, an agreement (known in project nomenclature as the Kaduna 
agreement/budget) was reached on a new budget to avert the total collapse of project 
operations. Three main changes were made to the original project budget by the 
agreement. The first was that EAADP’s five-year investment phase was extended by one 
fiscal year from 1981-1985 to 1986. This gave the state government more time to meet 
its financial obligations to EAADP. Subject to improved fund allocation, the extension 
could have enabled EAADP to make more efficient use of its credit. The arrangement 
implied, however, that ODSG’s poor fund disbursement had been due in some way to 
insufficient time, and that the problem would be resolved over time. As I show below, 
this was clearly mistaken, for it assumed away the deeper structural roots of ODSG’s 
cash crisis.
Second, the state government was allowed to turn over to EAADP part of its 
Development Loan Stock in lieu of anticipated cash contributions. About 41% (N6.4m) 
of the N15.7 million due from ODSG for the remainder of EAADP’s investment phase 
was so converted. In theory, this reduced existing pressure on government cash while 
enabling the project to raise funds from the capital market. In practice, however, the 
project was little more than a newly established parastatal in the eyes of the investing 
public. The stocks on offer were also the state government’s and could attract only as 
much funds as the private sector was willing to invest in ODSG’s business. Given the 
limited opportunities for commerce and industry in the local economy, Ondo State has 
been everything but an exciting investment proposition. In the event, only N2.2 million 
or one-third of the amount anticipated under the Kaduna budget had been raised from this 
source by June 1984. Finally, a substantial sum was redistributed between expenditure
Computed from Jens Christensen, EAADP Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), pp. 130-131.
^  EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP from Inception to October 1986’ (Ikole-Ekiti, n.d.). Appendix II.
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categories to concentrate cash on crucial areas of project activity and increase momentum 
of project development in what may be called cross-subsidisation.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.3 present the original and re-negotiated budgets, with cross­
subsidised values shown in bold letters to facilitate comparison. A total of US $8.8 
million, or 27 % of project credit, was shuffled between expenditure items in two related 
processes. The first was the reduction by US $2.8 million of the SAR’s residual or 
‘unallocated’ category (item vi) and the corresponding transfer of the sum to civil works 
(item i). This increased the original SAR provision for civil works by 36% and left the 
residual category with only US $0.5 million. The reimbursement rate for civil works was 
also raised from 40% to 70%. Since civil works encompass construction of physical 
infrastructure like warehouses and stores, the additional provision could have facilitated 
the establishment of the project’s operational infrastructure.
Table 3.3
Re allocation of EAADP’s Credit, 1983 (by category)
(1) (2) Loan/Expenditure Category (3) Original budget (4) Re-negotiated budget
N=
Allocation 
(US $m)
Reimburse­
ment rate 
(%)
Allocation 
(US $m)
Reimburse­
ment rate 
(%)
i. Civil works 7.8 40.0 10.6 70.0
ii. Plant, vehicles, road making 
equipment, spare parts 7.2 90.0-100.0 7.2 90.0-100.0
iii. Salaries and allowances of 
international staff, consultancy 
services, overseas training 6.7 100.0 6.7 90.0-100.0
iv. Salaries of local (direct) staff - - 6.0 50.0
V. Fertilizer, chemicals, agricultural 
equipment, other farm implement 7.5 85.0-100.0 1.5 85.0
vi. Unallocated 3.3 - 0.5 -
Total 32.5 79.0-85.0 32.5 77.0-84.0
Source: same as Table 3.2.
Secondly, the vote for fertilizer, chemicals, and agricultural equipment (US $7.5m, item 
vi) was reduced by four-fifths. The amount involved, US $6.0 million or 18.5% of total
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project credit, was transferred to Local Staff Salaries (item v). This left the fertilizer and 
farm implement expenditure category with only one-fifth of the original vote but enabled 
EAADP to include local staff salaries among items with foreign exchange ‘cover’. 
Regular and prompt payment of salaries could have boosted staff morale at a time when 
public servants were being owed up to six months’ wages in some states, including Ondo. 
But the arrangement only applied to staff recruited directly by or on behalf of the project 
and excluded ‘assigned staff’, those seconded from existing government departments for 
more or less fixed terms. Since, as I show below, the latter constituted up to two-thirds 
of senior staff, and averaged 47% of EAADP’s total staff complement in 1981-86, the 
Kaduna agreement in effect discriminated against a statistically and structurally significant 
segment of project personnel.
The agreement remained subject to the Bank’s counterpart principle. This effectively tied 
potential improvement in EAADP’s fortunes to increased funding by the state 
government. Nigeria’s worsening macro-economic circumstances after 1982, and the cost 
of ODSG’s free education and health programmes clearly whittled down the Kaduna 
agreement’s initial potential. By June 1984, three years into project life, ODSG had 
disbursed less than one-fifth of its share of total project budget. The federal government 
had released over 50% of its projected contribution while 36% of Bank credit had been 
withdrawn. Disbursements from all sources amounted to 36% of planned total 
expenditure.^^ At the end of EAADP’s extended investment phase in 1986, the federal 
government had met 93 % of its contribution while the Bank and ODSG met only 55 % 
and 29% respectively (Table 3.4). At slightly over half of expected levels, total 
investment from all sources was similar to the Bank’s disbursement rate, suggesting that 
‘the rate of loan disbursement [was] positively correlated with the extent of the 
contributions of [Ondo] State and Federal Governments.
“  Computed from ibid.. Table 46, p. 132.
^  APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Vol. I, Main Report (Benin-City, 1986), p. 15.
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Table 3.4
Planned and Actual Investment in EAADP, 1981-86 (by source, current N’m)
Source Planned investment (N’m) Actual investment (N’m) Actual as % of 
planned 
investmentAmount % of total Amount* % of total
Ondo State Govt. 16.7 35.0 4.8 17.9 28.7
Federal Govt. 12.1 25.0 11.3 42.1 93.4
World Bank 19.4 40.0 10.7 40.0 55.0
Total 48.2 100.0 26.8 100.0 55.6
Note: “ ODSG’s contribution included N2.2 million development stock, but excluded building and 
equipment (Nl,6m) and seconded staff salaries (N3.242m).
Source; EAADP: ‘Brief on EAADP’.
In view of the above, it is not surprising that poor funding was a primary constraint on 
Ekiti-Akoko ADP. Apart from occasioning delays and loss of momentum in a sector in 
which operations are particularly time-sensitive, the project was also obliged to pay a 
conunitment charge on the undisbursed balance on its credit account. The commitment 
charge is not new in Nigeria’s credit transactions with the Bank. Article II Section 2.05 
of Nigeria’s second cocoa loan agreement states that ‘a commitment charge at the rate 
of three-fourths of one per cent (3/4 of 1 %) per annum on the principal amount of the 
Loan not withdrawn from time to tim e\^  In EAADP’s case, however, the charge was 
payable on any balance of the project loan that was ‘at any time unspent*}^ It is difficult 
to put a precise value on EAADP’s losses from the charge or from its poor financial 
state. As a former Project Manager told me, however, the commitment charge possibly 
did more harm to EAADP’s finances than the nominal interest rate on Bank credit. 
Indeed, since that three-quarters of project credit was never withdrawn, let alone 
employed productively, the charge is likely to have formed a substantial part of project 
losses estimated at N5.0 million or 10% of total plaimed expenditure.^*
^ IBRD, ‘Loan Agreement (Second Cocoa Project) Between Federal Republic of Nigeria and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ (October 11, 1974), p. 5. Emphasis added.
“  Christensen, Final Report, p. 132. Emphasis added.
Interview, March 1992,
Christensen, Final Report, p. 132.
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3.3 Populism and EAADP’s Crisis of Expectations
Before examining Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s institutional framework, it is necessary to consider 
the role of the general farming public in the project’s constitutive environment. How 
were EAADP’s objectives presented to its potential beneficiaries and the general public? 
How was the farming population mobilised prior to project implementation? In attempting 
to answer the foregoing questions, this section discusses what EAADP meant to the man 
in the street, how official campaign strategies helped create that popular imagination, and 
the implications of both for project performance.
Public opinion formation about EAADP revolved around assumed or perceived want-get 
gaps, or levels of socio-economic deprivation in Ondo State’s farming community. 
Although all development projects are designed to address this problem, officials made 
much from prevailing interpretations of deprivation in Ondo State by emphasising how 
Bank assistance for EAADP and the project’s transformatory potential would help close 
the want-get ratios in the project area. But this reinforced the civil servant’s conception 
of state agencies as ‘champions of rural cultivators’, overstated EAADP’s potential and 
encouraged an erroneous view of its objectives and operations by the general public.
Claims that EAADP represented a new dimension in World Bank activity in Ondo State’s 
agricultural economy could be justified. Before the 1980s, Bank involvement in the state 
had been limited to cocoa rehabilitation and oil-palm production - reflecting official 
concern at the decline in both crops since the late 1960s. As ‘the first comprehensive 
Bank investment in food crop development in Ondo State’,Ekiti-A koko ADP provided 
a welcome assistance on the state’s food production difficulties, discussed in chapter 2. 
Its enclave orientation also promised a concentration of support services over a relatively 
small geographical area straddling Ondo State’s savanna and forest vegetations, with 
demonstration effects expected well beyond the enclave.
From a wider viewpoint, EAADP stood over and above its contemporaries in terms of 
cost or the foreign (loan) component of its planned total expenditure. The commitment
IBRD, EAADP Staff Appraisal Report (1980), p. 1.
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by the bank of US $32.5 million in loans to EAADP clearly puts it ahead of each and 
every one of its antecedents, amounting as it does to 13.5% of total Bank loan 
commitments ($241.5 million) to Nigeria’s nine enclave ADPs, including Ekiti-Akoko 
(Table 3.5). The sum conunitted to EAADP also accounts for 7.3% of all agricultural 
sector loans (19 loans totalling US $442.7 million) granted to Nigeria by the Bank up to
1980. In relative terms, no single agricultural project embarked upon in Nigeria with 
World Bank assistance (25 projects. Bank credit totalling US $1,130.0 million) between 
1971 and 1983 attracted, or was planned to attract, as much Bank funding as Ekiti-Akoko 
(Table 3.5).
Table 3.5
World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans to Nigeria, 1971-83 (US $ million)
No. Year Purpose/Project Amount*
1. 1971 Western State Cocoa Project 7.2
2. 1971 2nd Western State Cocoa Project 20.2
3. 1974 Funtua ADP 29.0
4. 1974 Gusau ADP 19.0
5. 1974 Gombe ADP 21.0
6. 1974 Rice Production: Anambra, Imo and Cross-River States 17.5
7. 1974 Livestock 21.0
8. 1975 Nucleus Oil-Palm Estate/Smallholders Project: Ondo State 17.0
9. 1975 Ditto: Bendel State 29.5
10. 1975 Ditto: Imo State 19.0
11. 1977 Lafia ADP 27.0
12. 1977 Ayangba ADP 35.0
13. 1979 Bida ADP 23.0
14. 1979 Ilorin ADP 27.0
15. 1979 Rivers Oil-Palm Project 30.0
16. 1979 Forestry Plantation Programme 31.0
17. 1979 Agricultural and Rural Management Training Institute (ARMTI) 9.0
18. 1980 Oyo North ADP 28.0
19. 1980 Ekiti-Akoko ADP 32.5
20. 1981 Bauchi ADP 132.0
21. 1981 Kano ADP 142.0
22. 1981 Technical Assistance 47.0
23. 1982 Sokoto ADP 147.0
24. 1983 Agricultural Development 81.3
25. 1983 Kaduna ADP 138.0
Total 1,130.0
Note: “ Approved but not necessarily disbursed credit.
Computed from: World Bank, EAADP Staff Appraisal Report (1980), pp. 4-5; FGN, ‘A Decade of ADPs 
in Nigeria’ (Lagos, 1986); Editor, ‘Agriculture and Oil-Based Accumulation’, in Watts, State, p. 79.
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The exemptions to this apparent rule of thumb are four ADPs and two technical 
assistance programmes in the agricultural sector, but all four differ significantly from 
Ekiti-Akoko ADP. Since the four ADPs (in Bauchi, Kano, Sokoto, and Kaduna States) 
commenced operations between 1981 and 1983 as state-wide projects, the higher average 
Bank assistance could be justified by their presumably wider territorial scope. Similarly, 
the Federal Agricultural Co-ordinating Unit (FACU) and the Agricultural Projects 
Monitoring, Evaluation, and Planning Unit (APMEPU), both established under a 
technical assistance programme with the Bank, are extra-ministerial agencies with 
Nigeria-wide functional responsibilities. FACU co-ordinates agricultural policy 
implementation while APMEPU is responsible for strategic planning and monitoring of 
Nigeria’s ADPs. Finally, rent-seeking and outright plunder of public funds by the elite 
has had a cost-push effect on public sector projects, but the impact of this generalised 
problem on individual ADPs is difficult to assess.
The World Bank loomed large in projections of EAADP’s potential to the general public. 
Bank involvement (or its articulation) facilitated the legitimation and acceptance by the 
public of the project idea. But it also raised expectations that became unattainable in 
practice. Official pre-implementation campaigns in rural Ondo State made great store of 
the global alliance of forces that EAADP symbolised. Rural development was rationalized 
to the less discerning public as îgbé ayé rere fun îgbèriko - the good life in rural areas; 
or better still, as îgbé ayé rere fun àwon àgbèe wa - higher living standards for our 
farmers, with emphasis on the collective pronoun our to suggest common destiny or 
common interests between poor farmers and a benevolent state supported by ‘progressive’ 
rural and urban el i tes .The bank itself was referred to in vernacular as Bânki àgbâyé 
and, for good effect, as Bânkî àgbânlâ ayé. In ordinary circumstances, Àgbâyé and 
Àgbânlà ayé both depict the physical expanse and diversity of the universe. But the latter 
hints at infinite physicality, suggesting that the World Bank normally deals with an 
incredibly large number of demands for assistance, and sensitizing Ekiti-Akoko farmers 
to the ‘good luck’ that they have had in obtaining Bank funding for EAADP. In this 
frame, the Bank was not a hard-nosed commercial institution, rather a charity whose long
^  Personal knowledge. As a co-operative inspector, I attended many farmers’ meetings in the late 1970s 
at which these claims were made by several co-operative leaders.
90
caring hands could reach, and finally did reach, Ondo State’s northernmost fringes.
To sum up, EAADP’s popular image contrasted sharply with its design objectives and 
operational mode. Official documents left no doubt that the project’s commercial 
orientation was designed to change the status quo in small-scale production, but the public 
was encouraged to regard it as a reinforcement of the peasantry. This fitted various 
depictions of the project as ‘[a] champion of the small farmer’ a Farmer’s Friend, as 
EAADP’s in-house newsmagazine was titled; or the symbol of God’s intervention to 
ensure that Ekiti-Akoko farmers obtained their share of increasing local and global 
expenditure on rural development. To be sure, this distorted view of ADPs extended well 
beyond Ondo State, accounting at least in part, for political pressure during the 1980s to 
abandon the enclave strategy altogether and transform existing enclave projects into state­
wide projects .But  a combination of unrealistic expectations and not-too-compatible 
interests compounded EAADP’s uniquely difficult financial and operational 
circumstances. As the next section shows, the project’s internal structures were no less 
afflicted.
3.4 Project Administration and Management
Ekiti-Akoko ADP was designed as a semi-autonomous agency, its parallel structures to 
be supervised nominally rather than controlled directly by or through the ministry of 
agriculture. In theory, this could ‘insulate the project from the country in general and 
from the rest of...[Ondo State’s] public sector in par t icularAutonomy also enables 
a project to ‘benefit from a clearer orientation towards achieving visible and measurable 
results within a specified time frame...the greater coincidence in formation and 
implementation of work programs and a shorter chain of command’. I n  fact, however, 
the quest for project autonomy has often created more problems than it has solved by
Payer, World Bank, p. 208.
Francis Idachaba, ‘Institutional Arrangements for Self-Sufficiency in Food Production in the 1990s’, 
Public Service Lecture, NIIA, Lagos, 21 August 1990, p. 5.
Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, 1995 ed.), p. 154.
^ Uma Lele, The Design o f Rural Development (Baltimore, 1975), p. 129.
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making relations between project authorities and cognate departments more crucial to day- 
to-day project administration than the structures established specifically for that purpose. 
This section describes EAADP’s decision-making structures, showing how presumably 
sincere attempts to overcome administrative and structural problems associated with 
Nigeria’s public sector occasioned greater difficulties for the project.
The project’s institutional framework comprised three main organs, namely, the 
Agricultural Projects Governing Board, the Technical Advisory Committee, and the 
Project Management Unit.^  ^ Of the three, the Agricultural Projects Governing Board 
(APGB, or the Board) was formally the most important. Established by legislation, APGB 
had overall control of Ondo State’s agriculture and rural development policy, with 
express powers to ‘coordinate the work of Ministries and Agencies and organisations 
involved in carrying out the agricultural projects of the State and to oversee the progress 
of the p ro j ec t s .The  Board was also expected to award contracts and ‘ensure common 
conditions of s e r v i c e i n  all projects, including Bank-assisted programmes on 
afforestation and cocoa regeneration; a seed multiplication unit, and ODSG’s ‘agricultural 
development project’. Finally, APGB mediated project-govemment relations, each Project 
Manager reporting to the Commissioner for Agriculture through it while APGB itself 
reported through him to the State Executive Council.
The Board’s membership seemed to be broad-based enough for a policy organ. With the 
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development as chairman, APGB comprised 
five nominees of the State Governor, the Permanent Secretary of the Agriculture 
Ministry, one representative each from the Ministries of Finance, Works and Transport, 
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, and from ‘coopted agencies’. But its wide-ranging 
remit included rival projects, raising questions about the Board’s even-handedness. 
Several ex-EAADP officials, including the Project Manager, argued that APGB was far
Cf. IBRD, Rural Development (n.p., 1988), p. 78f.
“  Ondo State Legal Notice N® 38, Ondo State o f Nigeria Official Gazette, 5, 9 (1980), p. 86.
O. Famoriyo, ‘Organisation and Management’, in APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Vol.II 
(Benin-City, 1986), p. 3.
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too concerned with political interest-balancing to be an objective umpire, and that wider 
concerns embraced by the Board often imposed substantial losses on E AA DP .T he  
inclusion of the co-opted membership from unspecified agencies also allowed for an 
expanded APGB but provided potential sinecures for government’s partisan supporters. 
Both possibilities were intensified, albeit in different ways, by the lack of commitment 
to the ADP concept by Ondo State’s elected government in 1979-83 and the establishment 
in 1988 of the Ondo State Farmers’ Congress (on which more in chapter 10). In fact, 
APGB held 45 meetings over 59 calendar months, their frequency declining steadily from 
about monthly in April 1980 to September 1983 to less than five in eight months after 
April 1984.39
The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC or the Committee), illustrates the depth of 
bureaucratic oversight on Ekiti-Akoko ADP. In one sense, TAC represented an essential 
continuity with EAADP’s past, having formed the nucleus of the project’s planning 
secretariat as the Agricultural Projects Planning Committee, with a remit that included 
all assisted projects in Ondo State. Its metamorphosis however constituted an avoidable 
anachronism from the viewpoint of project autonomy. Established to advise APGB on 
technical issues, including agronomy and infrastructure, the Committee’s membership 
comprised the cream of Ondo State’s agriculture ministry, including its Permanent 
Secretary as chairman; seven heads of divisions (i.e. Agriculture, Veterinary, Forests, 
Fisheries, Produce, Engineering, Rural Development, and the Secretary for Finance and 
Administration); and two APGB members. In principle, other officials, including those 
from the project, could be coopted into the Committee as and when necessary, but 
cooptation is not quite the same as full-fledged membership. The Committee could and 
most probably did serve as a counterpoint to APGB’s seeming political partisanship. But 
it was dominated by officials most likely to have projected the civil service orientation 
in project-related decision-making, or at least resolved conflict-of-interest situations in 
favour of the civil service, because their departments’ responsibilities overlapped with 
project functions. In short, TAC may have compounded EAADP’s difficulties by adding
Interviews, January-April 1992; Christensen, Final Report, pp. 119-120. 
EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 3.
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bureaucratie partisanship to APGB’s political partisanship, or bringing in through the 
back door the very traditions negating project autonomy.
The Ekiti-Akoko Project Management Unit (EAPMU, or the Unit) was the most crucial 
and, ironically, the most paralysed project institution. As the organ responsible for day- 
to-day administration, EAPMU was the focal point of operational decisions. The Unit 
was also responsible for promoting local participation in project decision-making; as 
such, it provided a meeting point for all project-related interests, including senior project 
personnel, representatives of local farmers and supervisory agencies. Yet, as shown 
below, sharp contradictions in the objective interests and outlook of these groupings made 
EAPMU an improbable coalition, a symptom and an underlying cause of the project’s 
social and operational difficulties.
In theory, PMUs existed at project and local government levels, bringing together 
respective senior project personnel and representatives of cognate agencies and farmers. 
The project-level PMU comprised the Project Manager as chairman; his Deputy, and 
heads of sub-programmes, that is Agriculture; Monitoring and Evaluation; Engineering; 
and Extension. Also included were two farmers from each of five EGAs, a representative 
of the host local government authority, the ministry of agriculture, two coopted members 
(including at least one from FACU), and a Secretary. In turn, local PMUs operated as 
committees comprising respective heads of the project’s main divisions (i.e. agricultural 
extension, cooperatives, mechanical engineering, and poultry); a project Zonal Officer; 
representatives of the local government and education authorities; five farmers; and one 
coopted member. A chairman was selected from amongst the members.
In practice, local PMUs were little more than executive bodies of project headquarters. 
Project-level PMU membership also included the most strategic project positions, a 
normal practice in ordinary circumstances. In EAADP’s case, where all such positions 
were occupied by expatriates, PMU s membership excluded the project’s understudies, 
themselves senior officials seconded to the project as part of plans to improve local 
management capacity and sustain the project sub-culture beyond EAADP’s investment 
phase. This was potentially self-destructive to the project since it denied invaluable hands-
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on training to its future m anage r sBu t  the puzzle was compounded by acrimonious 
relations between DARUDEC’s management team and the indigenous complement of 
EAADP’s staff on the one hand, and on the other by different approaches to farmer 
organisation by staff seconded from the departments of agriculture and cooperatives 
respectively/^ I shall return to this issue in section 5 of chapter 4.
The problem derived largely from ODSG’s attempt to eat its cake and keep it. As 
indicated above, EAADP’s commercial orientation was contrary to expectations by Ondo 
State’s farming public and existing patterns of government-administered programmes. 
Still, the state government was not inclined to incorporate it as a private company. This 
left open the single firm approach favoured by the Bank, whereby the project would be 
run by a consulting firm,"^  ^but ODSG contracted Copenhagen-based DARUDEC, rather 
than a local firm, to run the project from 1981 to 1984. As a foreign concern, 
DARUDEC probably had a greater potential to help improve staff management skills than 
a local consulting firm, but this depended on whether the project recruited fresh staff 
directly or relied on those seconded from existing government agencies.
The former option meant a wider scope for the acquisition of new skills while the latter 
was cheaper financially. Apart from putting at project’s disposal as much of ODSG’s 
existing human resources as was possible, project responsibility for seconded staff 
salaries was limited to incentives - fixed at one additional salary grade level and after 
1986, at 15% of gross salaries. Secondments also offered new opportunities for local staff 
from a wide spectrum of the public service to acquire new technical, commercial and 
management skills. These skills could be invaluable in subsequent non-project postings, 
for example by helping to overcome red-tape and inertia as well as facilitate the 
integration of project sub-culture into the policy machine. However, secondments often 
create its own organisational problems. Seconded staff usually have to keep one of their
40 Ibid., p. 5.
Interviews with ex-project staff, including Project Manager (30/3/92) and two Commercial Managers 
(on 31/3/92 and 30/4/92).
IBRD, Staff Appraisal Report, para. 8.08.
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legs in their original agencies for reasons of career progression. In a context in which 
civil servants normally keep their jobs for life, the choice has often been between a 
temporary posting and long-term security of tenure, giving rise to divided loyalty and 
weakening the host organisation’s control over reward and punishment.
In EAADP’s case, seconded staff were easily the most dominant both in statistical and 
structural terms. In 1982, assigned staff accounted for 63% out of a total staff 
complement of 480, leaving direct staff with only 37% of the total staff complement 
(Table 3.6). The assigned staff ratio declined subsequently to just over 40% as from 1983 
and fell below 30% in 1986, partly because of increased staff recruitment by the project 
and partly because EAADP’s initial allure had subsided and seconded staff had returned 
to their substantive posts. Still, assigned staff remained significant statistically at an 
annual average of 46.5% in 1981 to 1986, while direct staff averaged 53.5% per annum.
Table 3.6
EAADP: Staff Disposition by Origin, 1981-86
Year Total staff 
complement
Assigned Direct
N® % of total N= % of total
1981 307 286 93.2 21 6.8
1982 480 302 63.0 178 37.0
1983 718 318 44.3 400 55.7
1984 726 301 41.5 425 58.5
1985 707 272 38.5 435 61.5
1986 516 127 24.6 389 75.4
Average® 576 268 46.5 308 53.5
Note: * Unweighted mean per annum.
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 7,
A substantial component of senior project staff, including most understudies, also belong 
to the assigned staff category. In 1981, EAADP’s total staff complement stood at 307, 
comprising 246 junior staff (on salary grade levels 01 and 06 of Nigeria’s public service 
salary scheme), 53 senior indigenous staff and 8 expatriates.Assigned staff for that 
year totalled 286, forty more than the total complement of junior staff for the same year.
EAADP, Internal Project Completion Report.
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The difference is most certainly attributable to assigned staff in senior project positions. 
In fact, assigned staff accounted for two-thirds of all established senior project (including 
expatriates’) posts, or three-quarters of positions occupied by indigenous staff in 1981. 
By 1982, EAADP had increased its staff complement by 173 or 56% over the level for
1981. About 91% (or 157) of newly recruited staff belonged to the direct staff category 
while only 16 (or 9%) were assigned. Of all newly recruited staff, 164 (or 95%) were 
junior while 9 (5%) were senior, of which only one was expatriate. Even if it was 
assumed that only half of senior staff recruited in 1982 was seconded from existing 
agencies, at least 63% of all senior project posts and up to 70% of all such posts 
occupied by indigenous personnel in 1982 would still have been held by assigned staff.
The large presence of assigned staff however brought its own difficulties. Two major 
project attributes became problematic, namely, the large foreign component of 
management personnel and differentials in pay and working conditions between 
expatriates and local senior staff. Under the terms of the consultancy agreement, 
DARUDEC was responsible for recruitment into 14 senior posts, including those of 
Project Manager, Chief Accountant, Commercial Manager, Cooperative and Credit 
Specialist and Workshop Manager.'^ The agreement did not specifically assign any of 
these posts to Nigerians, but DARUDEC agreed informally, according to internal 
documents, to appoint Nigerians into nine posts and expatriates into the remaining five. 
The mix was altered subsequently to eight Nigerians and six expatriates, but an 
understudy programme was to be pursued to enable Nigerians to take over all expatriate 
positions.
Contrary to this informal agreement, DARUDEC reportedly manoeuvred the state 
government to back its preferred complement of 13 expatriates and one Nigerian, a 
Senior Extension Officer. Still, DARUDEC’s staffing performance was inadequate, for 
it failed to fill all posts in the ‘new’ expatriate quota, recruited inappropriately qualified
EAADP, ‘Agreement for Consultancy Services Between the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development Ondo State and Danish Rural Development Consultants (DARUDEC) Copenhagen-Denmark ' 
(August 1981), Appendix C.
EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 5.
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staff, and above all, could not retain the services of appointees in the project. According 
to official reports, the Project Manager held a masters degree in agriculture as required, 
but his practical experience was limited to a family farm. The Chief Accountant was 62 
years old at the time he was employed; moreover, his resume did not indicate that he 
possessed any accounting qualification. Only one of five appointees into the Chief 
Agricultural Officer’s (CAO) post in six years had ‘satisfactory agricultural research 
background to be able to supervise and articulate agricultural research results for the 
purpose of supporting the extension component. Others found it difficult to adjust to 
local social circumstances or get on with indigenous staff.
This occasioned a remarkably high turnover of key (expatriate) staff, which, as Idachaba 
has shown in a wider context, often encourages inertia and operational inefficiency. 
For example, three expatriate CAOs served the project in as many years to 1984. The 
first was allowed to spend part of his sabbatical leave at EAADP, staying for six months 
to September 1982; the second spent ten months, leaving in July 1983, while the third, 
designated as Deputy Chief Agricultural Officer, held the post from September 1982 to 
December 1984.^ *^ By 1986, the headship of each of Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation; Training and Information Services; and Agriculture and Technical Services 
had changed four times respectively, while that of Engineering changed five times. Even 
the headship of project administration, held by locals from the Governor’s Office, 
changed three times in four years: the first Chief Administrative Officer (CADO) spent 
three months only, the second left the project after eight months, while the third held 
office for 27 m onths.T his meant an average tenure of one year for each CADO.
High expatriate turnover created a vicious circle in relations between expatriates, local 
staff, and the state government. On the one hand, frequent premature departures by
^  C. O. Iwueke, ‘Adaptive Research’, in APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report^ Vol. 1, p. 25.
Francis Idachaba, ‘Sustainability Issues in Agricultural Development’, in Ted Davis and Isabelle 
Schirmer (eds.), Sustainability Issues in Agricultural Development (Washington, 1987), p. 20; and 
‘Institutional Arrangements’, pp. 18-20, p. 21.
Famoriyo, ‘Organisation’, p. 22.
^Ubid., p. 15.
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expatriates raised expectations or even muted demands that some locals be appointed into 
substantive management posts to stabilize project operations. But DARUDEC seemed to 
prefer to recruit expatriates even on short tenures. On the other hand, such demands 
implied that DARUDEC expatriates were not providing good value for money, making 
them feel insecure and worsening relations between them and their understudies. The 
state government was effectively trapped between the two sides, unable to take a firm 
stand because any decision would have been interpreted as a breach of contract by 
DARUDEC or a sell-out by dissatisfied civil servants. In the event, ODSG chose the line 
of least resistance by refusing to fill vacant posts at all. No appointment was ever made 
to the post of Chief Extension Officer or of Agricultural Superintendent, senior and 
intermediate positions respectively in the extension division. The Chief Commercial 
Officer’s post was vacant for seventeen months in a row, from April 1983 to August 
1984; otherwise it was held in acting capacity until March 1986, six months to the end 
of the project’s investment period. The government’s minimalist option meant that all 
Nigerian staff in the Project Management Unit by 1984 had been with the project for less 
than one year.^°
The second issue concerned double standards on staff salary and working conditions and 
may very well explain ODSG’s seeming impotence. Expatriates’ salaries and perks were 
fantastic and written into the consultancy agreement while, as noted above, local staff 
were initially granted one additional salary grade level over and above their civil service 
salaries. Expatriates’ basic pay ranged from N3,796.88 and N4,374.87, plus a fixed 
allowance of Nl,560.00 per m on th .T h is amounted to an annual gross of between 
N64,282.56 and N71,218.44. Moreover, expatriate salaries were indexed to Danish 
inflation figures and denominated in Kroner, while their perks were indexed to Nigeria’s 
all-urban CPI. These might seem unimportant since one Kroner exchanged for only 
NO.086 at the time, but due account must be taken of the Naira’s over-valuation as well 
as expatriates’ non-wage perquisites like free, well-serviced accommodation and 
chauffeured cars. Nigerian senior staff also enjoyed some of the latter benefits, but this
Ibid., p. 8.
EAADP, ‘Consultancy Services’.
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did little to close the disparity in the project’s reward structure. On the contrary, 
government rejected DARUDEC’s request to denominate in Danish Kroner the salary of 
the Nigerian on its team, leaving him with an annual N17,040 or 37.4% of expatriates’ 
lowest basic pay. Government thinking in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, seemed to be 
that harmonisation would have further set apart the extension officer from his colleagues 
in the ministry, creating a groundswell of discontent in the civil service that could have 
forced a re-think of public sector remunerations.
It is against this background that relations between expatriates and local staff became a 
war of nerves in which each party deployed resources at its disposal to subvert or 
undermine the other. Perhaps conscious of their numerical and social disadvantages, 
expatriates sought self-preservation by keeping indigenous senior staff well away from 
decision-making. One of their tactics was to deny local staff access to deliberations at 
management meetings by failing to keep or circulate minutes of proceedings for at least 
two years.A ccess to the Staff Appraisal Report, which as noted previously was the 
World Bank’s preview of EAADP’s operations, was equally prevented,m aking it 
impossible for local staff to compare actual performance with official projections and 
possibly blame expatriates for whatever gaps existed. Yet a third ‘weapon’ was to 
frustrate counterpart training of Nigerian understudies. According to many participant- 
officials, this was to ensure that the understudies would not be ready to take over project 
management in 1984, and impliedly, to provide sufficient justification for DARUDEC’s 
consultancy contract to be extended. A DARUDEC-induced conspiracy against local staff 
and the project itself, so clearly implied in this view, is not necessarily supported by the 
facts. It seems more plausible that DARUDEC’s tactics reflected unseemly staff relations 
at the project. For example, counterpart training could hardly have been successful 
where, as in EAADP, the trainees were largely contemptuous of their trainers because 
the latter were short on formal qualifications and because of resentment occasioned by 
management structures and working conditions skewed in expatriates’ favour.
Interviews with ex-project staff.
Famoriyo, ‘Organisation’; APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, p. 10.
100
However, DARUDEC’s balance sheet was far from impressive. The firm presided over 
a regime in which more money was spent on administration and consultancy than on 
more directly productive project activities. As Table 3.7 shows, management and 
administration took nearly 17 % of actual total expenditure, more than double its projected 
share and 80% over and above the sum allocated in the SAR. This suggests a relative 
lack of management control, especially since EAADP was not paying basic salaries to 
assigned staff. Similarly, consultancy fees were three times larger than their projected 
share of total expenditure, overshooting the budget by a staggering 135%. In contrast, 
commercial services took about two-fifths of projected share of total expenses and was 
undersubscribed by 68%; training had 71% of its projected share of total expenditure but 
ended up with 41% underspending; while monitoring and evaluation took 62% of its 
expected share of total expenditure and just over half of its SAR budget. Certainly, 
EAADP’s finances could have been better managed.
Table 3.7
EAADP: Planned and Actual Expenditure by Component (’000 current Naira)
(1) Component (2) SAR budget (3) Actual Expenditure (4) Index 
(SAR =100)
Amount % of total Amount % of total
Project Management & Admin. 3,071.4 7.7 5,514.0 16.5 179.5
Monitoring & Evaluation 821.7 2.1 433.2 1.3 52.7
Commercial Services 12,372.5 30.9 3,957.8 11.9 32.0
Training 1,411.0 3.5 829.5 2.5 58.8
Agric. & Technical Services 8,032.9 20.0 6,625.1 19.8 82.5
Engineering 13,960.4 34.8 15,070.6 45.1 108.0
Consultancy 414.0 1.0 970.5 2.9 234.4
Total 40,083.9 100.0 33,400.7 100.0 83.3
Source: APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Vol. Ill, p. 168.
The choice, however, was not simply between DARUDEC expatriates and local 
understudies or any Nigerian-led management team for that matter. The problem lay in 
the relative lack of political commitment to the ADP concept at the state level, and in a 
mixture of frustrated ambitions and bruised egos on the part of DARUDEC and local 
staff alike. That this was the case became apparent after mid-1984, when DARUDEC’s 
consultancy contract expired and expatriate managers left the project. The military had 
taken over government in early 1984, in itself necessary reason to expect greater resolve,
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especially since military regimes have traditionally had relatively less complex political 
constituencies.
Naturally, local staff took over project management in acting capacity. The state 
government also appealed to the World Bank for further extension by two years of the 
investment phase to enable it draw down the loan account. For eighteen months after 
August 1984, however, government failed to make substantive appointments to key 
management positions, including some which had been vacant under DARUDEC. A 
primary reason was that a state government, least of all a poor one like Ondo’s, could 
not have taken unilateral action on public sector salaries or offered new packages outside 
the existing reward structure to attract skilled manpower from the private sector.
Yet, in early 1985, ODSG established a holding company, the Agricultural Production 
Holding Company, to serve as an umbrella house for six other crop or function-specific 
companies.Government’s equity participation in the latter companies was to be limited 
to 25% while private investors were to provide the remainder; they were also to seek 
commercial transactions throughout the country. But government also offered directors’ 
posts and private sector salaries to officials who had just retired from senior civil service 
jobs and whose commitment could not be vouchsafed since they were not shareholders. 
Junior officers were also transferred en masse, in some cases compulsorily, from the 
ministry to the same companies.These changes were effectively nullified by the advent 
in 1986 of Nigeria’s economic reform programme and the publication two years later of 
a new agricultural policy which prohibited direct production activities by public sector 
agencies. But while they existed, the new companies were run by people with very little 
business experience or inclination, many of whom had taken up the jobs because they had 
no c h o ic e .T h e  state government also set up rival, albeit aggressively pro-market, 
ventures against EAADP, perhaps adding to low morale among project staff and the
These companies were Agricultural Mechanisation Co.; Food Crops Production Co.; Tree Crops 
Production Co.; Integrated Livestock Co.; Fish Production Co.; and Processing, Storage, and Marketing 
Co.
“  Interviews, February to April 1992.
Interviews, February to April 1992.
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project’s loss-making position. Government’s underlying mistake, it seemed, was to 
assume that institutional replacement offered solutions to recurrent performance gaps, and 
that new mechanisms could succeed where older ones failed without changes in the 
operational context or prior answers to the question why existing performance targets 
were not met in the first instance.
In March 1986, government finally made substantive appointments into project positions. 
But it was too little too late. The appointees, most of whom came from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, saw themselves more as career civil servants than project officials. In the 
absence of DARUDEC or other relatively autonomous entity in the immediate project 
environment, there was no incentive for new appointees to change the sub-culture ‘of 
inertia and excessive red-tapism’ which they brought with them from their civil service 
backgrounds.^^ Government also had no compelling reason not to meddle in project 
decision-making.
Above all, official attitudes to EAADP-type projects had changed. The World Bank gave 
notice and eventually withdrew effective participation in the Ekiti-Akoko project. At the 
local level, enclave projects were transformed to state-wide projects, more on account of 
political pressure than the successes of respective pilot schem es.In  1989, ODSADEP 
emerged as the single institution with responsibility for agriculture and rural development 
programmes throughout Ondo State. In pursuit of that goal, the entire extension division 
(both structure and personnel) of the state’s ministry of agriculture was transferred to 
ODSADEP in 1991/92. By precluding one major ground for staff secondments, 
ODSADEP has avoided one of EAADP’s organisational pitfalls. But the new structure 
has re-instated the pre-EAADP status quo in several respects and seems to have been 
adopted in order to be in step with wider opinion and certainly before the full potential 
of project autonomy had been realised at the policy level. What remains to be seen is
Olajumoke Mordi, ‘Organisation of ADP Management in Nigeria: Ekiti-Akoko ADP Case Study’, 
in A. Sanda (ed.), Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1988), 
p. 94.
Interview with ex-Project Manager.
Idachaba, ‘Institutional Arrangements’, p. 5.
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whether project autonomy was worthwhile in Ondo State, or indeed whether the new 
arrangements would result in more efficient delivery of extension services than in the 
1980s.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined three main issues in Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s constitutive and 
regulative environment. These are macro-economic difficulties and their impact on project 
financing; local state strategies to mobilise support for the project and their effects on 
public expectations; and the quest for project autonomy both as a principle in itself and 
as a strategy to improve technical, commercial and managerial capacities of local staff. 
In one sense, the project and the state government were both victims of changes in 
Nigeria’s economic fortunes in the 1980s. Similarly, public opinion-formation about 
EAADP’s operations reflect official campaign strategies as much as they highlight 
continuing social preferences for a welfare state. The one issue over which the project 
seemed to have had complete control was internal administration, yet, deep conflict 
between ODSG’s desire for an efficient project framework and its cost-cutting measures 
and civil service-based resistance to expatriate control made a total mess of EAADP’s 
day-to-day administration.
In general, project attempts to wrestle control over aspects of public policy from 
government departments have often been easier to conceive than to accomplish. As 
Hirschman observed.
conflicts [have] arise[n]...when[ever] projects disturb, by design or inadvertently, the 
political, social, or- most frequently- the bureaucratic status quo...the central 
administration [has been] naturally reluctant to relinquish power or to accept establishment 
of a new activity somewhat removed from its direct control.“
Moreover, projects have typically offered better salaries and incentives than the civil 
service and/or prompted an ‘elitist project administration...that is not capable of
“  Hirschman, Projects, p. 48; p. 155.
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establishing rapport with the normal administrative s tru c tu re .T h is  has often 
exacerbated the potential for conflict by making tenured civil service jobs relatively 
unattractive in the short term, or, where applicable, by stimulating superior-inferior 
relations between indigenous and expatriate staff. The result has been a two-sided 
conflict-ridden framework which has, on average, undermined short-term feasibility as 
well as long-term sustainability of project g o a ls .F irs t, the civil service had usually 
sought to control project decision-making remotely, for example through bureaucratic 
delays of decisions on staffing, budgets, or other forms of government assistance; or by 
manipulating access to political functionaries by project officers. Secondly, ‘the 
dissatisfaction of [indigenous] staff’ has usually been intensified by the tendency for
management practices of the project authorities to gravitate towards the style of the 
expatriate expert...[creating a] vicious circle [in which] initial staffing problems; poor 
working conditions; and inadequate training given to the available indigenous staff and, 
hence, inadequate incentive for them to remain in project[s] [have] left...project 
authorities with few, if any, [indigenous] employees in management positions and with 
a concentration of expatriate manpower at project headquarters.®
In the present case, civil service-based opposition to project autonomy was expressed 
initially through pseudo-nationalist opposition to DARUDEC, the Danish firm contracted 
to run Ekiti-Akoko ADP for the Erst three years. This position was reinforced 
subsequently by wider concerns about the ‘high...social and economic externalities 
from.. .the situation whereby a foreign firm of consultants manage a Nigerian Agricultural 
Development Project, especially where it is possible to employ qualified indigenous 
s t a f f . . . T h e  problem lay, however, with government reluctance to bridge ‘the 
disparity in remunerations between public and private se c to rsa n d , following that, the 
absence in Nigeria’s public services of the business orientation required in a time-bound 
production project. Project management therefore reflected a complex mix of factors,
Lele, Design, p. 129.
® Cf. Honadle and Rosengard, ‘"Projectized" Development’. 
® Lele, Design, p. 132.
® Mordi, ‘Organisation’, pp. 94-95.
® Famoriyo, ‘Organisation’, p. 7.
105
including unseemly relations between DARUDEC and local staff; and the apparent effects 
on project sub-culture and management of the scheme under which civil servants were 
seconded to EAADP from existing agencies, notably the ministry of agriculture and the 
Cooperative Societies Division. Intended primarily as a cost-cutting measure, the latter 
arrangement created conditions which reinforced directly or indirectly the ‘back to the 
ministry lobby’, an influential but largely nebulous grouping dedicated to maintaining the 
civil service’s traditional pre-eminence in the policy sphere.^
“  Idachaba, ‘Sustainability’, p. 46.
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Chapter 4 
Infrastructure Development, 1981-92
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines project performance on the construction and maintenance of 
productive infrastructure in rural Ondo State over the 1981-92 decade. Nigeria’s ADPs 
have usually emphasised two sub-types of infrastructure, physical and socio-institutional. ^  
Physical infrastructure comprises three major elements, namely irrigation dams or dug- 
out wells to assure water supply for all-year round farming; farm service centres (FSCs) 
for more efficient distribution of inputs and other services; and rural and feeder roads to 
facilitate the movement of people and goods, including farm produce, in and out of the 
rural areas.
In turn, social-institutional infrastructure encompasses a variety of rural economic and 
social groupings, including home-town self-help groups,^ traditional esusu (savings and 
credit) associations,^ or formal co-operative societies."  ^ In theory, formal cooperatives 
have been the preferred option in project-type schemes, but many groups have been loose 
conglomerations of individuals or ‘temporary banding together of farmers for the 
expediency of securing credit packages’.^  Either way, farmers’ and other economic
' Federal Department of Rural Development, ‘Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: 1978’, p. 1.
 ^ For a framework, see Joel D. Barkan, Michael L. McNulty, and M. A. O. Ayeni, ‘Hometown 
Voluntary Associations, Local Development, and the Emergence of Civil Society in Western Nigeria’, 
JMAS, 29, 3 (1991), pp. 457-480; and contributions in Eme O. Awa (ed.). The Transformation o f Rural 
Society (Jos, 1988),
 ^ William Bascom, ‘The Esusu: A Credit Institution of the Yoruba’, Journal o f the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, LXXXII, 1 (1952), pp. 63-69; Clifford Geertz, ‘The Rotating Credit Association: 
A "Middle Rung" in Development’, EDCC, X, 3 (1962), pp. 241-263.
 ^ S. A. Nkom, ‘Co-operatives and the Political Economy of Agrarian Capitalist Development in 
Nigeria’, NJPS, 4, I&II (1985), pp. 105-119; Adeniyi Osuntogun, ‘Co-operatives and Small Farmers in 
Nigeria’, in S. O. Olayide, J. A. Eweka, and V. E. Bello-Osagie (eds.), Nigerian Small Farmers (Ibadan, 
1980), pp. 133-148.
 ^Dickson L. Eyoh, ‘Structures of Intermediation and Change in African Agriculture: A Nigerian Case 
Study’, ASR, 35, 1 (1992), pp. 23-24.
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groupings have enabled small, cash-poor rural producers to pool otherwise disparate 
resources ‘to attain objectives which they could not attain if they worked separately or 
in mutual competition’.^  Since the turn of the century, they have helped to facilitate 
small-farmer participation in formal-sector economic opportunities, for example by 
providing soft-term credit in an informal setting in which all members assume partial 
responsibility for control and management functions.^
What follows puts EAADP and ODSADEP’s infrastructure development programmes in 
the context of their intermediate objectives, the wider history of infrastructure 
development in Ondo State, and in relation to similar projects in other parts of Nigeria. 
Specifically, the chapter compares EAADP and ODSADEP’s infrastructure development 
objectives with their end results and identifies gaps between the projects’ set targets and 
verifiable attainments during 1981-92. It also draws on the existing instrumental 
literature* and structural analysis^ to explain the gaps.
The rest of the chapter is divided into six sections. Section two reviews the state of 
infrastructure in Ondo State, while a section each examines project performance on 
irrigation, farm service centres, and also cooperative and farmers’ groups. Section six 
examines EAADP’s road construction and maintenance programme in detail, partly 
because ‘feeder and access roads rightly located can cause increased cultivation of
® E. I. Price, ‘Co-operation and the Co-operative Department’ (Ibadan, 1952), p. 1.
 ^Cf. John H. Hamer, ‘Preconditions and Limits in the Formation of Associations: The Self-Help and 
Cooperative Movement in Africa’, ASR, 24, 1 (1981), pp. 113-132.
* See Brian D’Silva and M. Rafique Raza, ‘Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: The Funtua 
Project’, FP, 5, 4 (1980), pp. 282-297; McDonald P. Benjamin, ‘Nigeria - Funtua Agricultural 
Development Project’, chp. 12 in his Investment Projects in Agriculture (1985), pp. 178-216; and three 
contributions in Uzo Igbozurike and R. Raza (eds.). Rural Nigeria (Ilorin, 1983) viz: A. J. Adejo, ‘The 
Impact of Agricultural Development Projects on Quality of Life in Rural Areas’, pp. 193-203; J. Ukoje 
and J. Baba, ‘The Impact of the Ayangba Agricultural Development Project on the Quality of Rural Life’, 
pp. 204-251; and S. Nwoko and A. Mabawonku, ‘Welfare Indicators for Farmers in Lafia Agricultural 
Development Project Area’, pp. 252-260.
® As in Akin Mabogunje, ‘The Funtua Integrated Rural Development Project’, in R. P. Misra (ed.). 
Rural Development (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 175-273; Eyoh, ‘Structures’; Duro Oniemola, ‘The World Bank 
and Capitalist Agricultural Development: The Ilorin Agricultural Development Project in Nigeria’, (Berlin, 
n.d).
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adjacent land by more than 100%’ ®^ and help reduce production diseconomies or the 
individual farmer’s marginal cost of adoption;and partly because Nigeria’s ADPs have 
often been more successful in road construction than in the pursuit of their agricultural 
goals. In each case, the pre-project situation is discussed alongside developments 
during the 1980s. Section seven concludes the chapter.
4.2 Infrastructure Supply in Rural Ondo State
That Ondo State’s farmers have confronted severe infrastructure supply problems is 
legendary, though as I show below, official data have often suggested the contrary. 
Within Western Nigeria, at least, present-day Ondo State is widely believed to be 
relatively deprived with regard to economic opportunities outside agriculture. There are 
at least two ways of illustrating this position. The first is general and indirect, relying on 
inferences from the wider literature on urban bias. A low-level variant of this approach 
would be to examine patterns of government’s development expenditure, say at the 
regional level, to ascertain how public expenditure has been allocated between urban and 
rural areas over the years, or determine the location of government-funded productive 
projects between urban and rural areas. In both respects, the available literature suggests 
that urban bias has been a cumulative consequence, if not the initial intent, of government 
development policy in Western Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s. It has also been 
established that the Western Nigeria Marketing Board (WNMB) assumed fiscal powers 
from the 1950s onwards partly to fund the government’s programme of modernisation 
and industrialization.
Jens Christensen, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), p.
88 .
” For an overview, see Peter Richards, ‘The Economic Context of Rural Roads’, in John Howe and 
Peter Richards (eds.). Rural Roads and Poverty Alleviation (1984), pp. 1-17; cf. Francis S. Idachaba, 
‘Commentary on Infrastructure’, in John Mellor, Christopher Delgado, and Malcolm Blackie (eds.). 
Accelerating Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore, 1987), pp. 232-233.
Juan Gaviria, Vishva Bindlish, and Uma Lele, ‘The Rural Road Question and Nigeria’s Agricultural 
Development’, MADIA Discussion Paper 10 (Washington, 1989), p. 5; p. 15; note 4, p. 24.
For early academic support, see G. K. Helleiner, ‘The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigeria’s 
Economic Development’, EcJ, LXXIV, 295 (1964), pp. 582-610. For a review of the Nigeria literature, 
see Duru Tobi, ‘The Relevance of Lipton’s Urban Bias Thesis to Nigeria’, NISER Monograph Series N® 3 
1989; and W. J. Okowa, ‘Urban Bias in Nigerian Development Planning’, NJESS, 29, 1 (1987), pp. 47-59.
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The regional government did attempt to increase local processing of agricultural produce 
and expand employment opportunities in the region. But most of the ventures were 
located in relatively well-serviced cities and industrial estates (e.g. Ikeja, near Lagos). 
While this strategy assured that industries were close to large markets and economic 
growth points, the cities and industrial estates were themselves islands of well-serviced 
publicly-funded infrastructure supply in an environment characterised by large want-get 
ratios and social stagnation. The programme’s increasing demand on government 
resources also precluded infrastructure development in rural areas even though additional 
tax burdens were imposed on cocoa farmers.
Apart from the general backwash effects of urban bias on rural Western Nigeria, the 
foregoing processes affected Ondo State in two specific ways. First, although 
government’s tax extortions on cocoa were applied across the board, farmers in present- 
day Ondo State may have home a greater share of the increasing burden than their 
counterparts from western Yorubaland. As indicated in chapter 2, this is because the 
state’s cocoa output increased in absolute and relative terms in the 1950s and 1960s, 
about the same time as WNMB’s fiscal role was intensified.
Moreover, present-day Ondo State was and remains distant physically from the Lagos- 
Ibadan axis. Western Nigeria’s main growth centres since the 1940s. Given ‘the 
deprivation of the rural sector relative to the urban sector in the provision of 
infrastructures’, and the manner expenditure on maintenance and ancillary services has 
intensified initial locational advantages,competing demands for available resources 
have set the odds against Ondo State. Moreover, the state has not benefited substantially 
from the indirect effects of government activism, such as employment and commercial 
opportunities in small businesses and in the service sector, which are often located close 
to the seat of government. In short, Ondo State’s contribution to Western Nigeria’s 
engine of growth has not been matched by public expenditure on productive and social 
infrastructure in the state.
Tobi, ‘Lipton’s Thesis’, p. 25; pp. 27-28. 
Idachaba, ‘Commentary’, p. 238.
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The second and more realistic gauge of infrastructure supply in rural Ondo State lay in 
the findings of specific empirical surveys of productive infrastructure and of economic 
opportunities in the state. Once again, the indications are that a slightly arid economic 
environment engendered partly by the absence of basic facilities has in turn occasioned 
further scarcity of economic opportunities. This view has been suggested consistently by 
the results of empirical surveys conducted in different parts of the state since the 1960s.
In 1968, Afolabi Ojo conducted a survey of modes of transport to and from agricultural 
work in Ife as well as in Idanre. A similar survey conducted by Ogundana in 1971 
examined the demand for and supply of transport infrastructure among farmers in Ado 
Ekiti. Both surveys suggest an abject lack of motorised vehicular transport in rural Ondo 
State. About half of Ogundana’s respondents (n=64) depended on human porterage 
to transport their cocoa crop from farmsteads to unsurfaced roads. The corresponding 
figure for non-cocoa produce was 62% (n=69). In turn, 47% of cocoa and 28% of non­
cocoa produce were transported over non-surfaced roads by motor lorries. The situation 
was slightly better with roads with tar or laterite surfaces, where 83% of cocoa farmer- 
respondents and 46% of food farmer respondents were using motor vehicles. As a whole 
therefore, nearly one-fifth of Ado-Ekiti’s cocoa farmers, and more than half of its food- 
crop growers were not employing motorised transport by 1971.*^
The inference from this is clear enough: shortfalls in transport infrastructure supply have 
been more prevalent among food crop farmers than among cocoa farmers. Cocoa farmers 
have also had better access to, or higher effective demand for, more efficient transport 
facilities than food-crop growers. Whether this constitutes necessary evidence of the 
character of social differentiation in rural Ondo State is arguable, but it does indicate 
generally how official support for the export crop sub-sector could have precluded 
concern for the plight of food crop farmers up to the 1970s.
G. J. Afolabi Ojo, ‘Some Observations on Journey to Agricultural Work in Yorubaland, 
Southwestern Nigeria’, EcG, 46, 3 (July 1970), pp. 459-471; Babafemi Ogundana, ‘The Transport 
Constraint on Rural Development in Nigeria’, in NES, Rural Development, pp. 77-91.
Ogundana, ‘Transport Constraint’, Table 3, p. 80; pp. 82-83.
I l l
Still, productive infrastructure has been far more scarce in what became Ondo State in 
1976 than Ogundana's survey has indicated. The main reason is that Ado-Ekiti, the 
survey’s location, has not been really representative of rural Western Nigeria. As 
Ogundana himself observed, more people from Western Nigeria’s villages go ‘to farm 
on foot’ and depend on human labour to transport their crops than his data suggested.^* 
Since the 1960s at least. Ado Ekiti has been an agro town, one of those settlements with 
a large population and with commercial opportunities to be considered urban by Western 
Nigeria’s standards of the 1970s. This explains APMEPU’s decision to exclude Ado 
along with Ikare Akoko and Oka Akoko from the survey in 1981 of Ekiti-Akoko’s 
villages.
A more appropriate and recent picture of rural Ondo State is furnished by the report of 
the agricultural survey for 1986/87.^° The survey covered 4,968 households selected 
from 34 villages, two from each of the 17 EGAs then existing in the state, in which case 
ten survey villages were in the project area.^  ^ Apart from being recent, the survey’s 
findings are interesting both in themselves and in the context of this chapter. For 
example, the report suggests that only five (14.7%) of the 34 villages had pipe home 
water. The same proportion had electricity; three (about 9%) had health institutions; and 
one village had none of these facilities.A ccess to motorable roads by respondents 
seemed better. About 62% of all villages reported all-year round motorable roads; 21% 
had seasonal roads, and 12% had no motorable roads at all. The remaining 2% of 
villages was based in riverine Ondo State, in predominantly swampy terrain.
Despite this seemingly remarkable access to motorable roads, human porterage has been
** Ibid., p. 82.
See APMEPU, ‘Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Report on the Village Listing 
Exercise’ (Benin City, 1982), p. 5.
ODS, Report o f Agricultural Crop Reporting Survey 1986/87 (Akure, n.d.).
Ibid., section I, p. 1.
Ibid., section II, p. 1.
23 Ibid.
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the most pervasive means of evacuating agricultural produce from farm to village or 
market place. According to the survey, head loading of farm produce was reported in 29 
villages (85.3% of the total); bicycles were used in only eight villages (23.5%), while 
lorries were in use in 20 villages (59% of the to ta l) .T h e  seeming contradiction 
between the availability of motorable roads and widespread employment of human 
porterage may reflect a high incidence of subsistence (or consumption) production in the 
sample villages. Alternatively, the proportion of output that gets to the market may be 
relatively low value, food crops that cannot absorb the cost of vehicular transport.^^ This 
would apply to cases where the quantity, and therefore market value, of surplus 
production in each case is such that transport from farm to village is undertaken with the 
labour of family members or with that of the farmer’s associates rather than with paid 
labour.
Furthermore, the cost to farmers of commercial transport may have been high, either 
because tariffs were high on account of low demand, or because commercial operators 
were probably facing competition from itinerant traders who were more willing to assume 
responsibility for the primary costs of transport. Finally, it is possible that the motorable 
roads referred to in the survey are secondary roads linking villages with one another or 
with adjacent towns rather than those that lead to farmsteads. In any case, the survey has 
painted a vivid picture of the scarcity of productive infrastructure in rural Ondo State 
during the 1980s. For most farmers, two options are open: to deploy human labour into 
porterage, sometime at the cost of more economic uses, or to locate farms near motorable 
roads, even though high demand for such land might have translated to shorter fallows 
and possibly lower yield potential; or lower-than-average farm-sizes.^^ The following 
conclusions from a nation-wide survey (hereafter Idachaba survey) of rural productive 
and social infrastructure, conducted on the eve of EAADP operations under the auspices 
of Nigeria’s Federal Department of Agriculture, are therefore instructive:
^  Ibid., section II, p. 2.
^  Cf. Ogundana, ‘Transport Constraint’, p. 79.
A. A. Ogunsanya, ‘Rural Accessibility Problems and Human Resource Development’, JRS, 3, 1 
(1987), pp. 31-42.
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The basic infrastructure of rural Ondo [State]...is poorly developed and what exists is 
often not maintained. Local government area roads in particular, are seasonal and some 
become unmotorable during the heavy rains. This situation creates many problems for the 
local farmer trying to evacuate produce to the market...Ondo State must look to 
upgrading the basic amenities to her rural population...
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s response to the foregoing situation was an infrastructure development 
programme that incorporated four major components: irrigation dams, farm service/input 
distribution centres, co-operative societies, and rural and feeder roads.
The remaining parts of this chapter examine EAADP’s performance in respect of these, 
though the road construction programme is emphasised over and above the other 
components for several reasons. First, it is a truism that the provision of good, motorable 
roads is a primary objective as well as a veritable tool to open up traditional agriculture 
to wider commercial and technological influences and break the vicious circle of poverty 
in rural society .T h is ‘rule’ applies more to food crops than to export crops. Since 
food crops deteriorate faster, and since they attract lower value per unit weight than 
export crops, commercial production of food items is feasible only after prior investment 
in infrastructure. Yet, the leap from subsistence to commercial production is itself 
constrained invariably by the lack of investment in productive infrastructure. For 
example.
The perishability of agricultural products demands prompt evacuation if substantial loss 
is not to occur.. .But tragically, a substantial proportion of existing agricultural (especially 
food) production has little or no economic value because it cannot be moved to meet 
available demand in other areas...Measures to increase output per man and per unit in 
rural areas must be accompanied by substantial improvement in the modes of transport 
in the rural area, because what is gained by the application of fertilizers or by eliminating 
pests may be lost if there are no physical facilities for movement and distribution.^’
Indeed, the point made by the Gaviria, Bindlish, and Lele study is that road construction
Francis S. Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1985), p. 662.
Richards, ‘Rural Roads’. For Nigeria-wide reviews, see C. O. Ikporukpo, ‘The Management of the 
Rural Transportation Problem in Nigeria’, QJA, XXI, 1/2 (1986/87), pp. 57-71; and Gaviria, Bindlish, and 
Lele, ‘Road Question’. Case studies in present-day Ondo State include Ojo, ‘Observations’; and Ogundana, 
‘Transport Constraint’.
Ogundana, ‘Transport Constraint’, p. 79; p. 87.
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has been a prior objective as far as Nigeria’s enclave ADPs are concerned. In this sense, 
EAADP’s road construction programme facilitates close comparison with its 
contemporaries. It also provides a more productive gauge of project contributions to the 
Ekiti-Akoko region than does performance in the supply of irrigation dams, farm 
service/input distribution centres, or the establishment of co-operative societies.
4.3 Irrigation Dams
Ekiti-Akoko ADP was expected to ‘build 35 earthen dams, each of 35,000 cubic metre 
storage capacity for water supply to permanent farm settlements’.^ ® Although the SAR 
did not so state, the adjective ‘permanent’ in the above statement most probably referred 
to residence, in which case settlers were expected to practice crop rotation rather than the 
more popular shifting cultivation. The immediate point of interest, however, is that the 
inclusion of thirty-five dams in EAADP’s infrastructure programme is extremely difficult 
to justify - except perhaps as an example of how the World Bank and international 
agribusiness have sought to transplant ‘turn-key’ projects in third world countries with 
little regard to local resource circumstances.^^ This section discusses EAADP’s 
irrigation objectives and argues that irrigation dams constitute a technological overkill in 
the project area.
Rain-fed agriculture has been predominant and mechanised irrigation virtually unknown 
in the Ekiti-Akoko area and elsewhere in Ondo State. Traditions of community control 
over arable land have also meant that most cultivators have only usufruct rights rather 
than freehold control over farmland. As noted in chapter 2, farm holdings are small, 
fragmented lots estimated at about 0.53 hectares per cultivator in 1976.^  ^ Estimated 
landholding per farmer may have risen as a result of the 1991 headcount, under which 
the state’s estimated population was reduced by about 1.0%. But the most sanguine 
estimate would hardly exceed 0.75 ha. per farmer. At a deeper level, the identities of
30 APMEPU, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Project Completion Report, Main Report Vol. I, p. 72.
See Susan George, ^Caveat Emptor: The Transfer of Technology’ in her III Fares the Land 
(Washington, 1984), p. 76; p. 78.
ODS, Rural Economic Survey 1976 (Akure, n.d.), various tables.
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entire communities are tied closely to the land, in some cases without properly 
demarcated or mutually acceptable boundaries. Such boundaries are likely to be blurred 
through land consolidation induced by mechanisation, but consolidation could also trigger 
inter-communal unrest or highlight deeper, overlapping economic interests - depending 
on specific factors like the man-land ratio and urban-related demand for land in each
case.”
Neither mechanisation nor irrigation is necessarily incompatible with small plots or 
communal land tenure. In theory, small plots could be ‘pooled’ as in Western Nigeria’s 
‘grouped’ farms of the 1950s, or small farmers encouraged to cultivate contiguous plots 
to reduce tractor movement between farms. This however depends on existence of prior 
demand for mechanised services, on farmers having been convinced that mechanisation 
offers substantial economic pay-offs, and above all, on the opportunity costs of 
mechanisation. With regard to the latter, Ondo State’s ecological attributes make 
irrigation relatively expensive and unattractive. In a lecture delivered in 1984, S. A. 
Olusuyi, a senior agricultural official, had argued that Ondo State would not require large 
dams like those associated with ADPs in northern Nigeria. According to Olusuyi, 
‘supplementary irrigation’ might suffice to promote intensive and more efficient, all-year- 
round farming in the state .G iven rainfall distribution in Nigeria’s forest zone, and that 
it is impossible to have 50 ha. of arable land that is not traversed by a river, even these 
smaller, less capital-intensive, and perhaps more socially responsive dams would be 
needed in Ondo State in only two months of a normal agricultural year.”
In Iju, near Akure, these factors (among others) have resulted in the failure of government schemes 
because of Iju’s fear of being swallowed up by Akure [Interviews]. In turn, Ayede was founded in the mid- 
nineteenth century on Itaji’s land - with permission according to intelligence reports, and without permission 
according to oral tradition and other primary sources [A. C. C. Swayne, ‘Intelligence Report on the Ayede 
District, Ekiti Division, Ondo Province’, CSC 26/31014, NAI]. In any case, Ayede’s farmers have obtained 
farmland from Itaji, Ishan, and Grin, among other villages, with minimum effort and without boimdary 
disputes [Personal knowledge].
^  S. A, Olusuyi, ‘Some Farmers’ Problems that must be attended to before farmers can play their 
rightful role in Economic Viability of Ondo State’, in G, T. Fatunla (ed.). Economic Viability of Ondo State 
(Akure, 1984), p. 42.
35 Ibid.
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Olusuyi*s overall position differs slightly from that of Nigeria’s ‘large dam lobby’ but has 
deeper structural significance. For one, brigation schemes require large injections of 
foreign exchange and local currency as well as foreign technical expertise.G iven 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange circumstances in the 1980s, and the alternative uses to which 
available receipts could be put, a generalised commitment to mechanisation could have 
replaced relatively cheap labour with expensive machines (see chapter 8). For another, 
northern Nigeria’s irrigation schemes have been associated with the emergence of more 
centralised control and management of land as well as water resources, attributes which 
erode small farmers’ autonomy.These points raise questions about the social relevance 
and economic value of dams, supplementary or otherwise, in Ondo State’s resource 
circumstances. In any case, EAADP’s unrelenting financial difficulties made irrigation 
an unaffordable luxury: not one of the projected 35 earthen dams had been built by 1992.
4.4 Farm Service Centres
Farm service centres are the individual ADP’s field outposts; hence they are critical to 
the administration of agricultural extension programmes. For one, FSCs are located 
closer to the ordinary farmer than, say, the normal Ministry of Agriculture or extra- 
ministerial office, thereby providing the farmer a focal contact point with fellow farmers 
and with extension staff, a mental image of the values espoused by ADPs, and necessary 
evidence that those values or aspirations are realisable. As distribution outlets for 
improved seeds, fertilizer, chemicals, and equipment, FSCs bring ADPs’ agricultural 
goals even closer to the point of demand. Ideally, FSCs should also serve as bridgeheads 
for collating farmers’ views on project performance and for linking research and training 
with farm experience. This section discusses project performance in respect of FSCs and 
alternative criteria for the location of FSCs and comment on the efficiency of their 
distribution in the Ekiti-Akoko area.
^ F. S. Idachaba, ‘Sustainability Issues in Agricultural Development’, in Ted J. Davis and Isabelle A. 
Schirmer, eds.. Sustainability Issues in Agricultural Development (Washington, 1987), p. 32.
For example by A. C. Bird, ‘The Land Issue in Large Scale Irrigation Projects: Some Problems from 
Northern Nigeria’, in W. M. Adams and A. T. Grove (eds.). Irrigation in Tropical Africa (Cambridge, 
1993), pp. 75-85. Cf. Tina Wallace, ‘Agricultural Projects and Land in Northern Nigeria’, ROAPE, 17 
(1980); and W. M. Adams, ‘Development’s Deaf Ear: Downstream Users and Water Releases from the 
Bakolori Dam, Nigeria’, WD, 21, 9 (1993), pp. 1405-1416.
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Mabogunje has associated Nigeria’s ADPs with the spatial approach to the distribution 
of farm inputs and extension services.^* Under this scheme, farmers are organised in 
clusters of groups and/or villages for regular and frequent contact with extension officers. 
For purposes of input distribution, central locations are selected from a core of farming 
villages, administrative centres, or market places and then developed as distributive 
outlets or contact points for farmers located over a presumably suitable distance from that 
centre. The objective is usually to reduce the physical distance between the demand and 
supply of extension services; ensure a more efficient delivery of improved seeds, 
fertilizer, insecticide, sprayers, and technical advice to end-users; cut the cost to the 
progressive farmer of adopting new techniques; and above all make adoption attractive 
to all and sundry.
On the eve of project implementation in 1981, according to the Idachaba report, Ondo 
State had seven fertilizer stores and 20 crop storage facilities (i.e. grain silos, maize 
cribs, stores, and warehouses) within its boundaries.Seven of these were built between 
1960 and 1966; sixteen were constructed after 1976, when Ondo Province gained full 
state status; no information was provided on construction date for the remaining four. 
Eleven (i.e. eight silos, stores and cribs for grains and three fertilizer stores) were located 
in the project area, three of them were constructed in the 1960s, seven after 1976, and 
there was no information on the remaining one."*^
By 1980, the Federal Department of Agriculture had only ‘allocated’ five agro-service 
centres to Ondo State while the state government in turn ‘planned’ 17, that is one to each 
local government council (LGC) then existing. According to this calculation, one agro­
service centre was to serve about 932 sq. km. and have a walking radius of 17.2 km."^  ^
In fact, only five agro-service centres existed in the state by 1981; two of these were in 
the project area, in Ikare (Akoko North) and lyin (Ekiti Central), serving a land area of
Mabogunje, ‘Funtua’, p. 196.
Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, Table 468, pp. 668-669. 
^  Extracted from ibid.. Table 446, p. 666.
Ibid., Table 7, p. 19.
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874 sq. km. and 745 sq. km. and having a walking radius of 17 km. and 15 km. 
respectively.It is not clear how many of these five were operational, or how well they 
performed. However, five others were proposed for construction; one of these was to 
serve a land area of 597 sq. km. and have a walking radius of 14 km. in and around 
Aisegba (Ekiti East), within the project area."^ ^
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s goals on input distribution and extension administration were clearly 
ambitious. Among other objectives, the project sought to cut the average physical 
distance between a farm service centre and the farmer to about ten kilometres. To this 
end, 30 FSCs were to be built in two categories. The first, comprising 25 smaller FSCs 
were to be distributed evenly to ensure that project services could reach all comers of the 
Ekiti-Akoko area and developed as clusters around five larger FSCs. In addition, five 
pre-delivery centres (PDCs) were planned, one at the headquarters of each of the five 
local government areas in the project area.
Only 27 FSCs were established successfully in the project area in 1982-86. Each council 
headquarters had at least one ESC, with one additional PDC established in Ikole (Ekiti 
North), Omuo (Ekiti East) and Ikare (Akoko N orth).Fourteen FSCs, or one-third of 
the total number, were constmcted in 1983-85 but did not open for business until 1987, 
while at least eight (or 30%) were either inherited or remodelled. Among newly 
constmcted FSCs were those at Imn and Ikaram (Akoko North); Ifira and Oba (Akoko 
South); Ode and Aisegba (Ekiti East), as well as those at Ayede, Ilupeju, and Oke-Ako 
(Ekiti North). The ESC at Oka (Akoko South) was remodelled while another at Isua, also 
in Akoko South, was inherited. Other inherited FSCs were at Oke-Agbe (Akoko North), 
Iluomoba (Ekiti East), and Ado, Are-Afao, Igede, and Igbemo, all in Ekiti Central EGA. 
As a whole, EAADP achieved a remarkable 90% completion rate for FSCs.
Ibid., Table 467, p. 667. 
Ibid., p. 667.
^  This paragraph is based on V. A. P. Naik, ‘Commercial Services Division’, in APMEPU, EAADP 
Completion Report, Vol. II, pp. 45-46.
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Table 4.1 presents information on the precise location and distribution of 27 FSCs by 
local government. At face value, the table suggests that FSCs were evenly distributed 
between the five LGCs in the project area. With the two agriculturally most populous 
LGAs in the project area, Akoko North and Ekiti North, each having 22.2% of the total, 
and the three others sharing about 56% of the total between them, the range of actual 
distribution of established FSCs from the 20% arithmetic mean stood at between -1.5% 
and 2.2%. The narrowness of this range suggests that LGAs were the unit of distribution.
Table 4.1
Location and Distribution of Farm Service Centres (FSCs, by local government area)
Akoko North Akoko South Ekiti Central Ekiti East Ekiti North Total
Location N® Location N® Location N® Location N® Location N®
Ikare I Ifira 2 Ado 2 Aisegba 2 Ayede 2 9
Ikaram 2 Isua I Are-Afao I Iluomoba I Ikole I 6
Oke-Agbe I Oba I Igede I Ode I Ilupeju 2 6
Imn 2 Oka I Igbemo I Omuo I Oke-Ako I 6
6 5 5 5 6 27
Source; O, Famoriyo, ‘Organisation and Management’, in APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Vol. II, 
p. 7.
It is also likely that LGAs were conceived as equal socio-political entities rather than as 
aggregate territorial representations of unequally endowed economic units or farming 
families. There is much to be said for the socially conscientious approach that most 
certainly lay beneath the siting of the project’s FSCs. But a principled insistence on equal 
access to productive resources is not necessarily compatible with efficient resource use 
in the long term. As post-colonial Africa’s economic development record has shown so 
clearly, measures designed to assure equal access to unequally distributed resources could 
not by themselves effect changes in the structures of economic behaviour; hence, they 
have stifled initiative, and channelled direct and indirect subsidies to inefficient or non- 
optimal production.
See, e.g., Douglas Rimmer, ‘Development in Nigeria: An Overview’, in Henry Bienen and V. P. 
Diejomaoh (eds.). The Political Economy o f Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), pp. 29-87; 
and Staying Poor: Ghana’s Political Economy I952-I990 (Oxford, 1992). For a wider review, see Richard 
C. Cook, ‘Farmers and the State’, in Rimmer (ed.). Rural Transformation in Tropical Africa (1988), pp. 
116-139.
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The above commentary could apply to the distribution of the project’s service centres. 
If alternative or proxy measures were employed to determine the share of each LGA from 
the available 27 FSCs, the seemingly equal distribution portrayed by Table 4.1 can even 
be shown to be less than optimal. For example, Akoko North and Ekiti North LGAs, 
which between them accounted for 58% of estimated farming families in the project area 
now had about 45% of FSCs within their borders. This is itself skewed in favour of Ekiti 
North LGA and against Akoko North LGA, given that the former provided 20.3% of 
total estimated farming population in the project area while the latter’s share amounted 
to 38%. In contrast, each of the remaining three LGAs with an average 14% of estimated 
farming families now had 18.5% of FSCs each.
Two points are thus suggested by the foregoing. The first is that some farmers in the two 
more agriculturally populous LGAs may have been deprived of the potential benefits, 
including the demonstration effects, of the close presence of FSCs. Secondly, although 
the parity between Akoko North and Ekiti North seems to be part of an unwritten formula 
for maintaining ‘balance’ between the Ekiti and Akoko sub-ethnic groups in the project 
area, it implies further deprivation for farmers in Akoko North LGA. In any case. Table 
4.2 shows that one ESC was serving about 4,800 farming families in Akoko North and
Table 4.2
Number of Families Served by FSCs (by LGA)
(1)
Local government
(2)
Estimated number of 
farming families
(3)
N® of farming 
families per ESC
(4)
Service factor 
per ESC*
Akoko North 28,650 4,775 170.6
Akoko South 11,857 2,372 84.8
Ekiti Central 9,730 1,946 69.5
Ekiti East 9,968 1,994 71.3
Ekiti North 15,343 2,557 91.4
All Project 75,548 2,798 100.0
Notes: * Individual LGA entries in col. 3 expressed as percent of all-project mean. 
Computed from APMEPU, ‘Village Listing’.
just about 2,600 farming families in Ekiti North LGA. The number of farming families 
served by FSCs in the other three LGAs ranged from 1,946 to 2,372. At an average of 
2,104 farming families each, the clientele of FSCs in the latter LGAs amounted to only
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44% of their counterparts’ immediate publics in Akoko North LGA. Expressed as a 
service factor or as an index of the mean clientele for the entire project, all FSCs except 
those in Akoko North LGA were operating below the project’s ‘arithmetical’ threshold.
Disparities in the actual distribution of FSCs could be shown more clearly with the use 
of proxies. To do this, it has to be assumed that the number of farming families in each 
LGA could indicate effective or potential demand for project services, that the number 
of villages in each LGA could substitute for a measure of dispersion of FSCs, and that 
the number of wards could indicate the potential intensity or density of demand on FSCs 
in each LGA. If these assumptions are acceptable, three proxy measures could be used 
to construct alternative modes of distributing FSCs in the project area. Such largely 
hypothetical calculation could highlight the weaknesses of criteria employed by EAADP 
to site its FSCs, thus making possible a closer assessment of data in Table 4.1.
I have attempted one such exercise, using as weights APMEPU’s data on the distribution 
by LGAs of the total estimated number of villages, inside and outside wards, as well as 
farming families in the Ekiti-Akoko area. The results are presented in Table 4.3 and 
suggest more or less remarkably different outcomes, for example between actual and 
weighted distribution of FSCs on the one hand, and the three elements of weighted 
distribution of FSCs on the other.
Table 4.3
Actual and Weighted Distribution of FSCs in Ekiti-Akoko ADP
(1)
Local Government
(2) Distribution of FSCs (3) Difference 
between actual 
and weightedActual® Weighted*’
% of 
villages
% of 
wards
% of farming 
families
Akoko North 6 7 7 10 6
Akoko South 5 4 5 4 -2
Ekiti Central 5 4 3 3 -5
Ekiti East 5 4 7 4 0
Ekiti North 6 8 5 6 1
Total 27 27 27 27 0
Sources: * Same as Table 4.1. Computed from APMEPU, ‘Village Listing’, pp. 11-13.
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The weighted distribution of FSCs in respect of the number of farming families differs 
most, both in relation to other elements in the weighted distribution sub-category and, 
arguably, in relation to the actual distribution of FSCs. While the other LGAs move back 
and forth in relation to the actual distribution of FSCs, Akoko North’s hypothetical share 
of FSCs increased sharply, from five actual FSCs through seven FSCs in respect of the 
LGA s share of villages and wards to ten FSCs on account of its relative share of farming 
families in the project area. Finally, if these differences are balanced out, as in column 
3 of Table 4.3, Akoko North becomes the most deprived of the five LGAs, with six units 
of what may be referred to, albeit arbitrarily, as cumulative deprivation in the distribution 
of FSCs. Ekiti North LGA, the second most populous in the context of APMEPU’s data, 
has been deprived by only one unit, while Ekiti East is in equilibrium. In contrast, Ekiti 
Central and Akoko South were the ‘favoured’ LGAs; the former obtained five extra units 
while the latter got two units more than it seems to have deserved.
The foregoing inferences point up aspects of the history of government presence in the 
project area as a whole, and the differential intensity of that presence between the LGAs. 
In its report on the village listing exercise in the project area, APMEPU had remarked 
that Akoko North LGA s farming population may have been underestimated by 13%."^ 
This ‘unusual’ claim may or may not be valid, especially since it was explained away by 
reference to enumerators’ familiarity with their survey area. The point of interest, 
though, is that this ties in with Akoko North LGA s status in the alternative allocation 
of FSCs, for Table 4.3 suggests that it was worse off by one unit each in the weighted 
distribution of FSCs by number of villages and by number of wards. Since both criteria 
(i.e. number of villages and number of wards) are more determinate than the size of 
farming population, it is reasonable to surmise that the alternative scenario in Table 4.3 
is closer to reality than it seems, and that Akoko North LGA has been deprived in fact.
Ekiti Central LGA s status as the most favoured LGA in the actual distribution of FSCs 
is perhaps best explained by wider political-economic factors; its status may also help in 
isolating additional considerations in the location of the project’s FSCs. Of all LGAs in
^  APMEPU, ‘Village Listing’, pp. 4-5.
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the project area, Ekiti Central has the longest tradition of government’s physical presence 
that dates back to 1914, when Ondo Province was constituted with Ado-Ekiti as 
headquarters/^ Unlike many Akoko and northern Ekiti communities which moved back 
and forth between the old Kabba/Lokoja Division and Ilorin Division respectively, Ekiti 
Central has also had a tradition of administrative stability woven around Ado. This has 
in turn translated to relative advantage with the location of administrative infrastructures, 
including office blocks, an agricultural station (comprising an experimental farm, 
warehouses, stores, and a mechanical workshop) and related facilities. In the wake of 
EAADP’s financial debacle, ODSG decided to hand over existing facilities to the project 
to relieve pressure on its cash. Since much of the infrastructure owned previously by the 
state’s Ministry of Agriculture in the project area was handed over to EAADP under this 
arrangement, those areas with existing facilities became favourite locations for project 
structures. All five FSCs in Ekiti Central LGA were thus inherited by the project, while 
the other LGAs had between three and five newly constructed FSCs.
Finally, at an average clientele of 2,800 farming families, many of EAADP’s twenty 
seven FSCs were located outside EAADP’s ten-kilometre physical distance limit. Many 
FSCs were also located away from market centres and other central locations in the 
various LGAs.'^ ® It is also likely that EAADP’s investment on FSCs are justifiable more 
by their demonstration effect than by business volume or their marginal contribution to 
efficient service delivery. According to Naik, 15 FSCs recorded an annual turnover of 
less than 100 toimes of fertilizer or N100,000 in annual sales. While staff offices were 
well-furnished, ‘exhibits of sample poultry feeds and seeds were not available in most 
stores. Agro-chemicals and sprayers were available only in the five main PDCs, whereas 
the smaller stores had only fertilizer in s t o c k . N a i k ’s view, therefore, was that 
EAADP’s ESC programme was largely wasteful, that private agencies and co-operative 
societies could have been more economical for EAADP, and that one PDC or ESC per 
LGA should sufficiently meet the project’s distribution objectives. Other structures, Naik
Annual Report on the Southern Provinces o f Nigeria for the Year 1927 (Lagos, 1928), pp. 48-49. 
Naik, ‘Commercial Services’, p. 46.
Ibid.
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concludes, should be turned over to the private or quasi-private sector (e.g. co­
operatives).^®
Naik’s views are valid but too economistic to appreciate the deeper roots of the waste that 
he has criticised. It is true that generalised attitudes to public property in Nigeria have 
been lax, and that public officers have tended to show greater concern for their personal 
comfort than they have for duty. It is probable, however, that FSCs’ low business 
turnover had less to do with public sector control than with the lack of local demand for 
their merchandise. Unless it could be proved that FSCs’ low turnover resulted mainly 
from problems with input supply and service delivery, private sector control of FSCs 
would have made little difference to their business fortunes. The question of low demand 
for project services by local farmers is addressed in subsequent chapters.
4.5 Co-operatives and Farmers’ Groups
This section examines EAADP’s contributions to the growth of farmers’ groups in the 
context of the remarkable history of cooperative development in Ondo State. It is argued 
that EAADP could not have altered the commercial orientation of existing societies or 
championed the cause of production societies in five short years. The main reason was 
intra-project division over what constituted a cooperative society, but this itself reflected 
historical facts in the growth of cooperatives in Nigeria.
Ondo State has been home to co-operative societies, especially cocoa marketing but also 
thrift and credit societies, long before the advent of EAADP. In 1950/51 for example, 
about 22% of Western Region’s co-operative societies were based in Ondo Province, as 
were over 5,600 or 31.2% of total active members; marketing societies in the province 
also accounted for about 34% of cocoa purchased in the region, for 33.4% of turnover 
and 43% of net deposits .By March 1970, the number of marketing societies in the 
province had increased by 345% to 267 or nearly one-third of the regional total. The 
province also accounted for two of three government-owned plantations, two-fifths of
^  Ibid., pp. 47-48.
R. Galletti, K. D. S, Baldwin and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers (1956), p. 628.
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produce marketing unions, 47% of thrift and credit societies, and 54% of thrift and credit 
u n io n s .A s  Table 4.4 shows, cooperative activity has expanded substantially in Ondo 
State since the 1970s, possibly because Ondo’s elevation to full state status in 1976 has 
facilitated more intensive extension and propaganda by the co-operatives and agriculture 
departments.
Table 4.4
Co-operative Societies in Ondo State (select years)
Type of society 1970 1976/77 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90
Agricultural
CPMS 267 367 375 418 360
CPMU/CMU 9 14 16 16 17
CTCS 653 1,100 1,140 3,202 2,804
CTCU/CMU 20 12 13 15 18
Co-Fishing 2 5 75 91 70
Co-Fishing Unions - - - - 4
Livestock - - - - 1
Group Farming - - - 70 25
Non-agricultural/mixed
Co-Consumer 5 21 51 35 40
Others ‘ 20 7 30 96 1,066
Total 978 1,526 1,700 3,944 4,445
Notes; ‘Includes weaving, thrift and loan societies, thrift and savings societies (1970 only); artisanal societies, 
better life societies, industrial society (1989/90 only); transport society and multi-purpose societies (all years). 
Sources: 1970 figures are computed from Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria (Ibadan, 
1976), p. 122; other years Ondo State Co-operative Federation, April 1992,
Yet, rural development in present-day Ondo State has been mired in a deep, unending 
controversy about conceptions of farmers’ groups, and about the respective roles of the 
Agriculture and Cooperative Departments in providing nurture and advice to such 
groups.Historically, farmers’ cooperatives started as independent, self-help 
associations, established to enable members exploit new opportunities in commodity 
production. The earliest example, the Agege Planters Union, was promoting agricultural 
improvement and cocoa fermenting by the turn of the twentieth century, while others 
soon combined agricultural extension with the provision of credit to their members. By
C, E, P. Beer, The Politics o f Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria (Ibadan, 1976), p. 122.
See, e.g., Nigeria, Report o f a Committee Appointed in Nigeria to Examine the Recommendations 
made by the Commission on the Marketing o f West African Cocoa (Lagos, 1939).
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1919, R. E. Dennett, a forestry specialist in Nigeria’s Department of Agriculture, had 
commented generously on the rapid growth in the number of voluntary farmers’ 
associations in southern Nigeria.
In 1931, however, the control of co-operative marketing societies changed from the 
Department of Agriculture to a ‘specialized branch of the Secretariat knowledgeable on 
co-operative m a t te r s T h is  move was designed ostensibly to delineate departmental 
responsibilities and avert a clash of interests between small-scale farmers and wealthier 
traders who co-existed in the marketing societies supervised by the Agricultural 
Department.^^ In fact, government action amounted to a structural overkill. As Carlson 
argued, co-operative societies
lulled the farmer into thinking that someone was taking good care of his interests imtil it 
was too late for him to act. [Co-operative] extension’s major achievement was preventing 
extensive reactionary political and mob action by farmers willing to preserve the status 
quo. Instead of maintaining the rural way of life to which it was dedicated, extension 
actually assisted in its liquidation.^^
In 1936, government assumed control over cooperative marketing societies, immediately 
reducing them to mere agencies of commercial interests in the cocoa trad e .T h e  take­
over also destroyed the societies’ status as autonomous farmers’ groups, severed them 
from their production development functions, and imposed a narrower conception of co­
operatives on the farming public.A bove all, the new functional arrangement marked
R. E. Dennett, ‘Agricultural Progress in Nigeria’, JAS, XVIII, LXXII (1919), pp. 268-269.
Beer, Politics, p. 24; Tom Forrest, ‘Agricultural Policies in Nigeria, 1900-78’, in Judith Heyer, Pepe 
Roberts and Gavin Williams (eds.). Rural Development in Tropical Africa, (1981), p. 227.
Price, ‘Co-operation’, pp. 1-2. Hence the wide regulatory and supervisory powers granted the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1935, on which see Nigeria, 
‘Co-operative Societies Ordinance No. 39 of 1935’ (Lagos, 1935).
Robert Carlson, ‘Co-operative Extension: A Historical Assessment’, Journal o f Extension, VII, 3 
(1970), pp. 10-11.
Michael Koll, ‘The Western Nigerian Cooperative Administration: An Obstacle to Development’, 
in Ukandi Damachi and Hans Dieter Seibel (eds.). Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria 
(New York, 1973), p. 42; A. Olorunfemi, ‘Backgroimd to the Establishment of the Nigerian Cocoa 
Marketing Board 1947-48’, Odu, 19 (1979), p. 63.
Beer, Politics, p. 24; cf. E. J. Nwosu, ‘The Role of Government in the Development of the Co-
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the advent of parallel farmer organisations in Western Nigeria, with agricultural farmers’ 
unions and other production-oriented associations under the auspices of the Agriculture 
Department and more formal, commercially-oriented co-operative societies supervised by 
the Co-operative Department. As Table 4.4 show clearly, commercially-oriented societies 
have expanded much more rapidly - both in absolute and relative terms, than production 
societies since the 1970s.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s cooperative policy was clear enough. In the short term, all farmers’ 
credit was to be routed through cooperative societies, both to reduce the costs to the 
project of credit administration and afford the affected farmers some participation in the 
project process as well as self-development. Its long-term strategic objective lay in 
reorienting existing societies away from their commercial inclination towards production. 
A cooperative and credit specialist was to be employed to oversee project efforts on both 
counts. However, no appointment was ever made to the post. Moreover, staff 
secondments to the project from Ondo State’s co-operatives department took place only 
in 1983.^ Up to this time, the project’s commercial division was run by extension 
officers from the ministry of agriculture. As shown above, however, the latter were 
slightly opposed to the formal co-operative approach to farmer organisation, preferring 
what Eyoh has called a ‘temporary banding together of farmers for the expediency of 
securing credit packages’. N o t  surprisingly, they dealt with farmers as individuals for 
purposes of credit administration in clear contravention of project policy to employ 
registered cooperative societies.That situation prevailed until 1986, when the emphasis 
on cooperatives was restored.
As a result, EAADP’s contributions to co-operative growth in the Ekiti-Akoko area are 
likely to have been peripheral. This inference is supported by data on the numerical
operative Movement’, Vierteljahresberichte, 64 (1976), pp. 143-158. 
“  Interview with ex-Commercial Manager, 30/3/92.
Eyoh, ‘Structures’, pp. 23-24.
“  EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 140.
« EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP’.
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growth of co-operative societies in the Ekiti-Akoko area between 1981 and 1986. As 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.5a show respectively, the number of primary societies in the 
project area increased by 78% while secondary organisations grew by 70%. Absolute 
increases of 524% and 1200% were recorded for multi-purpose societies and co-operative 
farmers’ societies respectively, but the major shift seemed to have been between thrift 
and credit societies on the one hand and multi-purpose societies on the other. This 
involved an increase in the relative share of multipurpose societies, from 11.6% of the 
total number of societies in 1981 to about 41% of the total number of societies in 1986. 
In contrast, the share of thrift and credit societies declined from a high 82% of the 1981 
total to 53%.
Table 4.5
Co-operative Societies in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1981 and 1986
Type of society 1981 1986 % change®
No. % of total No. % of total
Multi-purpose 88 12.0 549 41.9 524.0
Thrift and Credit 620 84.5 720 54.9 16.1
Co-Consumers 25 3.4 29 2.2 16.0
Coop Farmers 1 0.1 13 1.0 1200.0
Total 734 100.0 1,311 100.0 -
Notes; * Difference between 1986 and 1981 figures expressed as percent of 1981 figures. 
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Table 4.15, p. 144.
Table 4.5a
Co-operative Unions in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1981 and 1986
Type of society 1981 1986 % change
No. % of total No. % of total
Multipurpose Unions 2 8.7 15 38.5 650.0
Produce Marketing Unions 5 21.7 5 12.8 0.0
Thrift and Credit Unions 16 69.6 19 48.7 18.8
Total 23 100.0 39 100.0 -
Source: Same as Table 4.5.
The relative change in each component is very close, but the shift to multi-purpose 
societies does not suggest a shift from the commercial orientation in pre-project times to 
more production-related organisational forms. On the contrary, multi-purpose societies
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exemplify movement away from primary to fluid but often confusing combinations of 
secondary and tertiary economic functions. In Ayede, for example, the CT&CU became 
a multi-purpose union to accommodate new production societies formed in the wake of 
the Green Revolution progranune in the 1980s. Most of such societies were little more 
than transient responses to equally transient emphases in Nigeria’s food production 
campaigns. Clearly, the changes could be interpreted as necessary evidence of increasing 
rural-urban linkages and of mobility in rural society, but this does not really strengthen 
EAADP’s primary concern for agricultural production. The number of cooperative 
societies had also started to increase before the project started, in which case the 
functional redefinition could have resulted from the co-operative movement’s efforts at 
re-equipping itself to operate in produce and credit markets. In this sense, EAADP’s 
institutional objectives may have resulted from rural institutional adaptation to commercial 
opportunities and therefore achieved independently of project efforts to build or reinforce 
social infrastructure.
In short, EAADP was not able to achieve a significant shift in pre-existing patterns, for 
example by encouraging explicitly production-oriented co-operatives, or by eroding the 
commercial orientation of co-operatives in the project area. If this is the case, as the data 
suggest, it follows that EAADP made little or no impact on co-operative development, 
or on social infrastructure development generally. The remainder of the chapter examines 
the project’s record on physical infrastructure.
4.6 Rural and Feeder Roads, 1983-86
Like its counterparts in other parts of Nigeria, Ekiti-Akoko ADP was engaged in the 
construction and maintenance of rural roads ‘to permit the efficient evacuation of farm 
produce, the timely supply of inputs, the effective movement of project service staff and 
much improved access to farms and hamlets.’^  Specifically, EAADP was expected to 
‘provide 125 km. of gravel surfaced feeder road and 375 km. of farm road, one half of 
which was to be newly constructed.’^  ^The project was also to assume responsibility for
^  Mabogunje, ‘Funtua’, p. 197.
“  APMEPU, Project Completion Report, Vol. I Main Report, p. 72.
130
routine and periodic maintenance of some 2,000 km. of rural roads within the project 
area. This section examines EAADP’s road programme in 1983-86 in some detail, 
arguing that the project failed to improve rural producers’ access to roads partly because 
of the sheer magnitude of the supply gap and partly because of EAADP’s institutional 
failures.
4.6.1 Types of Roads
A gravel surfaced road differs from a farm road on at least two grounds. The first ground 
relates to their respective weight-bearing capabilities between climatic seasons while the 
second is the type and magnitude of maintenance required to make them motorable all 
year round, especially during the wet season. Normally, a gravel surfaced road can take 
relatively heavy traffic in the wet season and may or may not be motorable throughout 
the year. In contrast, farm roads comprise a variety of more or less permanent 
connections between town (or village) and farm, farm and market centre, or village and 
market centre. Three forms of farm roads may be identified in the present context.“  
The first comprises ‘emergency’ roads cut through thick bush to facilitate the evacuation 
of timber to sawmills for further processing. As Afolabi Ojo has noted, however, ‘these 
[emergency roads] are almost always useable by vehicles only during the dry season’; 
they also usually terminate at the required or designated collection point, ‘thus leaving 
some distance to farm sites to be traversed on foot. Some ‘emergency roads’ have 
nevertheless encouraged the development of more permanent connections between farm 
and village in various parts of Yorubaland, for example through use and wont.
A second form of farm roads comprises what Ekundare calls ‘footpaths or bush 
tracks’,^ * used traditionally by pedestrians and more recently by cyclists and 
motorcyclists. Footpaths are often narrow and winding openings through more or less 
thick bush with considerable socio-economic significance. Historically, footpaths are the 
exclusive preserve of trade caravans, defined by Falola as ‘a company.. .of regular traders
“  Cf. Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele, ‘Road Question’, note 5, p. 24.
Ojo, ‘Observations’, p. 459.
“  R. Ekundare, An Economic History o f Nigeria 1860-1960 (1973), p. 71; Ogunsanya, ‘Rural’, p. 33.
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(usually women) who covered long and short distances’ by foot to buy and sell foodstuffs 
and other articles of trade in major markets in nineteenth century Yoruba society. 
Owing to inclement weather and pervasive insect-home diseases in Nigeria’s forest zone, 
there has been little, if any, use of animal transport in southwestern Nigeria. Hence, 
while camels and donkeys have been employed widely for transport in the semi-desert 
and desert areas of northern Nigeria, crop evacuation from southwestern Nigeria’s 
farmsteads, and the conveying between periodic markets of an even wider variety of 
articles of trade, has been predominantly by human carriers .A s with most other farm 
chores, labour for crop evacuation has been usually, but not exclusively, recmited from 
among family members or from among people in the same locality; since the formal end 
of domestic slavery in the late nineteenth century, human carriers have been 
predominantly female rather than male.^^
More recently, footpaths have been used by cyclists and motorcyclists; hence they are 
still pivotal elements of the network of roads by which crops are evacuated from farm 
to village market or from either (or both) to other marketing points. Since the 1970s, 
there has been a significant increase in the use by farmers of motorised vehicles, 
especially two-wheeled motorcycles on what used to be pedestrian footpaths. However, 
this trend may have been reversed in the face of economic decline in Nigeria in the 
1980s. For example, in Ayede and neighbouring villages where I did fieldwork in 
1991/92, up to 80% of farmers who had motorcycles in the 1970s and early 1980s had 
sold their motorcycles or could no longer afford to keep them in serviceable condition 
by 1992. In Ayede and neighbouring villages therefore, and possibly in other parts of 
Ondo State, more farmers now depend on non-vehicular or non-motorised means of 
transport (i.e. journeys by foot, or by bicycle) than in the 1970s and 1980s for the often 
daily return trips to their farms, what Ojo calls ‘the daily pulsing of population out to the
® Toy in Falola, ‘The Yoruba Caravan System of the Nineteenth Century’, UAHS, 24, 1, 1991, pp. 
111- 112.
™ Ekundare, Economic History, pp. 71-72; Falola, ‘Yoruba Caravan’, pp. 111-132.
Ekundare, Economic History, p. 71.
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farm and back to the town (or v illa g e ) .T h e  general decline in the use of motorised 
vehicles would most certainly have meant extra costs, in lost time and in productivity, 
for those who hitherto had been journeying to work in ‘the speed and comfort’ of 
motorised vehicles as well as for the local agricultural economy.
The third, and in the present context final, form of farm roads may be called the farm 
road proper, that is roads designed and built primarily to increase the intensity of 
motorised vehicular traffic in agricultural communities. EAADP refers to this type of 
road as ‘access roads’, that is to say.
...farm roads...which start from a secondary road, a feeder road or an access road and 
serve important farm communities. The road has a traffic intensity of less than 20 
vehicles/day and a width of 5m.^^
Usually, a substantial proportion of roads in this sub-group has been employed as bush 
paths (as defined above) at some point in the past, and were subsequently expanded, 
usually ‘by community effort under the supervision of the ch iefsA lternatively , they 
may have been expanded by government agencies eager to make politically strategic 
claims of commitment to, or success in, the development of rural infrastructure. Farm 
roads would usually, but not always, bear heavy, produce-laden vehicular traffic during 
the wet season, but they require major annual or periodic maintenance, for example 
regrading to fill up potholes, or some form of bridge-building to prevent total loss of the 
road surface to erosion.
^  Ojo, ‘Observations’, p. 459.
Cf. Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele, ‘Road Question’, p. 8.
Christensen [Final Report, p. 86] has described two other types of roads constructed by EAADP as 
follows: (a) ‘Secondary roads which coimect two major towns or villages, and have a traffic intensity of 
more than 100 vehicles/day. The road width is 8m’; and (b) ‘Feeder roads, which start at a primary or 
secondary road and serve a number of villages or farm settlements. The road has a traffic intensity of 20- 
100 vehicles/day and a width of 6m.’
Ekundare, Economic History, p. 72.
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4.6.2 Rural and Feeder Roads in Ondo State
Rural Ondo State is generally served by a very poor road network. Many feeder roads 
in the state are not tarred; most of those with any tarring were constructed during the 
1950s and had all but disintegrated over the years from lack of maintenance. The 
situation has not been helped by changes instituted under the 1976 local government 
reform, by which local government authorities were assigned constitutional responsibility 
for rural roads without corresponding ‘financial resources to develop a good network of 
rural feeder roads.
Yet, official data suggest that the state’s rural road network is well above average by 
Nigeria’s standards. According to the Idachaba report, the state’s estimated total road 
length of 7,391 km. placed it in seventh position amongst Nigeria’s nineteen states as of 
1985. Only 13.3% (983.5 km.) of the state’s total road length was however built up to 
federal government specifications while 36.0% (2,666.5 km.) met standards prescribed 
by the state government.
It follows therefore that 51% (i.e. 3,747 km.) of the state’s estimated total road length 
belong to the ‘residual’ category, the ensemble of less standardized feeder roads 
controlled by cash-strapped local government authorities.^^ For a variety of reasons, 
including financial and technical, local government-controlled roads have traditionally 
excluded agriculturally strategic emergency roads and footpaths. At an estimated road 
density of 357 metres per square kilometre of land in its territory, Ondo State was ahead 
of fourteen states in terms of road density.However, the 51.3% (i.e. 183 metres per 
sq. km.) share of feeder roads in the state’s total road density compares with a mere 48 
metres per sq. km. for federal roads. At 130 metres per square kilometre, Ondo State 
returned the highest density of state roads in the nineteen s t a t e s .As  Ogundana has 
observed, Ondo’s higher density of state roads might suggest that a greater proportion of
Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, p. 12.
^  Ibid., Table 3, p. 15.
Ibid., Table 5, p. 17.
^  Ibid.
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distant agricultural land is being farmed in Ondo than in other states.*® Thus although 
the report’s calculations were based on incomplete information, they suggest clearly that 
Ondo State has a relatively good network of roads and that feeder roads provide the bulk 
of the state’s road network.
4.6.3 Rural and Feeder Roads in Ekiti-Akoko Area
The foregoing general views have found strong support in the report on the village listing 
exercise conducted in the project area in 1981 by APMEPU.*^ According to the report,
Households in the project area have relatively good road access...Good tar roads provide 
direct access to around one third of the households across the project, though nearly two 
thirds of all households appear to have access through some form of tar roads. Of the 
(five) Local Government Areas (in the project area), better quality tar roads are found 
more in Ekiti North, East and Central.^
Indeed, a remarkable 68% of the estimated farming population in the project area had 
direct access to tar roads (Table 4.6). In contrast, 28% of estimated farm families in the 
project area were served by laterite roads, while only 4% were condenmed, as it were,
Table 4.6
EAADP: Main Road Types and Farm Families Served (1981)
Local
Government
Head­
quarters
Road Types (%) N« of
farming
familiesGood tar Bad tar Good
laterite
Bad
laterite
Footpath
Akoko North Ikare Akoko 27.0 48.0 12.0 12.0 1.0 28,650
Akoko South Oka Akoko 11.0 65.0 _a 19.0 5.0 11,857
Ekiti Central Ado Ekiti 45.0 20.0 9.0 25.0 1.0 9,730
Ekiti East Omuo Ekiti 50.0 9.0 19.0 12.0 10.0 9,968
Ekiti North Ikole Ekiti 57.0 5.0 .» 38.0 *b 15,343
Project mean 35.0 33.0 7.0 21.0 4.0 -
Notes: “ means nil; Less than 0.5%.
Source: APMEPU, ‘Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Report on the Village Listing Exercise’ 
(Benin City, 1982), Table 6, p. 18.
“  Ogundana, ‘Transport Constraint’, p. 79.
** The Agricultural Projects Monitoring, Evaluation, and Planning Unit, a semi-autonomous federal 
agency responsible for overseeing ADPs and irrigation schemes.
“ APMEPU, ‘Village Listing’, p. 6.
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to using footpaths. About 51 % of the proportion with access to tar roads, or 35% of farm 
families in the project area, were served by ‘good tar’ roads while 49% (33% of all farm 
families) was served by ‘bad tar’ roads. Of the 28% of project population with access to 
‘laterite roads’, only one-quarter (or 7% of all families) was served by ‘good laterite’ 
roads while the remaining three-quarters (or 21 % of all families) were using ‘bad laterite’ 
roads.
In a deeper sense, however, APMEPU s up-beat picture of rural roads in the Ekiti-Akoko 
area is superficial and misleading. The report does not contain explicit operational 
definitions of its road categories. Except with the benefit of prior access to its (pre­
report) working papers, therefore, APMEPU s criteria for classifying the project area’s 
roads lie beyond immediate analytical reach, making serious criticism of its road 
categories difficult, if not impossible. Whatever they may be, APMEPU’s criteria are 
likely to have been so broad to have obscured the differential distribution of road types 
between EGAs in the project area. APMEPU’s conclusions have thus disregarded the 
intra-project dimensions of the rural road problem.
Although an average 35% of the project population had direct access to ‘good tar’ roads, 
only 27% and 11% of the estimated farm families in Akoko North and Akoko South 
EGAs respectively, was served by ‘good tar’ roads. In contrast, between 45% and 57% 
of farm families in Ekiti Central, East and North EGAs had direct access to ‘good tar’ 
roads. Farm families in Akoko North and South EGAs were equally disadvantaged, in 
relative terms, with regard to ‘bad tar’ roads, with between half and two-thirds of 
estimated farm families in the two EGAs being served by ‘bad tar’ roads. This is 
certainly poor in relation to Ekiti Central’s 20%; it is even worse when compared with 
9% and 5% for Ekiti East and Ekiti North EGAs respectively. Both ‘bad laterite’ and 
‘good laterite’ roads seem to be fairly distributed throughout the project area, but 25% 
and 38% of farm families in Ekiti Central and Ekiti North EGAs respectively were being 
served by ‘bad laterite’ roads while ‘good laterite’ roads were statistically insignificant 
in Akoko South and Ekiti North EGAs. In short, APMEPU’s view that farm families in 
the three Ekiti EGAs in the project area were better served by rural roads than their 
counterparts in Akoko North and South EGAs would seem justified.
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In fact, however, roads in Ekiti Central, East, and North EGAs have been less well laid 
out than APMEPU s conclusions have suggested. While ‘better quality tar roads [might 
be] found more in Ekiti North, East and Central’,*^  road types in the three EGAs have 
not been well blended or networked. In relation to their counterparts in Akoko North and 
South EGAs, farm families in the three Ekiti EGAs were more sharply divided between 
‘good tar’ and ‘bad laterite’ road types, polar opposites in the context of APMEPU s 
data. About 57% of estimated farm families in Ekiti North EGA were served by ‘good 
tar’ roads while about 88.4% of the remaining families (or 38% of all farm families) in 
the EGA only had access to ‘bad laterite’ roads. Since the use by farm families of ‘good 
laterite’ roads in Ekiti North EGA was statistically insignificant, it has to be assumed that 
the 2.0% of families who had no direct access to ‘good tar’ roads was served by 
footpaths. Ekiti North EGA thus combined the highest proportion of families served by 
‘good tar’ roads with the highest percentage of farm families with direct access to ‘bad 
laterite’ roads!
Ekiti Central and Ekiti East EGAs’ circumstances were no less remarkable. Farm families 
in Ekiti Central and East EGAs had access to every road type, but the differential 
distribution of access between the two EGAs and within each is remarkable. Two-thirds 
of all farm families in Ekiti Central EGA were by 1981 divided between ‘good tar’ roads 
and ‘bad laterite’ roads. Specifically, about half of estimated farm families in Ekiti 
Central EGA was served by ‘good tar’ roads while one-quarter made do with ‘bad 
laterite’ roads. 20% and 9% of farm families in the EGA was served by ‘bad tar’ and 
‘good laterite’ roads respectively. This is not an exciting record, given that government’s 
physical presence in present-day Ekiti Central EGA dates back to 1914, when Ondo 
Province was constituted.
Similarly, about half of estimated farm families in Ekiti East EGA was served by ‘good 
tar’ roads while an additional 19% had access to ‘good laterite’ roads in 1981. The latter 
figure is about 50.0% higher than the proportion for Akoko North and about double the 
corresponding figure for Ekiti Central EGA. Moreover, only 12% of farm families in
Ibid.
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Ekiti East LGA, just about half of the proportion for Ekiti Central and one-third of Ekiti 
North’s, was served by ‘bad laterite’ roads. Yet, an unusually high 10% of estimated 
farm families in Ekiti East LGA was bound up with footpaths! The last figure is double 
the rate for Akoko South, the only other LGA where more than 0.5% of farm families 
relied on footpaths.
In sum, the distribution of roads within the three Ekiti LGAs in the project area exhibits 
a remarkable imbalance between ‘tar roads’ and non-tar roads. This imbalance cannot be 
dismissed off-handedly as evidence of the anti-agricultural bias of Nigeria’s development 
policy, rather a result of APMEPU s selective interpretation of its data. The ‘better 
quality tar roads...in Ekiti North, East and Central’ are inter-state roads, politically 
significant highways linking Nigeria’s second-tier administrative units which the federal 
government has consciously developed since the 1970s. One such highway starts in 
Aramoko in Ekiti West LGA (outside the project area), close to Ondo State’s 
northwestern boundary with Osun State. After about ten kilometres of uneven road 
surface between Ido and Ifaki (Ero LGA), this highway intersects much of Ekiti North 
and East LGAs and connects Ondo State’s northeastern communities with their cultural 
kith and kin in present-day Kogi and Kwara States (see map 2 on p. xvii). Another inter­
state road starts from Ado (Ekiti Central LGA), passes through much of Ekiti Central and 
East LGAs as well as Akoko North LGA, linking up with what used to be Afemai and 
Akoko-Edo Divisions in present-day Edo State.
Notwithstanding their status as ‘good tar’ roads, the place in the local agricultural 
economy of the Aramoko-Omuo and the Ado-Ikare roads can be overstated. For one, 
both were by 1981 newly constructed, in relative terms, from the narrow and winding 
routes in much of the project area since the 1950s. Construction work on the Aramoko- 
Omuo road commenced after the advent of Ondo State in the 1970s, while the Ado-Ikare 
road was rehabilitated as late as 1981/82. The latter deteriorated rather quickly because 
of extremely poor construction standards and even poorer maintenance; by 1983, at least 
a five kilometre stretch of the road close to Ado (Ekiti Central LGA) and a number of
8" APMEPU, ‘Village Listing’, p. 6.
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spots around Aisegba (Ekiti East), were virtually impassable to ordinary vehicles and had 
become no-go areas for produce-bearing lorries during the wet season.
APMEPU’s emphasis on highways also ignores the year-on-year condition of feeder roads 
in the project area, understating the predicament of farm families who use non-tar roads 
to evacuate their produce to neighbouring periodic markets. In 1980, Oka (Akoko South) 
was cut off for at least one week after persistent rainfall made the only road link from 
Iwaro Oka to the south impassable to motorised vehicles. All journeys to Oka from the 
south were undertaken by foot, more so since the only motorable access road through 
Ikare and Epinmi to the north was about thirty kilometres away.*  ^Now, Oka and Ikare 
had been key commercial long before the advent of Ekiti-Akoko ADP. In the 1950s, 
according to Galletti, Baldwin, and Dina, up to two-fifths of traders in Ikare's eight-day 
market came from Oka, selling yams, kola, and woven c l o t h . I t  is reasonable to 
believe that such links between Oka and Ikare have expanded since the 1960s, 
heightening the costs to the local economy and farmers especially of poor road links 
between Oka and Ikare.
Similarly, the road that linked Igede farm settlement to Ayede became so bad that 
produce evacuation from Igede depended almost entirely on a tractor hired out to farmers 
in and outside the area by the Benin-Owena River Basin Development Authori ty.The 
main economic and commercial route to Ayede from Oye, a ‘good tar’ in the 1970s, also 
became routinely impassable to commercial vehicles after each heavy downpour as lately 
as 1992. While Oka and Ayede may be isolated cases, each is surrounded by, and 
connected by road to, a cluster of villages whose access roads are even worse. To this 
extent, Ayede and Oka may very well reflect the year-on-year predicament of farm 
families in the remote but agriculturally important villages in what became the Ekiti- 
Akoko project area from 1981.
^ Personal knowledge.
“  Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, p. 62. 
^  Personal knowledge.
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4.6.4 Significance of EAADP’s Road Progranune
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s road programme was significant not because it could induce a 
turnaround in the project area’s rural road problem even in the medium term but because 
of its potential to regenerate vehicular transport and stimulate new commercial 
opportunities for farmers. At a total of 500 km. in roads constructed and routinely 
maintained over five years from 1981-85, and another two thousand kilometres 
maintained periodically over the same period, EAADP’s target amounted to a modest 
beginning in a long process of socio-economic reconstruction in and outside the project 
area. The same would remain true even after due account has been taken of the 300 
kilometre road improvement scheme added to the programme under the Kaduna 
agreement.
Available evidence for the late 1980s also support the view that EAADP’s road 
construction targets were no more than a drop in the ocean. The project area has featured 
prominently in the rural road programme of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural 
Infrastructure (DFRRI), a federal omnibus agency established in 1986. Local government 
councils in the Ekiti-Akoko area accounted for 26.5% of DFFRI’s feeder road 
programme in the state, which totalled 4,177.3 kilometres. More specifically, the project 
area’s share amounted to about one-quarter of Phase I (total 1,405.4 km.); 27% of Phase 
II (1,339.0 km.); and 28.1% of Phase III (1,432.9 km.) of feeder roads constructed or 
rehabilitated by DFFRI up to 1991.*®
The significance of EAADP’s road programme lay therefore in the project’s structural 
advantage vis-a-vis existing institutions and in the potential for results that arises from 
that structural attribute. At its inauguration in 1981, EAADP was simply the best 
endowed, both in the structural and long-term senses, to address the problems of poor 
road networking in the project area as well as combat seasonal bottlenecks in the more 
remote parts within it. For example, the very existence of EAADP’s road programme 
implied a transfer of responsibility for rural roads in the project area from the respective 
Local Government Councils (LGCs) to the project. Implicit in this jurisdictional change
Ondo State DFFRI, ‘The Journey so far’ (Akure, n.d.), pp. 5-6.
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was EAADP’s unstated but nonetheless remarkable potential to address the problems of 
‘rural isolation, segmented rural markets and rural stagnation’*^ , themselves outcomes 
of years of urban-oriented development policies in Nigeria and the continuing knock-on 
effects on (the lack of effective) local government of the excessive politicisation of 
revenue allocation.
Because it had access to enormous financial and technical resources, EAADP seemed 
better placed than local government councils or even the state’s Ministry of Works to 
articulate a more centralised and more co-ordinated approach to the rural road problem 
in the project area. Afterall, LGCs depend ultimately on financial grants from Nigeria’s 
federal and state governments, both of which were hard pressed for cash during the 
1980s. In fact, while Nigeria’s second republic (1979-83) lasted, many state governments 
had refused to pass to their respective LGCs part of federal grants that were transferred 
through them (state governments). In the southwestern states then controlled by the 
defunct Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), state governments exploited the party’s welfare 
programmes, which they were implementing, to get their largely politically compliant 
LGCs to agree to share with them (state governments) the cost of providing essential 
public goods like pipe-borne water and primary education.
Nigeria’s local government councils have not been remarkable, therefore, for providing 
basic infrastructure and related services without substantial direct assistance from federal 
and/or state governments. A pointed example of financial impotence or lack of political 
will at LGC level is furnished by the case of water supply in Ekiti North LGA. Since the 
late 1970s, a dam over the Èle river in Itapaji (Ekiti North LGA) has provided pipe-home 
water for many communities in the LGA. Since its commissioning, the dam has depended 
on two generating plants for power supply, but changes in Nigeria’s economic fortunes 
in the 1980s had meant that spare parts were no longer readily available and that 
maintenance standards were declining. By the late 1980s, water supply from Èle had 
become intermittent, largely because the dam’s low capacity generators could no longer 
provide sufficient power to pump water to neighbouring communities.
Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, p. 12.
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By 1991, most communities in what may be called central Ekiti North (including Ikole, 
the LGC’s seat) have been without pipe-home water for at least two years. Some of the 
well-off and/or vehicle-owning residents travelled to villages coimected to the Èrô dam 
to fetch water in plastic containers while others relied on an expanding but extremely 
informal water market.^ But most residents had reverted to more pristine sources of 
potable but untreated water, such as streams and dug-out wells. By late 1992, the national 
power grid was yet to be extended over a ten-kilometre stretch from Ikole to Itapaji to 
upgrade the dam’s power supply and increase its water supply capacity.
The above situation is most readily attributable to financial cutbacks to public sector 
agencies in the 1980s. But it raises a deeper question, namely that the capacity for 
essential technical-intensive constmction and maintenance operations has either not been 
developed at all in Nigeria’s public sector agencies or is not available at local government 
level. On the contrary, as Gaviria, Bindlish, and Lele have remarked, ‘much of the 
institutional capacity built by the (World) Bank has been at the federal level, and outside 
the existing governmental stmctures.’^  ^ Even so, EAADP was closer to federal level 
agencies in 1979-83 than Ekiti North LGC or Ondo State’s Ministry of Works. To this 
extent, the project had considerable potential to transform mral livelihoods in the project 
area by bringing the benefits of its relatively ready access to globally-sourced finance and 
technical expertise to bear on the supply of, and access to, infrastructure in the Ekiti- 
Akoko area.
4.6.5 Analysis of Results
EAADP could not fully exploit, let alone realise, its potential to effect changes in the 
mral road situation in the project area. It constmcted a total of 258 km. of all road types 
over four years to 1986. An additional 182 km. of roads were routinely maintained, but
Personal knowledge. On being checked into ODSADEP’s guest house at Ikole in March 1992, a man 
offered to provide me with a bucketful of water per day for drinking and personal use- for an unspecified 
fee. Concerned about the health implications of the offer, I turned down ODSADEP’s offer of free lodging 
and made alternative arrangements elsewhere. Since my options cannot be assumed for all locals, Ekiti 
North LGC’s failure to restore power supply to the Èle dam may as yet trigger health problems for many 
helpless residents.
” ‘Road Question’, p. 5,
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the project did not undertake any road improvement between 1983 and 1986.^ Between 
February 1983 and June 1984 alone, EAADP constructed a total of seventy one culverts 
of various dimensions, that is to say thirty-one 0.6m, thirty-nine 0.9m. and one 1.2m 
diameter culverts. Two bridges and two box/beam culverts were also constructed over 
fifteen months to June 1984.^  ^Of the 258 kilometres of roads constructed between 1983 
and 1986, ten kilometres (about 4.0%) provided a new access road to Ikun in Ero LGA, 
east of Ekiti North, to replace the existing bridge and tar road that linked Ikun with Ekiti 
North LGA through lye and Ayede, which had been washed away by flood from the Èrô 
dam.
Table 4.7 presents information on the distribution by local government of EAADP’s road 
programme in 1983 to 1986. The table suggests, among other things, that Ekiti LGAs
Table 4.7
EAADP’s Road Programme, 1983-86 (Km. by LGA)
Local Government Construction Maintenance
Km. % of total Km. % of total
Akoko North 56.02 21.7 26.0 14.3
Akoko South 46.48 18.0 14.0 7.7
Ekiti Central 36.60 14.2 35.0 19.2
Ekiti East 59.46 23.0 26.0 14.3
Ekiti North 48.98 19.0 81.0 44.5
Ero 10.50 4.1 - -
Total 258.04 100.0 182.0 100.0
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Table 3,1b, between pp. 78-79.
accounted for 56% and 78% of roads constructed and maintained by the project 
respectively. The former figure excludes the ten-kilometre access road to Ikun; if this was 
included, Ekiti LGAs’ share of roads constructed by EAADP would rise to 60% of the 
total. Table 4.7 also suggests that Ekiti East and Akoko South LGAs each accounted for 
over 20% of newly constructed roads, followed closely by Ekiti North LGA with 19% 
of all newly constructed roads and a remarkable 45 % of roads maintained by the project.
^  EAADP, Internal Completion Report, pp. 78-79. 
”  Christensen, Final Report, p. 89.
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This supports my criticism of APMEPU’s view on the quality of roads in Ekiti LGAs, 
more so if one assumes that EAADP’s choice of roads for construction and/or 
rehabilitation was informed by social need and potential contribution to agricultural 
production.
Overall, EAADP achieved 52.0% of its original road construction target. If the 300 
kilometre road improvement scheme integrated into EAADP’s programme in 1983 was 
included, the completion rate would amount to 21.5%; otherwise it is 19.0% if excluded. 
As Table 4.8 shows, project performance varied widely on an annual basis. In 1983,
Table 4.8
EAADP’s Road Programme Components, 1983-86 (kilometres)
Activity 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
-pa A" T A T A T A T A %“
Construction 60 62 75 106 50 35 40 55 275 258 94.0
Improvement 60 - 75 - 50 - 40 - 275 - 0.0
Routine
maintenance - 6 25 18 40 69 60 89 125 182 146.0
Periodic
maintenance 100 - 340 - 640 - 840 - 1920 - 0.0
Total 220 68 515 124 780 104 980 144 2320 440 19.0
% achieved 30.9 24.1 13.3 14.7 19.0
excl. impro­
vement 42.5 28.2 14.2 15.3 21.5
Notes: * SAR target; •* Achieved; Total target for construction component includes 50 km. for 1982, before 
the road programme commenced. Total achieved as % of overall target for each programme component. 
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Tables 3.1a and 3.2, p. 76 and p. 79 respectively.
EAADP recorded a 31% completion rate or about 43% if the road improvement scheme 
was excluded. The ratios dropped to 24% and 28% respectively in 1984, declining even 
further in 1985. By 1986, project achievement stood at about half of its 1983 completion 
rate on SAR target. Even so, EAADP undertook no improvement or periodic 
maintenance of any type of rural roads.
The above outcomes could be explained in various ways. Ekiti-Akoko’s financial and
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staffing difficulties, about which much has been said in chapter 3, delayed the road 
programme by one year and affected its momentum in other ways. Comparatively, 
EAADP’s completion rate was the lowest among its contemporaries. According to 
Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele, road construction output was higher in Nigeria’s early enclave 
ADPs than in late enclave projects. Of five early enclave projects, only Funtua failed to 
meet its road construction target; even so, its 69.5% completion rate was remarkable (see 
Table 4.9). Gusau achieved 100% completion rate, while the remaining three early 
enclave ADPs exceeded their targets by between 28.2% and 41.2%. In contrast, Bida 
ADP posted 71.5% completion rate, probably because it commenced operations in the 
relatively favourable climate of 1979, while EAADP’s completion rate was about 52.0%. 
Road construction was therefore prosecuted more forcefully in early than in late enclave 
ADPs.
Table 4.9
Road Construction by Nigeria’s Enclave ADPs (Targets and Achievements)
Particulars Target (km.) Actual (km.) Completion rate (%)*
Early Enclave Projects
Funtua 750 521 69.5
Gombe 500 706 141.2
Gusau 750 750 100.0
Lafia 600 807 134.5
Ayangba 1,300 1,667 128.2
Late Enclave Projects'’
Bida 620 429 71.5
Ekiti-Akoko 500 258 51.6
Notes: ® Actual expressed as percent of target. Two other late enclave ADPs (i.e. Oyo North and 
Ilorin) are not included because of insufficient data.
Source: Gaviria, Bindlish, and Lele, ‘Road (Question’, Table 5, p. 13.
Early enclave ADPs’ higher accomplishments in road construction has been attributed 
variously to personnel, organisation, and financial factors, but funding seemed to be most 
important. Early enclave ADPs did experience fleeting financial difficulties, but large 
scale cutbacks in project funding became prevalent only after 1980/81. In Gusau ADP, 
actual recurrent funding increased from 43.4% of the estimated annual cost during 
1974/75 to 80% in 1975/76. Funding declined in 1976/77 and 1977/78 but picked up in
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Gusau’s final investment year.^ "^  Relatively favourable economic and financial conditions 
in mid- to late 1970s has meant that early enclave ADPs met their operational targets 
better than projects which opened shop from about 1980. To quote Gaviria, Bindlish and 
Lele once more,
...the better performance in Gusau, compared to Funtua and Gombe, was due to the 
employment of an expatriate full-time road engineer...and to the integration of the road 
and dam construction program. The road construction program turned out to be the most 
successful component of both Lafia and Ayangba...These earlier projects had a larger 
share of total costs (of between 17.3% and 24.0% and averaging 18.1% each, compared 
with EAADP’s 8.4% and Bida’s 10.8%) allocated to road investments as a proportion of 
total project costs. One reason project authorities may have emphasised road construction 
in the early enclave projects is because of.. .the fast disbursements (of funds) and the urge 
to start projects at early stages of implementation...^
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s road programme was also hampered by internal-structural factors. 
The programme seemed to have been planned and implemented without reference to 
institutional agencies which have had responsibility for the construction and maintenance 
of rural roads. These are in the main local government councils and the Public Works 
Department of the State’s Ministry of Works and Housing. It is true, as indicated earlier, 
that technical and institutional capacity at local and state ministerial levels were low by 
modem standards. However, these agencies were more familiar with the terrain; to this 
extent, EAADP could have benefited from establishing appropriate linkages with them. 
It was expected, for example, that EAADP would absorb the ‘lengthman system’, the 
network of manual labourers responsible for routine maintenance of mral roads (i.e. 
doing the road hedges, filling potholes, emptying the drains or otherwise channelling 
erosion during the wet season) and in the dry season became part of the staff that 
undertook periodic maintenance of roads. That EAADP did not absorb these manual 
labourers may be explained in part by its own financial predicament or institutional 
jealousy. But this denied it the manual labourers’ localised experience, the more so since 
the project did not dedicate staff to mral road maintenance but relied on direct labour to
^ Adefolu Akinbode and J. Y. Yayock, ‘Recurrent Financing of Agricultural Services in Nigeria’s 
Agricultural Development Projects’, in John Howell (ed.). Recurrent Costs and Agricultural Development 
(1985), p. 193.
^ Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele, ‘Rural Road’, p. 15. Cf. Ukoje and Baba, ‘Ayangba’, pp. 230-231; 
Adejo, ‘Impact’, pp. 195-196.
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man its two road construction units until 1984.^  ^New technical skills which may have 
been transferred in the process are likely to have been confined to project staff. The lack 
of local linkages partly explains the dramatic decline in EAADP’s target completion rates, 
especially after 1984.
4.7 Conclusion
Infrastructure supply in rural Ondo State, and in the Ekiti-Akoko area in particular, has 
been so poor that a turnaround over a five-year period seemed grossly ambitious. This 
applies less to institutional infrastructure, such as cooperative societies and farmers’ 
groups and more to physical infrastructure, such as roads and input storage and 
distribution facilities. In the former, progress has depended as much on the advance of 
commercial production in rural society as on local institutional adaptation; in the latter, 
costs and investments are most certainly beyond the reach of local people. There has 
always been a substantial scope, therefore, for project-type interventions both to stimulate 
access and to reduce the costs of production in rural Ondo State.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s infrastructure development programme emphasised physical 
infrastructure, with some elements so superfluous as to suggest a technological overkill. 
Irrigation dams are difficult to justify economically in an area in which rain-fed 
agriculture is predominant, plots are small and communal identities are closely associated 
with the land. Farm service centres were also distributed on the basis of the equality of 
local government areas and an apparent desire for balance between Ekiti and Akoko, the 
two sub-ethnic groups in the project area. Alternative criteria based on potential demand, 
as measured by different aspects of population density, showed that the apparent concern 
for equity in EAADP’s distribution criteria was false and mistaken. They deprived some 
sections of the population while favouring others, and in any case reinforced the primacy 
of political factors even on a demand-led question like the distribution and delivery of 
inputs and farm services.
Finally, EAADP’s rural roads programme was informed by a selective interpretation of
^  Christensen, Final Report, p. 88.
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APMEPU’s survey of Ekiti-Akoko roads. The report emphasised supply problems more 
at the interface between villages and neighbouring towns than between villages and 
between villages and farmsteads, hence its upbeat but misleading conclusions on Ekiti- 
Akoko’s rural and feeder roads. Closer analysis showed that the roads in the area were 
and remain less integrated than APMEPU suggested, and in any case that many feeder 
roads become impassable once the rains set in each year.
As a whole, project performance in all respects was far from successful. One reason was 
its precarious finances. Unlike enclave ADPs which commenced operations in the 1970s, 
EAADP operated under the inclement financial and policy circumstances of the 1980s. 
In addition, it suffered a high turnover of senior staff, both local and expatriate.
The project’s infrastructure programme was also afflicted by design weaknesses. For 
example, the programme was planned without reference to existing cognate agencies - the 
cooperatives department in the case of cooperative societies, and local government 
councils in the case of rural roads - let alone the people themselves. As Karunaratne’s 
detailed analysis of India’s community development programme since 1952 showed,^ 
the lack of popular participation in the design of rural development has existed long 
before the advent in the 1970s of IRD projects. Even so, local interest could have been 
activated during programme implementation, as Olujimi and Egunjobi’s review of 
experience in Akoko area in the 1950s has suggested.Local participation also made 
the difference between success and failure in infrastructure development programmes in 
two cases in Ogun State studied by Ekong and Sokoya.^ By going it alone, and failing 
to link up with cognate agencies and host communities, EAADP denied itself the 
localised experience of existing staff, constraining the potential for skills transfer in such 
technical areas as road construction and maintenance and the overall success of its own
^  Garvin Kanmaratne, ‘The Failure of the Community Development Programme in India’, CDJ, 11,
2 (1976), pp. 95-111.
Bayo Olujimi and Layi Egunjobi, ‘Public Participation in a Village Regrouping Scheme’, CDJ, 26,
3 (1991), pp. 165-171.
^  E. E. Ekong and L. Sokoya, ‘Success and Failure in Community Development Efforts: A Study of 
Two Cases in Southwestern Nigeria’, CDJ, 17, 3 (1982), pp. 217-224.
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programmes.
Still, EAADP’s disappointing results have been consistent with other experiences of 
project-based infrastructure development. Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele have remarked, for 
example, that Nigeria’s ADPs have often been more successful in road construction than 
in the pursuit of their agricultural goals. Conyers and Warren have also suggested 
that IRD projects, like mainstream government departments, have tended to emphasise 
physical facilities, such as irrigation and roads, more than institutional infrastructure. 
This is because physical facilities are ‘easier and quicker to achieve and more 
v i s i b l ep r ov i d ing  project managers and politicians alike with immediate results for 
which they could receive credit, and, in some cases, upon which more or less remarkable 
political and economic fortunes could be built. Yet, physical infrastructure construction 
constitutes the line of least resistance in directed economic change, a turn-key task for 
which IRD projects need not (and have often failed to) develop local institutional 
capacity. It is not enough, therefore, to assess infrastructure development 
programmes in terms of programme targets. As this chapter has shown, it is more 
realistic to put programme targets and achievements in the context of local demand for 
and supply of infrastructure as well as the development of local institutional capacity.
The second major issue raised in the wider literature concerns financial constraints and 
the dilemmas they throw up for infrastructure development. The available evidence is that 
rural infrastructure has been a low-priority issue for cash-strapped governments in 
Nigeria and elsewhere. As such, rural infrastructure budgets are soft options, the first to 
be affected by financial cutbacks. Urban areas are almost always treated more favourably, 
partly because they are politically important, and partly because the maintenance of 
existing services, disproportionately located in urban commercial and administrative
100 ‘Road Question’, p. 24.
Diana Conyers and Dennis Warren, ‘The Role of Integrated Rural Development Projects in 
Developing Local Institutional Capacity’, MPD, IV, 1 (1988), p. 32.
Ibid.
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centres, often puts less pressure on available (and usually dwindling) r esou rce s .As  
Idachaba has shown however, this argument not only reflects previous urban bias in 
development spending; it also overlooks the enormous potential economic gains from a 
well-serviced network of productive infrastructure in rural a r e a s . O n e  way out of the 
‘recurrent expenses trap’ might be to emphasise rehabilitation of existing facilities over 
and above new construction, as Nigeria’s ADPs have been doing since the mid- 
1980s. Even so, it is almost impossible for government to provide all the funding 
required to bridge the massive want-get gap in rural productive infrastructure.
Another compelling option, therefore, is to involve the rural population in infrastructure 
development, both to create a sense of belonging and as part of a longer-term process of 
empowerment. As Gow and Vansant have argued, rural participation is more easily 
advocated than attained in p r ac t i c e .B u t  that is not sufficient reason to preclude 
greater commitment to ‘the learning process approach’, the more flexible and less perfect 
but people-centred counterpoint to Nigeria’s experience of top-down approaches . I t  
is in any case necessary to go beyond conceptions of rural participation which assign 
secondary roles to rural dwellers. Self-help schemes have generally promoted local 
participation in Nigeria and e l sewhere ,bu t  increasing government involvement has 
distorted the social leverage effect which made them attractive in the first place.
Michael Lipton, ‘Agriculture and Central Physical Grid Infrastructure’, in Mellor, Delgado and 
Blackie, Food Production, pp. 210-226,
Idachaba, ‘Commentary’, pp. 233-234.
Gaviria, Bindlish and Lele, ‘Road Question’, p. 13.
D. Gow and J. Vansant, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development Participation; How Can it be 
Done?’, WD, 11, 5 (1983), pp. 427-45.
David C. Korten, ‘Community Organisation and Rural Development: A Learning Process 
Approach’, Public Administration Review, 40, 5 (1980), pp. 480-511.
See Ephraim N. Madu and E. P. Umebali, ‘Self-Help Approach to Rural Transformation in 
Nigeria’, CDJ, 28, 2 (1993), pp. 141-153; and Awa, Transformation, Part II. For wider experiences, see 
Hamer, ‘Preconditions’.
See Barkan, McNulty, and Ayeni, ‘Voluntary Associations’. For wider commentary, see Frank 
Holmquist, ‘Self-Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in Kenya’, Africa, 54, 3 (1984), pp. 72-91; and 
Barkan and Holmquist, ‘Peasant-State Relations and the Social Base of Self-Help in Kenya’, WP, 41,3 
(1989), pp. 359-80.
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Since the 1980s, in Nigeria, self-help schemes have become a means of fudging state 
responsibility for infrastructure development even in such obvious cases as police 
buildings and equipment. More specifically, self-help has enabled military and 
civilian administrations alike to transfer primary responsibility for financing rural 
infrastructure to the people without allowing corresponding social involvement in 
programme design and management.
Whatever options are adopted, rural infrastructure development is far too important to 
be left to market forces alone. Roads of all types and institutional facilities provide the 
context for agricultural change and serve as incentives to individuals to expand production 
or at least adopt new practices with similar potential. Investment in rural infrastructure 
is therefore ‘commenced business’. T o  pursue infrastructure development half­
heartedly or stop mid-way either because of short-term financial reasons, or as has 
become more common since the 1960s, because of urban-induced pressure on available 
resources, is to deny opportunities for economic growth and self-development to both the 
rural population and the wider economy.
no Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Boulder, 1993), p. 227.
Leo O. Ogba, ‘Problems in Community Participation and Rural Development Administration: The 
Case of Abriba Community in Imo State, Nigeria’, QJA, 25, 2 (1991), pp. 167-182.
To appropriate Michael Lipton’s phrase in ‘Land Reform as Commenced Business: The Evidence 
Against Stopping’, WD, 21, 4 (1993), pp. 641-657.
Idachaba, ‘Commentary’.
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Chapter 5 
Farming Systems in the Ekiti-Akoko Area
5.1 Introduction
Linkages between indigenous perceptions of the environment and small-farmer agronomy 
have provoked a substantial debate in the literature.^ This chapter shows, with respect 
to the Ekiti-Akoko area, that peasant methods are often the result of careful attempts by 
‘the man who farms the field [to make] the best compromise he can between opposing 
considerations’.^  Official concern since the 1940s for large scale farms and technical 
efficiency, it is also shown, has ignored considerable syncretism between traditional and 
modem farming techniques at the small-farm level, diminishing the scope for mutuality 
between the two.
Four specific analytical tasks are attempted. The first is to describe aspects of what Polly 
Hill calls ‘indigenous economics’, that is how small farmer factor combinations and 
production possibilities reflect ‘local experimentation and local tradition, adapted to soil, 
climate, crops, and levels of technology’^  in the project area. Second, the chapter 
highlights some of ‘the ecological and technical skills’'^  that small farmers bring to bear 
on crop production and farm management in the food sub-sector. The third objective is 
to identify the major social and economic considerations that inform small farmers’ 
production decisions. Finally, the chapter examines the production and ecological 
implications of changing attitudes to nature and its bounties.
‘ Compare J. Faye, T. Gallali and R. Billaz, ‘Peasant Agronomy: A Challenge to Planners's Models?’, 
AE, II, 4 and III, 1 (1977), pp. 37-46; and Paul Richards, ‘Ecological Change and the Politics of African 
Land Use’, ASR, 26, 2 (1983), pp. 1-72; with Michael Watts, ‘"Good Try, Mr. Paul": Populism and the 
Politics of African Land Use’, ASR, pp. 73-83.
 ^O. T. Faulkner, ‘Experiments on Ridged Cultivation in Tanganyika and Nigeria’, TA, XXI, 9 (1944), 
p. 178.
 ^Hill, A Plea for Indigenous Economics: The West African Example’, EDCC, 15, 1 (1966), p. 13; 
cf. her Development Economics on Trial (Cambridge, 1986).
Richards, ‘Ecological Change’, p. 2; and ‘Farming Systems and Agrarian Change in West Africa’, 
PHG, 7, 1 (1983), pp. 1-39.
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The narrative is rendered in the ethnographic present for at least three reasons. First, 
farming systems research seems most appropriate to low-level synchronic description and 
is dominated more by geographers and anthropologists than by historians. Second, 
traditional practices die hard: changes in general farming patterns are largely 
indistinguishable, though it is possible to identify possible direction(s) of change. Finally, 
the practices described below draw upon anecdotal evidence, including my own 
experience, as well as secondary literature.
The chapter comprises four main sections. The next section summarises official 
perceptions of the peasant alongside the views associated with farming systems research. 
The objective is to highlight the main contours of official policy in Nigeria since the 
1920s, and to show that policy-makers had been slow to appreciate peasants’ viewpoints. 
In section three, I present survey evidence on land use and examine factor requirements 
in the Ekiti-Akoko project area. Section four analyzes local farm and crop management 
practices, while section five describes continuity and change in strategies for coping with 
pests and other environmental hazards. A final section concludes the chapter.
5.2 Indigenous Knowledge and Agricultural Development
Atte has identified a ‘we-them’ or ‘emic-etic’ dichotomy in perceptions and evaluations 
of rural production and farm management methods.^ The ‘we’ or ‘emic’ element 
comprises small-scale rural producers who insist on the sanctity of their indigenous 
knowledge systems, and would adopt new practices only after sufficient experimentation 
to cut losses and reduce potential risks. To the ‘they’ or ‘etic’ sub-group belong academic 
experts, extension agents, policy managers, and international development agencies, who 
assume away important elements of the peasant’s environment a priori and expect rural 
producers to share their usually market-inclined values and social priorities. Hence, 
peasant experimentation is conceived in official circles as risk aversion, laziness or utter 
rural conservatism rather than credible attempts at ‘bridging’ the known and the 
unknown. The signal absence of effective interface between both has also encouraged a
 ^ D. O. Atte, ‘Resources and Decisions: Peasant Farmer Agricultural Management and its Relevance 
for Rural Development Planning in Kwara State, Nigeria’, Ph.D thesis. University of London (1980), pp. 
1- 2 .
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comparative method that is almost always inclined against small farmers.^
Atte’s framework is valid for analytical purposes, but the choice of nearly-mutually 
exclusive terms could easily overstate the differences between peasant and non-peasant 
methods. A ‘we-them’ perspective could also understate significant meeting points 
between both, and more importantly, the considerable peasant-led syncretism described 
below in the case of Ekiti-Akoko’s farmers. Since the 1920s, Nigeria’s agricultural policy 
initiatives have been clearly supportive of a market-led strategy to promote larger farm 
sizes and intensive cultivation in the small farm sector. Similarly, very few, if any, 
students of Nigerian agriculture have been explicitly opposed to technical change in the 
long-term, as indicated in chapter In both cases, the intensity of support for market- 
based strategies, or sympathy for peasant methods and viewpoints, has varied - between 
colonial and post-colonial regimes; between administrations within either regime; and, 
above all, between social science disciplines. The sharpest epistemological differences 
have been between economics and the more qualitative social science disciplines, over 
the relationship between intuition, ‘observation, induction from observations, and 
inference from "a priori" principles...’* But the real question has been not between 
market and non-market preferences; rather the strictly economic rationality and growth 
potential of traditional farming in a largely peasant-based but market-oriented economy.
Four main issues have been debated most recurrently: (a) whether, given the stock of 
available capital, including technical knowledge and skills, peasant production could 
provide substantial opportunities for efficient, market-led agricultural change;^ (b)
 ^Ibid.\ compare Eric Clayton, ‘Research Methodology and Peasant Agriculture’, FE, VIII, 6 (1956), 
pp. 27-32; and Anne Martin, ‘A Note on Research Methodology and Peasant Agriculture’, Farm 
Economist, VIII, 9 (1957), pp. 47-48.
 ^ Gavin Williams, ‘Ideologies and Strategies for Rural Development: A Critique’, in his State and 
Society in Nigeria (Idanre, 1980), pp. 135-136.
* Frank H. Knight, ‘Anthropology and Economics’, JPE, XLIX, 2 (1941), p. 254. This article reviews 
M. Herskovits’ book of the same title and shows how deeply divided the social sciences are on conceptual 
and methodological issues. Forty years on, Michael Watts’ rejoinder, ‘Populism’, raised similar arguments 
in virtually the same terms against Richards’ review article, ‘Ecological Change’.
® The locus classicus remains Theodore Schultz, Trantforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven, 
1964).
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whether technical change must come from outside, and if so, the place of peasants’ 
gradualist approach within a dual organisational framework; (c) how best to increase 
agricultural production and productivity in the short and medium terms, to meet 
expanding demand for food by urban consumers and (d) what benefits could be 
offered modem agriculture by traditional farmers - for example, on key social issues like 
environment, resource regeneration, and sustainability/^
On each of these issues, a continuum of non-mutually exclusive views can be constructed, 
with strands of major scholarly positions located on different points and, in some cases, 
opposite ends of the spectrum. Few scholars would now doubt the price response capacity 
of African peasants, as research on export crop production has shown so well.^  ^Nor is 
there any question about small farmers’ general willingness to adopt innovations once 
they are convinced that the marginal cost of adopting a new technique is lower than the 
respective opportunity costs. The problem, from the policy viewpoint at least, has been 
with the technical flexibility of peasants’ methods, especially in the short term; their 
willingness to take risks in order to try new factor combinations; and the speed with 
which they have adopted new technical advances. Ekiti-Akoko farmers’ experiences on 
these questions are detailed in sections 3 ,4 ,  and 5 of this chapter, but first, a summary 
of the policy and research contexts.
Since the 1920s, policy perceptions of peasant production have ranged from explicit
Cf. H. Myint, ‘Organisational Dualism and Economic Development’, ADR, 3, 1 (1985), p. 26,
" R. Cohen, ‘Introduction: Guidance and Misguidance in Africa’s Food Production’, pp. 1-30; and 
Christopher L. Delgado, ‘Setting Priorities for Promoting African Food Production’, pp. 31-46; in Cohen 
(ed.). Satisfying Africa’s Food Needs (1988).
David Barker, J. Oguntoyinbo and Paul Richards, ‘The Utility of the Nigerian Peasant Farmer’s 
Knowledge in the Monitoring of Agricultural Resources’, MARC Report No. 4 (1977); cf. Paul Richards, 
‘ "Alternative" Strategies for the African Environment: "Folk Ecology" as a Basis for Community Orientated 
Agricultural Development’, in Richards (ed.), African Environment (1975), pp. 102-114; David Brokensha,
D. M. Warren, and Oswald Werner (eds.). Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development (Lanham, 
1980).
For a survey, see G. K. Helleiner, ‘Smallholder Decision Making: Tropical African Evidence’, in 
L. G. Reynolds (ed.). Agriculture in Development Theory (New Haven, 1975), pp. 27-52.
O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), p. 7.
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support through benign indifference to relative hostility. The rationale for official 
positions have also changed more or less dramatically. An oft-cited and far-reaching 
example of early official support was in the 1920s, when Nigeria’s colonial government 
rejected attempts by Unilever to establish plantations in south-eastern Nigeria, opting 
instead for a peasant-led agricultural strategy. At a meeting held on 9 January 1925, Sir 
Graeme Thompson, then Governor of Nigeria, had told a delegation led by Lord 
Leverhulme, that
native holdings of land were almost entirely tribal or communal and not personal and that 
they were held in trust for existing and future generations of the tribe or community and 
it was the declared policy of...Government on no account to permit or acquiesce in any 
method of acquisition of such tribal lands by European (or any) capitalists and this even 
if the native holder was willing to dispose of the land.'^
In 1927, Governor Hugh Clifford justified the administration’s opposition to the granting 
of long leases or freehold titles to the plantation lobby. According to Clifford, the 
administration was not opposed to competition in the global oil-palm market but feared 
the backwash effects on local producers of the existence of technically more efficient oil 
plantations with European capital and vast connections. If government gave its approval, 
he went on, the plantations would be entirely foreign both in origin and orientation. 
There was a real possibility, therefore, that Africans would be structurally disadvantaged, 
or worse still, excluded from the benefits of plantation agriculture.
Hancock regarded the above position as the triumph of ‘applied ethics’ at a time the 
government ought to have taken steps to
command an increasing revenue [and encourage] organisations upon a modem and 
scientific basis [which], by force of example and pressure of competition... [could] exert 
a vigorous influence upon indigenous society, hastening the day when it will be able to 
fend for itself...[Plantations] will compel the Native society to discard its ‘mystical- 
magical technique’ and to substitute an ‘active’ conception of land-ownership for its own 
traditional ‘passive’ conception. The Native system of ownership and production belongs
CS026/31071/Vol. I, NAI. Notes taken most probably by F. M. B. Baddeley, Chief Secretary to 
Government.
Minute 03277/187 of 21 March 1927, ibid., p. 43.
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to a sociological phase which has already passed...*^
Usoro has also assessed the agricultural impact of this strategy with regard to oil-palm 
production, but details are not necessary here/^ The point of immediate interest is two­
fold. First, official preference for a peasant strategy was based more on political than 
economic considerations, reflecting as much the administration’s shaky hold on power 
and the fear of civil uprising as the underlying policy of promoting change with minimum 
social disruption. In mid-1936, for example, L. G. Shenton, writing on behalf of the 
Chief Secretary to the Government, noted that
[p]lantations require labour for which local supply is probably inadequate. It is most 
undesirable to turn a peasant owner into a mere farm labourer, but an even greater danger 
may result from the introduction into a plantation area of large bodies of labourers 
imported from outside and from the consequent disturbance of tribal balance and local 
custom.’’
Secondly, even in the 1920s, several senior colonial functionaries were unconvinced 
about the long-term feasibility of a peasant-led agricultural strategy. In December 1925, 
Captain J. Davidson, Acting Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Provinces, and H. R. 
Palmer, his opposite number in the north, prepared separate memoranda supporting long 
leases and freehold rights but with various safeguards.R . H. Rowe, Commissioner for 
Lands, and J. R. Mackie, latterly Director of Agriculture, also wrote a joint memo along 
similar l i n e s .A l l  the changes proposed in the memoranda were rejected by the 
administration.
W. K. Hancock, Survey o f Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. II (1942), pp. 174-175; cf. A. G. Hopkins, 
An Economic History o f West Africa (1973), pp. 210-214. On the exacting ‘revenue crisis’ of the early 
colonial state in Nigeria, see I. M. Okonjo, British Administration in Nigeria 1900-50 (New York, 1974), 
pp. 24-36; cf. Keith Hart, The Political Economy o f West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1987), p. 83f.
E. O. Usoro, ‘Colonial Economic Development Strategy in Nigeria 1919-1939: An Appraisal’, 
NJESS, 19, 1 (1977), pp. 121-142.
” Minute 3107/41, 1 June 1936, CSO26/31071/Vol I, NAI, p. 43.
^  Ibid., pp. 3-5 (Davidson); and pp. 6-10 (Palmer).
Ibid., pp. 14-20.
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Yet, in the early 1920s, the newly established national Department of Agriculture started 
articulating an extension strategy which sought to promote mixed farming and crop 
rotation as part of a long-term transformation of peasant farming (on which more in 
chapter 8).^  ^ Paradoxically, Odin Faulkner, Director of Agriculture from 1922, and 
Mackie, his Deputy, were utterly contemptuous of small native farmers, the largest 
segment of their public and presumed beneficiaries of their programme. According to 
them, Nigerian peasants were almost always unable to define their self-interest in material 
terms, could not channel new knowledge into productive ends, and tended to suffer from 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. For example,
[i]f a party of African farmers is taken round a farm, it does not seem to matter how 
much explanation is given, or how much the important points are emphasised, the points 
that the visitors will especially observe and remember are the regular shape of the plots 
and the straightness of the lines of plants. If demonstrations of grafting are given, the 
shape of the knife used will attract the most interest. Invariably some entirely unimportant 
point will seem to monopolize interest, and apparently even be regarded as the essential 
point.
By the 1930s, therefore, official attitudes to the peasantry in Nigeria and elsewhere had 
come full circle. Having savoured the fiscal pay-offs of a booming commercial sector, 
colonial authorities had become more tolerant of anti-competitive practices by big 
business and less directly supportive or protective of peasants in the 1940s.^ "^  This 
position could be illustrated with two articles, one more academic than the other, and 
both published in the same issue of Farm and Forest, a journal presumably ‘devoted to 
the interests of land use and rural planning in [colonial] West Africa’. The articles are 
not necessarily more representative of viewpoints in the 1940s than others, but they 
sufficiently outline the main elements in the changing official conceptions of and 
responses to the peasant phenomenon in Nigeria and elsewhere.
O. T. Faulkner, ‘Aims and Objects of the Agriculture Department in Nigeria’, First Annual Bulletin 
of the Agriculture Department (1922), pp. 1-14.
23 O. T. Faulkner and J, R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 80-81.
^  Sara Berry, ‘Inconclusive Encounters: Farmers and States in the Era of Planned Development’, in 
her No Condition is Permanent (Madison, 1993), pp. 48-53.
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The first is Captain E. F. Haig, Nigeria’s Chief Registrar of Co-operative Societies in 
the 1940s. In 1945, Haig had argued that peasant agriculture was ‘unsatisfactory 
economically’ because it sacrificed ‘the demands of economic efficiency to individual 
liberty of action...traditional habits...and family life...’^  ^ This could mean that the 
objects of economically efficient behaviour are contrary to the preservation or promotion 
of individual liberty and family life. But Haig thought otherwise, not least because he 
expected that his proposed cooperative settlements would help establish ‘a rural economy 
which combines the efficiency of the plantation system with the liberal advantages of 
peasant cultivation.
In fact, Haig’s 1945 proposal merely updated an earlier one under which peasants or their 
offspring could have been compelled to work in state-owned plantations. In a 
memorandum dated 22 April 1940, Haig had proposed a compulsory settlement scheme 
for youths who could not make it to middle schools after elementary education and did 
not seem fit for employment as clerks or artisans.W here local demand for middle 
school places or employment exceeded available supply, as it most certainly did, Haig 
suggested that examinations be ‘stiffened and the unemployed residue urged or compelled 
to take up individual farming or join a cooperative agricultural settlement.
Haig had justified the compulsory nature of the scheme on three grounds. The first was 
that the youths’ parents were not knowledgeable enough to provide sound advice to their 
offspring, and there was nothing like a body of public opinion to provide general 
guidance. Second, the state had a duty to act positively to combat rising unemployment 
and urban drift among youths. Finally, the state’s right to employ compulsion was 
reinforced by the annual expenditure of £250,000 on the scheme, about three pence (3d.) 
per capita! Even if plantation agriculture had the attractions envisaged by Haig, the point
^ Haig, ‘Co-operative Agricultural Settlements: An Experiment in Civilisation’, FaF, VI, I (1945), 
p. 36.
“  Ibid.
Memorandum C. 758/1, CSO 26/41996, NAI., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
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remains whether, as the Director of Education argued subsequently, ‘the liberty of the 
people can...be bought at [Haig’s] figure [of three pence each].’^  ^ Since the answer has 
to be negative, the question arises whether the cost of making efficient team-players of 
unwilling settlers would not override the expected advantages at some stage. Clearly, 
Haig’s view of human nature is faulty; nor has Nigeria’s experience supported his 
assumption that plantations are inherently more efficient than small peasant farms.
The other example, P. C. Hodson, Administrative Officer in The Gambia, was perhaps 
more orthodox in his perception of the African peasant.^^ As late as 1945, Hodson wrote 
that the African peasant could neither accumulate capital nor control excessive social 
spending. According to him, the peasant lacked the will power to discover the means of 
preserving perishable farm produce, which ‘results from the cultivation of tubers rather 
than grain and from the absence of substantial buildings for storage. Indeed, peasant 
values constituted ‘a serious drag on progress’, n o t  least because
African peasant culture is characterised by a lack of crop surpluses, a lack of capital, 
minute divisions of land, and stability which, though reactionary, yields a certain degree 
of contentment and happiness... Lack of capital deprives the cultivator of implements and 
animals. It drives him into debt, a condition which he aggravates by improvident feasting 
and by social customs of display at marriages and funerals, further reducing his 
resources...The problem is to increase crop surpluses and to use that increase for 
capitalization, thereby displacing the human body as a commodity for investment...and 
offering better opportunities for thrift and for raising the standard of living.^
Shed of all technicality, Hodson’s views parallel the conventional economic position on 
peasant agriculture. As summarised by Stevens, this was that peasants are (a) ‘poor 
decision makers’, or foolish to the extent that they have defied wider pressure for change
Memo D.E. 503/14 of 6 May 1940, ibid.
^  See. e.g., Lekan Are, ‘An Assessment of Some Plantation Problems in Western Nigeria’, 7M, 41, 
1 (1964), pp. 1-13.
P. C. Hodson, ‘Economy of the African Peasant’, FaF, VI, 1 (1945), pp. 52-54.
32 Ibid., p. 52.
33 Ibid.
3^  Ibid., p. 52; p. 53; cf. Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 10.
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through more efficient technologies; and (b) ‘poor but efficient’ economic actors trapped 
in a technical and economic equilibrium that provides little or no opportunities for profit, 
investment, or growth.
Specific scholarly views have differed from the above on questions of detail. According 
to Schultz, who best exemplified the mainstream view up to the 1970s, neither farm size 
nor whether output was for sale or subsistence had anything to do with the peasant 
problem. On the contrary, peasants are efficient but operate in a state of static technical 
equilibrium which itself offers ‘little opportunity for growth.. .because farmers have 
exhausted the profitable production possibilities of the state of the arts at their 
d i s p o s a l .F o r  agricultural progress to become realisable therefore, peasants must be 
persuaded to shift resources from subsistence to commercial production. Better still, 
peasants must adopt new factor combinations which emphasise capital and technology 
over and above land and labour in order to ‘improve efficiency and increase output at no 
extra cost to the economy’ or to peasants and their f a m i l i e s F o r  Schultz, this could 
be achieved through a state-led programme of incentives, covering prices, physical 
infrastructure and human capital development.
The Schultzian framework, and conventional opinion on the peasantry generally, have 
been criticised widely in the literature. Research has shown, for example, that 
mainstream analysis of peasant agriculture has often reified profit maximisation, ignored 
risk and uncertainty,^* failed to grapple with the complex institutional constraints faced 
by peasan tsand ,  above all, understated substantial technical advances occasioned by
R. D. Stevens, ‘Transformation of Traditional Agriculture: Theory and Empirical Findings’, in 
Stevens (ed,), Tradition and Dynamics in Small-Farm Agriculture (Ames, 1977), pp. 3-24. The volume 
contains six case studies, including one on Nigeria.
Schultz, Transforming, p. 131.
W. David Hopper, ‘Allocative Efficiency in a Traditional Indian Agriculture’, JFE, 47, 3 (1965),
p. 611.
See e.g. Malcolm McPherson, ‘Why do Researchers Continue to Ignore Risk in Tests of Farmer 
Efficiency?’, JDS, 22, 3 (1986), pp. 604-607.
For a Kenyan case of how inter-linked markets in land and credit undermine Schultz’s view, see 
Jerome Wolgin, ‘Resource Allocation and Risk: A Case Study of Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya’, AME,
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peasant experimentation in different social contexts .For example, after reviewing the 
evidence in six previously published case studies, Dillon and Anderson concluded that 
peasants engage in ‘active consideration of subjective risk and successfully endeavour to 
maximise expected utility rather than expected p ro f i t .L ip to n  showed how security 
considerations dominate farm level production decisions in India.
Norman’s study of grain farmers in northern Nigeria also suggests that peasants seek to 
maximize utility by minimizing risks.Statistical estimates from Norman’s data also 
suggest that the marginal value product for crop enterprises in three Zaria villages did 
not differ significantly from their opportunity costs - meaning that sole cropping did not 
offer significant productivity gains over and above mixed cropping.'^ As Norman 
concluded, the ‘practice of growing crops in mixtures has been the outstanding example 
in meeting both profit-maximisation and security criteria’ under indigenous conditions. 
The general view, since supported by African historiography, is that small farmers are 
no more averse to value maximizing behaviour than say, industrialists or large 
commercial farmers, but that peculiar resource constraints impose different decision 
algorithms on poor farmers .In  other words, peasant behaviour is more context-specific 
than orthodox thinking allowed, and must be analyzed with an alternative or at least more 
flexible analytical scheme.
57, 4 (1975). Similar processes are examined with regard to Guatemala in Thomas Schweigert, ‘Penny 
Capitalism: Efficient But Poor or Inefficient and (Less Than) Second Best?’, WD, 22, 5 (1994).
See, e.g., Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies (Oxford, 1986).
Dillon and Anderson, ‘Allocative Efficiency’, p. 31.
Michael Lipton, ‘The Theory of the Optimising Peasant’, JDS, 4, 3 (1968), pp. 327-351.
D. Norman, ‘Rationalising Mixed Cropping under Indigenous Conditions: The Example of Northern 
Nigeria’, JDS, II, 1 (1979), pp. 3-21.
^  Norman, ‘The Rationalisation of Intercropping’, AE, II, 4 and III, 1 (1977), pp. 97-109.
Ibid., p. 108.
^  For a synthesis of views up to the 1970s, see Hopkins, Economic History, chps. 2, 4 and 6. For 
more recent experiences, see the contributions in John Harriss (ed.). Rural Development (1982).
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That research showed the weak empirical bases of orthodox generalisations on peasant 
economic behaviour is not surprising. What is surprising is that the opposing view, now 
known as the ecological school, did not attain prominence among researchers until 
recently and remained largely ignored in the design and implementation of Nigeria’s IRD 
projects up to the 1980s. Since the turn of the century. Dudgeon had called attention to 
the appropriateness of peasant methods and the environmental impact on tropical 
conditions of imported technology.'*^ In 1938, Dudley Stamp, one-time Geography don 
at the University of London toured Nigeria in his capacity as Director of Britain’s Land 
Utilisation Survey. In an article published shortly afterwards. Stamp remarked that 
peasant land use practices were well-adapted to local soil profiles and made more 
ecological sense than observers had been willing to admit.'** Stamp also raised the 
spectre of possible long-term damage from mechanized cultivation to southern Nigeria’s 
fragile soils. As he wrote.
the native farmer has already evolved a scheme of farming which cannot be bettered in 
principle even if it can be improved in detail...[A]s practised in some areas, this scheme 
affords almost complete protection against soil erosion and loss of fertility.. .Within limits 
the curiously imtidy, irregular patches of cropped lands, scattered about among scrubby 
bush, represent the most efficient type of farming for the conditions. No Western method 
could be safely substituted; Western science can help by improving the quality and yield 
of crops and by teaching the value of green manuring, but it is hoped that Southern 
Nigeria may long be spared the dangers o f the plowf^
The foregoing comments were prompted by the success of local initiatives in controlling 
soil erosion but have wider import for agricultural development policy and analysis. For 
one. Stamp’s views stand in sharp contrast to received wisdom on peasant capacity for 
resource management. Coming only five years after the publication of Faulkner and 
Mackie’s West African Agriculture, Stamp’s views showed that officialdom had been 
extremely slow in appreciating peasants’ views and aspirations, highlighting the 
realpolitik of agricultural knowledge in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.
G. C. Dudgeon, The Agricultural and Forest Products o f British West Africa (2nd. ed. 1922); cf. F. 
R. Irvine, A Textbook o f West African Agriculture (2nd ed., 1953), pp. 28-32.
L. Dudley Stamp, ‘Land Utilization and Soil Erosion in Nigeria’, GR, XXVIII, I (1938), pp. 32-45.
Ibid., p. 32; pp. 38-39. Emphasis added.
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For another, Stamp’s concern for the long-term impact on local ecology of modem 
agricultural techniques transcends immediate policy pressures for increased production 
and productivity and calls attention to some of the social costs of mechanisation (on 
which see chapter 8). His argument also highlights local resource capability, thereby 
casting a shadow of doubt on the sustainability of large-scale agriculture. As I show 
shortly, similar questions were raised in official documents on the Ekiti-Akoko project.
Finally, Stamp’s perceptive remarks have become the building block of a peasant-inclined 
analysis of agricultural development. This relatively pro-peasant view has attracted 
leading proponents like Paul Richards, Michael Lipton, Robert Chambers, and Martin 
Igbozurike, among others .Even Goran Hyden, who in the early 1980s proposed that 
the full might of the market be unleashed on African peasants to break their resistance 
to capitalist agriculture,^^ was advocating an ecological position one decade later. In a 
contribution published in 1988, Hyden warned against the long-term implications of 
mono-cultural practices promoted by modem farming technology, suggesting that any 
feasible future agenda must take full advantage of the resilient aspects of African 
farming.Norman Uphoff’s criticism of top-down approaches to development shares 
similar premises, albeit from a wider viewpoint.^^ All these scholars share Faniran and 
Areola’s position that
the knowledge and experience of the local farmers are unrivalled...in the field of crop 
production and the management of the soil.. .and no alternative system has been found that 
is as nicely adjusted to the prevailing environmental conditions as the one which has long
See, e.g., Lipton, ‘Optimising Peasant’; Martin Igbozurike, ‘Against Monoculture’, PG, 23, 2 
(1971), pp. 113-117; and ‘Ecological Balance in Tropical Agriculture’, OR, 61, 4 (1971), pp. 519-529; 
Peter E. Hildebrand (ed.). Perspectives on Farming Systems Research and Extension (Boulder, 1986); 
Robert Chambers, Arnold Pacey, and Lori Ann Thrupp (eds.). Farmer First (1989). Paul Richards’ review 
article, ‘Ecological Change’, is clearly the most outstanding contribution in recent times to the discourse 
on sub-Saharan Africa. Two recent studies on Nigeria within this framework are L. C. Uzozie, ‘Tradition 
and Change in Igbo Food-crop Production Systems: A Geographical Appraisal’, Ph.D thesis. University 
of London (1979); and Atte, ‘Resources’.
Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (1980).
Hyden, ‘Beyond Hunger in Africa - Breaking the Spell of Mono-Culture’, in Cohen, Africa’s Food 
Needs, pp. 47-78.
Norman Uphoff, ‘Assisted Self-Reliance: Working With, Rather then For, the Poor’, in Lewis, et 
a l. Strengthening the Poor (1988), pp. 47-59.
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been practised by the people/'^
Few scholars would deny that indigenous knowledge has been limited as much by shared 
traditions as by individual subjectivity/^ As Faniran and Areola have shown, Yoruba 
peasants are wont to underestimate the full productive potential of their immediate 
environment, in part because the elements are part and parcel of their daily livelihood and 
possibilities for change become less apparent to them than they are (or could be) to 
outsiders/^ Even fewer scholars would suggest that inherited traditions be sustained for 
their own sake. Hard-line anti-capitalist peasant traditions are in any case changing, albeit 
within the general dynamic of resource constraints of small-scale, cash and capital-poor, 
farming. As Ruthenberg has observed, ‘innovation and change, no matter how slow, are 
normal features of traditional farming. Without a continuous series of small adjustments, 
the diverse and often well-adapted farming systems...could never have developed.As 
the next section shows with regard to the Ekiti-Akoko area, peasants’ agricultural 
knowledge and use of productive resources need to be examined against the background 
of their inherited traditions and the changes occasioned by their interactions with the 
wider environment. The persistence of traditional practices is just as important as the 
direction of their development.
5.3 Distribution and Use of Farmland in Ekiti-Akoko Area
The project area shares with Ondo State generally a remarkable endowment for rain-fed 
agriculture.^® Like his counterparts in other parts of the state and elsewhere in
A. Faniran and O. Areola, ‘The Concept of Resources and Utilisation Among Local Communities 
in Western Nigeria, AE, II, 3 (1976), p. 40.
“  Cf. H. C. Brookfield, ‘On the Environment as Perceived’, Progress in Geography, 1 (1969), pp. 53-
80.
Faniran and Areola, ‘Concept of Resources’, p. 47.
Hans Ruthenberg, Farming Systems in the Tropics (Oxford, 1980), p. 29; cf. Atte, ‘Resources’, p.
392.
Colonial intelligence reports - for example, those on Ayede and Ishan countries- made specific 
mention of this fact. See ‘Intelligence Report on Ayede District, Ekiti Division, Ondo Province’, CSO 
26/31014 NAI; and ‘Intelligence Report on the Ishan District, Ekiti Division, Ondo Province’, CSO 
26/30983 NAI.
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southwestern Nigeria, the average Ekiti-Akoko farmer also operates in a predominantly 
land surplus and labour scarce environment, employing little more than the simple hoe 
and machete. Established farming practices are therefore land-intensive in the sense that 
virtually everything else depends on the natural productive capacity of cropped land. The 
individual farmer is often concerned with promoting labour efficiency or maximising 
returns to labour in circumstances in which virtually every able-bodied adult has 
guaranteed usufruct right to arable land or could obtain same at minimal cost.^^ To be 
sure, Allison’s remark that fallows could last for up to 14 years in Ondo in the 1940s, 
and that an eight-year old fallow was ‘as yet unsuitable for yams, though good enough 
for com and cassava’, would seem rather unusual in the 1990s.^ Fallow periods have 
most certainly become shorter as a result of intensification arising from population 
increases and attendant growth in the size of villages and towns, the planting of cocoa on 
choice land, and expanding access to technology. But increasing population density has 
not yet translated to a substantial reduction in the supply of arable land. Small-scale 
agriculture in the project area is therefore far from being ‘alienated...from its eco­
system’.^  ^ Indeed, the following remarks by Stamp still depict the socio-technical 
balance in the area now as they did for Southern Nigeria in 1938:
cultivation is entirely by hand, unaided by animals...village lands are cultivated by a 
system that is misleadingly called "shifting cultivation" but that might be better called 
"bush fallowing," since periods of cultivation are separated by periods of fallowing...In 
preparing the land for cultivation, the bush fallow is cleared, usually by burning. The 
stumps are not removed; hence regeneration of trees takes place naturally after the period 
of cultivation.®
That the foregoing practices make ecological sense has been widely debated and requires 
no restatement here. Their persistence however reflects the low-level technical capacity
G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, 
1966), p. 52.
“  P. A. Allison, ‘From Farm to Forest’, FaF, 11, 2 (1941), p. 96; cf. Darryl Forde, ‘The Native 
Economies’, in Forde and R. Scott, The Native Economies o f Nigeria (1946), p. 81.
Igbozurike, ‘Ecological Balance’, p. 521.
® Stamp, ‘Land Utilization’, p. 34; p. 35; p. 36.
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of small farmers as well as the delicate structure of soils in southern N ige r ia .A s  
Oyenuga has remarked, ‘no attempt is made to remove [tree] stumps since the tools - 
hoe, cutlass and axe - in the hands of the cultivator are unsuitable for the stumping of 
large trees or for removing difficult r o o t s .W h i l e  bush burning facilitates organic 
decomposition in the soil, ‘it also destroys the seeds of weeds’,^ thus reducing 
subsequent demand on available labour supply for weeding operations. Bush fallowing 
is also a rational response to poorly structured soils with limited productive potential 
under continuous cultivation.^ In an instructive passage, the World Bank’s Staff 
Appraisal Report describes the soil structure in the project area as follows:
The area overlies metamorphic rocks of the basement complex consisting mainly of coarse 
to medium drained granites and gneiss. Most of the soils in the area, derived from these 
parent rocks, are relatively shallow, usually sandy (often containing marked stone/gravel 
layer at depths between 25cm and 100cm), well drained, weakly acid in the topsoil, and 
have a low base exchange capacity. Agricultural potential is only fair and the rapid 
decline in nutrient status, under existing farming systems, only allows productive food 
cropping once in 5 to 6 years. Based on a reconnaissance soil survey, about 60% is 
considered suitable for productive farming, of which only a very limited area is suitable 
for large-scale mechanized farming.
The foregoing commentary raises questions about the possible social cost as well as the 
sustainability of the project itself, but that is immaterial for now. The immediate point 
of interest is that the SAR indirectly confirms the relative superiority of traditional 
methods of land use and land regeneration through fallowing. As Arabi observed.
[t]he canopy of fallow vegetation protects the soil surface from the destructive influences 
of raindrop impacts and the sun, thereby reducing erosion and loss of organic matter
“  For example, Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, pp. 43-44; and C. A, P. Takes, ‘Problems of Rural 
Development in Southern Nigeria’, NISER Reprint Series No. 9, from Tijdschrift Van Het Koninklijk 
Nederiandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, LXXXI, 4 (1964).
^  V. A. Oyenuga, Agriculture in Nigeria (Rome, 1967), p. 135.
“  Ibid.
“  K. M. Buchanan and J. C. Pugh, Land and People in Nigeria (1955), pp. 104-105. For a summary 
analysis of Nigeria’s main soil types, see H. Vine, ‘The Soil Resources for Increased Production’, FaF, 
DC, 1 (1948), pp. 21-27.
Cited in APMEPU, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Project Completion Report, Vol. I Main Report (Benin- 
City, 1986), p. 19.
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through oxidation and consequent deterioration of the soils’ physical and chemical 
properties...The roots of fallow species penetrate deep down the soil layer to retrieve the 
nutrient rations which are redeposited in the soil surface through a recycling process, 
when the leaves and above ground part of the vegetation are returned to the soil as 
litter.^*
It is not surprising, therefore, that the man-land ratio has not changed significantly in the 
project area. In my survey, which is indicative rather than statistically representative, 160 
respondents claimed to have 430 fields of between 0.5 ha. and 10 ha. each between them 
(Table 5.2). This amounts to a mean of 2.7 plots per respondent. Actual survey figures 
range from one to 10 plots, with 89% of respondents having 75% of all plots or between 
one and four plots each. The remaining 25% (or 107 fields) are shared by 18 (or 11% 
of all) respondents, although a mere eight (or 5% of total) respondents claimed to ‘own’ 
over half of this proportion or 13% of the total number of plots claimed by all 
respondents. These figures therefore confirm the view that farms are often small and 
fragmented among small cultivators.
Over four-fifths of all plots fall under communal tenurial arrangements and are therefore 
exempt from îsâkôlè or from other forms of rent. About 86% of this proportion, or 75% 
of all plots fall under ‘inheritance’ while an additional 12% of all plots did not attract any 
rent payments to landowning families or communities. Two respondents claimed to have 
purchased farmland, but their claims relate to five plots only or 1.2% of the total number 
of plots. One of the two respondents, identified as R1608 for record purposes, claims to 
have seven fields, four of which are inherited while three are purchased. The other, 
R2607, owns ten plots, the highest number by any respondent. Two of these are 
purchased, three are rented, and the rest are made up by a variety of communal 
arrangements. R2607 also owns a tractor and equipment which are available for hire 
either on mechanized farm operations or to transport produce from farmsteads to village.
R1608 and R2607 therefore exemplify the frontiers of modem agriculture and the 
potential for private property in farmland in mral Ondo State. To this extent, the two
“  R. O. Arabi, ‘Cropping Practices of Farmers in the Ekiti/Akoko ADP Area, Ondo State, Nigeria’, 
M.Sc Dissertation, Department of Agronomy, University of Ibadan, 1985, p. 28; p. 29.
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respondents might well be the typical extension officer’s delights. But their cases are also 
the exceptions that prove the rule. For example, R2406 claimed to have eight plots and 
rivals R1608 and R2607 with regard to the number of fields owned. Unlike the two 
others however, all of R2406’s plots are inherited. Two-thirds of fields claimed by 
respondents with five of more fields (including the three mentioned above) each also fall 
under the inheritance category.
Fifty-five plots or 13 % of the total number of plots are claimed to have been rented. Rent 
payments are varied and flexible. For example, R2607’s rents are mixed; they range from 
100 yam tubers each year for his fields at Ayede and Itaji through NlOO per hectare on 
others to N150 per hectare on government land at Igede farm settlement. In contrast, 
R1608 freely determines what to pay, in cash and/or in kind, on his three rented fields. 
R1608 is in this regard more representative of the general practice in Ayede area. The 
significance of rent lies not in the value transferred from tenant to landlord. More often 
than not, the monetary value of rent is very low in relation to the real value of the land 
in the market place. The significance of rent lies in the symbolic acknowledgement by 
the tenant that freehold rights on the land remain vested in the landowning family, and 
that the tenant could only exercise such rights over his crops and not on the land itself.
The above inferences from my field data are consistent with patterns suggested by state­
wide surveys. As Table 5.1 shows, over four-fifths of farmland reported for the project 
area in Ondo State’s rural economic survey for 1978 were classified under inheritance. 
The corresponding proportion for the entire state was lower by only two percentage 
points. In contrast, the proportion of farmland leased or rented in the project area stood 
at about 7% each, compared with about 9% and 6% respectively for the state. The 
proportion of farmland rented in Ekiti East is rather high at 14%, especially in relation 
to other EGAs. Finally, gifts amounted to 2-3% of farmland at both project area and state 
levels.
^  For similar comments on Okeigbo, see Robert Clarke, ‘Agricultural Production in a Rural Yoruba 
Community’, Ph.D thesis. University of London (1979), p. 251. On Ondo and Ife, see Sara Berry, 
‘Migrant Farmers and Land Tenure in the Nigerian Cocoa Belt’, in O. Otite and C. Okali (eds.). Readings 
in Nigerian Rural Society and Rural Economy (Ibadan, 1990), pp. 90-100.
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Table 5.1
Distribution of Farmland in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1978 (by LGA and Tenure System)
Local Government 
Area
Forms of tenure :%)
Inheritance Lease Rent Gift
Akoko North 89.4 8.3 2.3 -
Akoko South 86.1 7.4 6.5 -
Ekiti Central 80.5 9.6 6.7 3.2
Ekiti East 79.6 4.5 14.1 1.8
Ekiti North 86.7 4.6 4.2 4.5
Project area 84.5 6.9 6.8 3.2
All state 82.7 9.2 5.9 2.2
Source: ODS, Report on Rural Economic Survey 1978 (Akure, n.d.), Table 47, p. 51.
The foregoing suggests clearly that disparities in the distribution of fields between 
respondents are less about access to land or about land supply constraints; rather about 
effective demand for farmland, defined as individual capacity to put land under crops. 
Strictly speaking, landlessness is non-existent among respondents. Few if any member 
of the wider population in Ayede area would also claim to be unable to farm because of 
inability to obtain land for economic or any other reason. Access to farmland cannot 
therefore constitute a reliable indicator of social differentiation among respondents.
A more useful indicator is cropped acreage per respondent. Information on farm size 
from my survey is too sketchy to bear statistical analysis, but state-wide data suggest that 
average holdings are small. In 1978, cropped averages ranged from 0.22 ha. for maize 
through 0.27 ha. for yam to 0.43 ha. for rice and 0.54 ha. for m e lo n . In  contrast, tree 
crop farms averaged 0.78 ha. for cocoa and 0.74 ha. for kolanuts.^^ Small holdings 
often mean that the individual’s farms are far apart, adding to the demands on available 
labour. Beyond a hypothetical point therefore, the labour requirements of extensive 
cultivation must exceed the supply capacity of the average farming family. The farmer 
who crops so many fields, and perhaps on a large scale, is therefore likely to depend on 
wage labour or on sharecropping.
ODS, Report on Rural Economic Survey, 1978 (Akure, n.d.). Table 39, p. 43. 
Ibid., Table 40, p. 44.
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However, sharecropping has been associated more with tree-crop farming than with food 
production. In recent times, women who have been engaged to harvest cassava farms and 
to process the tubers to gaari have often taken a share of the finished product. However, 
such women are hardly ever involved in the production process until the final stages and 
cannot be regarded as sharecroppers in the conventional sense of the term. The appeal 
of sharecropping at the final stages of cassava production may therefore reflect the sharp 
contrast between ‘the costliness of manioc processing [and] the cheapness of planting and 
growing... Sharecropping may also reflect low expectations or generalised uncertainty 
about the net benefit of employing wage labour to process gaari, especially in a rural 
setting with low functional or product specialisation.
A useful proxy for cropped acreage in the circumstances is the cultivation ratio, obtained 
by expressing the number of cultivated fields as a percentage of the number of fields 
owned by respondents. As Table 5.2 shows, the cultivation ratio for all respondents is 
about 91%. The implied high turnover of uncropped land could be interpreted variously - 
as an indication that man-land ratios are still high, that so much land is under fallow, 
or of labour scarcity if all the plots were intended for cultivation. The last interpretation 
is specifically supported by high cultivation ratios at both ends of the spectrum.
Table 5.2
Respondents’ Cultivation Ratio, 1992
(1)
N® of fields 
per respondent
(2)
Total N® of 
fields ‘owned’
(3)
Total N® of 
fields cropped
(4)
Cultivation 
ratio (3-5-2x100)%
1 29 29 100.0
2 118 128 108.5
3 96 90 93.8
4 80 76 95.0
5 50 35 70.0
6 18 6 33.3
7 21 7 33.3
8 8 8 100.0
10 10 10 100.0
Total 430 389 90.5
Source: Author’s field survey, November 1991-June 1992,
^  William Jones, Manioc in Africa (Stanford, 1959), p. 283.
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Respondents with up to two fields as well as respondents with eight fields and above 
cultivated all their farmland. The 108.5% ratio for respondents with two fields is unusual 
in this regard, but it could be attributed to respondents from other groups who cultivated 
only two of their fields. Beyond two fields per respondent, the cultivation ratio declines, 
at first moving haphazardly until five fields per respondent, after which it plummets to 
only 33%. If it is assumed that respondents with fewer fields are also likely to have 
smaller farms, and that every respondent wishes to crop as many fields as it is 
practicable,^^ it would follow that respondents with the lowest cultivation rate (or middle 
peasants, for convenience) typify the threshold between family-based, semi-commercial 
agriculture to full-fledged, market-oriented, food production.
The cultivation rate would then change from being a mere arithmetical measure to a 
rough indicator of the demand and supply of labour, mechanical implements and other 
capital inputs among respondents. To prepare and/or cultivate the land for example, the 
smaller farmer could always rely on family labour or on peak season co-operative labour 
arrangements. Larger farmers, such as the two survey respondents with eight and ten 
fields each, would normally retain migrant workers seasonally, procure wage labour as 
the need arises, or employ mechanical equipment to prepare their land. In trying to 
straddle both positions, the middle peasant faces more or less intensive competition and 
higher costs. For example, the middle peasant most certainly competes with the smaller 
farmer for the labour of teenage youths (often the smaller farmer’s offspring) and with 
larger farmers whose operations could absorb seasonally high wages for migrant labour.
Smaller farmers also need traditional co-operative labour arrangements more than middle 
peasants. The agreements, known variously in Yoruba as owe, aaro, or èbesé^ , have 
provided collective labour during the peak season to agnatic kin, members of peer groups 
or socially significant elders or chiefs. The usual objective, however, has been to enable 
beneficiaries meet their consumption needs and/or status-related entertainment expenditure 
rather than help willing individuals expand production for the market. '^  ^The groups have
Since access to farmland is free, and since speculation in land is still largely unknown, there is no 
real need for farmers or anybody else to claim ownership of a field except with the intent to cultivate it.
G. J. A. Ojo, ‘The Changing Patterns of Traditional Group Farming in Ekiti, North Eastern Yoruba
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almost always disbanded immediately after the peak season pressure on labour has 
subsided. At present, cooperative labour groups are little more than occasional 
expressions of peer solidarity, a direct result of pressure from the expanding cash 
economy and increasing availability of wage labour.^^ In effect, the low cultivation rate 
among respondents with five and seven fields each may have resulted from labour supply 
constraints or from low effective demand for wage labour at the going rates by aspirant 
middle peasants whereas richer respondents can afford to hire labour to cultivate all their 
fields.
5.4 Crop and Farm Management
This section describes in some detail the cropping patterns, farm management techniques, 
and ecological skills in the Ekiti-Akoko area. The factor requirements of the major food 
crops in the area are analyzed, as are incipient attempts at crop specialisation with respect 
to rice. Peasant practices, it is shown, remain basically traditional but are being diluted 
by increasing pressure for commercial production.
Crop production follows broad vegetational distinctions between the high to moderate 
forest zone in the south and the derived/guinea savanna vegetation north of the project 
area. The south and central parts of the area, comprising Ekiti Central, Ekiti East and 
parts of Akoko South LG As, lie in the forest area and are notable for ‘cash’ or export 
crops, especially cocoa, but also including coffee, kolanut, and oil palm as well as tubers 
and roots. In turn, farmers in the drier northern parts of the project area, mainly in 
Akoko North and Ekiti North LG As, produce staple food items like yams, cassava, 
cocoyam, and com (maize). The intensity with which particular crops are grown however 
differs between the areas, or even between villages in an area. Some farmers in fact 
straddle the food crop-cash crop divide, sometimes without due regard for agro-ecological 
and economic factors.
A survey of cropping practices conducted in the Ekiti-Akoko area by Arabi provides
Country’, NGJ, 6, 1 (1963). Cf. Atte, ‘Resources’, pp. 231-233. 
Ojo, ‘Changing’, pp. 36-37.
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information on the major crops grown in the area7  ^ The survey (hereafter the Arabi 
survey) suggests among other things, that 87% of respondents (n=60) cultivate maize, 
75% grow cassava, while 65% grow yams, 22% cocoyam, and 8% rice (Table 5.3)7^ 
The survey also provides information on respondents’ preferred crop mixtures. As Table 
5.3 shows, one-third of all respondents grew a mixture of yams, maize, cassava, and 
cocoyam while about one-fifth each preferred yam/maize/cassava and maize/cassava. 
Others expressed preference for y am/cocoy am/maize/cassava (10%),
yam/cassava/cocoyam (8%) and yam/maize/vegetables (7%).
Table 5.3
Fanners’ Food-Crop Preferences in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1985 J
No. Crops preferred Frequency (%)*
1. Y am/maize/cassava/cocoy am 33.0
2. Y am/maize/cassava 23.0
3. Maize/cassava 19.0
4. Y am/ cocoyam/maize/cassava 10.0
5. Y am/cassava/cocoy am 8.0
6. Y am/maize/vegetables 7.0
Total 100.0
Note: ® ‘N’ not available, but responses are multiple and overlapping. 
Source: Arabi Survey, Table 4, p. 45.
Much the same conclusions can be drawn from my own survey, even though it covered 
food as well as cash crops and also emphasised farmers’ crop preferences according to 
the size of land under each crop. For example, 42% of all respondents (n=163) claimed 
that yams was their first crop, that is the crop to which the largest proportion of their 
cultivated land was devoted in 1990/91. About 20% of all respondents made similar 
claims for maize, while 11-14% said they had more land under cocoa and cassava. Maize 
topped the list of second crops with about 31% of all responses (n=159), trailed by 
cassava (30%) and yams (24%). For the third crop, about 40% of respondents (n= 147) 
claimed they grow cassava, maize (19%) and yams (17%). Cocoyam features as the 
most-widely grown fourth crop with 23 % of responses for that crop. It is followed in that
Arabi, ‘Cropping’, p. 28, p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 26.
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group by yams (19%) and cassava (16.3%).
Table 5.4 expresses the foregoing as respondents’ enterprise combinations and suggests 
three important points. The first is that over two-thirds of all respondents grow at least 
three main crops while up to one-third grows four crops. Second, cocoa appeared once 
in combinations for the first four crops and only once again, with kolanut, in the 
combinations for the fifth crop. This suggests clearly that most respondents are 
overwhelmingly food farmers. In six seasons to 1975/76, for example, the project area 
accounted for 19-25% of Ondo State’s annual cocoa crop, or for 21.4% each season. 
About half (or 33-77%) of this proportion came from Akoko area, well outside my 
survey area.^* Finally, it could be deduced from Table 5.4 that yams feature in 80% of 
respondents’ crop preferences while cassava and maize recurred in 74% and 66% of all 
responses respectively.
Table 5.4
Respondents’ Enterprise Preferences, 1992
No. Crops preferred % of respondents 
in group
% of all 
respondents
1. Y am/maize/cocoa/cassava 163 86.0 86.0
2. Maize/cassava/yams 159 84.3 82.2
3. Cassava/maize/yams 147 75.5 68.1
4. Cocoyam/yams/cassava 92 57.6 32.5
5. Cocoyam/yams/kolanut/cowpea/cocoa 43 60.5 14.1
6. Cocoyam/kolanut/cassava/plantain/cashew 22 72.7 9.8
Note: * Multiple responses.
Source: Author’s field survey, November 1991-June 1992.
Together, both surveys suggest that the average Ekiti-Akoko farmer cultivates yams, 
cassava, and maize, probably in that order, while cocoyam and vegetables appear to be 
grown less extensively. It is also probable that agricultural production in the project area 
is geared more towards roots and tubers than to grains. The conclusions of both surveys 
are consistent with those in the existing literature. In the 1950s, according to the Galletti 
survey, yam constituted the single ‘largest element of food production both in volume and
Computed from ODS, Digest of Agricultural Statistics, 1976 (Akure, n.d.). Table 16, p. 18.
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in value’ for 187 Yoruba cocoa fam il ie s . In  1986/87, 83% of 1,169 food farms 
covered by Ondo State’s crop reporting survey were planted with roots and tubers while 
17% were under maize. About four-fifths of farms in the former group, or over half of 
all farms surveyed, were divided almost equally between yam and cassava, leaving less 
than one-fifth (16%, or one-tenth of the total) for cocoyam. Yam also provided 37% of 
the tubers output from the sample population.At the national level, yam accounted for 
over 35% by value and tonnage of all food crops produced locally in 1963. 
Corresponding figures for cassava are 22% and 9% respectively.*^ In two decades to 
1990, yam accounted for 24-40% by volume of Nigeria’s annual output of staple food 
items, though its share declined in the 1980s.Even so, yam remains a major element 
of internal commerce in Nigeria.
Yams are usually planted in November or early December, though some farmers plant 
as early as September or October. A late planting also takes place in February or March, 
offering farmers an opportunity to expand their farm sizes generally or prepare more yam 
fields without the peak season labour supply constraints associated with the last quarter 
of the calendar year. It has been established, however, that yams planted in the first of 
the two seasons give better results. According to Irvine, the Nigerian Department of 
Agriculture ‘tried planting yams in both seasons and obtained best results and heavier 
yields from the...method of planting in November or D e c e m b e r .A s  Faulkner and 
Mackie have also remarked, ‘yams planted in the earlier period yield better than those 
planted in March...[F]ven when the beetle is prevalent...late planting reduces the yield 
more than the beetle does.’*^  It is also widely accepted that yams planted between the 
two periods often fail to sprout, let alone produce good yields.
R. Galletti, K. D. S. Baldwin and I, O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers (1956), p. 418. 
ODS, Report o f Agricultural Crop Reporting Survey 1986/87 (Akure, n.d). Section 3, p. 1. 
Oyenuga, Agriculture, p. 7.
^  Computed from CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1&2 (1990), Table C.1,2, p. 78.
“  F. R. Irvine, A Textbook o f West African Agriculture (2nd ed., 1953), p. 123.
^  Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 147.
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Empirical support for these positions is well documented. In Kwara State, for example, 
Atte’s survey evidence indicate that Kabba farmers prefer early planting of yams because 
they wish to maintain their environmentally-induced work schedule as well as take 
advantage of early rains. They also fear that yams could decay or cannot be cut into setts 
once they become ‘pregnant’ or develop sprouts after October. Before then, there is 
normally a stock of good tubers from which setts could be made without putting pressure 
on food supply for the family; farmers are not therefore tempted to reduce the new year’s 
crops.
Brown has also observed that farmers plant yams early in order to avoid possible ‘damage 
by the heat of the sun.. .during the hotter months of the year... In Irvine’s words, ‘the 
farmer prefers to plant in the morning...he insists that the rays of the sun are not good 
for the sets which should be planted in a cool seed-bed or hill.’*^  Yam seed-beds are 
usually cooled by mulching, the practice by which yam setts are protected by ‘a "cap" 
consisting of dry grass or similar material which is finally kept in place by a small 
quantity of soil or a large stone...’®* Experiments conducted by Nigeria’s Agricultural 
Department in the 1920s suggest that yield differentials between capped and uncapped 
yam heaps could be as high as 100%.®  ^ In the Ekiti-Akoko area, most farmers use the 
late planting opportunity to replace seeds which have not germinated either because they 
had few buds or too many ‘blanks’ in them, or because the setts had been destroyed by 
rodents or by excessive heat. The checking and replacing of bad setts is often undertaken 
piecemeal or alongside the weeding and hoeing of yam plots.
Yoruba farmers plant their yams setts {Àlàgbè, or ‘[yam] sliced for planting’) on heaps. 
Àlàgbè could be obtained from the top, middle, or bottom of whole yams. The criteria 
of choice often include the size of a tuber as well as possible sprouting points between
^ Atte, ‘Resources’, Table 5.10, p. 198.
^  D. H. Brown, ‘The Cultivation of Yams’, TA, VIII, 8 (1931), p. 203. 
Irvine, Textbook, p. 122.
Brown, ‘Cultivation’, p. 203.
Irvine, Textbook, p. 124.
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its various parts. Whole seed yams are also obtained from what may be called second 
generation tubers from yam plants which have been harvested early either because the 
yam varieties concerned mature faster or because of deliberate action.^ Farmers often 
harvest their yam crops early (where possible) to generate whole seed yams which 
generally produce heavier yields than tops. Seeds made from middles and bottoms are, 
according to Irvine, less reliable and may not sprout at all.^^
OnÀkùrd ox fadama fields or on other plots with heavy soil, heaps could be 1-2 feet high 
and 3-4 feet apart.^ Depending on soil type as well as on the individual farmer’s choice 
regarding the size and quality of heaps, a hectare could comprise between 3,000 and
8.000 heaps, according to Atte’s data.”  In traditional Yoruba society, farm size is 
measured in multiples of 200 or igba. Two thousand heaps thus amount to eg b ^â , 
egbàâ, or igba mewa (i.e. 10 units of 200 heaps each). If, as Jeffreys reckoned in 1947, 
‘D/2 '*egba” is approximately equal to one acre’, one hectare would average 7,400 
heaps.”  At present official estimates of farm size in Ondo State assume an average of
3.000 heaps per hectare, which incidentally is Atte’s actual figure for Àkùro farms in 
Kabba. This might mean that heaps are generally bigger in Ondo State than in Kabba, or 
alternatively that Kabba farmers try to make more heaps per hectare because arable land 
is more scarce in relation to Ondo State. The divergent figures however point to the lack 
of standardisation in traditional measurements.
In making heaps, farmers turn the soil over without necessarily removing the top and 
most nutritious layers. Since in Stamp’s words ‘the centre of the hill (or mound) of one 
year becomes the intervening hollow of the next...the soil of the hill is naturally well
Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (1985), p. 109.
Ibid., p. 122.
^  Brown, ‘Cultivation’, p. 202; Oyenuga, Agriculture, p. 164.
”  Atte, ‘Resources’, p. 321.
^  M. D. W. Jeffreys, ‘Average Size of a Native Hoe Farm in Nigeria’, FaF, VIII, 1 (1947), p. 33.
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drained and the irregular hollows between form efficient drainage c h a n n e l s T h e  heap 
itself also amounts to an artificial depth of soil which ‘in some measure compensates for 
the non-employment of manure.’^  With appropriate mulching (or capping with weeded 
plants), the depth of soil helps to retain moisture for plant use^ and ensures that ‘the 
developing tuber is not checked by the growing tip of the root coming against hard 
soil.’^ *
Farmers also train growing yam vines to twine around and climb stakes made of dry com 
stems or of sticks obtained for the purpose from neighbouring bush.^ Four or six stakes 
are usually tied together to form a shade which helps to maintain soil moisture by 
protecting the hills from direct sunshine and also ‘enables the twining vines to withstand 
storms and rain.’ °^® Subject therefore to adequate rainfall and proper tending (i.e. 
weeding, hoeing, etc.) by the farmer, bigger heaps facilitate multiple cropping by 
providing space at the base of the heap (Esè-ebè) for interplanted crops and tend to 
induce better yam h a rv e s t s .A s  Faulkner and Mackie have observed, ‘yam responds 
more than most crops to deep and thorough cultivation of the soil before planting’; hence 
considerable resources are devoted to preparing land for the yam crop.^ ®^
Yam is often intercropped with maize as well as cassava and with a variety of subsidiary 
crops like pepper, vegetables, tomatoes, cowpea, and pumpkin. Maize and cassava are 
however the most important on account of their consumption value as well as exchange 
value. In theory, maize is drought-resistant and could ‘enter a dormant state when soil
^ Stamp, ‘Land Utilisation’, p. 38. 
^  Dudgeon, Forest Products, p. 95. 
^  Faulkner, ‘Experiments’, p. 177. 
^  Oyenuga, Agriculture, p. 165.
^  Brown, ‘Cultivation’, p. 202. 
Oyenuga, Agriculture, p. 165.
Kabba farmers are broadly representative of Yorubas generally in their perception of the benefits 
of heaping. For details, see Atte, ‘Resources’, pp. 187-191.
Agriculture, p. 148.
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moisture is unavailable and then [resume] growth when the supply of water in the soil is 
replenished.’ ®^^ In fact, maize is cultivated throughout the year only on fadama land. 
Given the strictly limited supply of fadama land, most small farmers plant maize twice 
each year. The early crop is planted in February/March and harvested about June while 
the late crop is planted in August and harvested in September or October. This pattern 
accords with Allison’s description of maize planting in Ondo villages.
Maize farms can be sole or mixed. In the Ekiti-Akoko area, as in other parts of Ondo 
State, small farmers usually plant maize, especially early maize, on sole plots although 
each plot is often small. In 1977, for example, an estimated 38,100 ha. of maize was 
cultivated by 178,510 farmers in Ondo State, that is about 0.2 ha. (0.5 acres) per 
farmer. About 45% of the total cropped area was however classified as single crop 
plots. Some 10,000 ha., or 27 % of the estimated total maize hectarage was based in what 
became the Ekiti-Akoko area in that year. Two-thirds of these were sole plots while only 
one-third was mixed. The share of sole plots also varied widely between EGAs in the 
project area, from about 51% of the total in each of Akoko North and Akoko South 
EGAs to about 86% of the total in each of the three Ekiti EGAs that comprise the project 
area. In 1978, 71% of the estimated land cropped with maize in the state was classified 
as sole; the corresponding figure for the Ekiti-Akoko area was 60%.^ ®^
The pervasiveness of sole maize plots suggested above is contrary to the general 
preference for mixed cropping among Ondo State’s small farmers. This seeming 
divergence from tradition is doubly significant for maize, a crop which, according to 
Johnston, depletes soil nutrients quickly and engenders leaching and erosion when its 
spacing requirements in sole stands are met.^ ®^  The African farmer’s single remedy to 
these negative attributes of the maize crop, Johnston suggests, is mixed cropping; yet.
Bruce F. Johnston, The Staple Food Economies of Western Tropical Africa (Stanford, 1958), p. 99. 
Allison, ‘Farm to Forest’, p. 96.
Computed from ODS, Rural Survey 1978, Table 33, pp. 35-36.
Ibid., Table 34, pp. 37-38.
Johnston, Staple Food, p. 101.
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the above data suggest that Ondo State’s farmers may have ignored this very solution! In 
fact however, sole maize cropping is another exception that proves the rule. Although 
maize’s marginal labour requirements are relatively low, its cultivation on sole plots 
enables farmers to take advantage of seasonal weather changes by seeking to increase the 
marginal returns to labour, or at least ensure that the marginal cost of establishing an 
additional field is lower than or equal to the opportunity costs of deploying available 
labour on other farm chores. For the smaller farmer this means a rare opportunity to 
expand potential food output and ensure food security at minimum cost in labour and 
time.
For example, the early maize crop is planted just after the first rains, when much 
unoccupied but previously cultivated or fallowing land is free of bush or even shrubs on 
account of fires made to bum bush clearings, or wild bushfires. Sometime the heat wave 
of the dry season also leaves fallow land without much shmb-growths. In such cases, 
maize can be planted after unbumt weeds and new shrub-growth have been duly 
cutlassed. Maize seeds are placed three or four in a hole which could be 2-4 cm. deep 
and 25-30 cm. apart. The holes are made with sticks, cutlasses, or some other tool and 
are usually spaced unevenly. A second possible reason why sole maize farms are popular 
among small farmers might well be its growth cycle. Since maize matures in about twelve 
weeks, the early crop is often ready for consumption by June or July. Early maize thus 
helps to meet the consumption needs of many farming families during the ‘starvation’ 
period before new yams are due for harvest from July/August. In those few weeks or 
perhaps months of the year, maize becomes a staple food eaten fresh on the cob or in the 
form of flour, meal, and starch.
In any case, sole maize cultivation is intertwined with ‘relay intercropping’, the practice 
of planting a second crop on a plot ‘after the first crop has reached its reproductive stage 
of growth but before it is ready for h a r v e s t .P r i o r  to June when the early maize crop 
matures, cover crops like cowpea or melon are often added to help check the growth of
Galletti, Baldwin, and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, pp. 234-235. 
Arabi, ‘Cropping’, p. 6.
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weeds. Other crops like cocoyam, okro, as well as vegetables may also be added. At 
harvest in June, the farmer may decide to plant another maize crop in August.
Maize is however often cultivated as a mixed or succession crop on yam plots. To add 
yam sets to an existing maize plot, the size of the mounds has to be increased 
substantially before the rains stop in July or August. Farmers also prepare and cultivate 
their plots as is customary for yams and plant maize seeds during or immediately after 
yams have been planted. Either way, the maize stems are retained for subsequent use as 
stakes for young yam vines to twine around and climb, as noted above; otherwise stakes 
must be obtained by some other arrangement. Maize is also intercropped with cassava, 
a tuber that offers substantial economies on farm labour. When intercropped with maize, 
the farmer may or may not create additional soil depth for the cassava crop. Cassava also 
does well without hoeing or weeding and could be abandoned once the maize crop has 
been harvested. To quote Faulkner and Mackie again, ‘cassava is always the last crop 
before cultivated land is allowed to revert to bush condition, and the crop is often not 
weeded at all.’“°
Rice, Nigeria’s most prominent and most discussed crop since the oil windfall of the 
1970s, is also cultivated widely in the Ekiti-Akoko area. It is however not represented 
in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 partly because of the biases of the Arabi survey as well as my 
own survey and also because rice production has become relatively specialised and 
localised, as shown below. Two varieties of rice, swamp and upland rice, are cultivated 
albeit unevenly in different parts of Ondo State. According to Oyenuga, swamp rice does 
well in flooded conditions, such as those that obtain in mangrove swamp belt, or under 
artificial flooding from irrigation. Swamp rice can also be cultivated by raising swamp 
rice plants in ‘small flooded nursery plots’ and then transplanting them after 4-6 weeks. 
In the field they are planted 2-3 inches deep and spaced 10 x 10 inches or at best 12 x
110 Agriculture, p. 149; cf. Allison, ‘Farm to Forest’, p. 96.
For example, the size and representativeness of respondents, the mode of their selection, etc. This 
however applies more to the Arabi survey, which covers the project area, than to my own survey of four 
villages in northeastern Ondo State, where rice cultivation has traditionally been low.
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12 i n c h e s . I n  contrast, upland rice requires less intricate techniques and attention at 
least up to the planting stage. Unlike swamp rice, upland rice can be sown directly in the 
field without the additional costs in labour and time of nursery and seed-bed preparation 
as well as transplanting.Upland rice is therefore more widely grown in Ondo State 
as in other parts of southern Nigeria, partly because of climatic considerations, and partly 
because it offers substantial labour economies over and above swamp rice.
Like maize, rice is often grown twice in a year. The early crop is planted in April or 
May and harvested in August or September while the late crop is planted in August and 
harvested in December or January. Upland rice is also similar to maize or to other grains 
in that it could be broadcast on uncultivated land once all weeds and undergrowths have 
been burnt or otherwise removed. Beyond these initial economies however, rice is on 
balance more labour intensive than most grains or tubers cultivated in the project area. 
For example, rice plots must be weeded at least twice. The first must be undertaken very 
early to ‘enable the field to be free of all sorts of adventitious vegetation, thus reducing 
the volume of work involved l a t e r . ‘Adventitious vegetation’ often includes regrowth 
from the roots of weeds that had not been burnt or otherwise turned over with the soil 
through the normal process of cultivation. Rice farms are particularly susceptible to such 
vegetation because they are not usually cultivated.
The second weeding is necessary to ensure that rice plants do not face severe competition 
for space, light and nutrients with weeds and tall(er) grass. Such competition could mean 
that rice plants are prevented from flowering because of insufficient access to solar 
energy. Apart from keeping the rice fields clean, the second weeding also helps to deter 
rodents, especially grasscutters, from taking up residence on the plot. Where this is the 
case, weeding makes it easier for farmers to trace and set up baits on rodents’ paths. 
Baiting rabbits and other rodents is a familiar art among Yoruba farmers. But baits placed 
on rice fields need to be checked regularly and moved around to cover the entire farm
Oyenuga, Agriculture, p. 191. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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or to keep up with changes in rodents’ paths or presumed locations. For rice farmers 
therefore, baiting and weeding are necessary and demanding tasks.
Herbicides can of course be used on large farms where hand weeding is uneconomic, but 
the supply of chemicals in the rural areas is often erratic and their prices beyond the 
reach of the small farmer. In the 1950s, as Galletti, Baldwin and Dina have remarked, 
a large number of farmers depended on family labour, or mutual aid groups to weed their 
rice f i e l d s . A s  noted shortly, however, mutual labour groups have declined because 
of increasing purchasing power and expanding wage labour. Unlike weeding, rice 
harvesting is a more arduous and labour-intensive task that has pushed the frontiers of 
rice production more into the commercial realm. In major rice-producing communities 
in the project area, wage labour or some form of share-cropping has become widespread 
since the 1970s.
One result of the above processes has been to make rice production a specialised activity 
vis-a-vis major food crops in the project area and elsewhere in Ondo State. Rice farming 
is so labour-intensive that it seems more difficult and less profitable to combine rice with 
other crops in the same way as yams are routinely combined with maize or yams and 
cassava are cultivated by the same small farmer. Hence rice is often cultivated more for 
exchange than for own consumption. For example, a small farmer at Imojo told me in 
1992 that he sold his entire 1991 rice crop, presumably at a good price, and was buying 
rice thereafter to meet his family’s consumption needs. This single case cannot support 
general deductions on the extent to which small farmers in the Ekiti-Akoko area rely on 
the market for their consumption needs, but it does support the view that rice is a higher- 
value crop vis-a-vis roots and tubers. Although the availability of imported rice has 
depressed local supply capacity over the years, the price of imported varieties and 
problems with their distribution have meant that available supply is cornered by urban 
wage earners, including civil servants and the elite generally. In contrast, local rice is 
more readily available at the local level at prices that are affordable to local farmers and 
to the poor. Small scale rice farming has therefore remained attractive enough.
Galletti, Baldwin, and Dina, Cocoa Farmers, pp. 181-182.
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Rice fanning is also more deeply incorporated in the formal economy than say yams or 
cassava. In 1976, rice alone accounted for 79% of a total of N299,500 credit disbursed 
by the Ondo State Agricultural Credit Corporation (O S A C C ) . I n  1977 and 1978, the 
share of credit to rice farming declined to 45% and 38% respectively; however total 
credit disbursement by the corporation increased to a record N5.22 million in 1977 and 
declined to only N2.86 million in 1978. Moreover OS ACC extended credit to a greater 
range of crops and agro-allied activities (e.g poultry and feed mills) in the latter years. 
Even then rice still accounted for a relatively high 44% of OSACC’s credit disbursement 
for the 1976-78 period. Given the small farmer’s structural disadvantage in the 
distribution of formal credit and, by implication, in the capacity to exploit economies of 
scale in rice cultivation, it seems that the marginal returns on a small consumption rice 
farm would be below the average for rice farmers generally. It is also reasonable to 
surmise that the smaller farmer might be better off economically if he grew more yams 
and maize rather than rice or otherwise expanded his rice farm to a point at which he 
could profitably sell the rice crop and use the proceeds to buy food in the market.
Rice is also less amenable to multiple cropping and is often cultivated on sole plots. 
While some farmers do grow maize on rice plots, such maize plants are often scattered 
rather than planted systematically among rice plants. In 1977, 97% of an estimated 
24,655 hectares of rice cultivated in Ondo State were classified as sole while only 3% 
was mixed. All of Ekiti-Akoko area’s 43% share of the state’s total rice hectarage was 
classified as sole.“* In 1978, sole plots accounted for 91% of estimated total rice 
hectarage in the state; the ratio in Ekiti-Akoko area was just below the state’s at 
89.6%.^^^ In short, mixed rice plots are rare; when they are cultivated, the objective 
is often to provide a consumption crop on plots motivated by farmers’ desire to enter or
Computed from OSACC’s figures in Adeniyi Osuntogun and Olufemi Oludimu, ‘Extending 
Agricultural Credit through Public Institutions in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the Ondo State 
Agricultural Credit Corporation and the Ogun State Agricultural Development Corporation’, OAS, X 
(1981), Table 1, p. 90.
Ibid.
Computed from ODS, Rural Survey 1978, pp. 35-36.
Ibid., Table 34, pp. 37-38.
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otherwise consolidate their position in the market for locally produced food. In this 
respect, rice farming in Ondo State differs from the Sierra Leonean practice as reported 
by Paul R i c h a r d s .A s  in Ondo State, maize is an ‘especially...valuable hunger 
breaker’ among Sierra Leone’s rice farming families.Unlike in Ondo State however, 
maize is mixed systematically on rice fields as are guinea com, millet, and beniseed. 
Richards observes however that ‘intercrops such as egusi and beniseed [are] grown partly 
or largely for cash...
Rice cultivation in Ondo State is localised vis-a-vis other major food crops. In 1978, only 
an estimated 16.5% of farming households in Ondo State (n= 396,945) had rice farms 
while three-quarters of all farming families cultivated yams and just under half grew 
maize. Some 85% of rice growing families were however based in six LG As in Ekiti 
area which also accounted for over 80% of estimated rice hectarage in Ondo State in 
1977 and again in 1978.^^ Three of the six LGAs with large numbers of rice growing 
families are in the project area and accounted for 55 % of rice growing families in the six 
LGAs. In contrast, all six LGAs accounted for only half of the number of estimated 
farming families with maize and yam farms. The cultivation of yams and of maize are 
therefore widely distributed while rice production is associated with particular 
communities within and outside the project area. Major rice growing communities outside 
the project area include Ijero, Ido, Brio, Aramoko, and Effon Alaye; within the project 
area, Igbemo and adjoining villages in Ekiti Central LGA and Ayedun in Ekiti North 
LG A are the most remarkable.
Of all rice-growing communities in the project area, Igbemo (in Ekiti Central LGA) is 
clearly predominant. If anything, Igbemo attracts more migrant workers than any rice- 
producing community during the summer harvest season. Migrant workers come from
Paul Richards, Coping with Hunger (1986).
Ibid., p. 118.
‘22 Ibid., p. 119.
‘22 Rural Survey 1978, Table 12, p. 12.
‘2" Ibid., Table 33, pp. 35-36 and Table 34, pp. 37-38.
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far and near, and usually include in their ranks local secondary school students eager to 
make some money over their the long summer vacation and otherwise unemployed female 
petty traders as well as those employed in the informal sector. Migrants also come from 
southeastern Nigeria and the Benue-Plateau region of the country, areas traditionally 
noted for producing large numbers of migrant agricultural workers in southwestern 
Nigeria. It is impossible in the absence of a data base to make precise statements about 
the magnitude of labour migration into Igbemo for the annual rice harvest. It seems 
reasonable to suggest however, that up to four-fifths of labour employed at the peak of 
the annual rice harvest originate from outside Igbemo and its adjoining villages.
The size of rice-related activity in Igbemo is also reflected by Ekiti Central LGA’s 
position in relevant economic statistics. In 1977, Ekiti Central LGA accounted for 46% 
of rice-growing households in the project area (n=26,813).^^ One year later in 1978, 
its share amounted to about 36% of estimated rice-growing households in the project area 
(n=32,475).^^^ The relative decline in Ekiti Central LGA’s position is however due less 
to absolute decreases within the LGA (estimated at 6%) than to large increases in other 
LGAs, for example in Ekiti North where an estimated 46% increase was reported and 
from expanded counting in Akoko North and South LGAs.^^^
The distribution by local government of OSACC’s credit operations suggests much the 
same point. In 1980, Ekiti Central LGA accounted for 32% of N l,327,700 (i.e. 
N554,200 for production and N773,500.00 for marketing) worth of OS ACC credit for 
the rice crop in the state. One year later, in 1981, the same LGA accounted for 56% by 
value of loans approved to applicants from what became the project area.^^* Rice 
production seems therefore to have the leading edge in the increasing commercial 
orientation and formalisation of small-scale food production in the Ekiti-Akoko area. 
Paradoxically, rice farming has also reinforced the value of local knowledge and local
Ibid., Table 14, pp. 14-15. 
Ibid., Table 15, pp. 16-17.
Ibid.
Francis S. Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1985), Table 492, pp. 697-698.
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experimentation in pest control methods and strategies.
5.5 Environmental Hazards
The peasant’s knowledge of environmental and ecological issues, including pests, soil 
erosion, and climatic changes is widely remarked in the literature, more so in the absence 
of written records or other modem methods of information storage and retrieval. Atte has 
shown how local proverbs, puzzles, games, rules and norms are but stmctured 
expressions of the ‘knowledge system’ that sustains local agricultural practices in 
Kabba.^^  ^ The same is tme of other Yomba groups as well as the Igbo people of 
eastern Nigeria.
Barker, Oguntoyinbo and Richards have also examined peasant perceptions of and 
strategies for coping with environmental difficulties in Ikale in southeastern Ondo 
S ta te .T h e i r  study suggests, among other things, that Ikale farmers possess substantial 
understanding of the biological attributes and growth cycles of the insects and pests in 
their domain, the timing and intensity of their attacks on crops, and the general economic 
menace that they constitute. It also shows how farmers made meat of grasshopper as a 
way of reducing their numbers and how, in the case of Zonocerus variegatus or 
variegated grasshopper, farmers’ concerns shifted from pure ecology to economics, 
‘reflecting the rapidly changing market conditions for foodstuff in drought-affected, post­
war Nigeria, as well as internal changes in the local e c o n o m y . . .B a rk e r  and his 
colleagues therefore make two general points. The first is that local farmers are no less 
rational than extension officers in their attitudes and responses to agronomic problems as 
well as environmental hazards. Secondly, local knowledge and local initiatives can be 
ignored only at the cost of agricultural progress at farm level. Research should in fact be 
directed at harnessing and systematizing local strategies for coping with environmental 
hazards.
Atte, ‘Resources’, chp. 7.
Uzozie, ‘Tradition’, chp. V.
Barker, Oguntoyinbo and Richards, ‘Peasant Farmer’s Knowledge’. 
Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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In general terms, the Ekiti-Akoko area has a relatively stable ecological history. The last 
known widespread drought was in 1945, when yam harvests in northern Ekiti area 
dropped by half and nearly all of the second maize crop was lost. One respondent 
told me he consumed gaari or cassava flour for the first time in 1945 because the yam 
harvest was poor. But he also recalled being scolded by his father for consuming gbongbd 
igi, a parody of cassava as worthless ‘woody’ roots normally consumed by poor or 
indolent men. Jones expressed a similar sentiment by depicting cassava as a crop that 
self-reinforces indolence: on the one hand, cassava appeals to lazy men because it is easy 
to cultivate; on the other hand, growing it makes such men lazier still!
There has been the occasional windstorm about which very little can be done. There was 
also a rare but widespread bushfire in parts of Ekiti North and Ero LGAs in 1984. But 
local farmers quickly converted this into positive ends by planting maize on many of the 
newly-bumt out fields. The result was a remarkable increase in local maize supply by 
mid-1984.
In the absence of mechanical irrigation, timely rains remain a critical hazard, especially 
in periods immediately before major farm operations. Drought, or its polar opposite, 
heavy or torrential rainfall, is regarded as an unnatural condition. As Uzozie has 
remarked in another context, both could be the outcome of malevolent acts, for example, 
of rainmakers intent on demonstrating their skills, of medicine men seeking to market 
their wares by first of all showing off their efficacy, or of envious neighbours seeking 
to ruin local festivals, private marriage, house-warming, or burial ce rem onies . I t  is 
also believed that intervention by powerful rainmakers could affect neighbouring villages. 
Such intervention could have been intended for the rainmaker’s village only; or he could 
have been paid by villagers themselves to spite rival groups or the entire village.
Ondo Prof. 1/1/120A, NAI, p. 5. 
‘3^ Jones, Manioc, p. 280,
‘35 Uzozie remarks [in ‘Tradition’, p. 193] that his house ‘was nearly attacked [in 1972] by angry 
village women who alleged that he had paid a rainmaker to withhold the rains while he was constructing 
a water tank.’ In 1975 ‘the same group of women undertook to marry a wife for the most powerful 
rainmaker simply because it was alleged that he withheld the rain during a new yam festival.’
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The first rain generally signals the beginning of the farming season but does not always 
bring forth a smile from every member of the community. The rains signal the end of the 
high season for log-felling as well as log transporters, the latter because rough and ready 
feeder ‘roads’ become impassable to heavily-laden lorries. Tobacco growers also face 
increasing costs and greater risks once the rains set in. With the early rains, tobacco 
leaves take longer to dry; the quality of the dried leaves might disintegrate in the process, 
and affected leaves may attract lower prices in the market. (Unlike in northern Oyo State 
where farmers grow tobacco leaves under contract with the Nigerian Tobacco Company, 
farmers in northern Ondo State produce and market their tobacco leaves independently, 
with the more notable ones taking their crop to Lagos or to other urban centres to sell).
There are also added opportunity costs: since early rains mean an extended period of 
‘waiting’ before tobacco leaves are or could be marketed, resources that could be 
expended on other farm chores would have to be redirected subsequently to tobacco 
leaves. Thus a farmer who grows yams and tobacco might be forced to spend time at 
home to dry his tobacco leaves in the sun; if he chose to leave them on site, he would 
still have to devote scarce labour and time (resources which, by now, could be better 
expended on weeding yam/maize plots) to pluck tobacco leaves. In short, rainfall or the 
lack of it has led to occasional squabbles within (and, in extreme cases, between) 
communities. One age-old practice in villages where the rains are late has been to shut 
down all economic activity and thereby interest everybody in the rain question. Whenever 
this has applied, local markets have been closed down usually and women in affected 
villages barred from taking their wares to neighbouring markets. Men also have been 
prohibited from going to their farms on appointed days - usually local market days. The 
sanctions have affected virtually every villager and even extended to traders and others 
from neighbouring villages, supporting Page and Richards’ view on the effectiveness of 
communal action on ecological matters.
Pests, both human and non-human, are the other major environmental difficulty in the 
project area. Local perceptions of these hazards have changed remarkably, as the case
W. Page and Paul Richards, ‘Agricultural Pest Control by Community Action: The Case of the 
Variegated Grasshopper in Southern Nigeria’, AE, II, 4 and III, 1 (1977), pp. 127-141.
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of rice illustrates. In the 1950s, Ayedun was a major centre for rice production, with a 
co-operative rice mill located at the market centre; plans by government to construct 
grain silos were not to materialize until the 1980s. By the 1960s, according to oral 
accounts, Ayedun’s rice fields were being attacked year after year by birds which came 
just as the plants flowered, destroying entire yields in some cases and scuttling the 
maturation of the crop in others. The damage wreaked on the local rice crop soon became 
a disincentive to production, and Ayedun’s rice fields all but disappeared until the 1980s. 
Initially, the migrating birds were usually attributed to malevolent neighbours employing 
witchcraft to offset rivals’ economic or social advantage within the village or block 
further progress. Recently, farmers have generally moved away from purely supernatural 
conceptions of the bird menace to more mundane explanations and practical remedies.
Three related bird control mechanisms (which also apply to some other insects or pests) 
are now commonplace in and outside the project area. The first is the direct policing of 
rice farms with humans, especially women and children but also including men. Their 
main task is to throw missiles - for example, stones, sticks, or anything else - in various 
directions to terrorize birds and possibly drive them away from the rice fields concerned. 
They also whistle, sing or make other loud noises to the same end. This mechanism has 
the advantage of producing direct and immediate results, but it is tiring, monotonous, and 
relatively labour-intensive. It is also feasible during daytime only, leaving rice fields 
‘unprotected’ at nightfall.
The second major bird control mechanism involves the simulation of human presence in 
rice fields. This takes at least two forms. The first is to dress up tree trunks or sticks 
with discarded human clothing and to place them at strategic locations on the field. 
Sometimes miniature bells or other objects are attached to these scarecrows to make noise 
when the wind blows. It is believed that birds are scared by the likelihood that such 
effigies might in fact be human beings, and if they were, by the danger that humans 
could inflict on their number. The second simulation mechanism involves the placing of 
carefully folded plastic sheets on sticks or on tree branches. When the wind blows, each 
sheet produces a sound similar to an object being rolled in the air or to a car being 
revved up. Many such sheets create an eerie feeling around the field, sufficient to give
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the impression of human presence and to deter birds. Either way dummies are used to 
supplement humans in policing rice farms, thereby releasing scarce labour for alternative 
daytime tasks and keeping birds at bay at night. The one problem with these simulation 
techniques is that birds do get used to them after a short while, when they could then 
attack and destroy rice fields regardless.
The third local initiative encompasses the entire foundations of existence in traditional 
Yoruba society. It is known as juju, or variously as ‘African science’, ‘ethno-science’, 
‘folk science’, ‘village science’ in the wider l i te ra ture . In  the present context, ‘village 
science’ involves the making and placing of charms on farms to deter thieves or other 
animal and human trespassers from stealing produce from or otherwise entering the 
fields. The nature and components of charms employed for this purpose differ widely 
between communities, between farms, and between Babalawo (or herbalists) who make 
them. Oral traditions are replete with cases in which thieves have been caught in the act 
because the Alilè on location incapacitated the thieves or otherwise turned them to 
involuntary labourers on the fields they had just stolen from. Such thieves are often 
‘arrested and detained’ on the farms with their loot by the watchful Alilè until the owners 
come round to deactivate the charms and set the thieves free, usually after paying a fine 
or making some other form of restitution.
Village science has also been employed to deter animals and birds from attacking rice 
fields. To this end, rice seeds are often sprinkled with medicinal preparations before they 
are planted, the objective being to make the seeds poisonous and unavailable to birds and 
rodents that might want to pick them before they germinated. Similar treatment is also 
given to other grain seeds, usually at the point of planting to ensure that poisoned grains 
are not processed for hiunan consiunption. In fields with growing rice plants, a mixture 
of dried herbs, which may or may not include ataare (alligator pepper) is added to small 
fires in various parts of the field so that the ‘impregnated’ smoke can spread to all 
comers of the rice farm concerned. A variant of this technique is to make liquid 
concoctions {Agbo) of selected herbs and sprinkle the mixture all over the farm. Either
Richards, ‘"Alternative" Strategies’; of. Brokensha, Indigenous Knowledge.
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method results in an unpleasant smell which in turn repels birds and other insect pests. 
This treatment is applied in particular to growing rice plants to discourage cane rats 
{pya) from uprooting rice plants or cutting their stalks for food. Similar treatment takes 
the rice fields concerned out of the normal reach of birds, especially at flowering 
stage.
It is difficult to make precise statements on the efficacy of the above mechanisms in the 
absence of sustained research into ‘village science’ or into its specifically agrarian 
elements. It is also difficult to assess the relative usefulness of each mechanism, largely 
because the average small farmer often employs two or more mechanisms simultaneously. 
Insofar as bird control in rice fields is concerned however, ‘village science’ has ceased 
to be the legacy of a distant past which conservative peasants have chosen to hang onto. 
‘Village science’ seems to have been embraced in government farms in Ondo and Oyo 
States and may well herald a new syncretism in formal and informal approaches to crop 
and farm management in southwestern Nigeria.
In 1979, for example, J. A. Oshakuade, a senior agricultural officer in Ondo State, 
suggested to a conference at which the efficacy of recommended food production 
packages in southwestern Nigeria was reviewed, that ‘African science’ be experimented 
with to combat the menace of birds on rice fa rm s.N iger ia ’s oil-induced food import 
regime of the 1970s had become clearly unsustainable by 1978, partly because of 
instability in the oil market and attendant shortfalls in Nigeria’s revenue projections, and 
partly because the operations of the first generation of ADPs in northern Nigeria 1974/75 
had created new opportunities for the local production of internationally traded grains, 
especially rice and maize. As part of that nation-wide concern, Ondo State’s agricultural 
department had inaugurated a grow-more-rice-campaign to seek new converts into rice 
cultivation or at least encourage existing producers to put more land under rice. 
Oshakuade however reported that the campaign was hampered by swarms of birds which
138 For a similar account, see Atte, ‘Resources’, pp. 404-406.
J. A. Oshakuade, ‘Evaluation of Package Recommendation on Food Crop Production in Ondo State’, 
in Report of the 8th Annual Conference on Package Recommendations for Production o f Food Crops in 
Southwestern Nigeria (Ibadan, 1979), p. 18.
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were attacking rice fields in the state. Having reviewed tested but ineffectual solutions, 
Oshakuade advised a recourse to ‘African science’ to protect rice farmers from incessant 
economic losses and to ensure that the state’s rice output did not decline. 
Coincidentally, Oshakuade’s counterpart from neighbouring Oyo State reported the same 
problem and confirmed that they had tried Oshakuade’s suggested solution in Oyo State. 
However, Juju did deter birds on one rice multiplication plot but failed pointedly to do 
the same on a second, similar plot!^ '*^
This case may seem isolated and perhaps too limited to support general inferences on the 
wider applicability of principles of village science in the modem sector. Oyo State’s 
experience also raises questions about the efficacy of traditional strategies for coping with 
pests and even more fundamental questions about their replicability. The experience does 
suggest however, that the boundaries between formal and informal management strategies 
are socially constmcted and not inviolable. The overall point therefore is that official 
agricultural development schemes would be more productive both economically and 
socially if they were moved closer to, and draw upon, local traditions on agricultural 
resource use and resource management. One prior requirement though is that local 
practices be standardized through appropriate research and development.
5.6 Conclusion
Farming systems analysis is as much about relations between farmers and bio-technical 
developments as it is about micro-macro linkages in agricultural development. But 
agricultural development policy and programmes in post-colonial Nigeria have tended to 
emphasise general bio-technical issues more than micro-level human and social 
f ac to rs .Y e t ,  as a Bhaduri and Smith and Sender have shown in different contexts, 
agrarian change will in the final analysis depend not so much on the availability of 
technical equipment as on context-specific trial and error by smallholders and complex
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 22.
Cf. Robert Chambers, Rural Development (1983).
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relations between small farmers and the wider economy. 143
Peasant rationality, it is now widely accepted, cannot be determined a priori. To do so 
is to conflate the rationality of means with the rationality of ends - to assume, in other 
words, that peasants subscribe to a particular set of values, and in addition, have the 
capacity to realise those v a lu e s .O n e  effect of this sweeping but largely mistaken 
generalisation has been to understate the extent to which macro-institutional factors could 
constrain micro-experiences as well as programme replication and sustainability. 
Another is to deny the authenticity and diversity of small-scale experimentation with new 
ideas and techniques, experimentation which has been shown to result in significant 
advances in the use of productive resources, as in labour productivity in Asia’s rice
economies.
This chapter has shown how crop production and farm management techniques in the 
Ekiti-Akoko area are deeply rooted in the ensemble of local traditions and initiatives, and 
how small farmers have exploited nature without provoking local ecological imbalance. 
Production possibilities as well as enterprise combinations in the food sub-sector are 
constrained not so much by access to farmland as by acute scarcity of labour and fixed 
capital, especially modem, efficient, implements. There is an emergent increase in 
formalisation and hence commercialisation of small scale food production, but this has 
been syncretic, a movement along the tradition-modemity curve than a shift from 
subsistence to commercial production.
Even so, Ekiti-Akoko’s experience has highlighted three contentious issues in the
Amit Bhaduri, The Economic Structure o f Backward Agriculture (1983), p. 127; John Sender and 
Sheila Smith, Poverty, Class, and Gender in Rural Africa (1990), p. 75.
Anthony Hopkins, ‘Rationality and Technology in African History’, Technology and Culture, 16, 
3 (1975), pp. 462-465.
Hans Gsanger, The Future o f Rural Development (1993), p. 8; cf. Michael Cemea, ‘Sociological 
Knowledge for Development Projects’, in Cemea (ed.). Putting People First (New York, 1991), p. 6.
Bray, Rice Economies; cf. Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley, 1979); and David 
Feeny, The Political Economy o f Productivity (Vancouver, 1982).
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literature. The first concerns the relative allocation of resources between cassava and 
yam. Jones had argued in the 1950s that the growth of cassava cultivation reflected 
farmers’ desire to maximise returns to land. Paul Richards had argued the contrary, 
insisting that peasant farming is typically labour-scarce, and that peasant resources are 
allocated primarily to maximise returns to labour. Both arguments could be sustained 
under particular resource circumstances, but my own survey data and wider evidence on 
Ekiti-Akoko’s land-surplus economy, presented in section 5.3 above, have supported 
Richards’ position. This point is examined further in chapter 7.
The second issue has been the shift from roots and tubers to grains, regarded widely as 
indicating movement from what may be called ‘ethnic foods’ with geo-culturally limited 
demand to globally tradeable items like rice and maize. The available evidence suggests 
that this movement has taken roots in the Ekiti-Akoko area, though maize has remained 
an opportunity crop, cultivated more to maximise returns to labour than in response to 
prices. Rice-growing seems to have been more price-responsive. A small-scale farmer 
even told me in Imojo in 1992 that he sold his rice harvest when market prices were high 
and subsequently bought rice for his family’s consumption needs. Still, large-scale rice 
cultivation has been relatively limited to a handful of villages, of which only Igbemo is 
within the project area. As the analysis showed, large numbers of people from within and 
outside Ondo State migrate annually to Igbemo to provide labour for the rice harvest. 
More specific investigation than that undertaken here is necessary to determine how rice 
production in Igbemo has affected other crops, or indeed the intensity of and implications 
for the local economy of crop specialisation in Igbemo and other rice-producing villages 
in Ondo State.
Finally, there has been considerable change in official attitudes to rural society and vice 
versa. The analysis showed a growing, albeit very slow, appreciation of indigenous 
knowledge among government officials. There is still substantial scope, however, for 
open-ended research as a prelude to collaborative efforts to bridge the gap between 
technology-driven agriculture and traditional production methods.
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Chapter 6 
Extension Mechanisms and Processes
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 5, it was suggested that a new but as yet undefined syncretism of elements 
from traditional and modem farming techniques has been emerging in the Ekiti-Akoko 
area. In this chapter, the responses of Ondo State’s food crop farmers to ‘modem’ 
agricultural practices, as exemplified by EAADP and ODSADEP’s extension 
mechanisms, would be further analyzed. Based primarily on my survey of farmers in four 
villages around Ayede in northeastem Ondo State, the chapter ascertains how much 
difference project extension has made over the years.
Agricultural extension refers to formal and informal modes of boosting farm output and 
productivity through improvements in production methods and techniques.^ Two basic 
elements are usually emphasised, namely, education in best-practice techniques and the 
provision and delivery of support services, such as information on farm management and 
farming systems to facilitate efficient decision-making at farm level.^ The usual object 
is to train and influence farmers in order that they could achieve economic fulfilment by 
themselves.
Official extension work in Nigeria dates back to the beginning of formal colonialism in 
the late 19th century. Since then, extension officers have been consistent in seeking to 
change farmers’ world view on commodity production. Early extension work was aimed 
at ‘inducing the people, by more consistent propaganda, to adopt new crops - which they 
had frequently proved reluctant to do, in spite of persuasion and promise of future 
profit.’^  In 1922, Odin Faulkner, Nigeria’s first Director of Agriculture, had described 
agricultural extension as
‘ S. K. T. Williams, Rural Development in Nigeria (Ile-Ife, 1978), pp. 69-72.
 ^Donald Williams, Agricultural Extension (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 8-10.
 ^O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), p. 3.
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the work of advising, instructing, teaching, or exhorting the native farmers in the way 
they should go, through the agency of itinerant instructors...Armed with the ability to 
make experiments, and with their wider intelligence, there is no doubt that agricultural 
officers can leam so much about the work and problems of the native farmer, as to be 
able to some extent, to teach him "his own business."^
Some scholars have attributed Faulkner’s initial approach to inadequate official knowledge 
of local socio-economic resources and farming practices. Paul Richards and H. Vine have 
likened Faulkner, a botanist, to the professional scientist imbued with ‘the ability to apply 
a logical, scientific mind to the problems of agriculture.’^  Faulkner’s approach to 
extension. Vine wrote further, indicated colonial officials’ desire to ‘acquire specialised 
knowledge about local conditions and the scientific and economic facts which led to their 
evolution. In fact, extensive research on the scale envisaged by Faulkner never took 
place, because the Agriculture Department ‘lacked adequate funds and staff’, and because 
available resources were dedicated to the more immediate need to ‘stimulate production 
for export by native farmers.’^  Faulkner subsequently modified some of his opinions to 
accommodate local farmers’ views and aspirations, but details are not necessary here.®
More recent conceptualisations of agricultural extension in Nigeria have built upon 
Faulkner’s pioneering efforts without abandoning his patronising view of ‘native farmers’ 
or the temptation to (re)define reality for them.^ In a public lecture delivered in 1989,
O. T. Faulkner, ‘The Aims and Objects of the Agriculture Department in Nigeria’, First Annual 
Bulletin o f the Agricultural Department (Lagos, 1922), p. 8, p. 6.
 ^ H. Vine, ‘Some Comments on the History of Agricultural Research in Nigeria’, NAJ^ 1, 1 (1964), 
p. 5.
® Ibid.\ Paul Richards, ‘Farming Systems and Agrarian Change in West Africa’, PHG, 7, 1 (1983), 
p. 2; Tom Forrest, ‘Agricultural Policies in Nigeria, 1900-78’, in J. Heyer, Pepe Roberts and G. Williams, 
Rural Development in Tropical Africa (1981), pp. 225-227.
’ Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, pp. 3-5; Robert Shenton, Die Development o f Capitalism in 
Northern Nigeria (1986), p. 120.
* Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, chp. 8.
’ A. U. Patel and J. A. Ekpere, ‘Strategy for Agricultural Development at Grassroot Level: A Nigerian 
Case’, in Bruce Crouch and Shankariah Chamala (eds.). Extension Education and Rural Development, Vol. 
2 (Chichester, 1981), pp. 213-220. For a review of Nigeria’s experience, see A. A. Adegbola and LA. 
Akinbode, ‘A Review of Old and Current Agricultural Development Schemes in Nigeria: Lessons for 
Future Programme Designs’, IJA, 8 (1986).
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s. K. Williams, a former senior agricultural officer in Western State and Professor of 
agricultural extension at Ife and Ibadan Universities, gave new currency to Faulkner’s 
view of the extension worker ‘as the enlightened leader of a backward people.’ ®^ 
According to Williams, agricultural extension is
an out of school system for teaching farmers how to raise their standard of living by their 
own efforts and using their own resources by providing them with scientific knowledge 
to solve their problems...To be successful, extension must start at the stage of 
development that the farmers are and gradually build them up to a level of higher 
standards of achievement. “
Agricultural extension is conceived here as a method and a process. As a method, 
exitension mechanisms define EAADP and ODSADEP’s approaches to the propagation 
o f high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds and improved cultural practices among farmers in 
the traditional agricultural sector. As a process, extension is the focal point of contact 
between ADPs and their farming populations.^^ Extension thus provides valuable 
insights into the general character of state-farmer relations as well as a substantive 
CO’unterpoint to ADPs’ more visible turn-key tasks, such as road construction and 
irrigation development.
The rest of the chapter comprises five sections. The next section examines EAADP’s 
exitension objectives and its attempt to implement the training and visit system (T&VS), 
am organisational framework for agricultural extension promoted by the World Bank. 
Section three analyzes the extension staff-farmer ratio in the project area and the 
recruitment of primary school leavers as extension agents in the 1980s. Section four 
describes non-farm extension mechanisms, including meetings with and visits to farmers 
by agents, while section five assesses the project’s contact farmers’ and outgrowers’ 
schemes. Section six concludes the discussion.
10 Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 78.
“ S. K. T. Williams, ‘Extension Services Within the Strategy of Agricultural Development in Nigeria 
in the 1990s’, Sixth ARMTILecture (Ilorin, 1989), p. 19; p. 23. Emphases added.
S. K. Williams, Rural Development, pp. 93-95; J. A. Alao, ‘The Extension of Agricultural 
Innovations’, in E. O. Akeredolu-Ale (ed.). Social Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1977), pp. 233-250; 
Jerome Wells, Agricultural Policy and Economic Growth in Nigeria 1962-68 (Ibadan, 1974), p. 268.
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6.2 Agricultural Extension in Ekiti-Akoko ADP
Christensen has observed that small scale food production in the Ekiti-Akoko area has 
been constrained by the supply of improved seeds and the supply of fertilizer, ‘the one 
single agricultural input which is responsible for the highest yield increase of crops. 
According to him, local farmers have been unenthusiastic about adopting fertilizer partly 
because generalized fertilizer use in the area dates back only to the 1970s, when the 
required distribution infrastructure was established in the Ekiti-Akoko area. Moreover, 
farmers did not understand how to apply fertilizer in the right quantities and could not 
appreciate its considerable benefits.
The basic objective of EAADP’s extension, therefore, has been ‘to educate farmers so 
that they could adopt advanced cultivation techniques, including farm mechanisation 
and/or use of minimum tillage to progressive individual and group farmers.Improved 
(HYV) seeds, seedlings, and/or stem cuttings were to be promoted among small farmers. 
So were the effective use of fertilizer, simple labour-saving technology, as well as the 
adoption of cultural practices like mono cropping and crop rotation. The project also 
planned to encourage ‘grouped farming’ in the short-term and all-year cropping in 
‘permanent’ farm settlements by building 35 irrigation dams of 35,000 cubic metre each. 
This element of EAADP’s extension was designed to overcome the problems occasioned 
by land fragmentation by encouraging farmers to expand their holdings to about 4 ha. per 
capita to make mechanisation economically feasible. But, as indicated in chapter 4, it 
never saw the light of day.
The project’s extension programme was based on the training and visit system (T&VS), 
an organisational framework formulated in the 1970s by Benor and Harrison. Informed
Jens Christensen, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), p.
54.
Ibid., pp. 54-55.
A. U. Patel, ‘Agriculture and Technical Services’, in APMEPU, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Project 
Completion Report, Vol. Ill Main Report, p. 4.
Daniel Benor and Michael Baxter, Training and Visit Extension (Washington, 1984); cf. Benor, James 
Harrison and Baxter, Agricultural Extension (Washington, 1984).
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largely by Asian experience, T&VS has sought to facilitate commercial production by 
channelling extension advice to individual farmers in small, compact groups. It has also 
promoted the diffusion of labour-saving technology for small farmers through adaptive 
research, a combination of on-station and on-farm research which seeks to close the gap 
between agricultural research and practice by relating farmers’ operational experience to 
researchers and encouraging farmers to experiment with research-induced solutions. 
Training and visit thus requires that extension agents be trained continuously on 
technologies adaptable to small farmers’ circumstances by subject-matter specialists drawn 
from universities or research institutes.^® Agents are in turn expected to train farmers 
and report their opinions and difficulties to researchers.^^
In pursuit of T&VS, EAADP established a four-tier pyramidal extension organisation at 
headquarters, areas, zones and villages or sub-zones, with control over policy moving 
from top to bottom and grassroots information moving in the opposite direction. 
However, this organisational structure is not novel. In 1971, Olayide and others had 
criticised similar structures in post-colonial Western Nigeria because they tended to 
centralise decision-making. This had in turn denied autonomy and initiative to field 
officers on the ground, increased the turnaround time of information, and above all, 
encouraged inefficiency.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP sought to pre-empt these negative possibilities by emphasising lower 
level structures in its extension organisation. For example, two-thirds of the 5,222 
recipients of its training programmes in 1982-86 were farmers. With an additional 19% 
of training beneficiaries provided by its junior staff, 70% of the project’s 2,295 training
Benor and Baxter, Training, pp. 99-104. Cf. C. O. Iwueke, ‘Adaptive Research’, in APMEPU, 
EAADP Completion Report, p. 24.
Benor and Baxter, Training, pp. 17-18; pp. 33-38.
”  Ibid., pp. 13-17. For a critique of T&VS, see Dominique Gentil, ‘A Few Questions on the Training 
and Visit Method’, in Nigel Roberts (ed.). Agricultural Extension in Africa (Washington, 1989), pp. 25-29.
S. O. Olayide, E. O. Idusogie, and Dupe Olatunbosun, ‘New Dimensions in the Administration of 
Agriculture in Nigeria’, QJA, 6, 1 (1971), pp. 55-69; summarized in Paul Collins (ed.). Administration for 
Development in Nigeria (Lagos, 1980), p. 277-279; p. 283.
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man-hours in 1982-86 had been dedicated to lower-level segments of farmers and staff. 
In short, T&VS has had the effect of taking EAADP’s training programmes closer to the 
village level.
The project also operated within SAR’s relatively bottom-heavy extension organisation. 
By 1984, 25 zones and 65 sub-zones had been established and fully manned by Zonal 
Extension Officers and Agricultural Inspectors respectively.^^ Field Assistants also 
constituted about two-thirds of the project’s extension staff each year from 1982 to 
1986.^  ^ This broadly achieved the 51-72% target in the SAR for the period. Initially, 
all five area officers and 15 zonal officers were seconded from the state’s ministry of 
agriculture.
In 1982, EAADP recruited 60 field assistants directly, most of them primary school 
leavers with practical farming experience.^ This enabled the project to exceed SAR’s 
target for field assistants by 180%. Their number increased to 64 in 1984 but declined 
to 44 (33% of SAR target) two years later. By 1986, all incumbents had left or been 
sacked for reasons identified below, leaving 175 positions vacant;^ the post was itself 
abolished and redesignated Village Extension Agent (EA) in the same year. In 1987, 33 
holders of the Ordinary National Diploma (OND)^  ^ were recruited into the newly 
created p o s ts .T h e  number of agents dropped slightly in 1988 but increased by 161% 
to 86 in 1989 and to 100 in 1990. By mid-1991, ODSADEP had 162 agents on its
Computed from O. Famoriyo, ‘Organisation and Management’, in APMEPU, EAADP Completion 
Report, Vol. 77 (Benin-City, 1986), p. 11.
Christensen, Final Report, p. 32.
^  Computed from Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 16,
^  Christensen, Final Report, p. 32.
“  Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 16.
“  Nigeria’s polytechnics award OND after at least two years of study. To qualify for admission, a 
candidate is normally required to have at least three credit passes in relevant subjects at ordinary level 
General Certificate of Education (GCE).
Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 16.
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payroll,^* a direct result of the change in EAADP’s status from enclave to state-wide 
project. The extension division of the state’s Ministry of Agriculture was also transferred 
to ODSADEP, swelling the latter’s staff and organisational bequest from EAADP.
6.3 Extension Staff-Farmer Ratio
Two measures of agricultural extension outcomes are available in the literature, namely 
the diffusion rate and the extension staff-farmer ratio. This section examines the latter in 
the Ekiti-Akoko area and alternative explanations of project impact on the ratio in the 
1980s.
The extension staff-farmer ratio (ESFR) is an arithmetical indicator of the density of 
extension staff within a specified politico-administrative unit. It is not a representative 
measure of the distribution of staff among the farming population. Rather, it is a means 
of assessing the workload of extension staff, and implicitly, the average farming family’s 
potential to receive advice and assistance on new technology and cultural practices. As 
such, ESFR says little, if anything, about the quality or depth of extension contacts: a 
declining ESFR merely suggests increasing potential for direct contact between extension 
staff and farmers, while a rising ESFR means more families per extension worker. Since 
extension agents cannot see all farmers physically, rising ESFR increases the likelihood 
that more farming families would rely on second hand information, make their own 
adaptations, or revert to traditional practices.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP s impact on extension staff-farmer ratios is not as straightforward as 
it may seem. Available information on pre-project ESFR is conflicting and often of 
questionable comparative value. Christensen has suggested, for example, that pre-project 
ESFR stood at around 1:4000.^^ But he provided no details on how the figures were 
derived. In turn, Idachaba’s nation-wide survey provided more details and suggests a 
slightly different picture; but this has to be adjusted to reflect EAADP’s rural focus more
ODSADEP, ‘Ondo State Implementation Strategy for the Achievement of the National Agricultural 
Policy’, Internal Briefmg Paper, Table 3, p. 6.
Christensen, Final Report, p. 36.
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closely. What follows juxtaposes available information to draw inferences on the outcome 
of project extension.
By 1980, according to Idachaba's survey, the ESFR for the Ekiti-Akoko area stood at 
1:2460.^° The calculation was, however, based on a total estimated farming population 
of 140,205, including urban-based farmers excluded from APMEPU s projections for the 
Ekiti-Akoko project.^^ If APMEPU s estimated farming population of 75,548 was 
adopted, and extension staff elasticity was held constant, pre-project ESFR would be 
around 1:1328, slightly lower than the 1:1387 suggested for Ondo State in the Idachaba 
rep o r t . I f ,  on the other hand, the more general view that about 70% of Ondo State’s 
farmers live in villages was adopted, and staff elasticity was held constant, a derived 
farming population of 98,144 and pre-project ESFR of 1:1722 would be obtained for the 
Ekiti-Akoko area.
In this context, it was grossly unrealistic to expect ESFR to fall to 1:400/600 over a five- 
year period, as in EAADP’s projections. Christensen’s assertion that EAADP actually 
reduced ESFR to as low as 1:620 by 1984^  ^ is also suspect on at least two grounds. 
First, Christensen used an extension staff complement of 105 to compute his ratio when 
actual staff size ranged from 89-96 up to 1984 and declined first to 68 in 1985 and 
further to 48 in 1986. '^  ^ Second, on the strength of Christensen’s pre-project ESFR of 
1:4000, an estimated post-project ESFR of 1:620 implies a five-fold increase in extension 
staff over 1981-84. In fact, staff increases totalled 223%, or 56-68% per annum in 1982- 
84 with Idachaba’s figures as base rates. Christensen’s figures are thus likely to have 
been prompted more by a desire to show that performance targets were being met than 
by realities on the ground. The project’s targets on ESFR were clearly unattainable under 
the circumstances.
Francis Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1985), Table 496, p. 702, 
APMEPU, ‘EAADP Report on the Village Listing Exercise’ (Benin City, 1982), p. 5. 
Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, p. 702.
Christensen, Final Report, p. 36,
^  Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 16,
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A relatively independent assessment has reached substantially different conclusions from 
Christensen’s but supports my own view. According to Professor Patel, EAADP did 
make some progress with ESFR in 1982-86, but the overall balance was negative.The 
ratio declined initially by 6.4%, from 1:1250 in 1982 and 1983 to 1:1171 in 1984 (cols. 
2 and 3 of Table 6.1). Thereafter, it rose sharply by 46% to 1:1704 in 1985 and by 
another 33% to 1:2273 in 1986. In 1982-86, according to Patel’s calculation, EAADP’s 
performance averaged 42% of SAR’s target (col. 4, Table 6.1). Yearly returns are 
however more revealing. From an average 48-51% in 1982-84, ESFR in Ekiti-Akoko 
area declined to 35% of SAR target in 1985 and 26% in 1986.
Table 6.1
Extension Staff-Farmer Ratio in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1982-86
(1)
Year
(2)
ESFR
(3)
% change
(4) 
% SAR
(5)
Index (pre-project 
1:1328 = 100)'
1982 1:1250 48.0 94.1
1983 1:1250 0.0 48.0 94.1
1984 1:1171 6.4 51.0 88.2
1985 1:1704 -45.6 35.0 128.3
1986 1:2273 -33.4 26.0 171.2
Average 1:1530 - 42.0 115.2
Note: “ Base figure derived from Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, p. 702,
Sources: Cols. 2 and 4 - Patel, ‘Agriculture and Technical Services’, p. 4; cols. 3 and 5 - computed.
Still, Patel’s efforts were largely descriptive and of very little comparative value. Project 
performance with regard to ESFR had been assessed only in the context of its internal 
objectives and targets rather than in relation to extra-project benchmarks. Further, in 
failing to link past and present ESFR estimates, Patel provided no clues on whether the 
average Ekiti-Akoko farming family stood a better chance of receiving direct extension 
advice and assistance in 1986 than it did in 1980.
An index of ESFR in the project area has been computed with the derived pre-project 
ESFR of 1:1328 as base figures to overcome this difficulty. The results, presented in 
column 5 of Table 6.1, provide broad support for Patel’s view that ESFR actually rose
Ibid., p. 4.
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in 1982-86. But the index suggests that decreases over the pre-project period of 6-12 units 
to 1984 were more than offset by increases of 28-71 points in 1985-86. Extension staff- 
farmer ratios therefore rose by an average of only 15 points in 1982-86 as a whole.
6.3.1 Explaining the Extension Staff-Farmer Ratio
Why did Ekiti-Akoko ADP perform so poorly in improving extension staff density? 
Patel’s analysis highlighted two possible explanations, namely, increases in the number 
of farming families and the allegedly poor quality of extension staff. Regarding the first, 
Patel suggested that project activities may have occasioned increases in the number of 
farming families which, in turn, stretched available staff more than anticipated. This 
explanation is plausible but also highlights the weak statistical basis of project projections. 
If, as is possible, the number of farming families did increase during project life, such 
increase must be attributed to either or both of two factors. One is a possible 
underestimation of the rural farming population in the SAR or in the village listing 
exercise by APMEPU. If this was the case, projected demand for extension services by 
the assumed number of farming families was also certain to have been underestimated, 
and no realistic basis would exist for precise conclusions on the project’s ESFR 
performance.
The other possible explanation for increases in the number of farming families could be 
that hitherto non-farming families moved over to agriculture to swell the farming 
population in the project area. This position is implied by Patel and perhaps preferred by 
project functionaries, but it flies in the face of the lack-lustre picture of project operations 
painted on these pages. Moreover, without prejudice to project successes, a five-year 
operational life seems too short to stimulate definite changes in local occupational 
preferences. The period is shorter still for such changes to become manifest, more so 
since Ekiti-Akoko is part of an area in which the quest for formal education and attendant 
preference of white-collar careers had constrained labour supply and led to stagnation in 
agricultural production.
Adekunle Folayan, Agriculture and Economic Development in Nigeria (New York, 1983), pp. 80-86; 
cf. Tom Forrest, The Advance o f African Capital (Edinburgh, 1994).
206
Patel’s second explanation, that increasing ESFR could have resulted from the poor 
quality of village-level extension staff, is equally plausible, although staff quality is 
slightly removed from the issue of extension staff density. Even so, the quality of senior 
and junior staff also has been a focal point of debate on EAADP. As I show 
subsequently, food production as well mechanisation declined in the Ekiti-Akoko project 
area following the withdrawal of expatriates in 1984. Famoriyo has observed also that 
three-fifths of EAADP’s management staff were just about one year old on the job by 
1984.^  ^All of this relates, however, to staff turnover and experience while Patel seemed 
to have emphasised the capacity of extension staff to market project programmes or at 
least convert more small-scale farmers to EAADP’s cause.
As indicated already, in 1982 the project had employed primary school leavers as village 
extension agents. The desire for formal education in Ondo State is proverbial, and it 
might at first seem curious that EAADP embarked on this experiment when people with 
higher formal qualifications were presumably available. Yet, the choice for EAADP’s 
managers was not simply between candidates with primary school leaving certificates and 
others with higher formal qualifications. The questions are more complex and wide- 
ranging, including considerations of the place and role of the farmer in the extension 
process. Was the farmer to be a passive recipient of new ideas imposed from above? Or 
was he to be ‘treated as a source of knowledge and wisdom to be leamt from, argued 
with and respected’ How was the extension agent’s formal educational qualifications 
to affect the project’s relations with farmers? Could higher educational attainments by 
extension workers hamper access to, or cloud official perceptions of, the farming 
population?^^
These questions have exercised policy-makers for decades. In the 1930s, Faulkner and 
Mackie had reasoned that the extension agent could (and would most probably) differ
Famoriyo, ‘Organisation’, p. 8.
G. Williams, ‘Ideologies and Strategies for Rural Development: A Critique’, in idem. State and 
Society in Nigeria (Idanre, 1980), p. 145.
Donald Williams {Agricultural Extension, p. 8] has raised similar queries with reference to developed 
economies.
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from his clients, but they also emphasised that ‘the personality of the manager of the 
demonstration farm’ and of the itinerant instructor should facilitate rather than impede 
effective contact with f a r m e r s .A n  agent is more likely to understand farmers’ 
viewpoints more easily where the social distance between them is minimal. In Faulkner 
and Mackie’s words, ‘if he is not too superior in social standing to his neighbours, yet 
is a man of sufficient intelligence and character to command their respect, he may be able 
to make intimate personal friends among them and to acquire real in f luence . In  short, 
the agent’s social standing and formal intelligence cannot be emphasised too far without 
stretching relations with farmers.
Since the 1940s, staff supply has improved with the expansion of educational 
opportunities. But the problem has remained how to ensure that change agents reflect the 
broad socio-economic attributes of their clients and do not ‘look down’ on farmers. 
Observers of agricultural development in Western Nigeria have often remarked upon 
educated extension agents’ arrogant and condescending attitudes to the illiterate segments 
of their publics.'*  ^This has often been attributed to status-related distance between agents 
and farmers, or to the failure to create social space that could be shared by both parties. 
Akinbode’s study of role perception by Western Nigeria’s divisional extension officers 
has suggested that respondents spent more time on administrative and educational 
functions than on providing agricultural services to farmers.Olatunbosun also reported 
a parallel case in the 1960s where farm settlers were treated like junior civil servants, 
instructed on what to do rather than encouraged to leam to act like independent economic 
a c t o r s . I n  turn, the settlers had despised extension agents because the latter’s civil
^  Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 83.
Ibid.
For an historical assessment of agricultural extension in Ghana, see R. H. Green and S. H. Hymer, 
‘Cocoa in the Gold Coast: A Study of Relations between African Farmers and Agricultural Experts’, JEH, 
XXVI, 3 (1966), pp. 299-319.
I. Akinbode, ‘Roles of the Divisional Extension Officers in the Western State of Nigeria’, QJA, 6, 
1 (1971).
^  Dupe Olatunbosun, ‘The Farm Settlement: A Case Study of an Agricultural Project in Nigeria’, 
BEES, 6, 1 (1971), p. 13.
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service salary was lower than the average settler’s earnings. Such settlers had regarded 
their higher cash incomes as a counterpoint to agents’ legitimate authority, which was 
thereby undermined.
Mutual recrimination between farmers and extension officials has intensified since the 
advent in the 1970s of ADPs and large-scale irrigation schemes. Mabogunje has reported 
that some farmers in the Funtua area ‘indicated resentment at the idea of young, 
inexperienced extension workers dishing instructions out to them about farming 
m e thods .Som e  Ekiti-Akoko farmers also hinted at having ‘blanket recommendation 
dictated [to them] by the Project Extension S taff .Off ic ia l  irresponsibility has been 
most remarkable at Bakolori, where large-scale social dislocation was anticipated at 
design stage but ignored until after project take-off.These and other studies highlight 
structural and cultural problems in social change, but they also suggest that agricultural 
extension would be most effective when there is relative value convergence between 
agents and farmers.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP sought to overcome some of the foregoing pitfalls by recruiting as 
village agents primary school leavers with hands-on farming experience. The option was 
also cheaper financially, since a primary school leaver is normally placed at the lowest 
rungs of Nigeria’s public service salary structure where wages could amount to half of 
a college graduate’s earnings. Admittedly, this calculation excludes induction and re­
training expenses that may be higher for primary school leavers than for individuals with 
post-secondary education. But it must not be assumed that an individual’s capacity to 
understand and deploy basic extension skills varies directly with his/her formal
O. Okediji, ‘Some Structural Strains in the Change Agent System of the Western Nigeria Land 
Settlement Scheme’, NJESS, 10, 3 (1968), pp. 393-394.
^  Akin L. Mabogunje, ‘The Funtua Integrated Rural Development Project’, in R. P. Misra, ed.. Rural 
Development (New Delhi, 1981), p. 203.
R. O. Arabi, ‘Cropping Practices of Farmers in the Ekiti/Akoko ADP Area, Ondo State, Nigeria’, 
M.Sc Dissertation, Department of Agronomy, University of Ibadan (1985), p. 24.
See, e.g., W. M. Adams, ‘Rural Protest, Land Policy and the Planning Process on the Bakolori 
Project, Nigeria’, Africa, 58, 3 (1988), pp. 318-320.
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educational qualifications. I return to this issue below.
The experiment also had the potential to ensure that agents were not set apart socially 
from their clients and to remove superior-inferior feelings in agent-farmer relations. The 
arrangement also provided a potential counterpoint to the widely criticised practice under 
which ‘educated’ agents gave disproportionate attention to ‘progressive farmers’ and then 
expected extension messages and benefits to trickle down to smaller farmers. As I show 
shortly, the fundamental premises of the ‘progressive farmers’ scheme as well as its 
record have been questioned both in Nigeria and elsewhere.
The immediate point, though, is that the experiment became entangled in the in-fighting 
between EAADP’s expatriate management and local senior staff. As indicated in chapter 
3, the latter had criticised the apparently low educational qualifications of expatriates who 
ran the project until mid-1984. Apparently convinced that basic extension tasks could not 
be handled by unlettered people, the project’s local senior staff had interpreted 
DARUDEC’s backing for agents with little formal education as a logical extension of the 
educational inadequacies of the project’s expatriate managers.'*^ The criticism also 
implied that Ondo State had a large pool of better educated but unemployed youths who 
could have filled the agents’ positions and provided better value for EAADP’s money.
The above critique of DARUDEC’s staffing policy is widely shared by staff in Ondo 
State’s Ministry of Agriculture. It was in fact mentioned in virtually all my interviews 
with serving and retired senior project staff. The ancillary point about youth employment 
in Ondo State is most probably valid, but the argument itself could be cavalier and 
perhaps mechanistic. On the one hand, the critics appeared to believe that primary school 
leavers could not acquire through project-based training sufficient understanding of the 
processes and techniques promoted by EAADP. If this was because primary school 
education was inadequate to provide the basic skills for village-level extension duties, a 
larger question arises, namely whether the training and visit system itself could be 
productive in the circumstances. Since a good proportion of farmers have no formal
DARUDEC’s case is reviewed in Famoriyo, ‘Organisation’, p. 8.
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education, a second question is whether farmers themselves could ever have acquired, 
least of all internalised, new skills and techniques from project operations.
On the other hand, the critics could have assumed that the problem was less about 
individual abilities and more about the nature of EAADP’s programme. But this would 
be self-defeating, for it would suggest that EAADP’s extension programme was so far 
removed from the farmers’ circumstances that agents had to be recruited from among 
those whose social vision lay outside the farmer’s worldview or was marginal to it. Either 
way, the underlying assumption seems to be that better qualified people would be as 
interested in agricultural careers as primary school leavers, or in any case that a 
relationship exists between the formal educational attainment of village agents and success 
in agricultural extension. Available evidence is not sufficient to support a precise 
position, but a reasonable view would be that Ondo State’s primary school leavers and 
OND holders generally would not wish to pursue agricultural careers if they had 
alternative options. Diploma holders are also more unlikely to have practical or enduring 
interest in farming; indeed, those appointed as agents most probably regarded the position 
as a stop-gap measure in the quest for white-collar jobs.^° In sum, EAADP broke no 
new grounds in extension organisation. Training and visit offered nothing new 
structurally. In turn, the novel attempt to break with tradition in the recruitment of village 
agents proved unpopular with local senior officials and was abandoned soon after the 
departure of the project’s foreign managers.
6.4 Non-Farm Contacts
Non-farm contacts refer to ancillary forms of contact between farmers and extension 
agents, emphasising advice and information sessions outside ordinary farming 
circumstances rather than hands-on farming practices by participant-farmers. This section 
describes EAADP’s experience with three such modes of contact, namely, villages 
meetings, the secondary schools programme, and pamphlets, radio and television 
broadcasts. The latter are discussed in a separate sub-section to underscore their potential 
import as mass media of extension and assess their suitability in Ekiti-Akoko’s social
Cf. Folayan, Agriculture, pp. 82-83.
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circumstances by examining survey data on actual farmers’ experience in Ayede, Imojo, 
Ilafon, and Igede.
Village meetings and personal visits are perhaps the most prominent forms of contact 
between extension staff and farmers outside the farm. Such meetings are usually 
convened to exchange information, make arrangements for credit, or attend to other 
administrative tasks, often by extension staff with support from communal or village 
groups, or from existing farmers’ groups and co-operative societies. Ideally, a zonal 
extension officer was expected to meet an average of five different farmers’ groups per 
week, while village agents took responsibility for more intensive personal contacts .In  
practice, personal visits by village agents were restricted to well-to-do ‘progressive’ 
farmers, including contact farmers on whose farms demonstration plots are located and 
adjacent farmers who are expected to help convert their friends and relations to the 
project’s cause.
Patel has suggested that an extension worker conducted an average of eight meetings per 
year to 1986, with average attendance of 24P  At an average staff complement of 77 
per annum (excluding the Principal Extension Officer and Chief Extension Officer, who 
were most likely to be engrossed in administration), Patel’s calculations suggest that an 
average of 624 meetings were held each year to 1986 under EAADP’s auspices, with 
about 15,000 farmers in attendance. If it is assumed that these corresponded to one 
representative per farming family, then about 20% of the estimated number of Ekiti- 
Akoko farming families may have participated in project-induced village meetings. If 
every participant at these meetings passed on the message to one other farmer, up to one- 
third of the estimated farming families in the project area may have been reached in this 
circuitous manner.
Available data are more precise on farmer visits by extension agents. According to
Patel, ‘Agriculture’, pp. 7-8.
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid. p. 8.
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ODSADEP’s internal figures, farmer visits by extension agents ranged from 5,030 in 
1986 to 11,861 in 1987, averaging 9,120 each year from 1985-88.^ "^  In 1990, visits 
totalled 8,256 but declined to 2,400 during the first half of 1991/^ Figures for 1985-88 
refer to EAADP and suggest clearly that an average farming family in the Ekiti-Akoko 
area had only a chance in ten of being visited by agents. The 1990 figure is worse, 
perhaps because of ODSADEP’s state-wide responsibility for extension. At the estimated 
farming population of 411,800 for 1980, an average farmer only had a chance in fifty of 
being visited in 1990. When account is taken of possible uneven distribution of agents 
between urban and rural areas, and of official preferential treatment of middle peasants 
and better-off farmers generally, j^Js_re^nable to suggest that a majority of small; 
farmers may not have been visited by agents over the y e ^ .
Table 6.2
Frequency of Extension Visits to Respondents, 1992
Frequency of visit N= of 
responses
% distribution of responses by village
Igede Imojo Ilafon Ayede
Very regular, once in two weeks 3 _ 2.9
Sporadic, irregular 4 - - - 3.9
Seldom 15 - 14.3 29.2 5.8
No visit 114 100.0 57.1 58.3 87.4
Other" 7 - 28.5 12.5 -
Total % 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
N 143 2 14 24 103
Note: * Respondents who claimed to have been visited last in the 1970s. 
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
Analysis of respondents’ claims on the frequency of extension visits supports the 
foregoing view. Of a total of 143 valid responses (Table 6.2), 114 (or 80%) claimed not 
to have been visited by agents. An additional 5% of respondents (in Imojo and Ilafon) 
claimed variously to have been visited last during a campaign on the use of fertilizer on 
yam plots in the 1970s, well before EAADP commenced business in the early 1980s. 
Only 2.1% of respondents regarded extension visits as very regular, while another 2.8%
ODSADEP, ‘Implementation Strategy’, Table 3, p. 6 
Ibid.
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considered them sporadic or irregular. All respondents in the last two response categories 
came from Ayede, where a high 87% of respondents also claimed not to have been 
visited at all. In contrast, respondents from Imojo and Ilafon were distributed unevenly 
between those who claimed that extension visits have been occasional or had long ceased 
to exist on the one hand, and those who were not visited at all on the other.
There are only two valid responses from Igede, both completely negative. Igede’s 
circumstances however differ from other survey villages: it was a former government 
farm settlement and remains a relatively outstanding centre of modem agricultural 
practices in the area. As of March 1992, Igede had 22 resident farming families, two of 
whom were among its original settlers. Some of the 20 other families/settlers comprised 
some from neighbouring villages; former staff of the Agriculture Department, as well as 
two polytechnic graduates who were being assisted by Nigeria’s Directorate of 
Employment and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture to become agricultural 
entrepreneurs. Given its history and relative standing in the area, extension visits to Igede 
are not likely to have had the same value as they would in neighbouring villages. Yet, 
Igede requires agents’ visits, and perhaps the more so, to sustain its pre-eminent position 
as a beacon of agricultural extension in the locality. In this regard, the zero response 
from Igede on extension visits might suggest problems with the availability of extension 
advice and assistance as well as direct access to these services by ordinary farmers 
elsewhere.
Other non-farm contacts included short drama sketches on such extension issues as pest 
control, cowpea production, profitability of fertilizer use, and production and uses of 
soyabeans. Fifteen such dramas were staged in 1985 and 1986 as an alternative to radio 
broadcasts.Village wall blackboards were also introduced in 1984 ‘for disseminating 
agricultural messages among farmers’ and were hung at central locations in select villages 
in 1984-86. In its first year, 60 blackboards were so displayed, but the number dropped 
to 40 in each of 1985 and 1986.^  ^ It is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of
Ibid., p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 8.
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messages on village blackboards or other similar media in a predominantly non-literate 
environment.
The project also instituted a secondary schools scheme similar to the Young Farmers’ 
Clubs of the 1930s. At that time, the clubs constituted the colonial government’s answer 
to youth unemployment and adult indifference to modem production techniques. Colonial 
officials had regarded them as ‘a most valuable means of establishing a link between the 
school and the farm’, given that they could encourage young school leavers to take up 
careers in agriculture.^® The clubs were also described by C. F. Strickland, then Chief 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, as ‘cooperative societies of children’ that could be 
employed to change parents’ largely cynical attitudes to modem agriculture.^^
The project’s school scheme virtually resuscitated Young Farmers’ Clubs, albeit without 
the overarching colonial context. According to Christensen, the scheme’s objectives were 
as follows:
(a) To attract young people to modem agriculture and thereby rejuvenate the ageing 
farming population in the [project] area.
(b) To influence the teaching of agriculture in the schools by combining to a greater 
extent practical and theoretical training.
(c) To contribute to the schools budget by income from direct production.
(d) To reach farmers with new ideas on agriculture through their secondary school 
children.®®
Ultimately, EAADP’s school scheme was aimed at getting ‘some of the 80,000 students 
leaving secondary schools in 1984 in Ondo State into either direct agricultural production 
or into related practical occupation in any of the jobs created by or arising as a 
consequence of the P ro jec t .F rom  twelve in 1983, the number of participating schools
CSO 26/31073 NAI.
CSO/26 26298/S. 10/5 NAI. Memorandum dated 1 February 1934. 
Christensen, Final Report, p. 46 and p. 48.
Ibid., p. 48.
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increased to eighteen in 1984 and reached 39 by 1986.^  ^However, input loans granted 
to schools under the scheme were not repaid; hence it was discontinued.®
There is no evidence on the schools programme’s impact on pupils’ subsequent 
employment preferences, or indeed whether some pupils took more active interest in 
agriculture after leaving school. What is clear is that EAADP never really interested the 
teaching staff in the programme, in which case it was another example of ad-hoc 
mobilisation schemes which have characterised Nigerian agriculture since the 1970s. 
Moreover, students who did the bulk of the work received little if any compensation for 
their efforts. One reason for the lack of incentive to students could be that teachers 
regarded their (students’) contributions as part of the weekly lesson in agriculture rather 
than career-linked practical training as EAADP had conceived it. But it is equally 
mistaken to assume that weekly classroom and hands-on lessons in agriculture in 
secondary schools are themselves sufficient to incline youths to take up careers in 
farming. On the contrary, Jibowo’s survey of 215 students in 11 secondary schools in 
Oyo State has suggested remarkable exposure to agricultural science.® Yet, only 37% 
of children with farmer fathers were favourably disposed to agriculture as a career. Less 
than one-fifth of children with non-farmer fathers were similarly disposed.®
Patel has proposed a simple but plausible solution to the above problem. This is that 
farmland be allotted to student groups in such a way that each member would have an 
average plot of one square metre. Students, Patel suggests, should also be allowed a share 
of the crop from such plots as an incentive for individual effort. The Project Manager 
also recommended that the five best school leavers from each of the 18 participating 
schools (as at mid-1984) be offered a credit package to sustain a farm plan of between 
two and five hectares each. Whatever their merits, Patel and Christensen’s
“  Ibid.
“  Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 11.
^  A. Adegboyega Jibowo, ‘Dynamics of Teaching Agricultural Science: A Focus on Secondary 
Grammar Schools in Oyo State of Nigeria’, AJAS, V, 2 (1978), pp. 7-14.
“  Ibid.
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recommendations have either not been attractive enough to project management in the 
poist-1984 period or they have not survived the policy changes initiated in Ondo State in 
19185. At the time of my fieldwork in 1992, a new fisheries programme, rather than crop 
production, was being promoted among secondary schools in Ondo State.
6.4.1 Pamphlets, Radio and Television Programmes
Finally, EAADP and ODSADEP printed pamphlets and made weekly broadcasts on state 
radio and television to put their message across to the population. One immediate 
advantage of these mass media is their potential to reach a wider audience of farmers and 
nom-farmers than was possible by more direct methods. However, this considerable 
potential is often offset by a generalized lack of access by farmers to mass media. Thus 
while the print and electronic media may have helped to spread the gospel of farming to 
miîscellaneous people who might have been less informed or not informed at all about 
modem farming practices, their impact on the target population is far from clear.
Extension pamphlets are good in themselves. As a classic example of the written word, 
pamphlets offer an impersonal mode of contact between project and population. Their 
content or messages can also be referred to time and again without loss of meaning or, 
possibly, relevance.^ The usability of pamphlets among large populations is however 
predicated on the ability of that population to read and write, either in the vernacular or 
in some more general language. This fundamental pre-condition has been unrealisable in 
Onido State, and elsewhere in and outside Nigeria, because of pervasive illiteracy among 
the mral farming population. By 1980-85, according to estimates published by the World 
Bamk, the illiteracy rate averaged 57% each year among Nigerians aged 15 years and 
above; by 1987-92, illiteracy stood at 49% on average for the same group.
These national averages most certainly understate the extent of illiteracy in mral areas. 
Fob* example, Obibuaku’s survey of six villages in present-day Oyo State in 1966
“  For general considerations, see Ram Krishan, Agricultural Demonstration and Extension 
Communication (1965), chp. 15.
IBRD, Social Indicators o f Development 1994 (Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 259.
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indicated a higher illiteracy level. Of 182 farmers surveyed, only 3% could read and 
write in English while 28% were literate in Yoruba.^* 57% of the respondents’ children 
were attending primary schools; 38% had completed primary education, while only 7% 
had completed secondary education.
My own survey of farmers in and around Ayede suggests a higher literacy level. As 
Table 6.3 shows, 62% of respondents (n=161) had a minimum of primary education 
while 38% had no formal education at all. However, about half of respondents with 
education, or 33% of all respondents, had primary education only. Between the villages, 
the proportion of respondents without formal education ranges from a low of 27% at 
Ayede through 50% at Igede and Ilafon to a high of 70% at Imojo. Conversely,
Table 6.3
Distribution of Formal Education among Respondents, 1992
Highest level of 
education
N» of 
responses
% of respondents
Igede Ilafon Imojo Ayede
Primary 53 8.3 24.0 15.0 40.6
Part-secondary 12 8.3 12.0 5.0 6.6
Full secondary 13 - 4.0 - 11.3
Tertiary 14 16.7 4.0 5.0 9.4
Others' 9 16.7 4.0 5.0 4.7
None 62 50.0 52.0 70.0 27.4
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 163 12 25 20 106
Note; * Include agricultural/vocational. 
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
respondents with primary education only account for 8% of those at Igede; 15 % at Imojo; 
24% at Ilafon; and 40% at Ayede. In both respects, respondents in Ayede, the most 
‘urbanised’ of the villages, appear better-off than those in other villages. Rural dwellers 
with higher levels of education thus appear to be concentrated in the more urbanised 
villages, suggesting that education is related to urbanisation even at the local level. The
“  L. O, Obibuaku, ‘An Analysis of Agricultural Extension Potentials in Selected Villages in the 
Western State of Nigeria’, in Crouch and Chamala (eds.). Extension, p. 43.
69Ibid., p. 44.
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indications therefore are that agricultural extension has a considerable potential in Ayede 
area. The same is likely to be true of other parts of rural Ondo State. For greater 
effectiveness however, different extension mechanisms have to be employed to reflect the 
distribution of literacy among the rural population.
For example, illiteracy varies significantly with respondents’ ages in Ayede area. The 
incidence of illiteracy is highest among respondents aged 46 and above, with 43% of 
those in the 46-55 age group and over 80% of those in the 56-65 and 65+ age groups 
having no formal education at all (see Table 6.4). In contrast, the proportion of younger 
respondents without any education range from 0% for those aged up to 25 to between 4% 
and 12% for respondents in the next two age groups. Functional literacy is likely to vary
Table 6.4
Pamphlet Accessibility by Respondents* Age Groups, 1992
(1) Age groups 
(years)
(2) % of valid 
responses
(3) % with 
primary 
education only
(4) % with no 
education
(5) % with 
‘unhindered’ access 
[100-(3-H4)l
Up to 25 6.2 20.0 80.0
26-35 29.8 50.0 4.2 45.8
36-45 15.5 60.0 12.0 28.0
46-55 17.4 28.6 42.9 28.5
56-65 19.9 6.3 84.4 9.3
66 and over 11.2 11.1 88.9 -
N 161 46 60 55
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
even more widely between respondents in upper and lower age-groups. Marsh and 
Coleman have shown in another context that eight years of schooling represents a 
threshold for a more favourable disposition to new farm techniques.I f  Marsh and 
Coleman’s threshold is adopted here, and account is taken of the effect of probable lack 
of practice on the sustainability of their reading and writing skills, respondents aged 46 
and above could hardly be regarded as having ‘unhindered’ access to extension 
pamphlets. If their numbers are added to those without any formal education, it follows
C. Paul March and A. Lee Coleman, ‘The Relation of Farmer Characteristics to the Adoption of 
Recommended Farm Practices’, Rural Sociology, XX, 3-4 (1955), p. 296.
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that up to two-thirds of respondents who need propaganda most have had very little or 
no access to pamphlets.
Analysis of survey responses on extension media supports this view. As Table 6.5 shows, 
only 7% of 252 claims on access to mass media of extension related to pamphlets. Over 
83% of this proportion was in Ayede, where pamphlet responses constituted only 8% of 
all mass media responses. The remaining 17% was in Igede, where it amounted to 16% 
of media responses. In Ilafon and Imojo, extension pamphlets attracted no positive 
response! Given that Ilafon and Imojo*s respondents are representative of their villages, 
and that some of the respondents are educated, the lack of pamphlet responses in both 
villages must reflect uneven distribution of pamphlets between the survey villages. Even 
so, the utility of extension pamphlets among Ondo State’s small-scale farmers is 
questionable.
Table 6.5
Respondent’s Access to Extension Pamphlets, 1992 (by village)
(1) Village (2) N® of total 
responses'
(3) N® of pamphlet 
responses
(4)
3 as % of 2
Igede 18 3 16.0
Imojo 21 - -
Ilafon 26 - -
Ayede 107 15 8.0
Total 252 18 7.1
Note: “ Multiple responses.
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
Access to broadcast media is less constrained by literacy or the lack of it. To this extent, 
broadcast media are more flexible than pamphlets. For example, radio and TV 
programmes can be transmitted in the vernacular, employing as much local imagery as 
is p o ss ib le . In  Western Nigeria, vernacular extension programmes on radio have 
included Ayé àwon àgbè (Farmers’ World) and Àgbè àr'oko b ’ôdûn dé (the farmer goes 
to the farm and returns at the end of the year or on festive occasions). These had been
Krishan, Agricultural^ pp. 221-224; L. Obibuaku and G. Hursh, ‘Effective Methods for Influencing 
Agricultural Modernisation Among Illiterate and Preliterate Communities’, BRES, 11,1 (1977).
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broadcast variously on the Federally-controlled Radio Nigeria or on the regional radio 
and television networks, the Western Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation/Television, as the 
case might be. This tradition has been sustained by the Ondo State Radiovision 
Corporation, as the local radio and TV network was known in 1992. Since its advent in 
1976, it has broadcast such farmer-based programmes asL^âbé abà (lit. ‘under the shelter 
of the traditional farm house’), largely to mobilise farmers’ support for government’s 
agricultural programmes.
Om its part EAADP had acquired mobile audio-visual equipment which ODSADEP duly 
inherited. With this mobile equipment and requisite processing accessories at base, both 
projects have often recorded radio and television programmes on location. Farmers’ 
involvement in relevant broadcast programmes has therefore taken place in their 
(farmers’) normal working circumstances. In the first quarter of 1992, for example, Àgbè 
àr”oko b ’ôdûn dé was being broadcast on the local state radio network in the late morning 
every Wednesday. Obalàgbè (‘the farmer is king’, apparently because of his role in food 
production and in social sustenance) followed on the local TV frequency in early 
evenings. Each programme usually addressed a subject of current import for agricultural 
production and attempted to resolve problems likely to be faced by farmers at the time 
of broadcast.
Ho)wever, access to extension programmes on electronic media by rural-dwelling farmers 
has been no less difficult than access to pamphlets or in relation to urban-based farmers. 
Farmer access to extension broadcasts has been influenced by two specific matters, 
namely, the distribution of receivers amongst farmers and the impact on programme 
scheduling of the urban orientation of broadcast media in Nigeria. The first relates to 
whether farmers own relevant receiving equipment themselves and therefore have direct 
access to such media and to extension programmes broadcast on them. Indirect access to 
extension programmes is also possible if broadcast receivers were owned by non-farming 
families, or if television viewing centres existed in rural villages for community viewing. 
Until recently, ownership of broadcast media in rural Nigeria has been very low. The 
determining factors have included a low income base, equally low purchasing power, as 
well as the lack of facilitating amenities, especially electricity. The situation has improved
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over the years however: the consumer boom of the 1970s had meant that local markets 
were flooded with imported household electronics whose prices had been subsidised or 
depressed by the naira’s over-valued exchange rate.
By the 1980s, therefore, the absence of radio transistors had ceased to be a characteristic 
of rural Ondo State, though TV sets remained few and far between. Apart from being 
more expensive generally, difficulties with power supply make television superfluous in 
rural areas; battery-powered sets are even more difficult to run. Once again, my survey 
fmdings provide broad support for the foregoing views. As Table 6.6 shows, 73% of all 
respondents (n=164) owned at least one broadcast receiver while 27% owned no 
broadcast receiver. About 40% of respondents in the former group owned radio receivers 
or radio-cassette players while an additional 3% of all respondents owned radio and 
television sets. 30% of all respondents owned all three media. As a whole, radio 
transistors seem well distributed between the villages.
Table 6.6
Distribution of Broadcast Receivers among Respondents, 1992
Type of receiver N® of 
responses
% of respondents
Igede Imojo Ilafon Ayede
Radio/radio-cassette player 65 41,7 30,0 56,0 37,4
Radio and TV 5 8,3 - 4,0 2,8“
Radio, cassette player, and TV 50 16,7 5,0 4,0 44,0
None 44 33,3 65,0 36,0 15,9
Total % 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,1"
N 164 12 20 25 107
Note: * Include one respondent with television only, Entries do not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
To own a radio transistor or a television set is not quite the same as being willing and 
able to listen to or watch extension programmes. A second important factor in the use of 
electronic media for extension, therefore, is ‘the extent to which their messages are 
written and programmed for rural aud iences .O f  particular importance is how extant 
programme schedules compare with the way the average farmer spends a normal working
^  A. W, Van Den Ban and H. S. Hawkins, Agricultural Extension (Harlow, 1988), p. 132,
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day; whether the two conflict, and if so, how the average rural farmer is likely to resolve 
the dilemma. In this regard, survey responses suggest that farmers make remarkable use 
of extension broadcasts. For example, 44% of respondents (n=156) claimed to listen to 
radio programmes; 2% claimed to watch television programmes while 37 % said they own 
or have access to these broadcast media and to pamphlets. Just over half of respondents 
in Ilafon claimed to use extension media, compared with 75-89% at Igede, Imojo, and 
Ayede. As a whole, four-fifths of all respondents claimed to make use of mass extension 
media. Broadcast receivers seem therefore to be well distributed in Ayede area, and 
probably in much of rural Ondo State.
Nevertheless, programme scheduling has been far from favourable to farmers, as the mid­
day time slot for Àgbè àr’oko b ’ôdûn dé suggests. Except in off-season, on market days, 
festive or odd occasions, mid-day is an unlikely time of the day to fmd most farmers at 
home listening to radio or engaging in leisure. Mid-day almost always finds farmers in 
their farmsteads, at work or otherwise on break, usually taking shelter from the sun, 
resting their back, or taking their first meals for the day.^^
It is of course possible for farmers to carry portable transistors with them to their 
farmsteads or to keep spare radio transistors in the farm for purposes such as the one 
under consideration. In general, such practice would be but a marginal step in the process 
of making abà, the traditional farm-house, more pleasant for those who live in the farms. 
In fact, very few farmers would go this far. For economic reasons at least, the idea of 
a spare transistor radio would appear ludicrous to most farmers in present-day Ondo 
State. Even if the practice did exist in the past, recent developments in transportation and 
in social conceptions of farming could only have constrained its growth.
For example, road development and increases in vehicular transport have generally 
reduced the duration of journeys to and from agricultural work, thus making it possible 
for farmers to commute daily between village and farm, including oko egàn or distant 
farmsteads. This factor of choice has perhaps combined with changing conceptions of
^  See, e.g., G. J. A. Ojo, ‘Some Observations on Journey to Agricultural Work in Yorubaland, 
Southwestern Nigeria’, EcG, 46, 3 (1970), p, 462; p. 464.
223
farming, especially in the wake of the ‘disappearing peasantry’ since the 1970s, to induce 
a possible decline in the number of farmers who routinely spend their weekdays in 
farmsteads and return to town or village only on weekends or on festive occasions. This 
might have increased access to radio or at least television programmes, but general 
interest in broadcast extension programmes cannot be assumed. As Sunday Adeniyi 
(a.k.a. Sunny Ade), a juju musician lamented in a 1982 album, kà s'âgbè mo Voko; arâ 
oko ti da’ri wâ’lé: farms are now bereft of farmers; the farmers of yore have abandoned 
their farmland and taken up permanent residence in town, ostensibly to partake in non- 
agricultural commercial activities.
It is difficult, therefore, to say precisely if extension programmes broadcast on radio and 
TV ever get to large numbers of rural small-scale farmers. The problems are partly 
socio-economic, ranging from the extent to which broadcast media remain far from being 
generally accessible on account of the sheer absence of receivers to problems with 
support infrastructure, especially the supply of electricity, in rural areas. Key structural 
questions also remain: for example, whether media that are primarily suited to urban 
tastes and interests could be profitably employed to mobilise rural farmers for agricultural 
purposes.
6.5 On-Farm Extension Mechanisms
The single most important element in on-farm extension mechanisms in Ondo State in the 
1980s has been the progressive farmers’ scheme. EAADP and ODSADEP have between 
them implemented two watered-down variants of the scheme. The first is the contact 
farmers’ scheme, embarked upon for local demonstration of the use of modem inputs. 
The second is the outgrowers’ scheme, EAADP’s answer to contract farming in seed 
multiplication. Both schemes are examined below.
6.5.1 The Contact Farmers’ Scheme
Contact or ‘progressive’ farmers’ are individuals who are generally ‘regarded by other
Ban and Hawkins, Agricultural Extension, pp. 129-132; K. N. Singh, ‘The Need for a 
Communication Strategy for Rural Development’, in Crouch and Chamala, Extension, pp. 22-24.
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farmers as able and worthy of imitation’ and on that account serve as focal points of 
extension activities in a locality/^ In theory therefore, contact farmers are no more than 
intermediaries between farmers’ groups and extension workers and ‘should not only be 
the community’s most progressive farmers, since neighbors usually regard these farmers 
as exceptional and tend not to attempt to imitate what they do.’^  ^ Indeed, they should 
be selected on the basis of criteria like social standing, representativeness, and 
commitment to farming. For example,
(a) they should proportionately represent the range of farm size...cropping patterns, and 
farming situations...found in the group...
(b) they should be practising, skilled farmers. Absentee landlords and people with a major 
occupation in addition to farming (like teachers, shopkeepers, businessmen, and 
politicians) should not be selected as contact farmers...
(c) they must be willing to consider the practices recommended and taught by the VEW 
[village extension worker], to adopt some of them on at least part of their land, and to 
let other farmers observe the practices. They should also be willing and able to explain 
to farmers what they did under the recommended practice.
(d) ...as far as size and composition of farmers’ groups permit, [they] should come from 
different families...
(e) their farms should be dispersed throughout the group area,^
In practice, the contact farmers’ scheme is feasible only as far as the practices they 
spearhead are desired by ordinary farmers. As Marsh and Coleman’s survey of American 
farmers showed, imitation of leaders follows prior dispositions to new ideas in particular 
communities.^* If ‘the residents of a neighborhood place a high value on 
innovations.. .they will go to innovators for information; but. ..if the residents are resistant 
to innovations, the "leaders" whose advice is sought are unlikely to be innovators . I t
Benor and Baxter, Training, p. 45.
Benor, Harrison and Baxter, Agricultural, p. 27,
^  Benor and Baxter, Training, p. 47.
C. Paul Marsh and A, Lee Coleman, ‘Farmers’ Practice-Adoption Rates in Relation to Adoption rates 
of "Leaders"’, Rural Sociology, XIX, 2 (1954), pp. 180-181.
Ibid.
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is likely, therefore, that the ‘spread effect’ of contact farmers will be more horizontal 
than vertical; the intensity of contact farmers’ influence on ordinary farmers is also likely 
to vary between different farm practices and between communities.
The notion of contact farmers as interlocutors valables has existed in Nigeria under 
various guises since the 1880s. In 1887, Sir Alfred Maloney, a colonial superintendent, 
had founded a botanical garden in Lagos to promote the growing of economic plants by 
native farmers, but the colonial authorities sought to define a hierarchy of possible 
beneficiaries. Sir Maloney was expected, therefore, to dedicate the botanical garden
to the growth and culture of all kinds of useful trees, plants and herbs as well as to run 
a model kitchen garden...fo consider the apprenticeship o f refugee [ex-slave] boys; the 
industrial education o f sons o f chiefs; sale of plants, or their gratuitous distribution under 
the authority, in writing, of the Governor, whenever of advantage to the public 
interest.*”
In the 1920s, Faulkner and Mackie had argued against the indiscriminate provision of 
extension advice and services to all farmers. They preferred a system which gave more 
intensive support to farmers with outstanding enthusiasm for new practices or with 
remarkable entrepreneurial spirit. According to Faulkner and Mackie, access to official 
advice must be restricted to
individuals who are remarkably ready to give a trial to a new method if they are 
approached in the right way- or indeed if they are not approached at all...[Since] others 
of the same tribe will follow one who succeeds, the [extension] worker can concentrate 
on helping effectively the few specially enterprising men whom he finds or, still better, 
who fmd him...**
The 1950s saw a policy shift in favour of large-scale f a r m s .A s  indicated in chapter 
2, the period 1952-62 has been called the ‘plantations decade’ because over four-fifths
*” R. E. Deimett, ‘Agricultural Progress in Nigeria’, JAS, XVIII, LXXII (1919), pp. 266-267. 
Emphasis added.
** Agriculture, p. 79; p. 83; p. 84. Emphasis added.
*^ See e.g., Nigeria, Agricultural Policy for the Western Region (Ibadan, 1952), p. 6; p. 12.
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of 44 plantations in southern Nigeria in the 1960s were established during the decade. 
By the 1960s, progressive farming had become synonymous with large farms and capital 
intensive agriculture, while ‘non-progressive farming’ was associated with the traditional 
slash-and-bum practices of most Nigerian farmers.
The progressive farmers’ scheme has been more pronounced since the advent of ADPs 
in the 1970s. The general practice also has been to select as contact farmers individuals 
who are outstanding socially or in business. While this may reflect official preference for 
individuals who are willing to assume the agro-economic risks associated with new 
practices, it also suggests that key selection criteria are not always widely distributed 
among Nigeria’s rural farmers. Some criteria, like access to project officials or to bank 
credit, are also cumulative, such that an initial advantage creates further advantages and 
invariably strengthens existing inequalities. In Nigeria, therefore, contact farmers are 
probably too unrepresentative of the farming population to expect ordinary farmers to 
imitate their techniques. In Tina Wallace’s words, contact farmers are often
a minority of...farmers with sufficient land to invest in a plough or tractor, or who can 
buy extra labour. The bulk of farmers are inevitably ignored because their landholdings 
are too small and they are too poor to buy the new inputs and undertake the risks 
involved to convert themselves into viable business farmers.^
The progressive farmers’ scheme has thus helped to create a vicious circle: poor farmers 
cannot obtain substantial extension advice and assistance without first becoming 
progressive; yet, the primary constraint to attaining the ‘progressive’ status has been their 
lack of economic well-being! The situation has not been helped by the apparent 
preference on the part of extension staff to recruit progressive farmers laterally rather 
than by vertical expansion of their ranks with non-progressive f a r m e rs .T h e  
proposition to be tested here, therefore, is that the progressive farmers scheme has been
“ R. K. Udo, ‘Sixty Years of Plantation Agriculture in Southern Nigeria: 1902-1962’, EcG, 41, 4 
(1965), p. 364.
^ Wallace, ‘The Challenge of Food: Nigeria’s Approach to Agriculture 1975-80’, CJAS, 15, 2 (1981), 
p. 248.
^ B. Beckman, ‘Bakolori: Peasantry versus State and Capital’, NJPS, 4, 1/2 (1985).
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a class project; an economically wasteful concentration of publicly-fiinded benefits on 
priivileged elements who, because their primary interests lay outside agricultural 
production, could neither provide economic value for the public expense on them nor 
sufficient leadership for small scale farmers.^
In EAADP as well as ODSADEP, contact farmers provided demonstration plots, small 
tracts of cultivated land of about 0.1 acre each on farmland owned and cultivated by 
contact farmers themselves but planted with improved seeds and given improved 
treatment, including fertilizer, by extension agents. Demonstration plots therefore stand 
in contrast to the rest of the farm and to adjacent farms, enabling members of the 
demonstration group and non-members alike to distinguish between traditional and 
mcDdem cultural practices. At harvest, the yield from demonstration plots and other parts 
of the farm are compared to make two related points. The first is experimental: to 
identify limiting factor(s) in traditional agriculture, and to confirm the view that farmers 
cam improve the yield potential of their land with technical change or factor 
substitution.®^ The second point is structural, namely, that with technological change, 
commercial agriculture is possible and profitable even among small scale farmers. In 
order to make for intensive farmer contact, each demonstration plot was expected to cater 
directly for small groups of 10-15 farmers. These chosen few were in turn expected to 
sell the new ideas picked up during group meetings to their friends and relations.
There are two sets of official figures on EAADP and ODSADEP’s contact farmers 
scheme. The first, presented in Table 6.7, shows the number of EAADP’s contact 
farmers from 1982-86 and was published alongside other data in project completion 
reports. The second set of figures in Table 6.8 extends the first by providing operational 
information on EAADP and ODSADEP up to 1991 and was circulated in 1992. 
However, the sets differ so widely that they cannot support a credible comparison of 
project operations for the years on which they overlap. The figures indicate, nonetheless.
“  Wallace, ‘Challenge’, p. 249; Mabogunje, ‘Funtua’, p. 202. Cf. Christopher Leo, ‘The Failure of 
the "Progressive Farmer" in Kenya’s Million-Acre Settlement Scheme’, JMAS, 16, 4 (1978).
^  Christensen, Final Report, p. 36.
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that neither EAADP nor ODSADEP has been able to sustain the interest of farmers 
selected for the scheme.
Table 6.7 suggests, for example, that the initial response to the scheme, measured by the 
high number of contact farmers, was short-lived. In 1982, EAADP’s contact farmers 
numbered over 2,000 but declined by 69% to just over 600 one year later (column 3), 
most probably because popular expectations about project benefits had been high and 
largely unfulfilled. In 1984, the ranks of contact farmers increased by 8% over 1983 
figures, but this was temporary. By 1985, the number of EAADP’s contact farmers had 
slipped by 30% to 480; and by a further 33% to just over 300 in 1986. If it is assumed 
that contact farmers had one demonstration plot each, and the estimated number of 
farming families in the project area is held constant, two approximate measures of access 
to demonstration plots by Ekiti-Akoko farming families can be computed.
Table 6.7
EAADP’s Contact Farmers, 1982-86
(1)
Year
(2)
N® of contact 
farmers
(3)
% change
(4)
Spread ratio"
(5) 
Index 
(1:15 = 100)
1982 2,030 37 247
1983 636 -68.7 119 793
1984 686 7.9 110 733
1985 480 -30.0 158 1,053
1986 324 -32.5 233 1,553
Note; “ Average estimated number of farming families served by a contact farmer. APMEPU’s 
estimate of 75,548 farming families for project area used to compute ratio.
Sources: Col. 2- Patel, ‘Agriculture and Technical Services’, p. 9. Cols. 3, 4 and 5 computed.
The first, which I call the spread ratio, indicates the average number of farming families 
served by each contact farmer/demonstration plot. It is obtained simply by dividing the 
total estimated number of farming families by the number of contact farmers in each year 
(column 4 of Table 6.7). The second measure in column 5 of Table 6.7 is an index of 
access to demonstration plots and compares the spread ratio for each year with the 
expected target of 10-15 farmers per demonstration plot, thereby indicating EAADP’s 
performance on its implied targets on demonstration. This index was obtained by dividing 
each year’s spread ratio by the upper limit of 15 farmers to a demonstration group.
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On both scores, the contact farmers’ scheme has measured rather poorly. For example, 
EAADP attained the best estimated spread ratio in 1982, the first year of the scheme, 
though this was still more than double the project target of one contact group to 15 
farmers. After 1983, the spread ratio and the index of access increased dramatically, 
from 119 and 793 respectively in that year to peaks of 233 and 1,553 in 1986.
Table 6.8 suggests a slightly more optimistic picture of CPS under both projects. Unlike 
in Table 6.7 where the number of contact farmers fell to as low as 320 in 1986, the least 
row entry for 1986 in Table 6.8 is about 3,100, yet it related to EAADP rather than 
ODSADEP. The number of contact farmers also rose to over 5,000 after 1989, 
presumably on account of the expansion of EAADP’s operations to other parts of the 
state.
Table 6.8
Contact Farmers in EAADP and ODSADEP, 1985-91
(1)
Year
(2)
N“ of contact 
farmers
(3)
% change
(4)
Spread ratio
(5) 
Index 
(1:15 = 100)
1985 4,824 16 106
1986 3,268 -32.3 23 153
1987 3,081 -5.7 25 167
1988 3,797 23.2 20 133
1989 5,700 50.1 72 480
1990 5,600 -1.8 74 493
1991* 13,200 135.7 31 207
Note: “ January-June only.
Sources; Col. 2- ODSADEP, ‘Ondo State Implementation Strategy’, Table 3, p. 6; Cols. 3, 4 and 5 
computed. Entries in col. 4 computed with project area’s estimated 75,548 farming families 
(1985-88) and 411,840 thereafter. Latter figure is from Idachaba, Rural Infrastructures, p. 702.
Higher figures in Table 6.8 however mean very little in relative terms. For example, the 
1989 figure of 5,700 contact farmers amounts to less than a 20% increase over 
corresponding figure for 1985. If pre-project population estimates for Ondo State are held 
constant, the change-over from EAADP to ODSADEP would suggest a 445% increase 
in the number of farming families to 412,000. This means that an average farming family 
had only one in twenty-five chances of being part of a demonstration or contact group, 
or perhaps, that 60-70% of farming families may not have been part of a contact group.
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Taking this into account, what columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.8 suggest is that average 
access to demonstration plots has been declining almost steadily since 1985. With the 
advent of ODSADEP in 1989, access to demonstration plots and/or groups most probably 
worsened by up to 300%. The difference between data in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 is less 
about whether access to demonstration plots or contact groups did decline than about the 
rate of their deterioration.
There are no disaggregated data on the location of contact farmers or on demonstration 
plots. It is not possible, therefore, to assess the distribution of contact farmers by local 
government areas and to match my measures of access with the actual distribution of 
farming families between contact farmers and/or demonstration plots. My survey data 
suggest, however, that contact farmers as well as demonstration plots are few and far 
between in rural areas. As Table 6.9 shows, only six or 4.1% of respondents (n=145) 
claimed to be contact farmers. An additional 2% of respondents claimed to belong to one
Table 6.9
Extension Contact with Respondents, 1992 (by village)
Form of contact N= of 
responses
Distribution of responses (%)
Igede Imojo Ilafon Ayede
Contact farmer 6 5.8
Extension group 2 - - - 1.9
Similar (i.e. unofficial) group 1 - 6.7 - -
Household never contacted 2 50.0 6.7 - -
Extension not required 15 50.0 26.7 29.2 2.9
No contact 117 - 60.0 62.5 89.4
Other 2 - - 8.3 -
Total % 100.0 100. P 100.0 100.0
N 145 2 15 24 104
Note: * Entries do not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
form or another of extension/demonstration groups. A tiny 1.2% stated that their 
households were not contacted, while 10.3% said they did not require extension, 
apparently because they were satisfied with their socio-technical conditions, or because 
there were no incentives to change those circumstances.
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This leaves four-fifths of respondents claiming no direct contact whatsoever with project 
extension. As usual, the incidence of these attributes differ between villages. All contact 
farmer-respondents came from Ayede, where a massive 89% of respondents also claimed 
not to have had any direct contact with extension. About one-third of respondents from 
Imojo and Ilafon claimed they did not require extension, while two-fifths had no direct 
contact in either village. It seems, therefore, that contact farmers were likely to be 
selected from among those in the more urbanised villages, where economic opportunities 
are more extensive and more diverse than in the more rural villages, and there are more 
progressive farmers in the first place.
Table 6.10 suggests much the same inferences with regard to respondents’ visits or lack 
of visits to demonstration plots. Igede has been excluded here because it is itself a huge 
demonstration plot and also because the single valid response from Igede was 
insignificant statistically. Of the remaining 142 respondents, 8% claimed to attend 
demonstration meetings regularly, while about 5% claimed to attend irregularly. About 
12% claimed not to have been informed about such meetings, while a remarkable 76% 
claimed there were no demonstration plots at all, suggesting they were not aware of the 
existence of such plots.
Table 6.10
Respondents’ Visits to Demonstration Plots, 1992 (by village)
Frequency of visit N= of 
responses
Distribution of responses (%)
Imojo Ilafon Ayede
Regular 11 7.7 8.3 7.7
Irregular 5 - 12.9 1.9
Not informed 17 23.1 33.3 5.8
None available 107 69.2 41.7 84.6
Other 1 - 4.2 -
Total % 100.0 100.4» 100.0
N 141 13 24 104
Note: “ Entries do not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Author’s field survey, 1992.
Respondents who claimed to have attended demonstration meetings regularly averaged 
8% and were evenly distributed between Imojo, Ilafon and Ayede. A remarkable 13%
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of respondents from Ilafon claimed irregular attendance at demonstration meetings while 
another 33 % claimed not to have had information. Corresponding figures for Ayede are 
about 2% and 6% respectively; No respondent from Imojo claimed irregular attendance, 
while 23% claimed ignorance. Finally, the proportion of respondents who believed that 
demonstration plots did not exist in their villages ranged from 42% for Ilafon through 
69% and 85% for Imojo and Ayede respectively.
In sum, two points are suggested by the foregoing. The first is that contact farmers are 
likely to have been concentrated in urban centres with wider economic opportunities, 
more so since commercial success has been an explicit or implied condition for individual 
eligibility. Secondly, the assumption that small-scale farmers would follow in the 
footsteps of contact farmers cannot be realised where contact farmers, demonstration 
plots, or both did not exist in good numbers or not at all. As Christensen remarked, 
‘technology does not diffuse very much from one category of farmers to another 
[but]...does occur among farmers belonging to the same category.’**
6.5.2 Outgrowers’ Scheme
This sub-section describes EAADP’s experiment with the outgrowers’ scheme, under 
which selected farmers grew seeds independently (or ‘out’) of project farms to 
supplement project output.*^ Outgrowing therefore refers to arrangements by which 
selected farmers or outgrowers are contracted to produce seeds with substantial 
assistance, such as credit and technical assistance, from a project or end-user of farm 
produce.
In return for such assistance, outgrowers undertake to deliver part or all of their annual 
harvest of seeds to the project at discounted prices determined by the project or at 
prevailing market prices less the value of assistance received by each outgrower. Like 
contract farming,^ outgrowing constitutes a quid pro quo of sorts. The outgrowers
«« Ibid., p. 41.
Cf. Mohammed Halfani and Jonathan Barker, ‘Agribusiness and Agrarian Change’, in J. Barker 
(ed.). The Politics o f Agriculture in Tropical Africa (Beverly Hills, 1984), p. 49.
^  Contract farming is as yet unknown in Ondo State. For an example in neighbouring Oyo State, see
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involved have preferred access to inputs, including seeds and fertilizer; cash to procure 
labour with; technical advice; and in some cases, guaranteed minimum prices for their 
crops. As such, farmers could almost always remain in production so long as demand 
exists for the seeds that they produce and regardless of annual harvest-related changes in 
their socio-economic circumstances. The project is in turn assured of ready supply of the 
crop(s) for its own use and is often in a position to influence the prices of the crop(s) on 
the local market.
EAADP’s outgrowers’ scheme had at least three specific objectives. The first was to 
increase the local supply of HYV seeds from parent stock obtained from three main 
sources, namely Nigeria’s national seed service, Ondo State’s seed multiplication service, 
and EAADP’s own seed processing plant. The latter had a processing capacity of 1,500 
tonnes of seed per season if it ran a single shift five-day week and was acquired at a cost 
of Danish Kroner 2.52 million.
The second objective was to create cost-effective seed multiplication centres and thereby 
improve local farmers’ access to HYV seeds. The potential for cheaper seeds derives 
partly from outgrowers’ capacity to operate more informally and with lower overhead 
costs than do government seed multiplication centres or project farms. Outgrowers could 
also multiply improved seeds under conditions closer to those faced by ordinary farmers, 
thereby facilitating local seed domestication. Since cheaper HYV seeds make adoption 
easier by a small but possibly significant step, improved seed varieties could become 
available to increasing numbers of farmers through outgrowers, and could ultimately 
substitute older seed varieties. Finally, the scheme sought to take seed multiplication 
beyond state or quasi-state farms and encourage end-users of improved seeds to 
participate in the seed multiplication process. To this extent, outgrowing signalled the 
partial privatisation of seed multiplication in Nigeria.
The project experimented with outgrowing in 1984 to supplement its own direct seed 
multiplication efforts. That experiment involved 39 outgrowers, most of them probably
D. A. Oyeleye, ‘Tobacco Cultivation in Oyo Division, Western Nigeria’, NGJ, 14, 2 (1971), pp. 165-184.
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contact farmers or businessmen-farmers who would be normally eligible for contact 
farmer status. From a list of ten outgrowers obtained by me, one was identified as a well- 
known photographer; another was a traditional ruler, while a third was a registered firm 
with interests in agribusiness. In effect, therefore, the scheme effectively concentrated a 
large proportion of project credit on a very small number of clients. I shall return to this 
point shortly.
Outgrowers multiplied seeds for five main food crops, namely maize, rice, cassava, 
cowpea, and soyabean. The available data do not indicate whether output per hectare 
differed between EAADP and outgrowers. What is certain is that outgrowers achieved 
90-100% of their planting targets for maize, rice, and cowpea (see Table 6.11). At 8% 
and 23% of planting targets respectively, outgrowers’ output was less remarkable with 
respect to soyabeans and cassava. Still, outgrowers’ 23% completion rate for cassava was
Table 6.11
Seed Multiplication by EAADP Outgrowers, 1984
(1) Crop (2) Farm size (ha) (3) Output
(2a)
Target
(2b)
Actual
(2c)
b as % of a
(3a) 
Total yield 
(toime)*
(3b)
Land
productivity
(tonne/ha)
Maize 133.5 126.0 94.7 109.0 0.865
Rice 55.0 50.0 90.9 22.2 0.444
Cassava 15.0 3.5 23.3 700.0 -
Cowpea 10.0 10.0 100.0 1.05 0.105
Soyabean 60.0 5.0 8.3 7.48 0.374
Total 273.5 194.5 71.1 - -
Notes: * Cassava output is measured in bundles of stems, each of which could provide 150-200 seed-cuttings. 
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 59.
higher than EAADP’s 15%. In turn, the project returned a 660% completion rate on 
soyabeans. Soyabean is however newly introduced into the project area; hence, in relation 
to say, cassava, soyabeans had little exchange or even use value to local farming families. 
Outgrowers’ performance in meeting production targets for both crops may well reflect 
the local demand and supply situations for each. On the whole, outgrowers completion 
rate amounted to 71%, compared to EAADP’s remarkable 420%.
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The foregoing picture could be misleading, however. In real terms, outgrowers’ 
production targets were low in relation to resources at their disposal. As Table 6.12 
shows, target farm size per outgrower ranged from 0.26 ha. for cowpea to 3.4 ha. for 
maize, while their actual average cultivated land ranged from 0.13 ha. to 3.2 ha. for 
soyabean and maize respectively. If it is assumed that the average outgrower grew seeds 
for all five crops and maintained separate plots for each, the target farm size per 
outgrower would have been 7.0 ha., while actual farms would have averaged 5.1 ha. 
Actual output per outgrower averaged 100-600 kg. for cowpea, soyabean, and maize, 
about 3 tonnes for rice, and 18 bundles for cassava. This outcome is not too remarkable 
and would most probably have been achieved by ordinary farmers if project support for 
outgrowers was extended to them. Land productivity was equally unimpressive: 
outgrowers’ 10% aggregate increase in maize yield per hectare over pre-project estimates 
was offset by a 44% decline in corresponding figures for rice.
Table 6.12
Farm Size and Output per EAADP Outgrower, 1984
(1) Crop (2) Farm size (ha.) (3) Output (tonne)*
(2a)
Target
(2b)
Actual
Maize 3.4 3.2 2.8
Rice 1.4 1.4 0.6
Cassava 0.4 0.1 18.0
Cowpea 0.3 0.3 0.1
Soyabean 1.5 0.1 0.2
Total 7.0 5.1 -
Notes: “ Cassava output is measured in bundles of stems, from which 150-200 seed-cuttings 
could be obtained.
Source: Computed from Table 6.11.
A clearer picture of the opportunity costs to the project of outgrowing could be obtained 
by comparing EAADP’s credit disbursements to outgrowers with that available to other 
farmers who received project credit. Table 6.13 presents comparative information on 
project credit to outgrowers and non-outgrowers alike and suggests clearly that 
outgrowers were favoured over and above ordinary farmers. For example, outgrowers 
accounted for about 42% of project credit (total N243,800) disbursed to all farmers in 
1984. An average farmer’s N377 in project credit was only 14.4% or less than one-fifth
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of the N2,610 available to an outgrower. Outgrower's relative advantage increased even 
further with the disaggregation by type of credit. An average crop farmer’s N177 in 
project credit thus amounted to 7% of that available to an average outgrower. Even a 
poultry farmer, who was still better placed than arable crop grower, obtained about 73% 
of the sum available to an average outgrower. Put differently, credit granted to the 
outgrower was 1380% over and above that of the arable crop farmer and 37% higher 
than that of the poultry farmer. As a whole, the average outgrower was about 600 times 
better-off than an average farmer who obtained project credit in 1984. In effect, 42% of 
total credit disbursed by the project in 1984 was cornered by 6% of beneficiaries, or by 
0.05% of families that were technically eligible for credit.
Table 6.13
Project Credit to Outgrowers, 1984 (current Naira)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Description All Categories Outgrowers 3 as % of 2
Value of credit 243,833.25 101,783.00 41.7
N® of beneficiaries 648 39 6.0
Average value of each loan 376.29 2,609.82 693.6
Average crop credit 176.60 2,609.82 1,477.8
Average poultry credit 1,901.75 2,609.82 137.2
Computed from: EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP, 1982-May 1986’, Appendix II.
Finally, the outgrowers refused to deliver their harvest to EAADP as originally agreed. 
The official reason for this development, that EAADP offered prices that were well 
below on-going rates in the open market, could itself be attributed to a number of factors. 
First, grain production by outgrowers turned out to be more expensive than projected. 
According to Christensen’s estimates, rice and maize produced by outgrowers was about 
80% more expensive to grow than grains produced by manual or mechanical means while 
production costs for cowpea and soyabean were lower or the same.^  ^ Seed prices could 
have been higher still if outgrowers had delivered their harvest to EAADP and it had 
added a margin to cover additional costs on transportation, storage and perhaps handling. 
It is not possible to say whether EAADP was opposed to this.
Christensen, Final Report^ p. 51.
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Two points are clear, however. First, in theory, seeds were obtainable from official 
sources, namely the national seed service and Ondo State’s seed multiplication project. 
Given the implicit subsidies on public sector goods at the time, EAADP could not 
possibly offer competitive prices for outgrowers’ seeds. Officials would most certainly 
have rejected the payment to outgrowers of a premium above prevailing market prices 
(Christensen subsequently estimated this at 50%) to get them to deliver their harvest to 
the project. Second, local demand for improved seeds seemed high enough that 
outgrowers successfully sold their seed output directly to farmers. In doing so, the 
outgrowers reneged on their pledge to deliver their harvest to EAADP, capturing the 
economic rent on their subsidized inputs and heightening the concentration of project 
benefits in the hands of a few privileged farmers. But the private sale also enabled them 
to achieve one of the scheme’s specific goals, namely, to liberalise seed multiplication 
and distribution.
In sum, the outgrowers scheme pointed up the potential for a private market in improved 
seeds and has certainly facilitated the diffusion of HYV seeds among Ekiti-Akoko 
farmers. But it turned out to be a relatively expensive mode of seed multiplication. 
Moreover, the refusal by outgrowers to hand in their harvest severely embarrassed the 
project management. The scheme was abandoned after 1984.
6.6 Conclusion
Agricultural extension has been conceived in this chapter both as method and as process. 
As a method, extension defines approaches adopted to realise specific agricultural 
objectives. As a process, extension points to conflict of values often occasioned by the 
promotion of modem production techniques in essentially traditional society. Nigeria has 
experienced both forms since the late nineteenth century, though officials have been 
consistent in seeking to promote commercial production among small scale farmers.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP and ODSADEP have pursued similar objectives and therefore offered 
very little new experience. Since irrigation dams and farm settlements, the ‘big ideas’ in 
EAADP’s programme, never really took off, both projects have had to activate well- 
known extension mechanisms against the background of the successes and failures of
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previous programmes as well as changes in the wider socio-economic environment. The 
programmes have been constrained, therefore, by difficulties associated with government 
programmes generally and by ambivalence founded on farmers’ experience of failed 
expectations from previous programmes.
Poor farmer response does not however suggest that Ondo State’s farmers are not 
interested in modem production techniques. On the contrary, the evidence presented 
above suggested clearly that mral attitudes to modem extension techniques are changing 
slowly but surely. Chapter 5 has also suggested the increasing market orientation of 
production even at the small-scale level. However, three long-standing questions need to 
be addressed. The first is the suitability of urban-inclined messages and media, while the 
second concerns the arrogance of extension officials who have seen and still see 
themselves as enlightened leaders of ‘backward people’. This attitude laid beneath the 
relatively hostile reaction by local officials to DARUDEC’s decision to employ as village 
agents people with little formal education but hands-on farming experience, more so since 
no evidence has been provided to justify the link between that experiment and EAADP’s 
lack-lustre performance.
The third question is the unrealistic assumption that peasant farmers would be inclined 
to adopt new techniques once businessmen-farmers or even leading peasants have done 
the same. As the analysis showed, EAADP’s progressive farmers’ scheme has indicated 
enormous potential for a private market in seed production and distribution. In general, 
however, the scheme has been little more than a mode of distributing state subsidies 
directly or indirectly to well-off segments of the population. As many scholars have 
argued, agricultural production would benefit more if the funds channelled to middle- 
ranking businessmen-farmers were to be directed to small-scale farmers; the latter would 
most certainly make do with smaller sums each (either in cash or kind) and are less likely 
to divert the funds to non-productive ends.
Ekiti-Akoko did experiment with the training and visit system, an organisational 
framework based on Indian experience and supported by the World Bank. The experiment 
was far from successful, however, for at least two reasons. First, training and visit
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seemed to have been adopted as part of the project package, with minimum considerations 
of contextual circumstances that could make or mar the model. A review of Somalia’s 
experience has suggested that T&VS is externally oriented, and to that extent, difficult 
to replicate or sustain in resource-poor countries.^ While Nigeria might seem better-off 
relatively, the 1980s have shown the limits of public funding even for basic government 
services. Above all, T&VS seemed to have been incorporated into Ekiti-Akoko’s 
programme as part of the project package rather than because of prior evidence of its 
successes in similar circumstances, and most certainly without addressing the question 
of why previous organisational approaches had failed to deliver expected results. In any 
case, the project’s romance with T&V did not improve the average farming family’s 
chance of being seen by extension officers. On the contrary, that potential declined rather 
sharply after the commencement of project operations.
^ John Mullen, ‘Training and Visit System in Somalia: Contradictions and Anomalies’, JID, 1, 1 
(1989), pp. 145-167.
240
Chapter 7 
Crop and Livestock Production
7.1 Introduction
This chapter appraises EAADP’s version of the seed-fertilizer (or green) revolution. 
Three distinct phases could be discerned in the green revolution (or GR) debate on Asia 
and Latin American countries. Initially, GR was remarked in the literature for factor 
combinations which had increased (or could increase) crop output and land productivity 
with constant, or nearly constant, returns to scale. ^  According to Ahmad,
[t]he Green Revolution...implies the judicious use of HYV and fertilisers in combination 
with water, labour and other inputs, together with improved techniques of production and 
farm management, culminating in considerably higher levels of production. So long as 
these ingredients are available to farmers, it is o f little importance for the desired result 
whether these farmers operate large or small-sized holdings [italics added]
Research conducted in the 1970s showed, however, that actual results differed from the 
foregoing, and that GR ultimately favoured larger farmers who could afford the capital 
costs of equipment, especially tractors and pumps.^ The revised view, therefore, was that 
GR was inherently skewed against small, cash-poor farmers and to this extent deepened 
existing social inequalities. By the 1980s, a third strand of debate had emerged, namely, 
that the inequalities indicated by earlier GR research had been transitional rather than 
permanent. In the long term, so the argument went, GR-induced inequality would 
disappear.'^ Indeed, as a geneticist’s dream come true, GR could riot itself encourage
* Vernon W. Ruttan and Hans P. Binswanger, ‘Induced Innovation and the Green Revolution’, in Hans 
P. Binswanger, V. W. Ruttan with others. Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions, and Development 
(Baltimore and London, 1978), pp. 358-408; Michel Cépède, ‘The Green Revolution and Employment’, 
ILR, 105, 1 (1972), pp. 1-8.
 ^Zubeida Ahmad, ‘The Social and Economic Implications of the Green Revolution in Asia’, HR, 105, 
1 (1972), p. 10.
 ^ Keith Griffm, The Political Economy o f Agrarian Development (1979); T. J. Byres, ‘The Green 
Revolution’s Second Phase’, JPS, 7, 2 (1980), pp. 245-250.
 ^ For a detailed review, see Edmund K. Oasa, ‘The Political Economy of International Agricultural 
Research: A Review of the CGIAR’s Response to Criticisms of the "Green Revolution"’, in Bernhard 
Glaeser (ed.). The Green Revolution Revisited (1987), pp. 13-55.
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rural social differentiation. But genetic engineering is one small bit in a complex real-life 
picture. Increases in output and productivity from GR have been remarkable, but they 
make better sense in the context of wider socio-structural variables, such as employment, 
incomes, access to nutritious food, and eco-balance. On these and the political-structural 
consequences of technology-induced change, GR’s record has been less unambiguous or, 
in some cases, nearly euphoric.^
The green revolution has expanded slowly or been delayed in Sub-Saharan Africa - in 
spite of its outstanding successes in Asia and Latin America and Africa’s agricultural 
crisis since the 1970s.^ One general reason is that the typical African country’s factor 
endowments, especially man-land ratios, do not encourage the rapid spread of GR-type 
farming. Progress has been faster, however, in countries with settler populations (e.g. 
Kenya and Zimbabwe),^ or where private property in land and intensification have 
proceeded further (e.g. Malawi),* than in say, Nigeria, where rain-fed agriculture and 
customary tenure patterns still predominate. Even within Nigeria, attitudes to 
intensification have differed significantly between closely-settled areas in the north and 
south-east on the one hand, and the southwest on the other. The reasons vary and have 
moved back and forth between population density and land productivity to rules 
governing access to land.^
Since the 1920s, extension workers in Nigeria have emphasised the need to supplement
 ^ See, e.g., John M. Cohen, ‘Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-scale 
Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia’, JDA, 9, 3 (1975), pp. 335-358; Michael Lipton with 
Richard Longhurst, New Seeds Poor People (1989); Pierre Spitz, ‘The Green Revolution Re-examined in 
India’, pp. 56-75; and Ignacy Sachs, ‘Towards a Second Green Revolution?’, in Glaeser, Green Revolution, 
pp. 193-198; and Vandana Shiva, The Violence o f the Green Revolution (1991).
® Peter Lawrence, ‘The Political Economy of the "Green Revolution" in Africa’, ROAPE, 42 (1988), 
pp. 59-75.
 ^Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market (Cambridge, 1989); Carl Eicher, ‘Zimbabwe’s Maize- 
Based Green Revolution: Preconditions for Replication’, WD, 23, 5 (1995), pp. 805-818.
* Melinda Smale, ‘"Maize is Life": Malawi’s Delayed Green Revolution’, WD, 23, 5 (1995), pp. 819- 
831.
® See relevant contributions in B. L. Turner II, Goran Hyden, and Robert W. Kates (eds.). Population 
Growth and Agricultural Change in Africa (Gainesville, 1993).
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soil nutrients with green manure and animal droppings to increase output and 
productiv ityB ut the impetus for a full-blown campaign came with independence. The 
F AO had argued in the 1960s, for instance, that chemical fertilizer offered self-evident 
advantages to Nigeria’s small farmers. According to the F AO,
.. .response from fertilizer is usually strikingly visual- the difference in growth, colour of 
the plant, and size of the crop or fruit are evident to the eye of even the untrained 
observer. Secondly, fertilizer is...tangible. The farmer can see it, handle it, and know 
when he has applied it. Another advantage is that the farmer gets relatively quick returns 
from the use of fertilizer, especially on annual crops. He can put the fertilizer on his 
crops and in a few months he can harvest and measure the increased production. Yet the 
capital required is much less than for many other improvements that may be desirable, 
e.g. the provision of animal or mechanical power or irrigation water."
The green revolution made its debut in Nigeria’s public imagination in the early 1980s, 
when the Federal Government embarked on an ambitious programme to attain food self- 
sufficiency with GR-type technology.Government’s underlying assumptions were 
shared by Jen Christensen, EAADP’s first project manager, who regarded the supply and 
application of high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds and fertilizer as the limiting factors in 
small scale food production in the Ekiti-Akoko area.^  ^ It is essential therefore to 
consider the place of HYV seeds and complementary inputs in EAADP’s agricultural 
operations.
Two analytical questions are addressed in this chapter. The first is to determine small 
farmer responses to HYV seeds, fertilizer, and chemicals in the project area. A related 
task is to examine farmer responses to the project’s poultry development programme. The
O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), p. 50f; pp. 64-71.
" PAO, Agricultural Development in Nigeria 1965-80 (Rome, 1966), p. 193.
"  Jonathan Derrick, ‘The Green Peril’, West Africa, 21 April 1986, pp. 829-831; P. L. Arya, ‘The 
Green Hope’, ibid., 23 June 1986, pp. 1315-1316; Olajire Bamisaye, ‘The Crisis of Green Revolution 
Programme in Nigeria: The Need for a Rural Development Policy’ in Ajibade Ogunjumo et. al. (eds.), 
Nigeria's Economic Recovery Strategies (Ile-Ife, 1988), pp. 12-27; and Francis Idachaba, ‘The Political 
Economy of Nigeria’s Green Revolution Programme’, in NES, The Nigerian Economy (Ibadan?, 1986), 
pp. 87-110.
"  Jens Christensen, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Final Report (Ikole-Ekiti, 1984), p.
54.
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second is to explain the diffusion rate in terms of competing rationalities between the 
project and its intended beneficiaries. Success and failure in the project’s production 
objectives are thus explained by isolating aspects of farmers’ socio-economic 
circumstances that seemed to have been assumed away or otherwise ignored in the design 
of the programme.
The main body of the chapter is divided into five sections. The next two sections examine 
crop production and land productivity on the basis of available project data as well as 
aggregate information. In section four, I discuss farmers’ responses to EAADP’s version 
of the seed-fertilizer revolution and emphasise the impact on the local economy of 
changes in the macro-economic framework of policy in the 1980s. Section five describes 
the project’s livestock development programme, with specific reference to poultry. A 
final section concludes the chapter.
7.2 Crop Production
The Ekiti-Akoko project sought to increase small-farmer food production by 50,000 
tonnes of grain equivalent. Its operational strategy, therefore, was to ‘promote intensive 
use of cultivated plots through the introduction of improved seedlings and related cultural 
p rac tices .T h is section describes the project’s crop development programme. Project- 
specific and Nigeria-wide data on food output are employed to determine EAADP’s 
contribution to food production in the 1980s.
Two major factors seem to have influenced the nature of the project’s crop production 
programmes. The first is that the project’s initial crop improvement scheme excluded 
cocoyam and yams,^  ^ which, as shown earlier, were and still are key elements of local 
food systems. Secondly, EAADP did not introduce any new crop into the local cropping 
complex. One exception is soyabeans, which was most probably introduced into the area 
by EAADP. However, local demand for soyabeans was extremely low in the 1980s and 
the situation is not likely to have changed significantly now. A second, more
APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Main Report (Benin-City, 1987), p. 72. 
Ibid., p. 51; Interview, 30 March 1992.
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questionable, exception is cowpeas. Elebute has suggested, for example, that the project 
introduced cowpea cultivation in the Ekiti North LGA.^^ But he provided no evidence 
and his position has not been confirmed by project documents or by my own inquiries. 
Moreover, cowpea has been part of crop mixtures in the area long before the 
commencement of project operations in 1981. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that 
the cultivation of soyabean and/or cowpea by local farmers would not alter the above 
statement or affect the overall diffusion rate negatively.
There is therefore a lack of novelty in the project’s crop complex. This is not necessarily 
bad in itself, and may in fact suggest that the project area was by 1981 relatively 
saturated with food crops for which local soils and local ecology are suitable. If this is 
the case, it would follow that local experimentation and perhaps previous development 
programmes have successfully matched crops with local resources, or alternatively, that 
the Ekiti-Akoko area has no comparative advantage in any of the crops with which the 
green revolution has had some success. Either way, the absence of a ‘big idea’ or new 
crops in EAADP’s programme virtually reduced the project to a demonstration farm writ 
large. While demonstration farms as well as specific demonstrations of modem cultural 
practices to farming families are valuable, the literature suggests that the ‘demonstration 
effect’ of previous projects has been limited. The question therefore is whether the 
demonstration function alone justifies EAADP’s scale or public expenditure on it, and 
whether the demonstration objective could not have been pursued through a less 
expensive, alternative strategy.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP did perform other roles, however, notably the establishment of its own 
farms to multiply improved seeds in aid of the demonstration function. In 1982-86, for 
example, a total of 435.3 ha. or 87 ha. per annum were cultivated for seed
Adebayo Elebute, ‘The Socio-Economic Impact of Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Project in Ekiti North 
Local Government Area of Ondo State’, B.Sc Honours Essay, Department of Geography, University of 
Ilorin (1985), p. 49.
R. O. Adegboye, A. C. Basu and Dupe Olatunbosun, ‘Impact of Western Nigerian Farm Settlements 
on Surrounding Farmers’, NJESS, 11,2 (1969), pp. 229-240; and Francis Idachaba, ‘The "Demonstration 
Effect" of Farm Institutes and Settlements: Theory and Evidence’, BRES, 8, 2 (1973), pp. 193-209.
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multiplication.^* The project also produced food crops on its farms, in effect competing 
with small farmers in the local food market. According to project data, an estimated 
501,100 ha., or 125,275 ha. each year, were planted with maize, rice, yams, cassava, 
and cocoyam throughout the Ekiti-Akoko area in 1983-86 (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1
Crop Production in Project Area, 1983-86
Crop Total hectarage (’000 ha.)
1983 1984 1985 1986 Average
Maize 25.5 29.0 32.7 27.3 28.6
Rice 4.5 4.5 5.1 6.0 5.0
Yam 20.5 29.3 30.7 32.4 28.2
Cassava 20.6 39.8 51.3 68.0 44.9
Cocoyam 12.3 21.8 19.6 20.2 18.5
Total 83.4 124.4 139.4 153.9 125.2
% change - 49.2 12.1 10.4 -
Source: EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP, 1982-May 1986’, Appendix 1.
At face value. Table 7.1 suggests clearly that food crop hectarage increased in 1983-86, 
sharply at first, and more slowly after 1984, but in any case that EAADP operations did 
occasion a substantial increase in area cultivated to food crops. The latter general claim 
is open to question, not least because of the parlous state of official statistics. Even if the 
claim was accepted for reasons of argument, there are specific reasons why possible 
important inferences from Table 7.1 cannot hold. For example, the data suggest that yam 
hectarage increased by nearly 30% while cassava’s almost doubled between 1983 and 
1984. In fact, such large increases are possible only if one crop had displaced the other 
(of which see below) or, more important in Ekiti-Akoko’s resource circumstances, if 
there has been a substantial increase in labour supply. Neither the project itself nor wider 
sources have thrown up credible evidence of labour or population movements into the 
project area in the 1980s, on a scale necessary to support large increases in land 
cultivated by Ekiti-Akoko’s food farmers. It has to be inferred, therefore, that data in 
Table 7.1 are implausible and similar to the project manager’s claims on project-induced 
increases in the frequency of contact between farmers and extension officers (see chapter
'* EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 59.
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6.3 above). As in that case, the content of data seemed to have been informed more by 
the need for evidence to justify officials’ claims of operational success than by the need 
to reflect the starker realities of food production in the project area. Initial, sharp 
increases in land under yams and cassava proved unsustainable in this instance, lending 
further support to the view that the claims were false or at least unrealistic.
Table 7.1 also has implications for crop substitution, the practice by which smaller 
farmers have sought increased productivity by shifting resources between different mixes 
of crops or crop variants. With regard to Africa’s smaller farmers, the debate has not 
been about the fact of crop substitution, rather about whether land or labour has been the 
dominant consideration in particular cases. Two non-mutually exclusive positions, 
associated most widely with William Jones and Paul Richards, are available in the 
literature, namely that Africa’s smaller farmers have often substituted cassava for white 
yams in order to conserve, or increase returns to, land (Jones)^  ^or labour (Richards). 
Ekiti-Akoko’s data on yam and cassava’s positions vis-a-vis each other and total cropped 
area provide useful general insights on this debate.
In 1983, yam and cassava shared 41,000 ha. between them and accounted for about half 
of total cultivated area (Table 7.2). Cassava cultivation however expanded faster, 
exceeding yam in absolute and relative terms after 1984. By 1986, the (absolute) land 
area planted with yam had increased by about half while its share of total hectarage had 
declined from one-quarter to one-fifth. In contrast, cassava hectarage tripled between 
1983 and 1986 while its share of total hectarage increased from 25% in 1983 to 44%, or 
double yam’s corresponding share, in 1986. Cassava accounted for over one-third of land 
under arable crops, about 14 percentage points over and above yam and maize 
respectively, over the four-year period. Table 7.2 thus provides support for Richards’ 
view, that small-farmers have over time cultivated more land to cassava than yam because
William Jones, ‘Manioc: An Example of Innovation in African Economies’, EDCC, V, 2 (1957), 
pp. 97-117; and his Manioc in Africa (Stanford, 1959).
“  Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (1985).
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‘cassava is more "labour efficient" and less demanding of soil fertility than white 
yam.’^ ^
Table 7.2
Growth of Crop Production in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1983-86
Crop Indices (a: 1983=100; b: % of total hectarage'
1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
Maize a 100.0 113.7 128.2 107.1
b 30.6 23.3 23.5 17.7 22.8
Rice a 100.0 100.0 113.3 133.3 -
b 5.4 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.0
Yam a 100.0 143.0 148.0 158.0
b 24.6 23.6 22.0 21.1 22.5
Cassava a 100.0 193.2 249.0 330.1
b 24.7 32.0 36.8 44.2 36.0
Cocoyam a 100.0 177.2 159.3 164.2 -
b 14.7 17.5 14.1 13.1 14.7
Base figures from Table 7.1.
As shown above, however, project data on area cultivated are implausible in particular 
respects. Hence, the analytical and comparative value of indices in Table 7.2 is open to 
question. The general inference to draw, therefore, is not that in terms of area cultivated, 
cassava had displaced yams by so many percentage points or so many hectares in the 
Ekiti-Akoko area in the 1980s. Rather that Ekiti-Akoko’s smaller farmers are likely to 
have been inclined, as farmers elsewhere, to shift land between yams and cassava in 
response to specific resource circumstances - in this case labour scarcity.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s share of this total hectarage has not been indicated by available 
sources. But produce from its farms was sold direct to the public or to state distribution 
agencies, especially the Ondo State Investment Corporation. The corporation in turn re­
sold the foodstuff to public servants through individual ministries or departments, or to 
interested members of the public. Ondo State’s civil servants and other segments of the
Ibid., p. 109; cf. Jones, ‘Manioc’.
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elite thus benefitted significantly from state involvement in food production. Some civil 
servants still recalled the scheme with apparent nostalgia during my fieldwork in 1992 
and even recommended a return to the ‘golden era’ of direct production by state agencies.
For the civil servant, bulk purchase of foodstuff from EAADP or from other state-owned 
distribution outlets was more convenient and ultimately cheaper than food procured from 
the open market. If anything, implicit subsidies have often resulted from administrative 
price-setting for government farms’ output. The frequent use of official facilities, for 
example vehicles and official time, to transport procurements from project warehouses 
to final consumers in the public services has the same effect. The Ekiti-Akoko project 
was thus part of the trend in Nigeria between the 1970s and mid-1980s, under which state 
agencies were actively engaged in direct production and/or marketing of staple foods.
Cohen has attributed the relative increases in food output in the mid-1980s to increased 
public investment on ADPs and river basin authorities, and indirectly at least, to direct 
food production by these and other state agencies.Fasoranti has also noted EAADP’s 
role in expanding food output in its operational area.^^ These views are supported by 
official statistics, which indicate broad increases in total output of major crops in the 
1980s. A less exciting picture is suggested, however, by comparison of total output 
before and after 1975, when Nigeria’s pilot ADPs were inaugurated.
Table 7.3 expresses nation-wide output data on seven major crops (i.e. four grain crops 
and three tubers/roots) in 1982-89 as an index of 1975 production. The indices suggests 
that increases in output were more remarkable for grains than for roots and tubers, and 
that the production of crops grown widely in the Ekiti-Akoko area remained much below 
1975 levels until 1987. As noted above, however, Nigeria’s official aggregate data do not 
necessarily reflect agricultural performance at state or project levels. This means that
“  Ronald Cohen, ‘Adversity and Transformation: The Nigerian Light at the End of the Tunnel’, in R. 
Cohen (ed.). Satisfying Africa’s Food Needs (1988), p. 215; pp. 223-226.
^ ^ 0 . 0 ,  Fasoranti, ‘Agriculture and Rural Development: Lessons from the Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural 
Development Project (ADP) Experience’, in S. A. Olomola and A. C. Nwosu (eds.). Rural Development 
Strategies in Nigeria (Lagos? 1992), p. 93.
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Table 7.3 cannot provide a credible basis for direct inferences on ADPs’ achievements, 
and that agricultural performance in the 1980s has to be explained in terms of wider, non­
project variables.
Table 7.3
Nigeria: Index of Output of Major Food Crops, 1982-89 (1975 =  100)
Crop Indices
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Maize 57.5 44.6 79.4 89.3 100.3 90.2 96.0 100.5
Millet 104.5 109.1 131.3 144.5 161.2 153.1 146.0 149.1
Sorghum 125.1 110.1 154.1 167.0 182.4 173.3 110.3 112.0
Rice 42.1 28.8 31.2 39.0 56.2 59.0 105.0 136.3
Cassava 25.5 22.1 52.0 59.3 67.3 64.0 136.0 160.4
Yams 62.5 47.0 53.4 55.0 60.4 56.7 106.0 106.4
Cocoyam 55.6 44.4 40.7 n.a. 74.0 70.2 137.5 129.0
Note; ‘n .a .’ means not available.
Computed from: CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1 & 2 (1990), Table C.1.2, p. 78.
By 1988, when output for rice, cassava, yams and cocoyam exceeded 1975 base figures, 
Nigeria’s economic reform programme was well under way. The combination of 
^incentives spawned by the reform programme and favourable weather after 1987 means 
that output increases could not be attributed entirely to direct production by ADPs or to 
the successful diffusion of their production packages.Since, as I show shortly, input 
sales were poor in the Ekiti-Akoko area during the 1980s, output increases in the area 
are likely to have resulted from expanded acreages rather than from intensive cultivation.
The social value of Nigeria’s ADPs and irrigation schemes has always been questioned 
in the literature. Capital-intensive farming of the type preferred by ADPs and river basin 
development authorities has been shown to intensify rural poverty and landlessness in % /
close-settled northern Nigeria, where small-holders have been displaced by large-scale
For slightly different views, see J. A. Ukoje and J. M. Baba, ‘The Impact o f  the Ayangba 
Agricultural Development Project on the Quality o f Rural Life’, in Martin U. Igbozurike and R. Raza 
(eds.). Rural Nigeria (Ilorin, 1983), pp. 214-216; Duro Oniemola, ‘The World Bank and Capitalist 
Agricultural Development: The Ilorin Agricultural Development Project in Nigeria’, mimeo (Berlin, 1986?), 
pp. 8-10; cf. Cohen, ‘Adversity’, p. 216.
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farms and/or irrigation sch em es.In  Funtua ADP, according to Mabogunje, 60% of 
personal visits by extension agents were concentrated on the 25 % of all farmers classified 
as ‘progressive’.^  ^ This might not amount to much per head since progressive farmers 
are better-off in relation to their ‘non-progressive’ counterparts, but it does mean that, 
as a group, j)rogressive .farmers have almost always obtained an inordinate share of 
project resources, including tractor loans, inputs, and commercial credit. As a result, 
progressive farmers have been better able to expand production by cropping plots hitherto 
cultivated by peasants - in other words, a further squeezing of those least able to respond 
to project-induced stimuli. As D’Silva and Raza have remarked.
the traditional cash-poor farmer...will continue producing for subsistence and...may not 
be able to break out of the vicious cycle of poverty. The emergence of a landless class 
is a possibility for the first time in [the Funtua] area.^^
Similar observations have been made on the Bakolori project by Beckman and on the 
irrigation strategy generally by Wallace.^* According to Cohen, these claims reflect the 
ideological preferences of ‘progressive’ scholars.B ut his counterpoint has not provided 
any more convincing rationale for the distributional inequities occasioned by ADPs and
“  Michael Watts and Robert Shenton, ‘State and Agrarian Transformation in Nigeria’, in Jonathan 
Barker (ed.), TTie Politics o f Agriculture in Tropical Africa (1981), pp. 173-203; Michael Watts and Paul 
Lubeck, ‘The Popular Classes and the Oil Boom: A Political Economy of Rural and Urban Poverty’, in
I. William Zartman (ed,). The Political Economy o f Nigeria (New York, 1983), pp. 121-130; R, Dunmoye, 
‘The Political Economy of Agricultural Production in Africa: State, Capital and the Peasantry’, PS, 16, 2 
(1989), pp. 102-103.
“  Akin L. Mabogunje, ‘The Funtua Integrated Rural Development Project’, in R. P. Misra (ed.). Rural 
Development (New Delhi, 1981), p. 202.
Brian C. D’Silva and M, Rafique Raza, ‘Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: The Funtua 
Project’, FP, 5, 4 (1980), p. 295.
Bjom Beckman, ‘Bakolori: Peasants vs. State and Capital’, NJPS, 4, 1/2 (1985), pp. 76-104; and 
‘Public Investments and Agrarian Transformation in Northern Nigeria’, in Michael Watts (ed.). State, Oil, 
and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 110-137; T. Wallace, ‘Agricultural Projects and Land in 
Northern Nigeria’, ROAPE, 17 (1980), pp. 59-70, and ‘The Challenge of Food: Nigeria’s Approach to 
Agriculture 1975-80’, CJAS, 15 (1981), pp. 239-258.
Cohen, ‘Adversity’, p. 223. See also P. 0 . Olusanya, ‘Differential Rural-Urban Development in 
Nigeria and the Myth of the Exploited Peasantry’, Odu, new ser., 27 (1986), pp. 3-23. For more general 
analysis, see John Weeks, ‘The Vanishing Rural-Urban Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa’, ILR, 127, 3 (1988), 
pp. 271-292; Vali Jamal and John Weeks, Africa Misunderstood (1993).
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river basin authorities.
The wider socio-economic impact of direct food production by state agencies is more 
difficult to ascertain. For one, access to project food (as to other publicly-administered 
benefits) is almost always structured against ordinary members of the public. As Stiglitz 
has observed in another context, the administrative control of the distribution of public 
goods is itself a public good, a veritable means of channelling scarce values to privileged 
constituencies.In Nigeria, administrative power has been the principal instrument by 
which public servants and the ‘urban’ elite generally have cornered an inordinate share 
of subsidized goods, especially those that have been christened as ‘essential commodities’ 
since the late 1970s. For another, the availability of large quantities of subsidised food 
(both imported and locally-produced) invariably depresses demand and prices in local 
m arkets.Bum per harvests occasioned by state-backed campaigns to make everybody 
grow some food in garden farms have often had similar resu lts .T hese  forms of 
intervention could mean higher opportunity costs, greater risk of economic losses, or 
outright disincentive to expanded production for cash-poor but ambitious small-farmers.
Aggregate data on food imports and consumer prices for the 1980s also suggest that food 
production by Nigeria’s ADPs and river basin authorities was marginal or insignificant 
in macro-economic terms. To be sure, the value of food imports in real 1975 terms had 
declined sharply after 1983, by up to 40% from about N7.0 million in 1980 to just under 
N4.0 million in 1983, and even further after 1984 (Table 7.4). Still, food imports stood 
at between 7% and 20% of all imports in 1980-89 and averaged 12% of all imports in 
1980-89, compared with between 7.6% and 15.4% and overall average of 11% in 1970- 
79.^  ^ In any case, food imports by value remained well over 1975 base levels
“  Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organisation; 
Methodological Remarks for Development Economics’, in Pranab Bardhan (ed.), The Economic Theory of 
Agrarian Institutions (Oxford, 1989), note 19, p. 29.
Watts and Lubeck, ‘Popular Classes’, pp. 118-119.
Cf. Robert Shenton, The Development o f Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (1986), pp. 104-105,
Cf. A. O. Sanda, The Nigerian State and Agricultural Policy Managements (Ile-Ife, 1991), Table 14,
p. 73.
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throughout the 1980s. Real decreases in the food import bill are also likely to have 
reflected Nigeria’s foreign exchange difficulties and resulting physical import restrictions 
imposed intermittently (and probably applied unevenly) since the early 1980s more than 
corresponding increases in local food supply from ADPs or state farms.
Table 7.4
Nigeria’s Food Imports, 1980-89
Year Value (millions, 
real 1975 Naira)
% change Index 
(1975 = 100)
% of 
total imports
1980 7.02 675.0 15.8
1981 7.35 4.7 706.7 14.4
1982 6.16 -16.2 592.3 16.3
1983 3.95 -35.9 379.8 19.8
1984 1.84 -53.4 176.9 18.8
1985 1.94 5.4 186.5 17.0
1986 1.57 -19.1 151.0 13.4
1987 2.93 86.6 281.7 10.5
1988 1.57 -46.4 151.0 8.8
1989 1.57 0.0 151.0 6.8
Average 3.59 - 345.2 12.3
V
Source: CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1 & 2 (1990), Table D.1.2, p. 113 (import values). Prices deflated 
with all-Nigeria composite CPI figures in ibid.. Table C.3.1, p. 93.
Above all, production in government farms did not necessarily ease the upward 
movement in food prices in the 1980s. The consumer price index (CPI) conventionally 
measures changes in the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods over a period of time 
(usually one year in relation to another), and would be employed here to determine the 
price impact of state production in the 1980s. To specify the differential impact of state 
production, it is also necessary to determine how food prices compare with non food 
prices, and above all, differences in consumer price movements between urban and rural 
areas, and between food and non-food items in each case. The usual caveats about 
Nigeria’s official data will most certainly make the results imprecise, but inferences based 
on imprecise evidence are more useful than unsupported statements.
Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 present composite, urban, and rural price indices respectively 
for food, non-food items (household goods, clothing, transport), and the all-inclusive 
category. Specific non-food items have been selected to facilitate comparison of food
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Table 7.5
All-Nigeria Composite Consumer Price Index, 1982-86 (select items)
Year Indices (a: 1975=100“; b: 1980=100'^
Food Household
goods/other
purchases
Clothing Transport All Items
1982 a 272.4 213.4 334.6 223.9 266.5
b 136.3 117.6 123.8 113.5 130.1
1983 a 335.6 328.1 397.5 271.2 328.4
b 168.0 180.8 147.1 137.5 160.4
1984 a 479.7 516.1 559.7 315.8 458.4
b 240.0 284.4 207.1 160.1 223.8
1985 a 498.5 542.0 610.3 357.2 483.7
b 249.4 298.6 226.0 181.0 236.2
1986 a 499.2 709.0 704.3 422.2 509.7
b 249.7 390.6 260.7 214.0 249.0
Sources: * CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1 & 2 (1990), Table C.3.1, p. 93. '* Computed.
Table 7.6
All-Nigeria Urban Consumer Price Index, 1982-86 (select items)
Year Indices (a: 1975=100"; b: 1980=100*^
Food Household
goods/other
purchases
Clothing Transport All Items
1982 a 327.7 206.9 231.8 206.8 283.2
b 140.3 115.0 113.1 107.0 130.0
1983 a 401.0 281.2 266.9 235.0 339.8
b 171.7 156.3 130.3 121.6 156.0
1984 a 585.3 430.8 351.7 277.6 479.7
b 250.7 239.5 171.6 143.7 220.1
1985 a 575.7 501.5 447.6 281.2 493.8
b 246.6 278.8 218.4 145.5 226.6
1986 a 619.2 648.1 553.9 346.8 543.6
b 265.2 360.3 270.3 179.5 249.5
Sources: * CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1 & 2 (1990), Table C.3.2, p. 94. Computed.
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Table 7.7
All-Nigeria Rural Consumer Price Index, 1982-86 (select items)
Year Indices (a: 1975=100*; b: 1980=100*0
Food Household
goods/other
purchases
Clothing Transport All Items
1982 a 264.6 214.3 349.0 226.6 264.2
b 135.6 118.0 125.0 114.5 130.1
1983 a 326.4 234.7 415.8 276.2 326.8
b 167.2 129.2 148.8 139.6 161.0
1984 a 464.9 528.1 588.8 321.1 455.4
b 238.2 290.6 210.7 162.3 224.3
1985 a 487.7 547.7 633.1 367.9 482.3
b 249.8 301.4 226.6 186.0 237.5
1986 a 482.3 717.6 725.4 432.8 504.9
b 247.1 395.0 259.6 218.7 248.7
Sources: “ CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 1, 1 & 2 (1990), Table C.3.3, p. 95. '* Computed.
prices with general consumer prices and with those of specific goods most likely to be 
included in real-life baskets, regardless of the consumer’s location and socio-economic 
status. Official CPI figures (a in tables) have been calculated with 1975 as base year, but 
I have also computed a second index (b in tables) with 1980 as base year to reflect higher 
inflation and prices in the 1980s and therefore make for a realistic comparison of the 
figures.
All three tables suggest that price inflation was rampant in Nigeria in the 1980s and not 
limited to foodstuff. Prices moved haphazardly in all cases, with the largest movements 
recorded after 1984 - ironically after large, politically-motivated expenditure on state-led 
agricultural strategies in Nigeria’s second republic (1979-83) - but neither urban nor rural 
food prices declined in real terms throughout the 1980s. Even after changing the base 
year from 1975 to 1980, food prices remained at more than double base levels from 1984 
onwards, much unlike non-food items like transport, the prices of which remained just 
above base levels in 1982 and below the 200% mark for much of the period.
Specifically, food prices rose more steeply in rural than in urban areas between 1984 and
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1985, suggesting that a lower proportion of supplies was being offered for sale in rural 
markets as more and more foodstuff ended up in self-consumption or in urban markets. 
Moreover, in relation to respective base rates, urban food prices rose faster and 
consistently, remaining higher than those of other items as well as the general all- 
inclusive category. Incidentally, state production has almost always been targeted at urban 
wage earners, partly to calm a politically important but potentially restive population, as 
public choice theorists have argued ,and  partly because rural consumers could more 
easily produce part of their own food if and when prices became unbearably high. High 
food prices in urban centres suggest, therefore, that food supply from state farms was 
either too low or whatever was available had been swallowed up by black markets. Either 
way, it seems that Nigeria’s state farms failed to exert a downward pressure on food 
prices in urban markets. Moreover, the operations of state farms, and the vast ‘internal 
markets’ by which their subsidized foodstuff was channelled to urban wage earners, 
ultimately had a distorting effect on prices and structured the market against rural 
producers.
7.3 Land Productivity
From the rural economic viewpoint, project farms are far more important for their role 
in agronomic research than for their direct contribution to food production. This section 
considers the impact of project operations on output per unit of land. Since land is the 
most abundant productive factor in rural Ondo State, project-induced improvements in 
its productivity could well generate local interest in new cropping and/or farm 
management techniques even by farmers who may be unwilling or unable to adopt seed- 
fertilizer packages.
In what looks like a resuscitation of the on-station research of the colonial period, Ekiti- 
Akoko project farms became important centres for investigations on crop husbandry, with 
emphasis on the comparative responses of traditional and improved crop varieties to 
fertilizer and to improved cultural practices. The farms also served as control centres for 
demonstrations on farmers’ plots, enabling extension workers to isolate conditions under
^  Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1981).
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which particular crops do best, or how crop yields could be improved.
Basically, a demonstration plot on the project’s farm comprised two sets of each crop. 
Each set consisted of a local variety and an improved variety of the same crop. One set 
was given fertilizer treatment while the other set was not fertilized. In sum therefore, 
each crop had four experimental plots, namely (a) local variety without fertilizer, LVFg; 
(b) improved variety without fertilizer, IVFq; (c) local variety with fertilizer, LVF^; and 
(d) improved variety with fertilizer, IVF^.
In the 1982/83 season, for example, EAADP established a total of 922 demonstration 
plots or about 95% of target for five main crops, namely maize, rice, yams, cowpea, and 
cassava. According to Christensen, the project’s cowpea crop failed on account of bad 
weather and pest infection while its cassava crop had not been harvested by mid-1984 
when his final report was written. This left three staple crops, namely maize, rice, and 
yams, of which a total of 561 plots or 94% of the total number of plots established were 
harvested.
Two caveats need to be entered before the yield data are considered. First, the quality 
as well as scope of the data vary between crops. For example, the yield data for maize 
are based on 180 harvested plots measuring about 100 square metres or 1.63 acres each, 
though each of the five EGAs in the project area had at least 10% of harvested plots. In 
turn, the size of rice plots is not stated. Moreover, only 73 rice plots were harvested. As 
stated above, there were no plantings in Akoko South EGA and the rice crop in Akoko 
North EGA failed. The rice data refer therefore to only three Ekiti EGAs in the project 
area. Finally, yield data for yams are extrapolated from average yield data obtained from 
a total of 308 harvested plots of about 25 heaps or 0.02 acres each. Demonstration plots 
were evenly distributed throughout the project area, but no EGA had less than 18% of 
the total number of plots harvested.
The second caveat follows closely on the first. While the results as a whole are more 
indicative than representative, returns for maize and yam reflect broad conditions in all 
parts of the project area. To this extent they are likely to be closer to reality than the
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result as a whole. The case of rice is equally straight-forward: in relation to the project 
area as well as the whole of Ondo State, rice production has not been particularly 
significant in the Akoko area. In the 1978 rural economic survey, for example, Akoko 
LGAs accounted for only 10% of an estimated 12,470 ha. of rice cultivated in the project 
area.^^ The latter figure itself amounted to 44% of total estimated rice hectarage in 
Ondo State in 1978. The absence of data from demonstration plots in Akoko North and 
South LGAs cannot therefore diminish the wider relevance of available yield data. Thus 
although the foregoing limitations are important in themselves, the yield data could still 
be employed to explore possibilities in land productivity as well as in the diffusion of 
seeds and fertilizer in the project area.
Some interesting inferences are suggested by the yield data in Table 7.8. In all cases and 
experimental configurations, improved crop varieties produced higher yields per hectare 
than unimproved varieties. Specifically, IVFq plots produced yield increases of between
Table 7.8
Crop Yield Data from Project Demonstration Farms, 1982
Crop Yield (tonne/ha.)•
(1) LVFo (2) IVFo (3) LVF, (4) IVF,
Maize
Range** 0.81-1.60 1.03-2.38 1.67-2.70 2.77-4.80
Average 1.35 2.04 2.44 3.56
% change - 51.1 19.6 46.0
Rice
Range 0.42-1.23 0.82-1.60 1.13-2.09 1.50-2.20
Average 0.79 1.13 1.45 1.61
% change - 43.0 28.3 11.0
Yams
Range 2.96-6.16 3.52-9.79 4.16-12.03 4.56-15.1
Average 4.31 6.13 7.16 8.4
% change - 42.2 16.8 17.3
Legend: LV Fo- Local variety without fertilizer; IV F q- Improved variety without fertilizer;
LVFj- Local variety with fertilizer; IVF,- Improved variety with fertilizer.
Notes: * See text above for explanatory notes on plot size. Actual yield figures at LG level for all crops. 
Computed from: Christensen, Final Report, Table 10, pp. 39-40.
ODS, Report on Rural Economic Survey, 1978 (Akure, n.d.). Table 34, pp. 37-38.
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40-50% per unit area over LVFq plots. In contrast, absolute yield differentials between 
seed varieties treated with fertilizer (i.e LVFj and IVFJ are less substantial. Estimates 
of absolute change in yield per unit area ranged from 11 % for rice through 17 % for yams 
to a remarkable 46% for maize. However, LVFj plots still returned an estimated 17-28% 
higher yield per unit area over and above IVFq plots.
Differences in relative yield between local and improved seed varieties - with or without 
fertilizer treatment - are perhaps more interesting analytically. To measure relative 
change in yield per unit area, an index with L V F q yield returns as base figures (Table 
7.9) was computed. The standard deviation as well as the co-efficient of variation for all 
four demonstrations on each crop were also estimated. The results suggest clearly that 
relative crop yields increase as one moves away from L V F q to IVF^, or from the basic.
Table 7.9
Statistical Measures on Demonstration Farms’ Crop Yield
Crop (1) LVF„ (2) IVF, (3) LVF, (4) IVF,
Maize
Index* 100 151,1 180,7 264,0
Standard deviation 0,28 0,49 0,37 0,67
Coeff, of variation 0,21 0,24 0,15 0,18
Rice
Index 100 143,0 183,5 204,0
Standard deviation 0,4 0,37 0,44 0,35
Coeff, of variation 0,51 0,33 0,3 0,22
Yams
Index 100 142,2 166,1 195,0
Standard deviation 1,21 2,28 2,89 4,03
Coeff, of variation 0,28 0,37 0,4 0,48
Note: * LVFo =100 for all indices. 
Source: Same as Table 7,8 above.
near-natural type of farming to improved seeds with fertilizer treatment. The standard 
deviation of yields per hectare increases for maize and yams but moves haphazardly in 
the case of rice. Most estimates of the coefficient of variation are however below 0.5, 
the two exceptions being the estimate for rice L V F q estimate and yam’s IVFj estimate. 
The former could mean that rice output per hectare would increase most from widespread 
adoption of improved seeds and/or fertilizer, but the rice data are also the most
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geographically limited of all three crops. The case of yam cannot possibly be explained 
in the same terms. But the point remains that the co-efficients of variation are broadly 
comparable within each crop. This suggests that actual yields at various project locations 
did not vary significantly from each crop’s mean yield.
The foregoing results are only to be expected. If anything, HYVs or improved seed 
varieties generally are distinguished by their ‘greater genetic potential for response to 
increased amounts of plant nutrition. High-yielding rice and wheat seeds also produce 
‘a larger edible proportion in the total dry matter’ per unit weight.Under  normal 
circumstances, these translate to increased returns to labour and capital even at the small 
unit-farm level. Without complementary inputs, including mechanisation, improved seeds 
should still produce higher yields per unit area than unimproved s e e d s . I f  soil 
properties and response to fertilizer are assumed to be similar, and other factors (e.g. 
rainfall, weeding, pest control, correct input application procedures) are held constant, 
differences in yield between improved and unimproved seed varieties should be less 
substantial where fertilizer has not been applied. This means that optimal yields result 
from a combination of factors, including the nature of the seeds themselves, the regular 
use of standard complementary inputs, and the observance of recommended practices. It 
also follows, however, that farmers operating at the margins of the seed-fertilizer 
revolution, for example those short of capital and credit who could not afford fertilizer, 
or every farmer if fertilizer is costly, could increase returns to land by adopting improved 
seeds without complementary inputs, especially fertilizer. Returns to labour could also 
be increased in the same way, subject to the assumption that HYVs are in themselves no 
more labour intensive than local seed varieties.
Both positions can be illustrated with yield data in Table 7.8 or statistical inferences from 
the data (Table 7.9). That small farmers could increase land productivity substantially by
^ Ruttan and Binswanger, ‘Induced Innovation’, p. 359.
^  Hans Ruthenberg, Innovation Policy for Small Farmers in the Tropics, ed. Hans E. Jahnke (Oxford, 
1985), p. 43.
Ibid., p. 45.
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adopting fertilizer and/or improved seeds, could be supported by comparing yields from 
IV F q and LVFi, perhaps the two least difficult options for traditional farmers in the 
context of project operations. Both options between them offer an estimated increase in 
yield per hectare of 40-80  index units, with yield from unfertilized local seed varieties 
as base rates (Table 7 .9 ). Specifically, IV F q plots produce an estimated increase of 42-50 
index units over L V F q plots. LVF^ yields are even higher than L V F q yields, by 66-83 
index units. Since L V F q configurations are the minimum available cropping situation, it 
follows that every farmer could achieve substantial output increases by planting improved 
seeds instead of local seed varieties. Indeed, according to Ruthenberg, initial productivity 
gains such as these encourage crop substitution by a generality of farm ers .As I show 
shortly, the initial evidence on experimentation with HYVs in Ayede area has provided 
some support for Ruthenberg’s position.
Comparisons of fertilized plots (IVFo) unfertilized plots (LVFJ suggest a slightly 
different picture. Between IVFq and LVFj, for example, the relative increase in average 
yield per hectare narrows to about 25 index units for yams and 30-40 units for maize and 
rice, lower than the yield differential between LVFq and rVFg. To be sure, average yields 
from LVFi as well as from IVF^ plots remain considerably higher than yield from IVFq 
plots. This however excludes the fmancial, social and transaction costs of fertilizer 
application. In land-surplus rural Nigeria, the social component of these costs almost 
always exceeds the financial element, as in the loss of natural nutrients and land 
productivity and environmental degradation occasioned by the practice of matching 
fertilizer nutrients to crop needs rather than to specific land properties."^ I shall return 
to this issue shortly, but the analytical question is whether it is rational for a smallholder 
on the margins to adopt fertilizer. Put differently, how realistic is it to expect peasants 
to adopt improved seeds and fertilizer when IVF^ offers no more than a 40% yield 
increase over and above IVFq, improved seeds without fertilizer? The issue is not that a 
40% relative yield increase is itself low; even a 10% margin could make some difference
39 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
^  S. O. Olayide and Francis Idachaba, ‘Input and Output Marketing Systems: A Nigerian Case’, in 
John W. Mellor, Christopher Delgado and Malcolm Blackie (eds.), Accelerating Food Production in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (1987), p. 176.
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to the average peasant’s circumstances. The problem is whether crop yields are 
themselves sufficient inducement for adoption, or more specifically, whether a 40% yield 
margin is large enough to offset the economic as well as the social costs of adoption by 
small farmers.
7.4 Local Responses to Seed-Fertilizer Packages
Answers to the above question could be positive and negative, the one reflecting the 
official or ‘expert’ imagination, and the other suggesting the more complex nature of 
technical change in peasant agriculture. This section presents project-specific and wider 
evidence in support of both positions. I argue that small-farmer response has been poor 
in the Ekiti-Akoko area, in part because of economic considerations, and in part because 
of negative shifts in institutional support for small-scale agriculture in Nigeria in the 
1980s.
The official position seems straight-forward enough: ‘fertilizer use.. .can act as a catalyst 
or a "lead" practice in securing the adoption of other improved techniques’'^  ^ to the 
extent that mineral fertilizer is ‘divisible (i.e. largely scale-neutral), relatively easy to 
transport and store, simple to apply and is almost immediately e f f e c t i v e F o r  similar 
reasons, HYV seeds are believed to increase cropping intensities as well as overcome 
seasonal unemployment irrespective of scale or of mechanisation.'^^ This position is also 
supported by Christensen, who argued that ‘fertilizer is the one single agricultural input 
which is responsible for the highest yield increase of crops’ in the Ekiti-Akoko area.'^ 
If, fertilizer application could increase returns per unit space on plots as small as 0.02 
acres, as the project’s yield data suggest, then small farmers who adopted fertilizer 
should expect to make significant productivity gains on their plots. Adopting both 
fertilizer and improved seed varieties is likely to mean even higher returns.
FAQ, Agricultural Development, p. 193.
Ruthenberg, Innovation, p. 46.
Cépède, ‘Green Revolution’, p. 2; Iftikhar Ahmed, ‘The Green Revolution and Tractorisation: Their 
Mutual Relations and Socio-Economic Effects’, ILR, 114, 1 (1976), p. 85.
^  Christensen, Final Report, p. 54.
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Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s aggregate yield data for four seasons to 1986/87 (Table 7.10) 
provides some support for the above position. Data in Table 7.10 might appear more 
authentic at first than those in Table 7.8, not least because the former relates to a longer 
time frame and EAADP has not admitted to significant limitations to its content. Yet, 
Table 7.10 does imply that average yield per hectare increased by between 30% and 
100% over and above pre-project estimates for maize, rice, yam, cassava, and cocoyam. 
If this is true, it would follow that small farmers might still be able to increase their 
average yield by between one-fifth and one-third of estimated pre-project levels, after due 
allowance has been made for difficulties associated with replicating experimental 
conditions in ordinary fields, or with the lack of correspondence in yield ratios between 
smaller and larger plots. Small and large farmers alike would benefit, therefore, from 
higher physical productivity and increased incomes resulting from fertilizer application.
Table 7.10
Comparative Crop Yield in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1983-87 (tonnes/ha.)
Crop Pre-project
yield*
Seasons
1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Maize 0.77 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.9
Rice 0.60 1.2 2.2 2.3 2.8
Yam 6.60 9.0 9.3 10.0 12.8
Cassava 6.10 8.0 8.0 24.0 26.7*’
Cocoyam n.a. 6.0 6.0 n.a. ll.S**
Notes: ® Based on Staff Appraisal Report. 1985 crops.
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Table 2.9A, p. 24,
The above claim is not necessarily true, however, and one need not derive more from 
Table 7.10 than its face value. For example, it is not clear how the yield data in Table 
7.10 had been complied, whether they refer to improved or unimproved crop varieties, 
and whether the crops had been cultivated on demonstration or non-demonstration plots - 
by the project itself, by select project farmers or by the generality of farmers. As noted 
in chapter 6.5.1, EAADP’s contact farmers scheme lost its initial momentum soon after 
take-off in 1982; official figures on the scheme are contrasting and irreconcilable. 
Moreover, as noted already, and unlike the data in Table 7.10, the project’s experiments 
on its own demonstration plots were short-lived and not continuous. Table 7.10 is thus 
unlikely to have been based on crop yield from EAADP’s demonstration plots.
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That the data have wider origins is supported by EAADP’s shrewd use of pre-project 
yield estimates, though this has implications not entirely supportive of the project. By 
definition, pre-project yield estimates could have been obtained only from production by 
the wider public, not necessarily under natural conditions or by smaller farmers, but in 
conditions most certainly different from those advocated by Ekiti-Akoko. As used in 
Table 7.10, pre-project yield estimates are a common denominator of physical 
productivity before and after project operations as well as a proximate measure of 
EAADP’s internal technical efficiency in respect of crop yield. Yet, according to a 
subsequent project document, average grain yield per hectare on project farms was closer 
to pre-project levels and, in some cases, lower than those in Table 7.10."^  ^ More 
importantly, pre-project average yield per hectare had been estimated from cultivated 
areas which, in the cases of maize and rice, were larger than post-project samples by 
between 67% and 250%.'^  ^ There is no a priori reason to conclude here that one 
document is a more credible source of information than the other, but smaller post-project 
hectarages are likely to have resulted in higher average yield per hectare than would be 
the case if the samples had been larger. Ekiti-Akoko ADP is thus likely to have been far 
less successful in its crop development objectives than Table 7.10 appears to suggest.
Wider empirical support for productivity increases from the green revolution has been 
no less controversial and inconclusive. As indicated above, three generations of research 
have left unresolved the question of whether small or large farmers have benefitted more 
from lower operating costs and increased yields occasioned by fertilizer and green 
revolution technology.The most recent view, that size-related inequalities have been 
transitional, need not be questioned here. But the view is underscored by about three 
decades of extensive use of GR-type technology in Asia and Latin America.
Similar optimistic views can hardly apply in countries like Nigeria, where green 
revolution technology is newer and has been employed less extensively. To support scale-
« EAADP, ‘Brief on EAADP’, p. 3.
^  Ibid., Appendix I.
Recent surveys on include Lipton with Longhurst, New Seeds; and Glaeser, Green Revolution.
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neutrality in such circumstances is to assume wrongly that a level playing field exists with 
regard to access to or effective demand for fertilizer, HYV seeds, or other inputs, and 
that the adoption process is not discontinuous or problematic/* It is, above all, to imply 
that there are no competing rationalities within rural society, for example between 
ordinary peasants and middle peasants, or between peasants as a group and others, 
including project officials and policy makers who favour commercial production. In this 
frame, diffusion rates are explained in terms of externalities like the lack of information 
or institutional rigidities. Little, if anything, is said about how new inputs affect, or in 
some cases disrupt, existing production patterns, raising the opportunity costs of adoption 
or at least increasing uncertainty in a situation that is already overly indeterminate.'^^
The small farmer who wishes to innovate in rural Ondo State must contend with 
relatively high transaction costs and a wider range of operational difficulties. As in other 
parts of Nigeria, pervasive rent-seeking means that large proportions of subsidized inputs, 
including fertilizer and other publicly-administered goods, are channelled through the 
black market.^® Given their relative access to the policy machinery and to functionaries, 
middlemen and traders further distort the market by increasing prices artificially and also 
reinforcing the urban orientation of fertilizer use. Limited supplies as well as 
administrative price-setting also intensify the competition for fertilizer and almost always 
structure the input market against small farmers.
Hence, ‘farmers [have paid] prices higher than the subsidized price- and possibly as high 
as it would have been without subsidies’, n o t  least because fertilizer subsidies are
For a critique, see Brian C. D'Silva and M. Rafique Raza, ‘Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: 
The Funtua Project’, Food Policy, 5, 4 (1980), pp. 282-297; and ‘Equity Considerations in Planning and 
Implementing Rural Development Projects in Nigeria: An Evaluation of the Funtua Project’, in Bruce L. 
Greenshields and M. A. Bellamy (eds.). Rural Development (1983), pp. 101-106.
For a summary critique, see Peter E. Hildebrand, ‘On the Non-Neutrality of Scale of Agricultural 
Research’, in Hildebrand (ed.). Perspectives on Farming Systems Research and Extension (Boulder, 1986), 
pp. 59-69; cf. Michael Cemea, ‘Sociological Knowledge for Development Projects’, in Cemea (ed.). 
Putting People First (Oxford, 1985), p. 6.
^  See Peter M. Lewis, ‘Economic Statism, Private Capital, and the Dilemmas of Accumulation in 
Nigeria’, WD, 22, 3 (1994), pp. 437-451.
Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, p. 177; Aja Okorie, ‘Recent Experiences in Input Supply and
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‘partially offset by the scarcity of subsidized inputs, which in turn [drives] up the 
consumer p r i c e . . . I n  fact, fertilizer and other inputs have been obtained often at 
subsidized prices by middlemen (traders or civil servants) or farmers with contacts in the 
Agriculture Department or in other departments of state. Some of my respondents in fact 
claimed to have obtained their fertilizer supply through relatives or other acquaintances 
in the Ministry of Agriculture. Rational from the individual’s viewpoint, this practice has 
intensified clientelism and rent-seeking in a market distorted by government activism. 
Middle peasants or ambitious small farmers also travel to urban or commercial centres 
to procure fertilizer or other inputs. Such journeys may or may not last more than one 
day, but peasants often use the opportunity to visit their relations in urban centres. Their 
economic costs can be considerable nonetheless, especially since such trips are typically 
undertaken at the peak of farm operations, often after closer and cheaper sources of input 
have been tried.
Finally, local farmers are well aware that fertilizer application hastens weed 
(re)growth.^^ Ordinarily, weeding is next to land tilling as the most labour-intensive 
operation in peasant agriculture.In the wider literature, the rise of at least two forms 
of reciprocal labour, namely exchange labour and festive labour, has been associated with 
this difficulty.As Swindell has indicated, however, the demise of domestic slavery and 
the ‘commoditization of the economy’ initially boosted demand for reciprocal labour, in 
some cases in forms which looked ‘suspiciously like the acquisition of large labour forces
Distribution in Nigeria’, in J. Feldman and Francis Idachaba (eds.). Crop Marketing and Input Distribution 
in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1984), pp. 111-112.
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1981), p. 53.
”  The average Yoruba small farmer often makes this point, but farmer-tenants at Igede farm settlement 
made an issue of it in 1991/1992, as I show below.
^  G. J. A. Ojo, ‘The Changing Patterns of Traditional Group Farming in Ekiti, North Eastern Yoruba 
Country’, NGJ, 6, 1 (1963), pp. 31-38.
For pioneer studies, see Charles J. Erasmus, ‘Culture Structure and Process: The Occurrence and 
Disappearance of Reciprocal Farm Labour’, Southwestern Journal o f Anthropology, 12,4 (1956), pp. 444- 
469 on Haiti; and David W. Ames, ‘Wolof Co-operative Work Groups’, in William R, Bascom and 
Melville J. Herskovits (eds.). Continuity and Change in African Cultures (Chicago, 1959), pp. 224-237 on 
The Gambia. For more recent general overviews, see M. P. Moore, ‘Cooperative Labour in Peasant 
Agriculture’, JPS, 2 (1975), pp. 270-291 and Ken Swindell, Farm Labour (Cambridge, 1985), chp. 5.
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which had previously been available through the ownership of s laves .Expanded 
commercial production and the cash nexus have occasioned a subsequent movement away 
from reciprocal labour, encouraged the emergence of new forms of cooperative labour, 
and ensured that net labour transfers have favoured larger or better-off farmers.
Fertilizer use by the small farmer thus means more intensive demand for labour in a 
transitional but decisively labour-scarce agricultural economy. In general, the additional 
fertilizer-induced demand for labour could mean increased seasonal employment for 
landless labourers.As indicated earlier, however, landlessness is unknown in the Ekiti- 
Akoko area as every able-bodied man has almost unrestricted access to farmland. Hence, 
labour scarcity at peak season could only drive up farm wages and thus reduce effective 
demand for wage labour by small, cash-poor farmers. Olayide and Idachaba have also 
observed that fertilizer application ‘raises the possibility of mass pest infestation’.^  ^The 
small farmer who intends to adopt fertilizer must therefore contemplate the risk of low 
crop yield and/or total crop failure from pest attack in addition to problems with labour 
supply.
In theory, the cost of additional labour employed in weeding operations could be offset 
by increases in crop yield. Depending on the socio-economic circumstances of individual 
farmers and wider variables (e.g. price levels), higher crop yields could translate to 
increased food security, to higher incomes from marketed output, or to some combination 
of both. However, trade-offs between higher yields and additional labour costs are scale- 
sensitive and cannot be realised by all small farmers. Using a standard recommendation 
of 100 kg. diamond phosphate and 200 kg. of urea per hectare of maize, Christensen has 
estimated a yield increase of 6 kg. maize grain equivalent for each kilogramme of 
nutrient applied.“  At an assumed farmgate price of NO.23 per kilogramme of nutrient
Swindell, Farm, pp. 139-150; citation p. 142, 
Ibid., p. 144.
Ruthenberg, Innovation, p. 45.
Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, p. 183.
“  Christensen, Final Report, p. 60.
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and a market price of N350 per ton of maize, Christensen also estimated a net profit of 
N8.13 for every naira invested on fert ilizer .In addition to this attractive profit ratio, 
Christensen forecast a ‘net profit due to fertilizer use of N3.4 million’ if fertilizer 
consumption expanded to 4,455 tons in 1985.^  ^ His enthusiasm was such that he 
recommended that these estimates 'should be maintained over the years, whenever 
alterations in fertilizer or crop prices are made by the Project, the State or the Federal 
authorities’.^  ^ Christensen’s movement from statistical projection to policy prescription 
may or may not be cavalier, the question though is whether (or how far) his projections 
could be sustained in real-life circumstances.
On available evidence, the projections are unsustainable. For one, the FAQ’s price 
estimates are higher than Christensen’s assumed average cost of a kilogramme of nutrient 
by at least two-thirds. Moreover, between one-quarter and one-third of small farmers may 
have been unable to buy fertilizer for economic reasons. But some who could have often 
avoided fertilizer use. Some farmers who had applied fertilizer in the recent past may 
also have reduced their demand for the input. One example of the latter is provided by 
settlers at Igede farm settlement who in 1992 refused to crop their mechanized plot 
allotments as part of their effort to avoid fertilizer use.^ According to the settlers, 
fertilized plots are overcome by undergrowth and bush much sooner than non-fertilized 
plots, creating an additional demand for farm labour. This argument is not new. Early 
green manuring research in southern Nigeria foundered in the 1930s partly because 
farmers could not meet the additional manure-induced demand for extra labour at peak 
season.Similar arguments featured prominently in the critique of Western Nigeria’s 
farm settlements. I shall return to this point shortly.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 60-61.
“  Ibid.
^  Interview with settlers, March 1992.
“  CSO 26/4/34177 NAI. Minute 2758/DA/6A of 16 May 1938 by J. R. Mackie, Director of 
Agriculture.
268
Settlers were also concerned with the productivity of mechanized plots. They told me that 
the mechanized plots may have lost much of their natural productive properties because 
they have been cultivated continuously. Such plots, the settlers argue, require increasing 
or at least consistent doses of fertilizer to assure reasonable productivity. There was 
therefore a real risk of lower than average yield per unit of mechanized land in the 
settlement if fertilizer was either not applied at all or was not applied in sufficient 
quantities. The same point has been made in respect of one of the project’s seed 
multiplication plots at Osin-Ekiti, some six kilometres south of Ikole-Ekiti.^
The settlers’ decision to abandon such plots constitutes the line of least resistance but also 
suggests two important points. First, as far as settler-respondents were concerned, 
mechanized plots symbolised state efforts to draw them into what may be called the 
‘fertilizer trap’. Since the abandoned plots were prepared on a group basis by the state 
government, which is also the ‘landlord’, individual settler-tenants could not opt out of 
the mechanization scheme or refuse to pay their share of the cost of joint services. 
Igede’s settlers have however avoided the ‘fertilizer trap’ successfully by not cropping 
the mechanized plots.
The use of fertilizer also represented real risks to settlers and small farmers generally. 
For example, food farmers could not be sure of selling their crops profitably, if at all, 
in the event of a bumper harvest from generalised fertilizer application.^^ As the PAO 
had rightly acknowledged, ‘food crops...are generally subject to fluctuating, uncertain 
low prices...inadequate marketing facilities and high selling costs and consequently low 
returns...’ vis-a-vis export crops.Indeed, ‘domestic food production does not attract 
international capital and management as export crops do’;^  ^ in the present case, prices 
as well as marketing infrastructure are skewed in favour of crops with large global 
market, such as rice and maize, and against local food crops, for example yam and
“  Interview with ex-Project Manager, 30 March 1992. 
Cf. Lipton with Longhurst, New Seeds, p. 29.
PAO, Agricultural Development, p. 199.
^  Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, p. 181.
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cocoyam. In any case, EAADP’s plan did not include a minimum guaranteed prices 
scheme unlike some of its antecedents. Funtua ADP had employed the scheme to buy up 
a bumper maize crop in 1979/80, after the Nigerian Grains Board had failed to meet its 
obligations as a buyer of last resort .Apart  from rescuing local maize growers from 
becoming victims of their own success, Funtua ADP also redressed the immediate 
disincentive effect on potential production of sharp price decreases induced by rising 
supply from small farmers.
Input supply infrastructure was also weak and largely unreliable. Indeed, neither the 
project nor ODSG could have provided adequate fertilizer supply if settler-tenants had 
chosen to crop their mechanized plots or if a large number of small-scale farmers in the 
project area had adopted fertilizer en masse. In 1980-82 for example, ‘fertilizer use.. .was 
practically nil due to non-availability in the [project] area and a total lack of supply by 
Ondo State [Government]. One obvious reason for this is the inefficiency of Nigeria’s 
central fertilizer procurement machinery, established within the Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture in 1976/77, or of the complex delivery system spawned by it.^  ^According 
to an ‘anonymous and undated’ complaint from former Bendel State (now Edo and Delta 
States),
...all the fertilizer were purchased centrally in Lagos, with the result that the actual needs 
of individual states received little attention. Thus, [NPK] 20:0:20 and 15:15:15 which 
were most in demand by our yam and maize farmers were supplied in less quantity, while 
those we did not need were dumped on us in large quantities, such as muriate of potash 
and calcium magnesium sulphate.^^
The underlying factor though is the foreign-exchange intensive character of fertilizer in 
Nigeria and the conflicting pressures this has triggered. Given the limited supply of hard 
currency in the economy, fertilizer purchases have invariably reduced foreign exchange
70 Wid.
Christensen, Final Report, p. 55; J. A. Olujobi, ‘Review of Input Supply and Distribution 
Arrangements in Ekiti-Akoko ADP’, in Feldman and Idachaba, Crop Marketing, p. 176,
^  Okorie, ‘Recent Experiences’; Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, pp. 174-175.
Cited in Okorie, ‘Recent Experiences’, p. 112.
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allocation to alternative ends, for example the procurement of industrial raw materials. 
Yet, if the overriding need for higher output and increasing returns to producers justify 
foreign exchange allocations for fertilizer procurement, the policy infrastructure has often 
generated contrary outcomes. For example, the relative overvaluation of the naira prior 
to 1986 meant that those with access to imported fertilizer became automatic recipients 
of massive transfers from public funds. Such beneficiaries have often included rent- 
seeking civil servants or businessmen with an eye for windfall profits, both united by 
shared indifference to the efficiency of agricultural production.
In any case, local production capacity for fertilizer was practically zero until the 1970s, 
when nearly all the fertilizer consumed in Nigeria was still imported. '^* In 1975, a 
superphosphate plant began operations in Kaduna; a second plant for nitrogenous fertilizer 
was also commissioned in Onne in the southeast in the late 1980s. Local fertilizer 
production has averaged 36,000 tonnes per annum in 1976-84 and about 250,000 tonnes 
in each of four seasons to 1990/91.^^ Exports have however increased rather sharply, 
from near zero up to 1987/88 to an average 364,000 tonnes per annum to 1990/91. 
Imports have amounted to over 200,000 tonnes each year for the same period. Local 
supply of fertilizer has perhaps depended less on aggregate domestic demand and more 
on the allure of unregulated and untaxed incomes from external markets if, as is likely, 
fertilizer exports have been conducted through informal channels to neighbouring West 
African countries. The main determinant, however, is Nigeria’s import capacity, which 
has declined as a result of lower foreign exchange earnings from oil sales after 1981 as 
well as increasing debt obligations since the mid-1980s. According to CBN/NISER 
figures, fertilizer consumption declined by 39% to 639,840 tonnes in 1982 alone and 
remained below one million tonnes each year for much of the 1980s.
The impact of fertilizer use on agricultural resource regeneration in Nigeria has been no
Based on my computation of figures for 1980/81 through 1986/87, from FAO, FAO Fertilizer 
Yearbook, 41 (1991), Tables 26-29, pp. llOff. Cf. Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, pp. 173-174.
Figures for 1976-84 computed from Okorie, ‘Recent Experiences’, p. 112; 1986-90 figures are based 
on FAO’s estimates, but much of entries on Nigeria are classified as ‘unofficial’.
CBN/NISER, Impact o f SAP on Nigerian Agriculture and Rural Life, Vol. II (Lagos, 1992).
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less problematic. Contrary to FAO advice, fertilizer has so far been applied without 
adequate soil te s tin g .N o r have there been sustained attempts to match particular 
fertilizer compounds to particular soil properties or nutrient profiles in particular 
ecological zones.Christensen observed that NPK 15-15-15 ‘is in most cases not the 
most adequate NPK fertilizer...due to inadequate nutrient r a t io .Y e t ,  a survey of 396 
households in Ondo State has suggested that NPK 15-15-15 accounted for 70% and 59% 
respectively of fertilizer channelled through the project in 1989/90 and 1990/91.*° 
Reference has already been made to the acknowledgement by the World Bank that soils 
in the Ekiti-Akoko area have very low productivity potential under continuous cultivation. 
A mechanical analysis of 465 soil samples also suggests that on average, soils from Ekiti- 
Akoko area comprised a 78% sand component, 13.4% silt, and 8.3% clay.*  ^ Given 
these considerations, Igede settler-tenants’ decision to abandon mechanized plots and 
instead cultivate virgin or fallow land may very well help to promote local eco- 
balance.*^ The settlers’ action was feasible mainly because of low man-land ratios, but 
continuous cultivation could easily disrupt nutrient regeneration, decrease land 
productivity, and make fertilizer application inevitable in the long-term.
The general trend, therefore, has been for small farmers to adopt improved seeds without 
fertilizer. There is indeed some evidence of crop substitution in the villages where I 
conducted field surveys in 1992. For example, 10% of my respondents claimed to have 
bought improved seeds from the project in 1991. Between one-third and half of the seeds 
which an additional 62% of respondents claimed to have obtained from previous harvests 
and from friends may also be improved strains from the project or from elsewhere, more
77 FAO, Agricultural Development^ p. 199,
Christensen, Final Report, p. 55; Olayide and Idachaba, ‘Input’, p. 176; interview with ex-Project 
Manager, March 1992.
Christensen, Final Report, p. 56.
“  Computed from ODSADEP, ‘Report for 1989/90 and 1990/91 Supplementary Fertilizer Surveys’, 
Internal Briefing Paper, Tables III, p. 4; and Table IV, p. 5.
Computed from Christensen, Final Report, Table 17, p. 57.
^ For an early commentary, see G. C. Dudgeon, The Agricultural and Forest Products o f British West 
Africa (2nd. ed. 1922).
272
so in view of the outcomes of the project’s outgrowers’ scheme described in chapter 6.
'Ègé Ekiti-Akoko’ (i.e. cassava from Ekiti-Akoko project’s stem cuttings) is particularly 
common in the project area. According to my respondents, project cassava matures early 
at nine months; but it tends to produce a higher ratio of stems to tubers than do older 
cassava strains. Project cassava is also relatively leafy and forms ‘excessive’ canopy. 
These canopies reduce labour exertions on weeding but could easily deny subsidiary or 
cover crops access to solar energy and make multiple intercropping less productive. 
There is a conflict of strategy here, for example between a high turn around of land 
through early maturation of a staple crop on the one hand, and the advantages of food 
security and lower risk of crop disease infestation which multiple intercropping offers on 
the other.“  While traditional crop varieties are not being abandoned altogether as 
Ruthenberg had hypothesised,^ that possibility cannot be ruled out in the distant future. 
At the moment, local farmers have been combining HYV seeds with ‘traditional’ or 
unimproved strains, often without complementary input support.
Most farmers attempt to get around this difficulty by growing a number of older cassava 
varieties as well as the project’s improved strains. Various respondents made specific 
reference to two older strains. The first is known locally as Ibàdü’eruwà, that is ‘the 
"heavy load" [i.e. yield] is in the bottom [below the soil surface].’ îbàdü’encwà matures 
over twelve months and is believed to produce better yields than other traditional 
varieties. It is also described by my informants as less leafy than EAADP’s improved 
cassava strain. The second widely grown cassava variety is called Ègé îjèsà because, 
according to local farmers, it was introduced into the local economy through the Ilesa 
area. This strain takes up to eighteen months to mature, six months longer than 
ibàdü’eruwà; but it is believed to be more resistant to adverse agricultural conditions 
including drought and pests. Ègé îjèsà is also believed to facilitate the replenishment of 
soil nutrients.
“ For general analysis, see Ajibola Taylor, ‘Mixed Cropping as an Input in the Management of Crop 
Pests in Tropical Africa’, AE, II, 4 and III, 1 (1977), pp. 111-126; and Martin U. Igbozurike, ‘Against 
Monoculture’, PG, 23, 2 (1971), pp. 113-117.
^ Ruthenberg, Innovation, pp. 45-46.
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By cultivating both the project’s improved seeds and older strains, local cassava growers 
seek to achieve a trade-off between early maturation and better yield on the one hand, 
and resistance to drought and pests and ultimately, lower risk of starvation from crop 
failure on the other. The literature on peasant farming is replete with examples, such as 
those reported on Northern Nigeria by Norman, of experiments with new and existing 
crop varieties to determine crop combinations that optimize peasant resources by 
minimising risk and increasing food security. Lipton has also reported that peasants in 
Kavathe village in India combine high-income millet seeds with less valuable but more 
drought-resistant bean-sprouts to achieve a trade-off between monetary profit and food 
security. In Sierra Leone, according to Paul Richards, farmers mix rice with cassava, 
millet, maize, and guinea com. Rice-guinea com mixtures are however risky: if planted 
too thickly, guinea com plants form shades that could lower rice yields. With careful 
spacing, however, this mixture averts hunger in the average rice-farming family; in some 
cases, it has also helped to conserve rice stocks with which labour employed for 
ploughing in a subsequent season can be fed.
In the present case, however, HYV seeds are often grown with little regard for 
recommended practices. This denies the seeds the full complement of support like 
fertilizer and spacing and could translate to sub-optimal returns to the respondents 
concemed. The selective adoption strategy, however, allows new crop varieties to be 
added to the local cropping complex with minimum, if any, dismption to existing farming 
systems. To this extent, experimentation of the kind reported by my respondents has 
enabled small farmers to avoid some of the transaction costs outlined earlier. The implied 
sequencing cannot itself tilt the balance against possible adoption of project 
recommendations in the long term. In the short and medium terms, however, selective 
adoption has reinforced peasant autonomy and certainly slowed down the adoption 
process. Since ADPs lack ultimate control over peasant access to productive factors, 
especially land, ‘the crop has [had to be] taken to the peasant..instead of taking the 
peasant to the crop.’ This may have reduced the project’s impact on the local cropping 
complex, but it has also created opportunities for farmers to mix old and new seed 
varieties, enabling farmers to increase their average crop yield without necessarily 
increasing the risk of crop failure.
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7.5 Livestock Production
The Ekiti-Akoko project’s livestock programme sought to continue the colonial tradition 
of encouraging ‘mixed farming’ by small-farmers, albeit on a more capital-intensive, 
larger scale. This section assesses EAADP’s livestock development programme in the 
context of Ondo State’s semi-traditional livestock economy. The project’s scheme, it is 
argued, fared badly because of a combination of factors, including design mistakes as 
well as macro-economic difficulties beyond the control of project management.
In design, EAADP’s integrated approach to livestock farming took at least three forms. 
The first involved poultry-keeping and maize-growing and sought to assist farmers to 
‘grow sufficient maize for their poultry, and feed the poultry with home-grown maize’, 
thus reducing dependence on imported feed and promoting backward integration in the 
project area.
The second form was poultry and fish farming. The project’s objective was a supply-side 
attempt to boost demand for meat and eggs in an area, which, as I show below, was 
widely remarked, until the 1950s at least, for generally low consumption of animal 
protein. The final form was inclined to the longer term, and involved a combination of 
duck and fish farming. According to Christensen, ‘up to 20% of the protein fed to ducks 
is left in [duck] droppings which form an excellent fish food.’ Moreover, ‘goats kept in 
pens and fed with lacuna and crop waste would be efficient and profitable meat 
producers.’ In sum, the project sought to improve local farming systems by encouraging 
the general use of animal droppings either as feed or as organic fertilizer as well as 
promote animal protein intake in the area. In practice, project resources were devoted to 
poultry farming, because it was easier to establish, because poultry-keeping could 
generate immediate or at least short-run economic and social benefit both for the project 
and for the local economy, and above all, because of the force of tradition in policy­
making.
An early example of a state-induced small-scale poultry farm was that at Awka, south­
eastern Nigeria, in the 1930s. On 8 October 1934, the colonial government had 
inaugurated a Young Farmers’ Club at the Agricultural School in Awka, with 48
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members and five oil-palm plots of 154 trees each. From a £7 loan from the school’s 
farm account, ‘two pure Rhode Island Red cocks and twenty native hens’ had been 
purchased and two poultry houses built. Three months later, five hens had hatched 35 
chickens, six were sitting on eggs, and a few more were laying eggs. Such, it seemed, 
was the ease with which tradition and modernity was reconciled in poultry keeping, to 
remarkable profit by colonial officials!
It has often been argued that less well-off Yorubas consume very little fish and meat and 
are therefore prone to animal protein deficiency. Johnson had observed, for example, that 
‘the poorer people are mostly vegetarians, except when animals are slaughtered for 
sacrifice they seldom partake of meat. ’ Faulkner and Mackie have also painted a near 
desperate meat supply situation in southern Nigeria and contrasted same with the relative 
abundance of meat in the north. In their view.
meat is very scarce indeed in the south and, in order to obtain animal food, some tribes 
will eat rats, dogs, and even snakes. In the north, meat, although not a staple article of 
the daily diet of the ordinary farmer, is usually obtainable; and is eaten occasionally by 
everyone with a frequency proportionate to his means, for it is the favourite luxury.
Faulkner and Mackie’s opinions are valid but more reflective of pre-colonial times than 
of the 1930s. The views also reflect the limited scope of the formal economy in the 
1930s, on account of which a substantial proportion of economic activity, and in this case 
dietary patterns are simply explained away or assumed not to exist.
In fact, the end of the Yoruba wars and the establishment of colonial rule had opened up 
road transport and boosted north-south trade in cattle and other livestock. In 1936-40 
(excluding 1937, for which no data were provided) for example, between 73,500 and 
100,840 head of cattle and an equal number of sheep crossed the Niger river each year 
in the long march to the coast. An additional 23,590-37,500 heads of cattle and 11,000-
20,000 sheep and goats per annum left Kano by rail for the south in 1936-39, with sheep 
outnumbering goats by 6:1 in 1936 and 57:1 in 1940. How much of this ended in Yoruba 
cooking pots is difficult to determine, but Bascom had suggested that herdsmen who 
journeyed by foot passed through many important Yoruba towns, possibly selling
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livestock and certainly disposing of diseased and dying animals at discounted rates. 
Increasing cash incomes from cocoa sales had also boosted purchasing power, making it 
probable that many more Yoruba families had meat in their diets in the 1930s than 
Faulkner and Mackie have suggested.
Even in earlier decades, access to meat and to animal protein may have been wider than 
presumed. Yorubas have generally regarded rats, snakes, and other non-domestic animals 
(including fowls) as wild game to be hunted down for consumption as eran îgbé or ‘bush 
meat’. Hence, as Galletti, Baldwin and Dina have remarked, hunters and their families 
as well as residents in country areas with large unsettled forest surroundings possibly 
consumed more meat than the traditional elite. The same would most probably apply to 
families in or around the coastal areas where fishing has been a calling or a favourite 
pastime. In any case, animal husbandry has been an intimate part of traditional 
agriculture in Yoruba society. To quote Johnson once again.
every woman, whatever her trade may be, is expected to keep a few chickens and a goat 
or two from which she derives small income for housekeeping.. .Aged women who reside 
in the farms also employ their time in...tending poultry, goats and sheep for the market.
While the extent of farm residency has probably declined over time, the Yoruba farming 
family still combines crop farming with traditional livestock farming.
In Ondo State, the average rural farming family usually keeps some poultry and a mixture 
of domestic animals like goats, sheep, and pigs. Cattle ownership is less common and 
fish farming rarer still for ecological as well as economic reasons. According to official 
estimates, 61% of all farming families in Ondo State kept chickens in 1978; 44% and 
13% reared goats and sheep respectively, while only 1% owned cattle. In the same year, 
63% of estimated farming families in the Ekiti-Akoko area kept chickens, 49% and 19% 
reared goats and sheep, while 1.2% owned cattle. On average, each Ekiti-Akoko farming 
family owned five chicken, three goats, an equal number of sheep, and two head of 
cattle. Together, Ekiti-Akoko farming families accounted for 28% of the estimated
473,000 chickens in Ondo State in 1978; they also owned 41 % and 57% of the estimated 
total number of goats, sheep, and cattle in the state. The Ekiti-Akoko area as well as the
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rest of Ondo State in general thus had a flourishing livestock economy in the pre-project 
period.
Admittedly, the livestock sub-sector has remained largely traditional. In other words, 
most farming families keep livestock without elaborate provisions for feeding and 
housing. However, local trade in livestock had also expanded and was well established 
by the 1970s. Alao’s survey has shown, for example, that many of the 190 respondents 
in 90 Ekiti towns and villages established modem poultry farms between 1963 and 1974. 
The survey however reported inadequate supply or non-availability of essential 
ingredients among a sizeable proportion of respondents. For example, over one-fifth of 
respondents had considered shortage of feed mixes a serious problem. Another 16% had 
emphasised problems regarding marketing and demand for eggs as well as chicken. 
Alao’s survey had also highlighted poor yields and losses occasioned by diseases as well 
as pilfering. The point remained, nonetheless, that commercial poultry farms had 
emerged to compete with traditional poultry-keeping in Ekiti Division. The same is likely 
to have been tme of other parts of Ondo State.
The 1960s and 1970s also saw a steady rise in the market value of cattle, sheep, and 
goats. According to official estimates, the average price of a cow increased by a nominal 
60-150% from N50-100 in 1966/67 to N125-160 in 1975/76. Sheep and goat prices also 
rose by an estimated 385-470% and 330-560% respectively over the decade. Local 
demand for livestock increased even more dramatically in the 1970s. As Table 7.11 
shows, about 16,500 cows and 5,000 sheep and goats were slaughtered each year in 
approved locations in the state in 1966-76. Imports (mainly from Kwara State to the north 
and Bendel to the east) ranged from 57-83.5% up to 1971/72, declining first to 40% and 
to less than 30% thereafter and averaging 45% of cattle slaughtered per annum.
In contrast, goat and sheep imports became statistically significant only in 1969/70, when 
imports rose sharply from about 3% to 51% of the number slaughtered in approved 
locations. The import ratio increased to 76% two years later, after which the number of 
goats and sheep slaughtered on approved sites fell below import levels by between 80% 
and 283 %. Only three-quarters of the estimated number of sheep and goats imported into
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Table 7.11
Imported and Slaughtered Livestock in Ondo State, 1966-76
(1) Year (2) Cattle (3) Sheep and Goats
(a) N« 
imported
(b) N= 
slaughtered
(c)
a as % of b
(a)N«
imported
(b) N« 
slaughtered
(c)
a as % of b
1966/67 5,034 7,814 64.4 180 5,447 3.3
1967/68 6,307 9,328 67.6 85 5,870 1.4
1968/69 11,271 13,504 83.5 122 3,381 3.6
1969/70 8,282 13,109 63.2 1,337 2,608 51.3
1970/71 8,510 12,706 67.0 2,175 3,309 65.7
1971/72 8,758 15,332 57.1 3,148 4,118 76.4
1972/73 7,628 19,265 39.6 5,325 2,954 180.3
1973/74 6,428 24,142 26.6 11,457 7,592 151.0
1974/75 5,606 27,848 20.1 20,558 9,430 218.0
1975/76 5,619 21,622 26.0 21,583 5,633 383.2
Total 73,443 164,670 44.6 65,970 50,342 131.0
Compiled from: ODS, Digest of Agricultural Statistics, 1976 (Akure, n.d.), Tables 24 and 25, pp. 27-28.
the state in 1966-76 were thus slaughtered in approved locations. Cattle imports 
constituted less than half of the number slaughtered in approved sites in 1966-76, while 
the number of imported sheep and goats exceeded the number slaughtered in approved 
locations by a remarkable 31%. It is likely, therefore, that some livestock imported into 
Ondo State were ‘re-exported’ to neighbouring states or otherwise retained to boost local 
reproduction. The essential point, though, is that meat consumption was substantial and 
enlarged greatly in the 1970s, perhaps as a result of the oil boom.
Yet, the above is only a partial picture of the local livestock economy. Because it is based 
on information from officially-designated slaughter houses. Table 7.11 excludes the 
number of animals slaughtered unofficially. These include sheep and goats, and perhaps 
cattle, that have been imported through unmanned entry points used often by small scale 
traders as well as the large, unrecorded trade in local poultry. A figure cannot be put on 
this aspect of the livestock trade; it is likely, however, that informal trade in live animals, 
including fowls, would increase existing estimates by between half and three-quarters.
The problem with EAADP’s livestock programme therefore, was not that it was 
commercially oriented; rather that the project plan understated the vitality of the local 
livestock economy or assumed away its existence, misread local tastes, and thus opted
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for overly optimistic demand projections for chicken. As I detail below, the foregoing 
considerations supported a relatively large-scale, capital-intensive poultry programme well 
beyond the absorptive capacity of the local economy.
The project sought to produce chickens and eggs in large numbers either by itself or 
through farmers assisted by it. Its target was to establish 200 egg production units of 500 
layers each over five years, to be raised from day-old chicks in modem battery cages and 
poultry houses. A 32,000 capacity hatchery and breeding farm, comprising 2 rearing 
houses and 4 layer houses was thus established and stocked with imported parent stock. 
EAADP subsequently reared the New Hampshire parental stock for egg production 
because, according to the Project Manager, it could breed continuously for 5-6 years 
‘without yield depression and without import of new parent stock* and also because its 
brown egg colour was preferred locally. In turn, the White Plymouth Rock parent stock 
was reared for meat production.
Moreover, ODSG handed over to the project a feedmill at Ado-Ekiti with daily 
processing capacity of six to eight tonnes. This had been intended to promote backward 
linkages in the programme, for example by enabling EAADP to produce chicken feed 
from maize grown on its own farms or by its outgrowers, thus assuring feed supply to 
poultry farmers and also avoiding some of the input supply problems raised in Alao’s 
survey. Finally, the project had imported a chicken slaughtering plant with freezing 
facilities at a cost of £7,000 in September 1984 to increase its capacity for meat 
processing and also increase local meat supply. Apart from putting the major aspects of 
the production process under project control, EAADP’s planned involvement in meat 
processing could add value to its own as well as its customers’ products, and give both 
a competitive edge over locally-bred chicken.
The foregoing strategies seem credible and well thought-out enough, but they also 
suffered from severe design constraints and macro-economic difficulties. To begin with, 
the capacity of the project’s hatchery was well beyond existing demand for day-old 
chicks. The project was thus compelled to sell fertile eggs for consumption because of 
low local demand for day-old chicks. Worse still, EAADP’s hatchery would still have
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been underutilised if the breeding farm was employed at full capacity. Production targets 
were therefore overly ambitious.
Nor is it clear whether EAADP’s choice of 500-bird units was justifiable in the 
circumstances. In 1972, Olayide and Olowude had supported 500-bird units in an input- 
output analysis of optimum enterprise combinations for small farmers in Western 
Nigeria’s savanna belt. But the study’s three enterprise combinations (i.e. poultry-rice- 
arable crops; poultry, no rice, arable crops; and poultry, tobacco, arable crops) were 
predicated on the prior existence of a fully established and operational framework of 
integrated farming rather than a situation in which most farmers were largely starting 
from the scratch, as in Ekiti-Akoko. Olayide and Olowude assumed, for example, that 
the small-scale farmer had
30 acres of land available for use each year. Of this acreage, 25 acres are to be used for 
the various commercial crop enterprises and the remaining 5 acres for family consumption 
and/or subsidiary or supplementary crop enterprises...The farmer could hire machine 
services from the "Tractor Hiring Unit".. .obtain casual labour during harvesting and other 
labour-demanding seasonal operations...Feeds for poultry could be purchased at all times 
and part of the maize enterprise could be used to feed the birds...
As indicated in chapter 5, cropped acreages per farmer in the Ekiti-Akoko area are much 
less than that specified above. Input supply was unreliable (of which more shortly) while 
local demand for tractor services was insufficient to sustain tractor services on a smaller 
scale, as the next chapter shows. Even if assumed cropped acreages per farmer and 
poultry’s derived share of 54-82% of total projected revenue in the programmes were 
halved, most small-scale farmers in the Ekiti-Akoko area would still have been unable 
to meet the above conditions. Olayide and Olowude’s statistically elegant analysis was 
therefore inapplicable in Ekiti-Akoko’s circumstances. The project’s prescribed 500-bird 
units also did not take full account of the cost of infrastructure as well as the capacity of 
local farmers to raise funds for pre-production costs. By definition, therefore, the average 
small-farmer had been rendered ineligible to participate in the project’s livestock 
programme.
To expand access to the programme by the local population, the following changes were
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made to the project plan:
(a) A standard unit was to comprise 250 layers rather than 500 as the SAR had 
prescribed.
(b) Intending poultry farmers were encouraged to select between the battery cage system 
and the deep litter system. EAADP argued that the former was more expensive and not 
necessarily better than the latter, thus effectively rejecting the SAR’s battery cage system.
(c) EAADP supplied farmers with 16-week old pullets from its farms rather than let them 
raise layers from day old chicks. The latter are believed to be more susceptible to disease 
and production losses and offered little security to small investors.
(d) Family production units of 25 layers were recommended in addition to commercial 
production to broaden the appeal of the programme.
The project also offered additional incentives to participants in the poultry programme. 
For example, farmers who combined livestock production with crop farming were 
exempted from a rule which barred the sale of fertilizer on credit. As indicated earlier, 
in 1980, the World Bank argued that public policies on farm input subsidies encouraged 
uneconomic use of inputs and intensified distortions in Nigeria’s agricultural markets.
The decision to grant fertilizer credit to integrated farmers amounted to a concession, or 
perhaps necessary evidence of operational flexibility in the face of a commitment to 
market-led change by the project. But it also has implications for access to project 
benefits. By redefining eligibility for fertilizer credit, the exemption rule had merely 
excluded non-poultry farmers from competing for available supply, thus increasing the 
potential supply of fertilizer as well as the implicit subsidy associated with it, to fewer 
farmers. Since integrated farmers are likely to have been well-off individuals in relation 
to the total farming population and even in the context of the enlightened farming 
community, the incentive could have channelled benefits to those best able to pay 
economic rates for project services. EAADP could also have unwittingly encouraged rent- 
seeking to the extent that beneficiaries of the exclusion clause could have abused the 
privilege by re-selling their fertilizer allocations at market prices. It is possible, therefore, 
that EAADP had merely subsidised the privileged, thereby intensifying existing socio­
economic inequalities in the project area.
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This position is supported by official data on the project’s credit operations. Poultry 
farmers benefited more than crop farmers did from project credit in 1983-86, even though 
the former constituted a very tiny proportion of loan beneficiaries. As Table 7.12 shows, 
credit granted to poultry farmers averaged N l,902-3,327 per annum in 1983-86. This is 
close to the N2,610 available to the average outgrower in 1984 but several times over and 
above the N49-510 granted to crop farmers in 1983-86. To be sure, higher credit to 
poultry farmers may have reflected the cost structure of poultry-keeping vis-a-vis the 
more traditional crop farming; it is also possible that many participants were starting 
from scratch and had to raise large sums of money to procure basic infrastructure.
Table 7.12
Credit Granted to Farmers, 1983-86 (average per recipient, current Naira)
Year Type/Purpose of credit
Crops Poultry Outgrowers® All types
1983
Value 49.0 2,235.0 - 239
Index*" 20.5 935.1 - 100
1984
Value 177.0 1,802.0 2,610 373
Index*" 47.5 483.1 700 100
1985
Value 337.0 3,434.0 - 487
Index*" 69.2 705.1 - 100
1986
Value 592.0 2,667.0 - 913
Index*" 64.8 292.1 - 100
Annual Average
Value 288.8 2,534.5 2,610 503
Index*" 57.4 503.9 518.9 100
Notes: ® Operated only in 1984. * Average value=100. 
Computed from: EAADP, Internal Completion Report^ p. 143.
However, participating farmers were few and far between. As Table 7.13 shows, 
recipients of poultry credit numbered only 106 in 1983, declined sharply to 20 in the 
following year, and thereafter to only eleven each year. At only 148, poultry loans 
accounted for 8% of the number of all loans granted by the project in 1983-86 but took 
up 49% of the value of all credit over the four-year period. This raises the question of
283
equity between the minority of poultry farmers and food-crop growers. Given that 
commercial poultry could create new markets for imported feeds, or for yellow maize 
which is suitable for chicken-feed but disliked by consumers of com, the question must 
also be asked whether EAADP was not seeking to channel local production along 
directions preferred by the World Bank and international capital without regard to local 
tastes.
Table 7.13
Number of Approved Loans, 1983-86 (by type)
Year Type of credit
Crops Poultry Outgrowers* All types
1983
N® 828 106 - 934
% of total 88.7 11.3 - 100.0
1984
N= 589 20 39 648
% of total 90.9 3.1 6.0 100.0
1985
N« 217 11 - 228
% of total 95.2 4.8 - 100.0
1986
N= 60 11 - 71
% of total 84.5 15.5 - 100.0
Total
N= 1,694 148 39 1,881
% share 90.0 7.9 2.1 100.0
Note: * Scheme operated in 1984 only. 
Source: Same as Table 7.12.
More damage was done to EAADP’s poultry development programme, however, by 
macro-economic difficulties than by equity considerations. For example, the programme 
could not take off until 1982, the second year of project life because the required 
equipment could not be imported on time. EAADP’s in-house egg production experiment 
with 250 layers in each of the five local government areas was also far from promising. 
In 1982, according to Christensen, egg production ratios (the number of eggs expressed 
as a percentage of number of point of laying birds) ranged from 0% in Ekiti East through 
19% in Akoko North EGA to 48% in Akoko South, averaging 24% for all EGAs or 30%
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if Ekiti East was excluded. The number of production units increased subsequently by 
248% to 87, resulting in an improved average egg-production ratio of about 50% for all 
LGAs in 1983 and 1984 (30 June). Higher egg- production ratios after 1982 thus appear 
to have been achieved through increases in the total number of layers rather than through 
increasing output per layer.
At the wider level, the project established 250-layer units for only twelve farmers in 1982 
instead of the expected 50. In 1983, the number of participating farmers dramatically 
increased to 108, probably because of unrealistic profit projections, or because of the 
incentives that the project offered to poultry farmers. The roll however declined to twelve 
almost immediately afterwards. By late 1983, the ‘programme...gradually reached a 
disastrous situation due to lack of feed ingredients for the Project’s feed mill, poor quality 
and low availability of commercial feed...[and their] prohibitive prices.’ By June 1984, 
new farms were not being established. On the contrary, ‘low productive farmers’ were 
being assisted to sell their birds and only 32 farmers were being supported in anticipation 
of improved feed supply and price levels. The project also tried to obtain permission to 
import feed ingredients but had not succeeded by June 1984. In 1985, the livestock 
programme had no participating farmer in the project area!
As a whole, production of poultry birds was low. Contrary to official projections, local 
demand for frozen chicken was low. This factor, and macro-economic difficulties meant 
that the project’s chicken slaughter plant had neither sufficient supply of raw materials 
nor a viable outlet for its end-product. The plant was thus left unused for much of 
EAADP’s life, occasioning losses on capital invested but also leaving a lesson on the 
dangers of technological overkill in largely peasant economies.
7.6 Conclusion
The Ekiti-Akoko project’s crop as well as livestock production programmes cannot be 
described as spectacular successes. If anything, both programmes were predicated on 
false or misleading assumptions about existing practices, about the ability and willingness 
of local farmers to adopt prescribed recommendations, and about social and technological 
change in small-scale agriculture.
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The ‘blueprint’ mentality has almost always blinded project designers and, in some cases, 
management teams, from local socio-economic circumstances and has been widely 
identified as a self-destructing attribute. The bureaucratic mind-set often thrown up by 
the blueprint also runs contrary to the careful and calculating experimentation preferred 
by small, cash-poor farmers. For most, if not all such farmers, the introduction of new, 
divisible inputs like fertilizer and improved seed strains means ‘new opportunities...but 
also new risks, costs, and changing demands.’ Farmers’ response in the present case has 
been to adopt individual components, especially improved seeds, without the supportive 
inputs like fertilizer. The foregoing analysis also suggests clearly that entire seed-fertilizer 
packages as such have been ignored by local farmers.
The above conclusion is consistent with findings on peasant responses to new seeds in 
other parts of Nigeria and elsewhere. Reference has been made to Lipton’s research on 
Indian wheat growers and Paul Richards’ on Sierra Leonean rice farmers. Eyoh’s study 
of Lafia ADP in Nigeria’s Plateau State also draws similar conclusions but seems to have 
overstated his case by arguing that project operations make ‘no noticeable impact on 
peasant production practices. ’ Fasoranti’s position, that Ekiti-Akoko project farmers have 
been uncritical and undiscriminating adopters of recommended practices, is even more 
misleading.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s achievements in its production programmes lie somewhere between 
Eyoh and Fasoranti’s positions. Its influence on the local cropping complex seemed to 
have been more manifest on the local cropping complex than on livestock production. 
Crop substitution by small farmer is indeed a long-term possibility, provided the limited 
cases of crop mixtures reported by my respondents are sustained, and official claims 
(accepted largely by small farmers) about the yield capacities of EAADP’s improved 
seeds are borne out by experience. Long-term trends are however dependent on prior, 
substantial improvements in the macro-economic environment, especially the institutional 
factors which have, in effect, undermined EAADP’s programmes and possibly 
discouraged minimum risk-taking by small farmers.
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Chapter 8 
Farm Mechanisation
8.1 Introduction
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s demonstration fonction invariably involved the active promotion of 
farm mechanisation, defined here as ‘all replacement of human muscle power by 
machines and implements’  ^ but excluding draught animals. Owing to insect-bome 
diseases, the use of bullocks is uneconomic and impractical in Nigeria’s forest zones. 
Hence the transition from ‘purely manual techniques to nearly automatic ones’^  in 
southwestern Nigeria has excluded animal-drawn ploughs and moved straight from the 
hoe and machete to tractors. Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s mechanisation programme focused on 
tractors and less complex implements and bio-chemical substitutes for human labour. It 
had three goals: first, to increase the capital-labour ratio in small farmer factor 
combinations; second, to encourage demand for mechanization, initially among larger 
farmers, and ultimately by all segments of the farming population; and finally, to promote 
the emergence of a private market in tractor services in the project area.
This chapter examines project-induced mechanisation in 1982-91, both in relation to its 
objectives and in wider historical-comparative context. It is argued, on the one hand, that 
the project’s mechanisation scheme was inherently faulty to the extent that it was 
predicated on sole cropping. The scheme also suffered severe setback from insufficient 
support by the local state. On the other hand, the available evidence suggests a 
considerable potential for technological change in the project area. That potential, it is 
contended, could not be realised without addressing some of the immediate policy 
problems that mechanisation throws up in peasant agriculture. Such commitment, it is 
also shown, underscores the successes of mechanisation in Asia and Latin America since 
the 1960s.
' Hans P. Binswanger, ‘Agricultural Mechanisation: A Comparative Historical Perspective, World Bank 
Staff Working Papers 673 (Washington, 1985), p. 3. Also in WBRO, 1, 1 (1986), 27-56. Subsequent 
references are to the Working Papers version.
 ^Ibid., p. 1.
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The argument is developed in five main parts. The next section draws upon the literature 
on Asian and Latin American experiences to highlight some of the social issues and 
policy dilemmas occasioned by farm mechanisation. Section three relates these issues to 
Nigeria-wide experience since the 1920s. Section four details the rise of a private tractor 
market in old Oyo Division, Western Nigeria, during the 1970s, and draws important 
parallels between Oyo Division and the Ekiti-Akoko area. In section five, I discuss 
EAADP’s technical service packages and their remarkably poor diffusion among Ekiti- 
Akoko farmers. Section six analyses the project’s tractor hire scheme and its limited 
achievements, while section seven summarises the discussion.
8.2 The Social Imperatives of Mechanisation: A Comparative Overview
The shift from human to mechanical power techniques is widely associated with far- 
reaching structural change in peasant agriculture.^ Specifically, mechanisation has been 
associated with expanded acreages; higher crop yields; increased cropping intensities; 
more valuable crop combinations; and improved opportunities for on-farm and off-farm 
employment.'^ In theory, mechanisation can reduce labour turnaround in peasant 
agriculture by shortening the time it takes to perform labour-intensive farm chores, 
especially seed-bed preparation. At constant farm acreages, the time saved on these 
operations implies an increase in labour productivity. It also means that labour is released 
sooner for alternative uses. A combination of HYV seeds, a better water supply 
(especially through irrigation systems) and a more productive labour force could easily 
translate to an extended planting time or a bi-modal agricultural year, to increased 
cropping intensities, and to a decline in the seasonality of farm operations.^
Empirical support for these propositions has however been far less straightforward. As
 ^Hans Binswanger, Vernon Ruttan with others, Induced Innovation (Baltimore, 1978); Prabhu Pingali, 
Yves Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural Mechanization and the Evolution o f Farming Systems in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (Baltimore, 1987). Cf. Ruttan and Colin Thirtle, ‘Induced Technical and Institutional 
Change in African Agriculture’, JID, 1, 1 (1989), pp. 1-45; and Binswanger and Pingali, ‘Technological 
Priorities for Farming in Sub-Saharan Africa’, ibid., pp. 46-65.
 ^Eric Clayton, Agriculture, Poverty and Freedom in Developing Countries (1983), pp. 161-174. See 
also ILO, Mechanisation and Employment in Agriculture (Geneva, 1973).
 ^ Clayton, Agriculture, pp. 161-164,
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indicated in chapter 7, available accounts of Asian and Latin American experiences since 
the 1960s are divided on the specific social, economic and structural circumstances as 
well as implications of mechanisation.^ The debate suggests clearly that responses to 
mechanisation differ between countries, between regions or agro-climatic zones in the 
same country, and even between crops. To this extent, the theoretical advantages of 
mechanisation may or may not be realised and cannot therefore be generalized. The 
impact of mechanisation on other variables or on the overall economy is therefore a 
function of how it affects and is affected by other operative variables in a particular 
setting.^
The employment effect of tractorisation is the most apparent, and, ironically, the most 
debated, in the literature on Asian and Latin American experiences.* On the face of it, 
few will disagree with the claim that farm mechanisation could generate employment 
opportunities within and outside agriculture. Inukai has shown, for example, that 
mechanisation need not be labour-displacing. Using Thailand’s experience in the 1960s, 
Inukai shows that selective mechanisation could be labour-augmenting.  ^ Since ‘farming 
consists of a series of operations from ploughing the land to marketing the crops’, 
mechanisation could ‘increase the total labour requirements per unit of land... [and] create 
more jobs than it eliminates’ if the choice of level and type of technology blends very 
well with relative factor endowments and/or costs in a given setting.
Such discrimination could be pursued at functional as well as strategic levels. Given
 ^See, e.g., V. N. Balasubramaniam, The Economy o f India (1984); B. Glaeser, The Green Revolution 
Reconsidered (1987); Michael Lipton with Richard Longhurst, New Seeds and Poor People (1989); and 
Vandana Shiva, The Violence o f the Green Revolution (1991).
See e.g. A. E. Deutsch, ‘Tractor Dilemma for the Developing Countries’, WC, 24, 5 (1972), pp. 234- 
236; and A. U. Khan, ‘Agricultural Mechanisation: The Tropical Farmer’s Dilemma’, WC, 24, 4 (1972), 
pp. 208-213.
* See the contributions in ILO, Mechanisation-, cf. Bruce F. Johnston and John Cownie, ‘The Seed- 
Fertilizer Revolution and Labour Force Absorption’, Æ R , LIX, 4 Part I (1969), pp. 569-582.
® I. Inukai, ‘Farm Mechanisation, Output and Labour Input: A Case Study in Thailand’, HR, 101, 5 
(1970), pp. 453-473; Michel Cépède, ‘The Green Revolution and Employment’, ILR, 105, 1 (1972), pp. 
1- 8 .
Inukai, ‘Farm’, p. 453.
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relative factor endowments and/or costs, a choice could be made between farm operations 
to be mechanised and in what sequence and other chores that could be left to manual 
labour.“ Official policy could then provide strategic incentives for the selected 
functional priorities by ‘relying largely on biological and chemical innovations 
that...[are]...land augmenting, excluding or at least discouraging mechanisation that 
displaces labour.S elec tive  mechanisation could thus help to achieve a reasonable 
balance between private profit (from increasing incomes for innovators and fewer farm 
workers) and wider social objectives, especially rural employment.
In other words, different combinations of labour and capital (in form of tractors) could 
be substituted one for the other under particular circumstances. Given that land tilling is 
often the first farm operation to be mechanised, labour displaced on account of 
mechanised land preparation and cultivation could be re-employed in, say, weeding and 
harvesting. Given also that mechanisation makes possible large increases in acreage and 
cropping intensities, the demand for labour on mechanised plots could increase over time. 
According to Clayton,
in a cash crop/food crop farm system where peak labour demand coincides with the 
cultivation and planting of food crops, mechanisation can prove to be economic if, by 
releasing labour from seed-bed preparation, it allows a re-arrangement of the cash 
crop/food crop ratio, with a resulting increase in the value of output, always 
provided...the right balance is achieved between the increased revenue and the cost of 
mechanisation.
The above claims are valid theoretically but would hardly stand close empirical scrutiny. 
To start with, ‘the right balance’ between the costs and benefits of mechanisation ‘is not 
merely a technical issue, but principally a political choice which affects the whole social
" Ibid.^ pp. 462-467; Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural, p. 150.
"  Keith Marsden, ‘Technological Change in Agriculture: Employment and Over-all Development 
Strategy’, in ILO, Mechanisation, p. 14.
"  On how to have it both ways, see Clayton, ‘A Note on Farm Mechanisation and Employment in 
Developing Countries’, ILR, 110, 1 (1974), pp. 57-62.
Clayton, ‘Mechanisation and Employment in East African Agriculture’, ILR, 105, 4 (1972), p. 311.
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structure of the rural e c o n o m y .F o r  example, increasing farm incomes depend on 
wider considerations, such as the balance between cash and ‘subsistence’ or consumption 
crops on the one hand, and aggregate demand for rising farm output on the other. These 
in turn hinge on price and fiscal policy on agriculture.
Secondly, the view that labour could move (or be moved) between operations is correct. 
But there is a time lag between land preparation and weeding during which displaced 
labour must seek sustenance through subsistence farming (where possible) or through 
alternative off-farm employment. Except there is a prior existence of landless labourers, 
or a well developed market for farm labour, or conditions that favour their emergence 
could be created rapidly, there is a distinct possibility that farm wages would increase in 
the immediate term. Such increase could be a demand for the re-distribution of the rising 
value of farm output and/or incomes/profits,^^ or the supply effect of possible movement 
of labour to industry or to subsistence farming after the first wave of displacements. The 
synchronic nature of farming means, for example, that a subsistence farmer would be less 
inclined to take up wage employment during peak season operations, especially since his 
earnings are likely to be lower than the consumption value of his own crops.
Either way, expanded labour use on mechanised plots is not automatic but subject to 
important size and price (or cost) constraints. For example, the use of manual labour in 
weeding operations could become uneconomic on very large farms. Mechanisation also 
generates new constraints on small-scale agricultural production. To quote Clayton once 
again.
In traditional peasant agriculture...there [are] limits to the benefits from expansion of the 
tillage acreage. For beyond a certain point, increased tillage is likely to generate weeding 
and/or harvesting labour bottlenecks - farm operations which are not commonly 
mechanised in peasant agriculture...Gains in output are not necessarily forthcoming, and
Marc Wuyts, ‘The Mechanisation of Present-Day Mozambican Agriculture’, DaC, 12 (1981), p. 1.
There is broad agreement on these issues in the literature. See, e.g., John Mellor and Uma Lele, 
‘Growth Linkages of the New Foodgrain Technologies’, IJAE, XXVIII, 1 (1973), pp. 35-55; G. Motilal, 
‘Economics of Tractor Utilisation’, ibid., pp. 96-105; Katar Singh, ‘The Impact of New Agricultural 
Technology on Farm Income Distribution in the Aligarh District of Uttah Pradesh’, IJAE, XXVIII, 2 
(1973), pp. 1-11; and Uma S. Singh and Dayanatha Jha, ‘A Note on Efficiency in Transitional Agriculture: 
A Study of Farms in Rural Delhi’, IJAE, XXVIII, 3 (1973), pp. 61-65.
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when they are, they tend to fall below expectations or those resulting from field trials/^
Moreover, labour could be employed on mechanised farms only so far as labour costs are 
lower than the cost of capital, or alternatively, or as long as the marginal productivity of 
labour is higher than or equal to the wage rate.^* However, these conditions are 
especially difficult to meet in technology-importing countries, where savings in labour 
costs from mechanisation are likely to be higher than the marginal productivity of labour 
because of import substitution and/or rapid mechanisation.^^ Increasing private profits 
from mechanisation thus co-exists with rising social costs, for example unemployment of 
unskilled labour.
The question of alternative employment in the rural non-farm sub-sector (where this 
exists) or in urban-based industry bears directly on wider economic policy as it reflects 
the skills of the workers themselves. On balance therefore, farm mechanisation is 
invariably problematic if rural-urban linkages are weak or overly skewed against rural 
economic interests, or where macro-economic forces cannot cushion the structural shocks 
which mechanisation almost always provokes in the rural sector.^  ^ Finally, Abercrombie 
has shown that it is difficult to translate selective mechanisation to concrete policies and 
to implement same.^  ^Inukai’s views are thus more inclined towards the long term, when 
the multiplier effects of mechanisation have become manifest in other sectors of the 
economy.
Clayton, Agriculture, p. 164.
Johnston and Cownie, ‘Seed-Fertilizer’, p. 576.
Ibid., p. 574; cf. B. H. Kinsey and Iftikhar Ahmed, ‘Mechanical Innovations on Small African 
Farms; Problems of Development and Diffusion’, ILR, 22, 2 (1983), pp. 227-238.
“  See, e.g., Carl H. Gotsch, ‘Tractor Mechanisation and Rural Development in Pakistan’, ILR, 107, 
2 (1973), pp. 133-166. Also in ILO, Mechanisation, pp. 129-162.
See Johnston and Cownie, ‘Seed-Fertilizer’, pp. 537-539; Gotsch, ‘Tractor’, pp. 160-164.
“  K. C. Abercrombie, ‘Agricultural Mechanisation and Employment in Latin America’, in ILO, 
Mechanisation, pp. 74-79.
^  For a summary, see Clayton, ‘Mechanisation’, pp. 312-313.
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In the short term, the use of tractors or even animal traction automatically displaces 
human labour from land tilling or from other labour-intensive operation for which 
alternative power is suitable. A study of rice farming in the Philippines has provided 
evidence of increased labour use that is unaccompanied by the adoption of labour-saving 
technologies.^"  ^ Acharya’s oft-cited survey of 120 farmers in two districts in India’s 
Rajasthan State suggested, for example, that labour use is higher by 31.7% among 
farmers adopting HYV seeds and tractors than among non-adopting farmers.^ Tractor 
operated farms however employed 27.3% less human labour than non-mechanised 
fa rm s .P a r t  of this was offset by higher cropping intensities in tractorised farms, 
estimated at 157% as against 132% in non-mechanised farms. But the differential in 
cropping intensities is wiped out after adjusting for the effect of cropping intensity on 
labour employment. In terms of labour employed per unit of cropped area, tractorised 
farms employ about 37% less labour than non-mechanised farm s.A charya’s view has 
been supported by, among others, Chattopadhyay’s more recent study on India;^* Gill’s 
data on Bangladesh; and Wood’s analysis of large farms in Mexico.Abercrombie 
has also estimated that about three workers were displaced by each tractor in Chile and 
about four in Columbia and Guatemala in the 1960s.Labour displacement is therefore 
one of several direct and indirect consequences of tractorisation.
The relationship between mechanisation and higher yields is no less conflicting.
^ Keijiro Otsuka, Fe Gascon and Seki Asano, ‘Green Revolution and Labour Demand in Rice Farming: 
The Case of Central Luzon, 1966-90’, JDS, 31, 1 (1994), pp. 82-109.
^ S. S. Acharya, ‘Green Revolution and Farm Employment’, IJAE, XXVIII, 3 (1973), p. 35.
Ibid., p. 36.
27 Ibid.
“  Manabendu Chattopadhyay, ‘Transformations of Labour Use in Indian Agriculture’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 8 (1984), pp. 289-296.
Gerard J. Gill, ‘Mechanised Land Preparation, Productivity and Employment in Bangladesh’, JDS, 
19, 3 (1983), pp. 329-348.
^  Richard H. Wood, ‘Tractor Mechanisation and Employment on Larger Private Mexican Farms’, ILR, 
122, 2 (1983), pp. 211-225. See also Gotsch, ‘Tractor’, pp. 151-153.
Abercrombie, ‘Agricultural’, p. 61.
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Binswanger’s review of historical data suggests no direct link between mechanisation and 
higher y ie ld s .N o r is tractorisation a prerequisite for the Green Revolution.Ahmed 
has shown that tractorisation commenced in south Asia before the Green Revolution in 
the 1960s and continued almost as rapidly after the advent of HYV seeds.Since HYV 
seeds also ‘embody a greater genetic potential for response to increased amounts of plant 
nutrition’ increased crop intensities is ‘a property of [HYV] seeds, not of 
mechanisation.’^  ^ Even so, higher yields have resulted from factors well beyond the 
seed-fertilizer nexus, including weather, guaranteed prices, and other supportive policy
measures.
Similarly, expanded ownership and use of tractors in Asia in the 1960s was fuelled less 
by the comparative advantage of tractorisation under the Green Revolution as by a 
combination of macro and micro-economic factors. At the micro level, increasing labour 
scarcity pushed up farm wages and left large farmers with only two options: to mechanise 
and reduce costs or otherwise face organised demands by labour for a share in the 
surplus. Most large-scale operators, it seemed, opted for the first option. At the macro 
level, over-valued currencies and liberalised credit policies translated to large implicit 
subsidies on imported tractors.^*
In Pakistan, for example, tractors were imported with foreign exchange obtained from 
official sources at about half of their market value.Government-guaranteed prices, or
Binswanger, Agricultural, pp. 7-8. 
Ahmad, ‘Implications’, p. 21.
^  Iftikhar Ahmed, ‘The Green Revolution and Tractorisation; Their Mutual Relations and Socio- 
Economic Effects’, ILR, 114, 1 (1976), pp. 83-93.
Ruttan and Binswanger, ‘Induced Innovation’, p. 359. Cf. Cépède, ‘Green Revolution’, p. 2.
^  Ahmed, ‘Green Revolution’, p. 85.
See, e.g., K. N. Raj, ‘Mechanisation of Agriculture in India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon)’, in ILO, 
Mechanisation, pp. 122-126.
Ahmed, ‘Green Revolution’, pp. 86-89.
Gotsch, ‘Tractor’, p. 139. Clayton makes similar points in respect of East African countries in
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the absence of an efficient scheme of agricultural taxation also assured a minimum 
reasonable return to private investment in tractors regardless of the propensity for prices 
to fall as a result of increased supp lyG iven  the opportunity costs of foreign exchange 
in developing countries, these and other policy incentives often distort the markets for 
labour, capital, as well as foreign exchange in the countries concerned and may well 
reduce their import capacity, as Gill has suggested with regard to Bangladesh/^ 
Mechanisation thus ‘involves substituting an expensive factor of production [capital, in 
the form of tractors and machinery] for a relatively cheap one [i.e. labour].
The point about expanded acreages is more interesting in the present context because 
Ekiti-Akoko’s small farmers were expected to increase their holdings six-fold, from an 
estimated 0.4 ha. to 2.5 ha. per capita. The latter is the minimum estimated size at which 
the individual farmer can employ mechanisation profitably. Data reviewed by Clayton and 
Ahmed have suggested increases in cropped areas of between 50% and 100% in India and 
Pakistan during the 1960s.‘^  ^ These increases are certainly related, in part at least, to 
expanded access to tractors during the Green Revolution. But the changes took place in 
close-settled zones where small farmers rented farmland for cash or occupied land in 
exchange for labour on the landlord’s fields. Landlords were thus able to expand their 
share of arable land ‘by reducing the amount of land available to tenants and thus creating 
landlessness [while] tractor owners increased their acreage by renting in or purchasing 
additional land.’^  ^Both mechanisms implied a systematic, market-induced abandonment 
of the landlord’s traditional obligations to tenants.
‘Mechanisation’,
^  Gotsch, ‘Tractor’; Ahmad, ‘Implications’, p. 12.
Gill, ‘Mechanised Land’.
Clayton, ‘Mechanisation’, p. 312. On Nigeria, see Jerome Wells, Agricultural Policy and Economic 
Growth in Nigeria 1962-68 (Ibadan, 1974), p. 311.
Clayton, Agriculture, p. 164; Ahmed, ‘Green Revolution’, p. 84.
^  Clayton, Agriculture, p. 163.
Ahmad, ‘Implications’, pp. 18-20; pp. 28-29; Gotsch, ‘Tractor’, pp. 150-151, pp. 155-156.
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Increased acreages in India and Pakistan during the 1960s were thus accompanied by 
‘regressive land reform’, that is ‘the taking of land from small cultivators to those that 
will develop the land more effectively’ or intensively/^ The Green Revolution, it would 
seem, strengthened existing tendencies for interlinked factor markets in Asian countries. 
Asian peasants thus faced an increasingly centralised suppliers’ market in land and 
technology. Available options, if they could be so-called, were to intensify their 
production in order to fulfil increasing rent and other obligations to landlords, or to lose 
their tenancy and means of subsistence altogether. This near zero-sum context precluded 
peasants from rejecting Green Revolution technology or otherwise adopting the new 
techniques at their own pace. Mechanisation is thus a technical as well as social-structural 
phenomenon.
To sum up. Mechanisation might be desirable in itself but is difficult to justify in strictly 
economic terms. The potential for expanded use of mechanical power by small and large 
farmers alike is also a function of two main factors. The first is access to productive 
resources, especially capital and land. The cost of capital could be reduced by direct and 
indirect subsidies, as indicated below. Tractors could also be employed economically on 
small, fragmented plots i f  the economic pay-offs from tractorisation are apparent enough 
to encourage farmers to cultivate contiguous plots, and if sufficient demand for tractor 
services exists at small-farm level.^ ®^ The more difficult general problem lies, therefore, 
with tenure systems and how they balance economic rationality (defined narrowly as 
individual profit-seeking) with social equity. Mechanisation flourishes where there is 
private property in land, and where smallholders compete for land on similar terms with 
larger-scale farmers. The institutional implication is clear: if mechanisation is to proceed 
apace, tenurial arrangements which sustain peasant farming have to change substantially.
The second major factor that promotes mechanisation is macro-economic policy support. 
Such support could take the form of subsidies to reduce the real cost of capital or
^  Payer, ITie World Bank (New York, 1982), p. 214; p. 217.
Ahmed, ‘Green Revolution’, pp. 90-91.
Inukai, ‘Farm’, p. 458. Western Nigeria’s farm settlements were founded upon similar assumptions.
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operational expenses. Alternatively, tax incentives might be granted to permit 
accumulation of surpluses which could then be invested in tractors and equipment. In 
practice, investors do not always act in the collective interest and policy structures do fail 
to channel incentives to the most appropriate groups. Policy incentives also distort factor 
markets and widen the gap between the private benefits and social costs of mechanisation. 
Add to this the net labour displacement effect of mechanical power, and it becomes clear 
that the social benefits of mechanisation are realisable only in the long-term.'^^ The next 
section considers how these issues have manifested in northern Nigeria and Nigeria-wide 
schemes.
8.3 Farm Mechanisation in Nigeria since c.1920s
Official attempts to expand the use of animal and mechanical power in small scale 
agriculture in Nigeria date back to the beginnings of colonial agricultural extension work 
early in the 20th cen tu ry .In  pre-colonial northern Nigeria,
...the settled farmer was commonly little more than a villein or slave; and even if any 
farmer had the money to invest in cattle, he dared not do so, as they were apt to be 
forcibly taken away from him; or, at best, such an obvious sign of increased wealth made 
him liable for excessive taxation. This state of affairs ended when [Nigeria] was taken 
over by the British; and after a few years a number of settled farmers began to invest 
their savings in cattle. Recently the number of those who have done so has been steadily 
increasing.^'
Faulkner and Mackie’s depiction of pre-colonial northern Nigeria as a despotic polity in 
which honest and productive endeavour economy was discouraged is open to question, 
especially as a counterpoint to the colonial state’s early economic stra tegy .B ut the
Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural, p. 185.
O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 64-75.
5' Ibid., p. 65.
Cf. Robert Shenton, The Development o f Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (1986), especially pp. 101- 
119; and Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, ‘From Wealthy Entrepreneurs to Petty Traders: The Decline of African 
Middlemen in Eastern Nigeria, 1900-1950’, JAH, 23, 3 (1982), pp. 365-379. For wider commentary, see 
Cyril Ehrlich, ‘Building and Caretaking: Economic Policy in British Tropical Africa, 1810-1960’, EHR, 
2nd ser., XXVI, 4 (1973), pp. 649-667; and Anne Phillips, The Enigma o f Colonialism (1989), especially 
pp. 156-163.
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commentary underscores how the colonial state had helped to promote mixed farming in 
northern Nigeria.
Government’s initial approach was to regard mixed farming and the introduction of the 
plough as two sides of a coin. The Agriculture Department thus designed a programme 
that sought to promote more intensive cultivation and the expansion of cropped acreages. 
According to Faulkner and Mackie,
...mixed farming [requires that] every farmer owns cattle of his own, say two bullocks 
and one or two cows, together with his usual head of sheep, goats and fowls. He would 
keep his cattle in a pen and supply them with bedding, thus making farmyard manure of 
the highest quality all the year round. His bullocks would be used for ploughing, thus 
solving the labour problem; and his cows would breed calves and supply him with milk 
for his family or for sale. The calves would appreciate in value as the male animals come 
on for draught purposes and the females develop into milking cows.^^
Faulkner and Mackie went on to review possible arrangements for making hay and animal 
feed. '^  ^ But the capital requirements of these arrangements and the centralized control 
over access to (grazing) land in northern Nigeria lent an elitist character to the 
arrangements. This partly explains why a large proportion of beneficiaries were from 
among the traditional gentry and native administration officials.
Early official policy sought to reduce the time spent by labour in food production and to 
make such extra labour time available for the production of export crops and raw 
materials.^^ Although the dual mandate had become fashionable by the 1920s, the need 
to ‘prop the state’s dwindling revenue’ was perhaps more important for officialdom than 
producer welfare.Expanded relations with the export market promised ‘quick returns’, 
increased access to cash, and higher purchasing power. Yet, native farmers’ material
Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 64.
Ibid., pp. 71-74.
“  Tom Forrest, ‘Agricultural Policies in Nigeria, 1900-78’, in Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts, and Gavin 
Williams (eds.). Rural Development in Tropical Africa (1981), pp. 226-227; ShexAon, Development, p. 105.
^  Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 5.
Shenton, Development, p. 104.
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welfare was to be improved not so much through direct policy intervention as by 
autonomous action by farmers themselves to intensify their involvement in primary 
commodity production/^ As Faulkner and Mackie argued,
the material advancement of the people...is at present...bound up with the production of 
raw materials for export, after they have provided for their own food... if labour is saved 
in the production of foodstuffs, it becomes available for production for export...The 
economics of native agriculture thus become the foundation of agricultural policy
Official concern for social welfare expanded dramatically with the global shift in 
development ideology in the 1950s and 1960s. This inclination was expressed in Nigeria 
through regional land settlement programmes and state-owned plantations. One result of 
this expansion was an increase in the number of imported tractors, from under 500 in 
1960 to over 1,200 ten years later. Tractor imports peaked at 8,700 units in 1981, 
concurrently with Nigeria’s Green Revolution campaign.^
Table 8.1 summarises data on Nigeria’s tractor imports between 1960 and 1986 in 
unweighted averages for three-year sub-periods. Data for 1980 are for six months and 
those for 1982 are estimated; still. Table 8.1 suggests a phenomenal growth in the 
number of imported tractors after 1968. In 1969-71, annual average imports reached
1,000 units, increasing to over 1,700 units in 1972-74. The latter exceeds 1960-62 and 
1963-65 figures by between three and four times respectively. Imports increased further 
after 1973, peaking at 4,600 each year in 1975-77. Thereafter, the number of imported 
tractors declined by about half, picked up once again in 1981-83 by about the same 
proportion, and then dropped to just over 1969-71 levels. The decline in tractor imports 
in the 1980s is partly in response to Nigeria’s diminishing economic fortunes since the 
1979 oil price shock, and partly because demand was being met by local tractor assembly
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Ibid., p. 5.
“  See Olajire Bamisaye, ‘The Crisis of Green Revolution Programme in Nigeria: The Need for a Rural 
Development Policy’ in Ajibade Ogunjumo et. al. (eds.), Nigeria’s Economic Recovery Strategies (Ile-Ife, 
1988), pp. 12-27; and Francis Idachaba, ‘The Political Economy of Nigeria’s Green Revolution 
Programme’, in NES, The Nigerian Economy (Ibadan?, 1986), pp. 87-110.
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plants.
Table 8.1
Nigeria’s Tractor Imports, 1960-86*
Sub-period Wheeled Tracked or 
half-tracked
Total % change
1960-62 870 286 1156 _
1963-65 222 269 491 -57.5
1966-68 235 211 446 -9.2
1969-71 776 226 1,002 124.7
1972-74 1,414 319 1,733 73.0
1975-77 3,089 1,514 4,603 165.6
1978-80” 1,396 987 2,383 -48.2
1981-83*= 2,312 1,324 3,636 52.6
1984-86 791 324 1,115 -69.3
Average per sub-period 1,234 607 1,841 -
Notes: * Unweighted averages computed from annual cumulative totals. '* 1980 figures as at 30 June.
Data for 1982 not available; estimate fitted with SPSS Release 6.0.
Computed from: Nigeria Trade Summary, various years.
Pockets of mechanised farms now exist in all parts of Nigeria. Policy support for large 
scale farming has been intensified since the 1980s as part of a wider strategy to expand 
local production of raw materials for indust ry.A list compiled by Bonat and Abdullahi 
has suggested, for example, that at least 54 transnational concerns in Nigeria have taken 
more or less substantial stakes in mechanised farming as at 1989.^  ^ Since some of the 
companies in the list have been traditionally engaged in the manufacture and/or retail of 
consumer goods, it must be inferred that Nigerian agriculture has become more attractive 
for foreign investment than in the 1960s and 1970s. Even so, the multiplier effects of 
mechanisation on employment prospects in agriculture generally or in the rural areas in 
particular have been negligible, limited, or open to debate.
The reasons are not difficult to seek. The policy concessions themselves, and the
Gunilla Andrae and Bjom Beckman, ‘Industry Goes Farming: The Nigerian Raw Material Crisis and 
the Case of Textiles and Cotton’, Research Report No. 80 (Uppsala, 1987); Ronald Cohen, ‘Adversity and 
Transformation: The Nigerian Light at the End of the Tunnel’, in R. Cohen (ed.). Satisfying Africa’s Food 
Needs (1988), pp. 232-234.
“  Zuwaqhu Bonat and Yahaya Abdullahi, ‘The World Bank, IMF and Nigeria’s Agricultural and rural 
Economy’, in Bade Onimode (ed.). The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt, Vol. 2 (1989), pp. 
174-176.
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circumstances that spawned them, put government in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis 
foreign investors. In 1984/85, Nigeria’s Indigenous Enterprises Promotion (or 
Indigenisation) Act was amended to allow complete foreign ownership of agricultural 
ventures. Conceived primarily to attract private foreign investment into the economy, the 
amendment reversed provisions under which agricultural enterprises could only be jointly 
owned with Nigerians. The preference for agricultural ventures thus reflects relative 
factor prices and profit potential (or turnover ratios) between agriculture and, say, 
manufacturing rather than a desire shared by government and investors alike to encourage 
new ways of transforming agricultural production.
Since the mid-1980s, Nigeria’s federal and state governments have been eager to offer 
large tracts of land in addition to tax and profit incentives to attract private investment. 
This is not bad in itself, but such deals invariably displace smallholders and encourage 
landlessness and impoverishment in areas with few, if any, economic opportunities 
outside agriculture. So far the government has done virtually nothing to discourage the 
use of labour-displacing technology on large-scale mechanised farms. Nor has there been 
any substantial evidence to suggest that Nigeria’s state managers have seriously addressed 
the deleterious effects on farm employment and rural welfare of imported tractors and 
equipment.
For example, the minimum capacity of tractors reported in Table 8.1 above is 40 b.h.p. 
(brake horse power). This reflects Nigeria’s soil profile less than it exemplifies the belief 
in developing countries that ‘the most modem and efficient technical equipment’ would 
help accelerate the development process.B ut while such tools are often the best in the 
market, they have invariably been developed with little consideration for the buying 
countries’ ecological or capital-labour profiles. Apart from poor linkages with their host 
rural economies, the equipment breaks down frequently and cannot be fully employed. 
Proper maintenance is also difficult because of poor local technical capacity or because 
foreign exchange supply constraints make spare parts too expensive and unavailable.
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York, 1965 ed.),
p. 9.
301
At the same time, officials have either trivialised or avoided altogether the potential for 
technology-induced income inequalities. In 1982, government acknowledged the existence 
of distributional inequalities and its possible social effects.^ But it did little more than 
express the belief that absolute change in income is more important than relative change, 
and that as part of Nigeria’s ‘virile and forward looking population.. .small farmers.. .will 
be happy with an increase in their absolute income and gradually promote themselves into 
medium and later into larger size farmers.
By 1983, senior officials were denying that the structure of access to productive resources 
constituted a problem. Theophilus Aribisala, Chief Consultant to the Green Revolution 
National Committee, argued in a NISER Distinguished Lecture that the problem of 
differential access to inputs did not apply to Nigeria because Nigeria’s Green Revolution 
programme was designed especially for small-scale farmers and because the country had 
‘very few large farmers to speak about’ Above all, Aribisala argued that ‘Green 
Revolution technology is scale neutral and as long as there is an even distribution of 
productive resources of land, capital and other inputs among [small farmers] there should 
be no p r o b l e m . I n  fact, productive inputs are never distributed evenly; access to 
recommended inputs has constituted a substantive problem in technology-driven 
agriculture. Large-scale farmers have also been shown to have employed Green 
Revolution technology more easily and more profitably than small, cash-poor farmers 
even in the success stories of Asia and Latin America, though the facts are debated as 
noted e a r l i e r . I n  short, Aribisala merely fudged the question of unequal access to 
inputs in Nigeria.
^  FRN, Green Revolution (Lagos, 1982). 
“  Ibid., p. 32.
“  Aribisala, ‘Nigeria’s Green Revolution: Achievement, Problems and Prospects’, NISER Distinguished 
Lecture N® 1 (Ibadan, 1983), p. 31.
67 Ibid. Emphasis added.
“  For recent comments, see Michael Lipton with Richard Longhurst, New Seeds and Poor People 
(1989), chp. 3; and Ignacy Sachs, ‘Towards a Second Green Revolution?’, in Glaeser, Green Revolution, 
pp. 193-198.
302
One point, however, is beyond dispute. Mechanisation has highlighted the importance of 
property rights in land and encouraged government to streamline Nigeria’s different 
tenure systems. Official strategies and successes have tended to differ between Nigeria’s 
ethno-geographical regions. In the north, central control over land was formalised in the 
Native Lands Ordinance of 1910, under which all land was vested in the government and 
administrative control in Native Authorities.^^ In the southwest, by contrast, 
government’s attempts to pool smallholdings have been less successful. In these cases, 
and in the southeast where the supply and productive potential of available farmland has 
been constrained by high population densities, the goal of policy has been first, to make 
intensification economically feasible and attractive to the peasantry; and second, to 
overcome land fragmentation by encouraging smallholders to increase their cropped 
acreages and, where possible, to cultivate contiguous fields.
As a whole, policy-induced landlessness has been confined largely to closely-settled 
northern Nigeria. The north’s history of semi-feudalism had converged with the 
imperatives of indirect rule and made a fait accompli of central governmental control over 
all land, as noted above. Indirect rule was less successful in southwestern Nigeria and a 
near-total failure in the east, partly because of different historio-political traditions and 
partly because of a sustained campaign by the then nascent southern elite against the 
extension to the south of provisions of the 1910 Ordinance.The 1978 Land Use Act 
was intended to achieve this goal, its main justification being that ‘the idea of government 
being the custodian of land in the Northern States is germane and should be remain as 
an acceptable base for land use’.^  ^ In fact, the Act has been widely abused even in the 
north and also failed to substantially weaken communal control over agricultural land in
® Michael Mortimore ef. al. (eds.), Perspectives on Land Admnistration and Development in Northern 
Nigeria (Kano, 1986).
See e.g., Martin U. Igbozurike (ed.). Land Use and Conservation in Nigeria (Nsukka, 1981), Part 
I; and Section 3. See Mortimore et. a l .  Perspectives, Part I.
I. M. Okonjo, British Administration in Nigeria 1900-50 ÇNew York, 1974); Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony 
on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, Africa, 62, 3 (1992), pp. 341-343.
^  Paul Francis, ‘ "For the Use and Common Benefit of all Nigerians": Consequences of the 1978 Land 
Nationalization’, Africa, 54, 3 (1984), p. 7.
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the southwest.
In any case, regressive trends in land distribution have been reported since the 1970s in 
research on close-settled Kano and Kaduna States^ '^  as well as in Sokoto^  ^ and Bauchi 
S t a t e s . I n  these and possibly other states, large-scale irrigation and wheat cultivation 
have intensified private property in land and generated landlessness among poor peasants. 
It is generally believed that these developments have benefited a class of middle peasants 
or urban-based farmer-businessmen with privileged access to government functionaries 
and to commercial credit.^^ The Land Use Act has consolidated private property in land 
to the extent that large-scale farmers now have more secure private rights, at least 
formally, than peasant cultivators. But this has been more limited to urban or peri-urban 
than rural land; in the latter, communal control has persisted, and in some cases been 
reinforced by the softness of the state’s structures or ethnic posturing by the political 
e l i t e . I n  any case, the Act has reinforced a dual tenure system and widened the scope 
of rent-seeking as well as speculation in arable land by privileged individuals and
See Yakub L. Fabiyi, ‘Land Policy in Nigeria: Case Studies of the Implementation of the Land Use 
Decree (Act) in Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States of Nigeria’, Odu, 19 (1979), pp. 144-156. See also A, N. 
Chidebelu, G. W. Ames and E. E. Brown, ‘Land Use in Nigeria’, FP, 5, 4 (1980), pp. 306-310; and R. 
O. Adegboye, ‘The Land Use Decree: A Revolution in Land Ownership?’, in O. Oyediran (ed.). Survey 
o f Nigerian Affairs 1977-78 (Lagos, 1981), pp. 47-54.
See, e.g., Segun Famoriyo, ‘Land Ownership and Control in Nigeria: Implications of the Land Use 
Act for Nigeria’s Political Economy’, in NES, Nigerian Economy, pp. 126-141.
Ken Swindell and A. B. Mamman, ‘Land Expropriation and Accumulation in the Sokoto Periphery, 
northwest Nigeria’, Africa, 60, 2 (1990), pp. 173-187.
76 Peter H. Koehn, Public Policy and Administration in Africa (Boulder, 1990), chp. 5.
^  See, e.g., Tina Wallace, ‘Agricultural Projects and Land in Northern Nigeria’, ROAPE, 17 (1980), 
pp. 59-70; Bjom Beckman, ‘Public Investments and Agrarian Transformation in Northern Nigeria’, in 
Michael Watts (ed.). State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 110-137.
In 1988, for example, Olusegun Obasanjo, who as military head of state presided over the 
promulgation of the Act, had the certificate of occupancy on his holdings in Niger State revoked by the 
state government. The official reason was an unspecified public interest requirement, but the revocation 
order was announced shortly after Obasanjo, who had become a successful large-scale farmer after leaving 
office, criticised the government’s stmctural adjustment programme for lacking a human face. In this and 
several other cases, government’s powers under the Act may have been used to settle political and personal 
scores with little regard for the credibility of incipient institutions,
304
groups.
8.4 Western Nigeria’s Experience to c.1970s
This section examines the rise of tractor operations in Western Nigeria, with particular 
emphasis on a relatively successful case in the old Oyo Division, within the savanna 
zone. The successes of that case are explained in the context of wider economic 
variables, which also distinguish it from Ekiti-Akoko’s experience. The latter is the 
subject-matter of a subsequent section.
In the 1870s, Christian missionaries working in or around Badagry and Abeokuta made 
an early attempt to introduce the plough into southwestern Nigeria.*® In the spirit of the 
presumed association between Christianity, commerce, and civilisation,*^ the 
missionaries had regarded the introduction of the plough as a logical sequel to the spread 
of the gospel.*^ Those early hopes floundered because the Yoruba wars had made 
organised development activity difficult, and also because ‘the new crops and seeds 
introduced needed neither the plough nor imported techniques to make them thrive.’*^ 
The potential for widespread use of the plough was also limited by the absence of draught 
animals and also because the dense forest provided a ‘vegetal cover that could not be 
easily removed for the plough to be set in motion.’*^
In the 1930s, the colonial government promoted a green manure scheme as a counterpart 
to the plough in northern Nigeria. But the scheme was doomed because of a very low 
animal density occasioned by bush and forest-borne diseases. Moreover, the application
Francis, ‘Land Nationalization’.
“  G. J. A. Ojo, ‘Trends Towards Mechanised Agriculture in Yorubaland’, NGJ, 6, 2 (1963), pp. 116- 
129.
C. C. Ifemesia, ‘The Civilising Mission of 1841: Aspects of an Episode in Anglo-Nigerian 
Relations’, JHSN, 2 3 (1962), pp. 291-310.
“  Ojo, ‘Trends’, p. 117.
mW., pp. 117-118.
^ Ibid., p. 118.
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of organic manures had encouraged rapid bush and grass regrowth, generating additional 
demand for peak-season labour for weeding operations.*^ It was only after 1945, 
therefore, that farm mechanisation became a prominent policy objective in Western 
Nigeria.*^
In 1959, Western Region launched its farm settlement scheme, an experiment with new 
forms of organization to stimulate the adoption of modem techniques in peasant farming 
and create agricultural career opportunities for youths who had completed six to eight 
years of formal education.*^ Thirteen settlements (including two in the savannah region) 
with a total of 2200 settlers, were originally proposed for the region, but this was revised 
upwards in 1962 to stem the tide of primary school graduates who were starting to 
feature ‘specially in troublesome migrations to towns and cities’.** By 1966, there were 
19 settlements and at least 3000 settlers at a cost totalling £N7.4 million in 1962-68. 
Apart from cost overmns, the scheme failed in its employment and welfare goals.*  ^
According to Adegeye, the scheme could have absorbed only 4,500 or 1.3% of the 
estimated 340,000 male school leavers in Western Nigeria in 1969.^ In the event, the 
scheme attracted only 1,410 settlers, less than one-third of the settlements’ total labour 
absorption capacity,while turnover increased steadily to 42% in 1965-66.
“  CS026/4/34177 NAI. Minute 2758/DA/6A of 16 May 1938 by J. R. Mackie, Director of 
Agriculture.
86 Ojo, ‘Trends’, pp. 118-119.
^  WRN, ‘Future Policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources’, Sessional Paper N® 9 
o / 7959 (Ibadan, 1959).
WRN, ‘White Paper on Integrated Rural Development’, Western Nigeria Official Document N® 8 of 
1963 (Ibadan, 1963).
Mordechai Kreinin, ‘The Introduction of Israel’s Land Settlement Plan to Nigeria’, JFE, 45, 3 
(1963); Oladejo Okediji, ‘Some Socio-Cultural Problems in the Western Nigeria Land Settlement Scheme: 
A Case Study’, NJESS, 7, 3 (1965); Dupe Olatunbosim, ‘The Farm Settlement: A Case Study of an 
Agricultural Project in Nigeria’, BRES, 6, 1 (1971).
^  A. J. Adegeye, ‘Re-Examination of the Issues involved in the Farm Settlement Scheme of the 
Western State of Nigeria’, GAS, III, 1, new ser. (1974), pp. 79-88.
Ibid,, , p. 80.
306
In 1962/63, 130 of 620 settlers [in two neighbouring settlements] left the settlements, 
discouraged by the hard life, the crop failures, the size of their debt, the authoritarian 
behaviour of the staff, a compulsory savings scheme and delays in paying the monthly 
food allowance [£5, 10s.
According to official figures, Igede farm settlement, near Ayede, never had more than 
20 settlers at any point in time,^  ^though two of the original settlers gave a higher figure 
of 22.^ By 1975/76, six years into Igede's life, the number of settlers had dwindled to 
only five.^^ In ten years to 1975/76, the number of settlers in all seven farm settlements 
in present-day Ondo State ranged from 238 to 365. If account is taken of missing data, 
each settlement would have a mean annual settler population of 50, with tree crop 
settlements in Akure and Okitipupa attracting up to 100 settlers in half of the period 
covered by the data.^^
A more successful case, perhaps, concerns the growth of private tractor services in old 
Oyo and Osun Divisions of Western State, as reported by Kolawole.^ Like some parts 
of EAADP’s operational area, what used to be Oyo and Osun Divisions (now divided 
between two states with the same names) have large areas under savanna vegetation. The 
case is therefore of immense analytical interest here. In the 1970s, the Western State 
Government had sought to develop a private market in tractor services, much like the 
Ekiti-Akoko project tried to do in the 1980s. To this end, government had sold used 
tractors at rock-bottom prices ‘to progressive farmers...to encourage private tractor 
ownership.’^ ® Prices averaged N200 each, that is some 2,150% lower than the minimum
”  W. Roider, ‘Nigerian Farm Settlements’, in A. H. Bunting (ed.). Change in Agriculture (1970), p. 
421.
”  ODS, Digest o f Agricultural Statistics, 1976 (Akure, n.d.). Table 30, p. 35.
^  Interview with both settlers, Amos Akinyemi and Julius Ayegbusi, 15 April 1992.
^  ODS, Digest 1976, Table 30, p. 35.
% îbid.
^  M. I. Kolawole, ‘Economic Aspects of Private Tractor Operations in the Savanna Zone of Western 
Nigeria’, Savanna, 3, 2 (1974), pp. 175-183.
Ibid., p. 178.
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market price of a new Mersey Fergusson 165 tractor.^ While the 165 model accounted 
for 39.1 % of all tractors (n=87) reported in Kolawole's survey, 93% of all tractors were 
Mersey Fergusson.
In addition to the generous undervaluing of the capital costs of tractors, government 
provided a 30% subsidy ‘to cover supervisory staff and expenses involved in movements 
of tractors between the scattered f arms .Government  also charged lower rates than 
private operators for field operations. This translated to implicit subsidies of between 
25% and 32% on the cost of major operations to farmers who hired government tractors 
in 1965-67.^02
One outcome of this scheme was a remarkable expansion in private ownership of tractors. 
In 1968, according to Purvis’ path-breaking survey, eight private tractor owners had 11 
Mersey Fergusson tractors between them.^°3 piy^ years later, in 1973, the number of 
private tractor operators had increased to 50. The number of privately-owned tractors had 
also increased seven fold to 87 by 1973, most of them in southern O yo/^
Kolawole’s survey area however comprised communities with a relatively long and 
intense exposure to capital-intensive, commercial agriculture. In the 1930s, the British- 
American Tobacco Company pioneered commercial production of tobacco leaves, its 
main raw material, in what is now known as northern Oyo State. Since 1954 at least.
^  Ibid., p. 179.
Computed from ibid., p. 178.
101 Ibid., p. 175.
Computed from S. A. Oni, ‘The Present Stage and Prospects of Agricultural Mechanisation in 
Nigeria’, in Recent Stage and Prospects o f Agricultural Mechanisation in Developing Countries (Berlin, 
1976), Table 4, p. 124.
M. Purvis, ‘A Study of the Economics of Tractor Use in Oyo Division of the Western State’, 
Consortium for the Study o f Nigerian Rural Development, Bulletin 17 (1968), cited extensively in Wells, 
Policy’, Kolawole, ‘Tractor’; and Oni, ‘Prospects’.
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 177.
J. T. Coppock, ‘Tobacco Cultivation in Nigeria’, Erdkunde, XIX, 4 (1965), p. 299, Also described
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the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NIC), a subsidiary of British-American, has contracted 
local farmers to produce flue-cured tobacco l e a v e s . T h i s  has certainly created 
alternative uses for land and labour, enabling local farmers to expand the production of 
a cash crop (i.e. tobacco leaves) for which there is substantial technical and economic 
support as well as demand.
Yield increases have also been reported for maize, often grown in rotation with tobacco 
but also benefitting from the use of fertilizer to improve tobacco yields.Increasing 
incomes from tobacco production have in turn meant that farmers have been able to 
absorb the costs of mechanisation more easily than they would if they were growing food 
crops for subsistence or for sale. °^* When account is taken of the economic and 
historical impact of NTC’s presence in the area,^°  ^ government’s generous support for 
private tractor operators is likely to become less significant.
For example, the NTC sponsored only three of 41 operators surveyed by kolawole. This 
small proportion of respondents however accounted for 52% of tractors reported in the 
survey! These ‘company owners’, as Kolawole calls them, were not themselves farmers, 
and they provided hire services full-time to all farmers in the tobacco belt. But they gave 
priority to tobacco growers, NTC’s primary c l i en t s .A l l  tractors used by company 
owners were also obtained from the open market or through the NTC. Conversely, co­
operative owners obtained 57% of their tractors through the government’s discount 
scheme; 32% of individually-owned tractors were similarly obtained. As a whole
in Elliott Morss et. aZ., Strategies for Small Farmer Development, Vol. II Case Studies (Boulder, 1976), 
pp. 203-212.
For details, see D. A. Oyeleye, ‘Tobacco Cultivation in Oyo Division, Western Nigeria’, NGJ, 14, 
2 (1971), pp. 165-184.
Morss et. al.. Strategies, p. 210.
108 wePs Policy, p. 311, citing Purvis.
See, e.g., M. I. Kolawole, ‘Economic Aspects of Flue-Cured Tobacco Production in the Savanna 
Zone of Western Nigeria’, Savanna, 4, 1 (1975), pp. 13-22; and Ademola Babalola, ‘Capitalist 
Development in Agriculture: The Case of Commercial Tobacco Farming in the Oyo-North Division, Oyo 
State, Nigeria’, AEH, 21 (1993), pp. 37-49.
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 177; p. 180.
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therefore, 36% of all non-company tractors, or 17% of all tractors reported in Kolawole's 
survey were obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture. About two-thirds of non­
company tractors and a remarkably high 87 % of all tractors covered by the survey thus 
originated outside the government’s sales scheme.
A number of inferences can be drawn from the above analysis. The first and most 
obvious is that company operators constitute a minority of private tractor operators in old 
Oyo and Osun Divisions. It is certain, however, that the NTC, acting through its 
sponsored units, has been better able to bring its influence to bear on the market than 
have independent operators. Tractor output figures suggest, for example, that NTC- 
sponsored units accounted for between one-third and over half of mechanised acreages 
in 1970-73. Average acreage per tractor was estimated at over 3,000 acres (1,214.1 ha.) 
at NTC-sponsored units and between 80-400 acres (or 32.4-162.0 ha.) in o the r s .The  
same point is supported by available evidence on NTC’s organisational leverage and 
control of credit for tobacco farming. Kolawole’s survey of 71 tobacco-growing families 
has suggested, for example, that 87% obtained all their credit from the co mp an y .A n  
additional 12% of respondents relied on the company as well as other sources for their 
credit needs . Indeed ,  what Kolawole regarded as NTC’s essential support for small 
tobacco-growing groups in 1973“  ^ had, in Babalola’s opinion, become a full-fledged 
monopoly control over a major element of productive life in the Oyo-North area by 
1987."*
Second, and more importantly, effective demand for tractors among locals was relatively 
high. This inference would still hold even after allowance has been made for NTC-
Computed from ibid., p. 178. 
'*2 Ibid., p. 180.
Kolawole, ‘Flue-Cured Tobacco’, Table 4, p. 19. 
Ibid.
"5 Ibid., p. 22.
Babalola, ‘Commercial Tobacco’, p. 48.
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sponsored operators. Demand levels may well reflect personal factors, such as the size 
of farms, the quest for ‘timeliness in operations’, or the desire to ‘avoid the 
disappointment usually associated with government hire stations’, as Kolawole has 
noted. Still, those who bought tractors must have built up their demand or utilisation 
capacity over time, most probably through government hire schemes.
The point, therefore, is that the government could have sold its discounted tractors at 
higher prices or with lower premiums. It is possible, of course, that fewer people would 
have been willing or able to buy tractors without the discounts. But the tractors would 
still have remained the cheapest alternative and private operators would have bought them 
to exploit local demand for tractor services. The government’s discount scheme thus 
bears the hallmarks of an official transfer to well-off segments of the farming public. 
This is the oft-cited divergence between the social costs and private benefits of state- 
sponsored mechanisation, details of which are not necessary here."^
What seems clear is that the scheme has helped to activate or at least sustain demand for 
tractor services in the survey area. It has also nurtured a crop of small-scale 
entrepreneurs in the locality, notably providers and users of tractors, and, by implication, 
support services such as spare parts and credit. According to Kolawole, total mechanized 
acreage increased by 320% to 10,200 acres over four years to 1973, though up to half 
of total acreage was accounted for by operators, most of whom worked their own land 
under close NTC supervision and control. Purvis’ survey data suggest further that 
farmers doubled the area planted to tobacco and other crops. Some 54% increase in 
yields was also reported for all crops grown on mechanized fields, although the increases 
are not attributed directly to mechanisation. Private tractor operators however 
charged higher rates than government-owned THU. The differentials averaged 38% for
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 178.
Binswanger, Agricultural, pp. 12-13 and p. 15.
See Clayton, ‘Mechanisation’, p. 312; and Abercrombie, ‘Mechanisation’, pp. 56-57. 
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 180.
Oni, ‘Prospects’, p. 130.
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ridging and 57% for harrowing in 1973, but were most certainly offset by the remarkable 
increases in output and land product ivi ty.The wider economic impact of tobacco- 
growing is also significant. For two-thirds of tobacco farmer-respondents (n=200) to 
Babalola’s survey reported investments outside the tobacco economy as well as in 
commerce and transport. A large proportion of such investment is likely to have been 
derived from profits on their tobacco operations.
The link between mechanisation and physical productivity may not always translate to 
cash gains. According to Olayide, a yam farmer who works for six hours per day in a 
derived savanna area would increase his labour productivity by 17% or 62 mandays if 
his land was cultivated by mechanical means. Cassava and maize growers would save 
40 mandays (29.2%) and 15 mandays (15.5%) respectively over and above their 
colleagues who rely entirely on muscle power. In terms of costs, however, the yam 
farmer who employs partial mechanisation would be better off by only 11%, cassava 
growers by 9.3% and maize farmers by 4%.^^ Clearly, mechanisation’s labour-saving 
effect does little to reduce its capital costs to the small farmer in the short and medium 
terms. On larger farms, savings on labour costs occasioned by mechanised land 
preparation are often offset by increased demand for labour in harvesting and processing. 
The question for policy, as noted earlier, is to make a choice between labour-saving or 
labour-displacing types of machines, or determine the speed and sequence in which farm 
chores are to be mechanised. Either way, fundamental questions remain unanswered 
on the marginal value of mechanisation to small-scale farmers.
The Ekiti-Akoko area shares with the old Oyo and Osun Divisions a savaima vegetation, 
low population density as well as similar policy structures and objectives. While these
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 183.
Babalola, ‘Commercial Tobacco’, p. 46.
S. O, Olayide, ‘Agricultural Technology and Nigeria’s Small Farmers’, in Olayide, J. Eweka, and 
V. Bello-Osagie (eds.), Nigerian Small Fanners (Ibadan, 1980), Table 4,3, p. 52; p. 60.
'25 Ibid.
'25 Inukai, ‘Farm Mechanisation’.
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suggest similar objective conditions for the growth of tractor services, the Ekiti-Akoko 
area, and Ondo State in general lacks enterprises suitable to propel private investment in 
tractors or perform other facilitating functions, as NTC has done in tobacco-growing 
areas in present-day Oyo State. This has meant at least three things. First, low and
uncertain economic incentives, or the lack of them, has meant that pressures for
intensification by small farmers have been low or non-existent. The second is that local 
response to the project’s mechanisation programme would turn not so much on the 
potential impact of mechanisation on land distribution as on individual concerns like 
labour supply, food security, and access to credit. The third and final point is that the 
project had to promote mechanisation without substantial private interest or policy
support. These issues are now examined in some detail.
8.5 EAADP’s Technical Service Packages
The Ekiti-Akoko project promoted two categories of input-technical services to address 
the different requirements of smallholders and middle peasants/large scale farmers. These 
are the Basic Service Package and the Advanced Service Package. This section describes 
both packages and how well they fitted into local farming arrangements.
The Basic Service Package (BSP) was targeted at small scale farmers who, for various 
reasons, were most likely to buy farm inputs in small units, and at irregular intervals. 
BSP comprised conventional inputs like improved seeds, fertilizer, and agro-chemicals, 
but the star component was the minimum tillage manual equipment (or MTME), a 
complement of hand-pushed tools for land tillage, fertilizing, planting, and spraying. But 
potential adopters of BSP were not obliged to buy the entire package. On the contrary, 
farmers could buy chemicals and insecticides without buying any of the labour-saving 
hand implements and vice versa. Estimated to cost about N30.00 per unit, 65,000 small 
scale farmers were expected to employ BSP on 29,000 ha. of cultivated land, that is 
about 0.45 ha. per f a r m e r . I n  fact, none of 8,300 available units of BSP’s hand tools 
was sold in six years to 1987.
V. A. P. Naik, ‘Commercial Services Division’, in APMEPU, EAADP Completion Report, Main 
Report Vol. II, p. 51.
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The reasons are partly fundamental: BSP seems more appropriate for mono-cropping than 
for multiple cropping agriculture. From the farmer’s viewpoint, the main issue is the 
rationality of adopting BSP when multiple intercropping is the fundamental principle of 
productive existence. As shown in chapter 5, local farmers do grow certain grains, 
especially maize, on single stands, but only when opportunity costs are nearly zero, or 
there is a near-absolute potential for increased returns to labour or for increased food 
output for consumption. There is reason to believe, therefore, that BSP as it existed in 
the 1980s could not offer similar assurance before fundamental change has been effected 
in dominant cropping patterns in the project area.
The above position can be illustrated with herbicides as with any other BSP component. 
Weeds are a universal problem in agriculture. As Hampson observed, weeds reduce crop 
yields, increase labour costs, create difficulties during harvesting, and harbour pests and 
insects that often attack plants . Indeed,  losses occasioned by weeds possibly exceed 
‘the losses caused by any other agricultural pests, including pests, diseases, and rodents, 
etc., and may in fact exceed the combined losses caused by all the other agricultural pests 
t o g e t h e r . . . I n  the tropics, according to Ashby and Pfeiffer, ‘yield increases of 
100%, or even more, result very frequently from weed control by proper methods.
As noted in chapter 7, weeding is only slightly less intensive than land clearing and tilling 
in its demand for labour. Hence, the need for traditional labour groups to provide pooled 
labour on weeding operations. As Ojo observed in respect of Ekiti country.
[b]etween the months of May and September a great diversity of weeds surge with the 
heavy rains. Unremoved within a short span of time weeds engulf, suffocate and smother 
the crops. A farmer working alone would find that by the time he had completed one 
round of weeding a farm of a couple of thousand heaps the section he started with would 
have reverted to bush. It is imperative, therefore, that many hands work on a plot of an 
average size to prevent it from being lost to the weeds. The pooled labour of group
C. P. Hampson, ‘Economics of Weed Control with Special Reference to MCPA’, WC, 8, 6 (1956), 
pp. 224-225.
129 Ibid., p. 223.
D. G. Ashby and R. K. Pfeiffer, ‘Weeds: A Limiting Factor in Tropical Agriculture’, WC, 8, 6 
(1956), p. 227.
See Ken Swindell, Farm Labour (Cambridge, 1985), chp. 5.
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farming adequately serves this purpose. 132
Group farming has declined since the advent of wage labour while ‘[h]and weeding - by 
hand pulling the weeds or by the use of heavy native hoes - is  a slow business and is 
usually done after the weeds have begun to exert a depressant effect on the crop 
y i e ld .Log ica l l y ,  even small farmers need herbicides to supplement family labour 
or to reduce the cost of hired labour in weeding operations and to improve total factor 
productivity. However, most farms are too small to make the application of herbicides 
economic.
The use of herbicides is also risky on multi-crop plots. As Allen had shown, weedkillers 
could be applied to sole maize or rice stands before or they germinate. But ‘special care 
is necessary to minimise the risk of injury to the maize [or rice]...risks are minimum if 
application is made when the crop is between 2 and 6 in. high...’^^^^ In other words, 
crop damage is unavoidable in the ‘post-emergence method’ ; weedkiller use is feasible 
only on single crop plots and cost-effective on interplanted plots only if cover or relay 
crops are not grown at all or if all plants stand sufficiently above the ground and are 
clearly distinguishable from grass and weeds. Even so, separating plants from weeds 
during spraying is difficult and time-consuming; subsequent weeding operations have to 
be (or are best) done manually.
Finally, herbicides and the applicator, spraying pumps, can be expensive for small 
farmers who are not actively engaged in cash crop production. As Table 8.2 shows, 
farming families in what became the project area had just under 11,000 pumps between 
them in 1978, an average of one pump to seven farming f ami l i e s .The  distribution 
of pumps however varies widely between LG As: the average in Akoko North LGA is
G. J. A. Ojo, ‘The Changing Patterns of Traditional Group Fanning in Ekiti, North Eastern Yoruba 
Country’, NGJ, 6, 1 (1963), p. 36; cf. N. A. Fadipe, The Sociology o f the Yoruba, ed. F. O. and 0 .0 . 
Okediji (Ibadan, 1970), p. 150.
Ashby and Pfeiffer, ‘Weeds’, p. 227. Emphasis in original.
H. P. Allen, ‘Weed Problems in World Agriculture’, WC, 8, 6 (1956), p. 218.
ODS, Rural Economic Survey 1978 (Akure, n.d.). Table 49, p. 53.
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23.9 families to a pump, that is thrice as high as the average for the project area. One 
probable reason for this could be that cocoa is grown more widely in the survey villages 
in Akoko North LGA than in other LG As. Thus only 25 pumps were reported by all of 
my 164 survey respondents, the same average of seven respondents to each pump as in 
the project area in 1978.
Table 8.2
Distribution of Spraying Pumps in Ekiti-Akoko Area, 1978
(1)
Local Government
(2)
N® of pumps
(3)
N® of farming 
families per pump
Akoko North 1,200 23.9
Akoko South 940 12.6
Ekiti Central 3,796 2.6
Ekiti East 2,281 4.4
Ekiti North 2,615 5.9
Project area 10,832 7.0
All Ondo State 45,603 8.7
Sources: Col. 2- ODS, Rural Economic Survey 1978 (Akure, n.d.). Table 49, 
p. 53; col. 3- computed.
The limited applicability of BSP also applies to tools for land tilling. It is generally 
believed by some farmers whom I spoke with that the manual tilling equipment is only 
useful for making low or flat ridges. The tilling equipment, it is argued by some 
enlightened respondents, is less appropriate than the short-handled hoe for making the 
usually large, cylindrical heaps which are most suitable for yams. This criticism of the 
manual tillage equipment has not been investigated systematically, but it is supported by 
two investigations on the impact on crop yield of a new tool and crop management 
techniques.
The first case, published in 1933 in Faulkner and Mackie’s West African Agriculture, 
concerned the possible impact on crop productivity of animal-drawn ploughs. Whereas 
the average farmer with a traditional hoe could make ridges of between 3.5ft. and 4ft. 
apart, a plough drawn by two bullocks could only make ridges of 2-3 ft. apart. If
Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 68.
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farmers were to employ bullocks, they had to consider the effect of smaller ridges on the 
space available for crop mixtures and interplantings; and the possible loss of yield from 
the main crops. After a thorough investigation spanning ‘several years’, Faulkner and 
Mackie’s view was that ‘no serious loss of yield o c c u r r e d . T h i s  means that some 
loss of yield did occur, but officials did not consider the magnitude large enough to offset 
the overall (expected) advantages of animal-drawn ploughs over the traditional hoe. The 
question perhaps, is whether Faulkner and Mackie, hardly sympathetic to native farmers 
and obliged to promote the plough, could have reached an objective decision on what 
constituted a serious loss of yield for native farmers.
The second case bears more directly on the present argument. It was reported in 1944 
in Tropical Agriculture, the journal of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, then 
based in St. Augustine in the Caribbean island of Trinidad. The case concerned 
experiments to establish the comparative response of yams to soil depth between flat 
ridges and traditional heaps. Once again, field experiments carried out in Nigeria and 
Tanganyika in 1922-30 showed that yam yields vary directly and significantly with the 
size and depth of heaps. As Faulkner reported in 1944, ‘whenever different sizes of 
ridges were compared, a higher though not necessarily much higher, yield was invariably 
obtained from the bigger ridges than from smaller ones.’^^  ^Ridges also produced better 
yields than flat cultivation in the Nigerian experiments, although the results were less 
spectacular than the 600% increase in yield that was obtained in similar experiments in 
Tanzania. I do not have any evidence to suggest that these findings have been 
controverted by new research. I however observed during a visit to the project farm in 
Ikole Ekiti in 1992 that extension staff themselves employed deeply cultivated heaps 
rather than fiat ridges on their private yam plots adjacent to the project’s demonstration 
plots!
137 Ibid., p. 69.
O. T. Faulkner, ‘Experiments on Ridged Cultivation in Tanganyika and Nigeria’, TA, XXI, 9 
(1944), pp. 177-178.
Ibid., p. 177. 
Ibid.
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It is not being suggested here that local farmers are aware of the above investigations, 
or that the findings have influenced popular attitudes to the animal draught or the tillage 
equipment as the case may be. New tools and techniques are often promoted before their 
real capacities or shortcomings have been fully appreciated. It is also impossible to 
fully establish the impact on established farming practices of a new tool before the tool 
has been diffused and employed in ordinary circumstances. Since research findings trickle 
down very slowly to the farming public and hardly ever get down to ordinary farmers, 
local farmers’ reaction to the present project’s manual tillage equipment may yet be the 
average spontaneous response to the unknown. Still, the above suggests that 
extension agents may have made exaggerated claims on behalf of implements which they 
themselves are less inclined to employ on their own fields.
The Ekiti-Akoko project also promoted an Advanced Service Package (ASP) for middle- 
ranking or enlightened farmers. An integrated package, ASP comprised inputs for food 
cropping as well as livestock farming, especially poultry and fisheries. Its tillage 
equipment is also powered by a 5 hp. (horse power) mini-tractor unit, which means that 
more farm operations could be undertaken mechanically. One hundred units of 
mechanized tillage tools were made available at a cost of N2,760 each,^ "^  ^ and it was 
anticipated that about 5,000 farmers would use the ASP on 11,000 ha. of land.^"  ^
Again, interested farmers were not obliged to buy the full ASP complement, but 
individuals who combined crop farming with animal husbandry were offered incentives 
like access to fertilizer credit that was otherwise unavailable to other farmers. ASP’s 
mechanised equipment has, however, been criticised for being largely unsuitable for 
dryland operations. In Naik’s view, rural labour was most probably cheaper than ASP’s
Cf. G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria 
(Homewood, 1966), p. 68.
For a general analysis of unforeseen consequences, see Peter E. Hildebrand and Edgar G. Luna, 
‘Unforeseen Consequences of Introducing New Technologies in Traditional Agriculture’, in Hildebrand 
(ed.). Perspectives on Farming Systems Research and Extension (Boulder, 1986), pp. 69-74.
Naik, ‘Commercial Services’, p. 51.
Patel, ‘Agriculture’, p. 3.
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micro-tillage equipment for purposes of economical crop production. 145
Finally, EAADP promoted a variant of ASP for large-scale farmers. This variant 
comprised conventional mechanised units, including a 60 hp. tractor with harrow, ridger, 
planter sprayer, trailer, and maize sheller, and cost about N23,000 per set. Thirty-nine 
such units were expected to be sold to medium and large farmers over five years. 
Tractor-owning farmers were in turn expected to make their tractors available for ftill- 
or part-time commercial work, as the case may be.^ "*^  As in the case of old Oyo and 
Osun Divisions, to which reference has been made, EAADP sought to ‘expose farmers 
to the potential of mechanizing land preparation’ and to create an adequate demand base 
which could sustain private tractor hire units in future. Ultimately, it was expected 
that tractor services would be routed through the open market and cease to be public 
goods, first in the project area and then in other parts of Ondo State. In the event, 
private interest in conventional tractors was virtually non-existent. A private market in 
tractor services in the project area also failed to take off as envisaged.
Many reasons could be cited for this failure of expectations, but two deserve immediate 
mention. The first is the lack of prior demand for tractor services, especially in the 
absence of private enterprises to perform the facilitating roles which the British-American 
Tobacco Company, and later the NTC, have been performing in northern Oyo State since 
the 1930s. As shown below, demand activated by the project itself seemed too low to 
sustain economically viable tractor operations.
Naik, ‘Commercial Services’, p. 51. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Dayo Phillip, ‘The Demand for Tractor Services by Farmers in Kaduna State: Estimates and Policy 
Options’, Savanna, 9, 1 (1988), p. 48.
Jen Christensen, Ekiti-Akoko Agricultural Development Project Final Report (Ikole Ekiti, 1984), p.
63.
Ibid.
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Secondly, mechanisation credit was either exceedingly low or non-existent. By 1984 for 
example, the project had approved only 20 loans worth N5,960.55 or less than N300.00 
each. Six of these loan beneficiaries were from Ekiti Central LGA, where the credit 
averaged N372.60, while the remaining 14 beneficiaries from Akoko North LGA each 
obtained an average of N266.07.^^^ Mechanisation credit was not granted to farmers 
from the remaining three LG As. The reasons for this are not clear, though lack of fiinds 
is a most probable factor.
In any case, the above sums are too small, either as a whole or as averages per 
beneficiary, to cover the capital costs of tractors or associated machinery. Igede-based 
respondent 2607 told me he raised N13,000 worth of credit from informal sources to 
acquire a used tractor in 1990.^ ^  ^ If his experience is any guide, EAADP’s 
mechanisation credit was most certainly disbursed in kind, with recipients debited for the 
value of mechanized services provided on their plots by the project’s tractor unit. Even 
so, the total value of N5,960.55 up to 1984 amounted to only 7.1% of revenue (total 
N84,180.00) earned from the PTHU’s commercial operations during the first half of that 
year.^ '^* This suggests clearly that most of the unit’s operations were probably paid for 
in cash, and that the project would not have incurred additional costs to recover debts 
from beneficiaries of mechanization credit. In fact, the recovery rate amounted to 74% 
for Ekiti Central LGA and 38% for Akoko North, averaging 52% in both cases. Yet, 
the lack of credit also means that ambitious but cash-poor farmers would have been 
precluded from experimenting with mechanization. On balance, the situation is likely to 
have depressed the potential demand for tractor services by small farmers.
At another level, the absence of credit clearly increased the opportunity costs of private
EAADP, Annual Report 1985, Annexure 3i, p. 63.
Ibid.
Interview, 15 April 1992. Follow-up interviews held intermittently between April and June 1992.
Revenue figures obtained from Christensen, Final Report, Table 20, p. 61.
According to Clayton [‘Mechanisation’, p. 323; p. 328], poor loan repayment was a key failure 
factor in government-owned tractor hire units in East Africa in the 1960s.
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investment in tractors and machinery. For one, the Ondo State Agricultural Credit 
Corporation (OSACC), a main plank in the project’s credit operations, was severely 
incapacitated in financial and operational terms alike. OS ACC always had a low capital 
base and failed to meet its obligations to its main commercial bank creditors. In 1978/79, 
on the eve of project operations, the corporation approved only 22% of the total amount 
requested by farmers; about two-thirds of the approved sum or 8.4% of the amount 
requested was disbursed. OSACC’s operational costs also exceeded its loan 
disbursements by 12% in 1982-85 and by an incredible 11,266% in 1983 a lone!Th i s  
is necessary evidence of gross failure to achieve economies of scale from granting more 
credit.
The state government’s failure to provide N2.5 million in cash to OS ACC only worsened 
the corporation’s weak financial state. By 1985, OS ACC approved 40% of 6,078 
applications for credit, but these amounted to only 23.4% of the total value 
requested. In the absence of additional cash to augment its loanable funds, OS ACC 
could not administer medium and long-term credit to support or activate private 
investment in equipment, tools and land development .The corporation’s short-term 
(or arable crop) loan funds were also diverted in 1984 to finance the procurement of 30 
units of new equipment for project use. Along with existing stock, these formed the 
nucleus of a project-owned tractor hire unit (PTHU) that continued the tradition of 
government-sponsored tractor hire in the project area. This scheme is examined below.
As a whole, neither BSP nor ASP was a commercial success. Official projections that 
both packages would be adopted in up to 70% of all farm holdings in the project area
*56 Adeniyi Osuntogun and Olufemi Oludimu, ‘Extending Agricultural Credit through Public Institutions 
in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the Ondo State Agricultural Credit Corporation and the Ogun State 
Agricultural Development Corporation’, OAS, X  (1981), p. 91.
Olu Omopariola, ‘Financing Agricultural Development: A Case Study of the Ondo State Agricultural 
Credit Corporation’, in A. O. Sanda (ed.). Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in 
Nigeria (Ibadan, 1988), p. 104.
Computed from Ibid., Table 4, p. 104.
Naik, ‘Commercial Services’, p. 60,
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also proved unrealistic. The lacklustre performance has been explained in different ways. 
For example, Naik has attributed it to technical and managerial lacunae. Specifically, 
Naik suggests that the project managed to retain engineering consultants for only one-fifth 
of 30 months envisaged in the Staff Appraisal Report. As indicated previously, the 
project could not recruit highly qualified staff and also experienced a remarkably high 
turnover of senior, especially expatriate, personnel. It seems logical to surmise that a 
lower staff turnover could have improved the project’s overall situation just as a longer 
agricultural engineering consultancy could have helped to domesticate BSP and ASP or 
at least improve their commercial fortunes. Naik’s position is thus reasonable to the 
extent that internal factors can explain the project’s performance in relation to its 
agricultural goals.
In my view, however, deeper explanations for the low take-up of project packages lay 
in the design of the packages themselves. The appropriateness of technical packages is 
prior to project implementation and clearly beyond management’s control. Since ADPs 
do not have ultimate control over peasant access to productive factors, especially 
land,^“  it is difficult to see how an extended consultancy could have increased demand 
for labour-saving tools in the short run. To blame project management for the lack of 
effective demand for hand-pushed fertilizer applicators or tractors is to hit a straw man.
The World Bank itself has now acknowledged, anyway, that the tools promoted in the 
1980s by Ekiti-Akoko and 12 other ADPs in Nigeria were inappropriate for small scale 
farm operat ions.Before the Bank admitted this lacuna, Christensen had noted that 
it was ‘totally wrong or, at best, misleading’ for the SAR to have prescribed two separate 
service packages (i.e. BSP and ASP) for sole cropping when mixed cropping ‘is and 
should be the rule.’^^  ^According to him, the project could have started with a basic and 
advanced service package for each category of farmers, or with developing and
D. L. Eyoh, ‘Reforming Peasant Production in Africa: Power and Technological Change in Two 
Nigerian Villages’, DaC, 23, 2 (1992), p. 46.
World Bank, Rural Development (1988), p. 75,
Christensen, Final Report, p. 16.
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encouraging the widespread adoption of a basic package for all farmers as a prelude to 
incremental ‘improvement towards a more advanced l e v e l . I n  short, BSP and ASP 
stood no substantial chance of market-driven success. Neither did EAADP’s tractor hire 
scheme, the subject of the next section.
8.6 The Project’s Tractor Hire Scheme
The Ekiti-Akoko project established a tractor hire scheme as part of its campaign to bring 
the full benefits of mechanisation to farmers who may be unable or unwilling to invest 
large sums of money in tractors and equipment. The achievements of the scheme however 
depended as much on local demand for tractor services as on their management and 
policy support. This section examines the operations of the project’s tractor hire unit 
(THU) in these terms.
The need for a THU owned or at least controlled by EAADP can hardly be overstated. 
For one, the project was obliged to create conditions favourable to expanded tractor use 
in its operational area. For another, the project had its own demonstration and food-crop 
farms to cultivate by mechanical means. The absence of private tractor operators at the 
local level also meant that the only existing THU was the one based in the Department 
of Agriculture. Government-owned THUs have been widely acclaimed, however, for 
their unreliable and often inefficient services.
Moreover, the project enjoyed (or was supposed to enjoy) operational autonomy from 
existing departmental units and in fact took over direct responsibility for farm operations 
in the Ekiti-Akoko area. In a technical sense therefore, government’s THU and the 
project’s were invariably going to compete with each other in the tractor services market 
in areas bordering the project area if not in other parts of Ondo State. In any case, the 
project was also expected to spearhead a commercial orientation in agricultural 
production. Since commercialisation is largely antithetical to the generalised orientation
163 Ibid.
This is one major reason that Kolawole’s respondents advanced for buying their own tractors. See 
Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, p. 178; cf. Clayton, Agriculture, p. 167.
323
of Nigeria’s civil services, it would have been illogical, or perhaps self-defeating, if 
EAADP had to rely on the state’s THU for its mechanized farm operations.
The PTHU took off in 1982 with 29 tractors and a variety of equipment, including 
ploughs, harrows, ridgers, planters, and sprayers but excluding tilling equipment. The 
tractor complement included 17 tractors which ODSG had bequeathed to the project as 
part of the jurisdictional change referred to above. This initial fleet was expanded 
subsequently to enable PTHU provide mechanised farm operations to private farmers on 
a commercial basis in addition to work on the project’s own f a r m s . I n  1983 for 
example, 10 harrows, four ridgers and five planters were added to PTHU’s stock of 
equipment. Six tractors, 10 ploughs and eight harrows were added one year later. By 
1986, PTHU’s equipment included 38 (mainly Steyr) tractors, 34 ploughs, 28 harrows, 
17 ridgers, 12 planters, 4 sprayers, and 21 t r a i le r s .The  unit’s first set of five tilling 
equipment was also acquired in 1986. In formal terms therefore, the unit seemed well 
equipped enough to spread the gospel of farm mechanisation among its beneficiaries.
Tractor deployment by EAADP was in fact less remarkable than the above figures 
suggest. Some of the tractors from ODSG were old and did not seem to have been well 
maintained by their previous operating agency, the state’s Ministry of Agriculture. The 
tractors therefore broke down incessantly as PTHU sought to expand demand for its 
services. About half (in fact between 46% and 57%) of PTHU’s tractors was regarded 
as ‘good’ in any of five years to 1986 while ‘fair’ tractors amounted to between 9% and 
35% of the entire tractor fleet (Table 8.3). In turn, 10.3% of all tractors (n=29) were 
‘bad’ or unserviceable in 1982, PTHU’s first operational year. In 1983, the number of 
bad tractors rose by more than double to 28% of the total tractor fleet. Thereafter, at 
least one-third of the entire complement of tractors (n= 35, 38) was unserviceable in any 
one year, reflecting perhaps the deteriorating conditions of PTHU’s bequest. By 1984,
Christensen, Final Report, pp. 52-53.
Extracted from EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 89. 
Ibid.
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26 tractors in the unit’s commercial fleet were old, eight of them ‘in bad shape’ On 
average, only 52% of PTHU’s tractors were ‘good’ in any one year; 18% were 
considered ‘fair’; and 30% were unserviceable.
Table 8.3
Operational Condition of PTHU’s Tractors, 1983-86
Year Total N® of 
tractors
Operating condition (% of all tractors)
Good Fair Bad
1982 29 55.2 34.5 10.3
1983 29 55.2 17.2 27.6
1984 35 57.1 8.6 34.3
1985 35 45.7 17.1 37.1
1986 38 47.4 18.4 34.2
Average N®* 33 17 6 10
% 100.0 51.5 18.2 30.3
Note: * Rounded up to the nearest whole number.
Computed from: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Table 3.9, p. 89.
The unit did dedicate a substantial part of its equipment to commercial operations, though 
available information is conflicting on the number of tractors so set apart. According to 
Christensen, some 42 tractors were deployed on custom work in private farms by 1983. 
By mid-1984, 31 tractors were similarly engaged. The Internal Project Completion 
Report (IPCR) contains significantly different figures and casts a shadow of doubt on the 
Project Manager’s review of tractor deployment by PTHU. According to the IPCR, the 
entire project had no more than 29 tractors in 1983. Although the fleet was expanded 
subsequently, the unit’s tractor complement increased only slightly to 35 in 1984 and 
peaked at 38 in 1986. It is of course possible that Christensen’s figures included mowers 
or agricultural machinery other than tractors, especially since he did not classify PTHU’s 
equipment as rigorously as in the IPCR. In the absence of more information, it is not 
possible to determine this question either way.
What is clear is that the PTHU demonstrated its potential to activate demand for tractor
Christensen, Final Report, p. 61, 
Ibid.
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services very early. At the end of 1983, output amounted to just 1,247 ha. for all 
operations (Table 8.4). Six months later in June 1984, PTHU’s output had risen by 122% 
to 2,763 ha. Output had thus more than doubled in the third half-year of PTHU’s 
operational life. Using Christensen’s figures on tractor deployment (n=42), output per 
tractor amounts to about 30 ha. in 1983. If the six tractors that ‘were in bad shape’ in 
1983 are excluded, average output per tractor would rise to about 35 ha. Average 
increase in output per tractor would therefore range between 158% (excluding bad 
tractors) and 200% (including all tractors) between 1983 and mid-1984. Yet, this total 
output amounted to only 10-30% of possible output per tractor, using as base figures 
Purvis’ estimate of 535 tractor hours per annum.
Table 8.4
Ekiti-Akoko PTHU: Comparative Output Figures, 1983-84
(1)
Operation
(2)
Output (ha.)
(a)
1983
(b)
1984"
(c)
% change (b-a^axlOO)
Ploughing 541 796 47.1
Harrowing 425 750 76.5
Ridging 114 97 -14.0
Planting 155 617 298.1
Spraying 12 503 4,091.7
Total 1,247 2,763 121.6
Average per tractor 29.7 89.1 200.0
N® of tractors 42" 31 -
Notes: ® To 30 June. ” Including six tractors ‘in bad shape’.
Source: Cols. 2(a) and 2(b) Christensen, EAADP Final Report, p. 61; col. 2(c) computed.
The above trends were largely maintained until 1986. A total of 13,375 ha. were 
mechanized by the project in 1982-86 (Table 8.5). This amounts to 2,675 ha. per annum 
for all operations. Ploughing and harrowing account for about 61% of this output; 
planting took 16.7% and spraying about 12%. Land clearing and ridging accounted for 
about 5% of total output. Total mechanized output increased by 170% after the first 
operational year and by another 40% in 1984. The unit’s output began to decline in 1985, 
initially by one-third of 1984 levels and less steeply thereafter. Table 8.5 suggests
Purvis’ estimate obtained from Oni, ‘Prospects’, note g, p. 135.
326
nonetheless that a sizeable potential market for mechanized services exists in the project 
area.
Table 8.5
Mechanisation Output by Main Purposes, 1982-86 (ha.)
Purpose Total Years
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Land clearing 659.3 _ 148.0 99.0 247.8 164.5
Ploughing 4,127.8 444.6 1,068.8 1,103.4 708.7 802.3
Harrowing 4,026.0 429.2 980.4 1,191.3 714.0 711.1
Ridging 742.8 61.0 156.8 232.6 184.8 107.6
Planting 2,229.8 108.5 355.8 808.8 518.7 438.0
Spraying 1,589.6 - 182.4 629.0 344.7 433.5
Total 13,375.3 1,043.3 2,892.2 4,064.1 2,718.7 2,657.0
% change - - 64.0 40.5 -33.1 -2.7
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report, Table 3.7, p. 87. Except land clearing, from Table 3.12, p. 94.
Table 8.6 presents an index of PTHU output in 1982-86, with 1982 as base year (except 
land clearing and spraying with 1983 as base year). The indices suggest that output levels 
were remarkably high relative to 1982 base levels, except in land clearing and spraying 
where output moved haphazardly. In all cases, output peaked in 1984 and declined
Table 8.6
Index of PTHU Output, 1982-86 (1982=100)“
Operation Years/Indices
1983 1984 1985 1986
Land clearing 100.0 66.9 167.4 111.1
Ploughing 240.4 248.2 159.4 180.5
Harrowing 228.4 277.6 166.4 165.7
Ridging 257.0 381.3 303.0 176.4
Planting 328.0 745.4 478.1 403.7
Spraying 100.0 344.8 189.0 237.7
Total 277.2 389.5 260.5 254.7
Note: “ 1983 = 100 for land clearing and spraying. 
Base figures from: same as Table 8.5.
thereafter, reflecting the problems occasioned by Bank withdrawal from the project and 
the consequent departure of its expatriate managers. Two key internal factors may also
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be mentioned, namely, the policy inertia that comes after each coup d’etat as in Nigeria 
in 1984, and the level of skills that the new management team, drawn from the state’s 
civil service, brought to bear on project operations from 1984.
Output per tractor increased reasonably in 1982-86, with average figures exceeding those 
reported for the old Oyo Division in the 1970s (Table 8,7). Average output per tractor 
ranged from 26.0 ha. to 116.1 ha. with the total number of tractors (IPCR’s figures) as 
denominator (col. 3a, Table 8.7). If bad tractors are excluded, output rises to between 
40.2 ha. to 176.7 per tractor per annum (col. 3b). In both cases, the lowest average 
output figures were recorded in 1982 while peak output levels were achieved in 1984. 
Average output per tractor per annum thus amounted to 80.6 ha. for all tractors and to 
a relatively high 114.3 ha. per annum without unserviceable tractors. Column 3c 
expresses differences between column 3a and colunm 3b as a percentage of entries in 
column 3a. The differences range from 12% in 1982 to 59% in 1985, averaging 42% per 
annum in 1982-86. They translate to the proportion of output that the PTHU lost to its 
unserviceable tractors in form of losses on capital or on revenue from expanded (or 
potential) demand for tractor services.
Table 8.7
Output per Tractor per Annum, 1982-86 (ha., all operations)
(1)
Year
(2)
Total output
(3)
Output per tractor
(a)
All tractors
(b)
Excluding 
‘bad’ tractors
(c)
% difference 
(b-a-^axlOO)
1982 1,043.3 36.0 40.2 11.7
1983 2,892.2 99.7 137.7 38.1
1984 4,064.1 116.1 176.7 52.2
1985 2,718.7 77.7 123.6 59.1
1986 2,657.0 70.0 106.3 52.0
Total 13,375.3 80.6 114.3 42.0
Source: EAADP, Internal Completion Report^ Table 3.7, p. 87; and Table 3.12, p. 94, except 
col. 3c computed by me.
Nonetheless, PTHU’s output figures are remarkably higher than those reported in 
Kolawole’s survey of tractor operators. In 1970-73, output per tractor in old Oyo
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Division ranged from 24.3 ha. to 70.4 ha. and averaged 48 ha. per annum. Output 
per tractor however differed according to ownership, with individual operators recording 
an average output of 32.3 ha. per annum as opposed to 64.3 ha. and 179.3 ha. by 
company owners and group (or cooperative) owners respectively.
Tractor output per unit of time also increased in the first 18 months to June 1984, 
perhaps as part of the initial momentum in PTHU’s operations. As Table 8.8 shows, the 
number of tractor hours per hectare decreased in all major operations (spraying and 
transport are excluded for lack of data). The size of savings on operating time however 
differs remarkably between operations. In the case of ridging for example, only a modest 
5% reduction in tractor hours per hectare was realised. More significant savings of 22- 
24% were achieved on planting and harrowing, with ploughing operations indicating a 
relatively high 44% savings on operating time. Efficiency gains on tractor operating time 
averaged 40% for all operations over eighteen months to June 1984. Even if one assumes
Table 8.8
Average Tractor Time per Hectare, 1983-84
Operation N“ of hours per hectare
(1)
1983
(2)
1984*
(3) % change 
(2-14-1x100)
Ploughing 5.05 2.82 44.2
Harrowing 2.02 1.58 21.8
Ridging 2.07 1.97 4.8
Planting 2.01 1.53 23.9
Spraying 2.00 1.42 29.0
Overall average 3.39 2.02 40.1
Notes: ® At 30 June.
Computed from: Christensen, Final Report, p. 61.
a 50% decline in performance from peak-season difficulties with the ‘scheduling and 
time-tabling of farm visits’ or more specifically from the allocation of tractors
Computed from Kolawole, ‘Tractor’, Table 7, p. 180. 
Ibid.
173 Clayton, Agriculture, p. 167.
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between distant locations in the second half of 1984, PTHU would still have recorded a 
20% improvement on its operational efficiency for 1983. Comparative figures on tractor 
time per unit of land are not available, but PTHU’s performance are likely to be similar 
to existing experience in Western Nigeria’s savanna region.
Table 8.9
Output per Tractor Hour, 1983-84 (ha.)
(1)
Operation
(2)
Output
(a)
1983
(b)
1984»
% change 
(b -a -5-ax 100)
Ploughing 0.20 0.36 80.0
Harrowing 0.49 0.63 28.6
Ridging 0.48 0.51 6.3
Planting 0.49 0.66 34.7
Spraying 0.50 0.71 42.0
Overall average 2.16 2.87 32.9
Notes: * At 30 June.
Computed from: Christensen, Final Report, p. 61,
Efficiency gains in tractor time could be expressed in output as well as revenue terms. 
To obtain output per tractor hour, the procedure used in Table 8.8 had only to be was 
reversed, making tractor time the denominator. With regard to output. Table 8.9 suggests 
increases of between 30% and 40% per tractor hour in harrowing, planting and spraying 
and a remarkable 80% increase in ploughing in 1983-84. The average increase in output 
per tractor hour for all operations is 33%. Again, these figures accord with results 
obtained in Western Nigeria’s farm settlement scheme, wherein tractor output per hour 
was 0.20 ha. for ploughing; 0.61 ha. for harrowing and ridging; and 0.81 ha. for 
planting. Ekiti-Akoko PTHU’s output was not far off the mark on each and every 
operation.
Table 8.10 presents data on the revenue effect of PTHU’s increasing technical efficiency. 
The table suggests clearly that the unit improved its earnings per hour on all operations. 
For example, harrowing and planting operations showed increases of 28% and 31%
Computed from Oni, ‘Prospects’, Table 7, p. 127.
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respectively, while revenue per hour of spraying operations rose by 41%. Ploughing was 
the most remarkable at 79.4% over and above 1983 levels. On average, PTHU’s revenue 
per tractor hour improved by 37.3%.
Table 8.10
Average Revenue per Tractor Hour, 1983/84 (current Naira)
(1) Purpose (2) Revenue earned
(a)
1983
(b)
1984'
(c)
% change 
(b-a-i-axlOO)
Ploughing 9.90 17.76 79.4
Harrowing 9.90 12.76 28.0
Ridging 9.62 10.16 5.6
Planting 9.97 13.11 31.5
Spraying 10.00 14.13 41.3
Average 9.88 13.57 37.3
Note; • As at 30 June. 
Source: Same as Table 8.9.
It is not clear however if these figures include the cost of tractor journeys between farms. 
Purvis has estimated that tractors spend two hours per day travelling to and from 
farmsteads in Oyo Division. According to Wells, this factor alone has increased costs per 
acre by at least 33% of actual costs of on-site operations.U nlike in Oyo Division 
however, PTHU’s charges are assessed per hectare rather than on fixed hourly rates. 
The unit’s improved revenue situation would thus acquire added significance if it included 
the cost of journeys between base and sites or between farms. If these costs are excluded, 
as it seems likely, then increased earnings per tractor hour may have resulted from two 
factors. The first is if travel time has been reduced drastically because the farms serviced 
by PTHU are contiguous or not too far apart. This would in turn mean that the demand 
for tractor services has been relatively localised, suggesting areas where future 
mechanisation campaigns would be more productive. Scholars are in fact agreed that 
mechanisation is more cost-effective when pursued at small-scale l e v e ls .T h i s  would
Wells, Policy, p. 309; note 19, p. 329.
Oni, ‘Prospects’, p. 125.
Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural, p. 11. Cf. Wells, Policy, p. 311.
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translate to specific communities in the present context.
The second, and perhaps more obvious factor is if the PTHU had been able to reduce its 
operating costs and, or increase user charges, for example by tying such charges to 
market trends or reducing implicit subsidies. The unit’s user charges were however 
determined administratively and remained fixed in spite of rising costs (e.g. of imported 
spare parts) and personnel charges in Nigeria in the early 1980s. User charges were also 
unaffected by the upward revision of input prices by the project in March 1984.^^* This 
suggests clearly that the efficiency gains indicated above had resulted from little, if any, 
relationship with prices charged by the PTHU. It is possible, however, that such gains 
reflect lower production costs made possible, for instance, by economies of scale from 
fuller utilisation of its capital stock.
I do not have primary data on PTHU’s capital or operating costs and cannot therefore 
resolve this question either way. A broad picture of the unit’s overall performance could 
be obtained nonetheless by comparing its output and productivity with available estimates 
for the scheme in Oyo Division. This does not in any way imply that tractor operations 
in Oyo Division were economically efficient; rather that the experience provides some 
backdrop from which a broad picture of the economic aspects of PTHU’s operations 
could be obtained.
Table 8.11 presents disaggregated information on the structure of demand for tractor 
services in both cases. The data suggest similar trends in the distribution of tractor hours 
between different operations. More tractor hours were however recorded on transport 
operations in Oyo. This could mean that farmsteads are more distant or that access roads 
are far worse in Oyo than in the Ekiti-Akoko area. It is likely however that the tractor- 
population density in Oyo was much higher than in the Ekiti-Akoko area. It is also 
possible, as a result of this fact, that Ekiti-Akoko farming families rely more on 
alternative arrangements, especially waged or unwaged human porterage, to convey their 
produce from farm to village or market, as the case may be.
Farmers’ Friend (EAADP’s newsletter), 2 (1984), pp. 3-4.
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Table 8.11
Distribution of Tractor Hours by Main Operations (% of total N® of hours)
(1)
Operation
(2)
Western State 
(1967)
(3)
Ekiti-Akoko PTHU
1983 1984'
Ploughing 32.0 64.7 40.0
Harrowing 21.7 20.3 21.1
Ridging 1.4 5.6 3.4
Planting 9.4 7.4 16.8
Spraying - 0.6 12.7
Transport 25.3 1.3 5.7
Other 10.2 0.1 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N® of hours n.a. 4,225 5,605
Note: ® As at June 30.
Sources: Col. 2 adapted from Oni, ‘Prospects’, Table 5, p. 124; col. 3 computed from 
Christensen, Final Report, p. 61.
Equipment utilisation at the PTHU was, however, far from being optimal. Purvis has 
estimated that a tractor could be deployed for 535 hours per annum in Western Nigeria’s 
savanna zone.^^  ^ With this as base figure, and Christensen’s data on tractor hours, 
tractor utilisation ratios at the PTHU for 1983 and 1984 were computed. Separate ratios 
were calculated for conflicting figures (i.e. IPCR and the Project Manager’s) on the 
number of tractors and, in each case, for serviceable and unserviceable tractors (Table 
8 . 12).
On IPCR’s figures, the ratios are 28.6% per tractor if the total number of tractors is used 
and 41.5% if bad tractors are excluded. Christensen’s figures suggest lower ratios: about 
27% per tractor if all tractors are included and 28% if bad tractors are excluded. Tractor 
utilisation averaged 27 % to 35 % in either case, suggesting considerable underemployment 
of PTHU’s equipment in 1983 and 1984. It is most unlikely that tractor utilisation would 
have improved after demand started to decline in 1984.
179 Oni, ‘Prospects’, p. 135, note g.
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Table 8.12
Tractor Utilisation in EAADP (N= of hours per annum)
Source (2)
Hours per tractor per annum
(3)
Utilisation ratio (%) 
[2c 4-535x100]
(a) 1983 (b) 1984 (c) Average 
(a-f-b-j-2)
IPCR^
All tractors 145 160 153 28.6
Excl. bad tractors 201 243 222 41.5
Christensen*’
All tractors 101 181 141 26.4
Excl. bad tractors 117 181 149 27.9
Sources: * EAADP, Internal Completion Report. * Christensen, Final Report, p. 61,
Available official reports also suggest that PTHU was virtually overwhelmed by its 
difficult operational circumstances and uncompetitive. Reference has been made to the 
possible output costs of the unit’s unserviceable tractors. According to Christensen, 
operators and supervisors alike lacked adequate knowledge and technical expertise. Also, 
a profusion of makes of tractors and other equipment also created problems of 
standardisation and made spare part holding as well as repairs difficult. Field sizes were 
often small per unit area and sometime unsuitable for mechanisation because of the 
density of tree s tum ps.W hile  these resulted in incessant breakdown of tractors and 
equipment, the project often did not have the cash to procure spare parts to make most 
of its equipment serviceable, largely because it was underfunded by the state 
government. Late delivery of new equipment by suppliers also compounded the 
problem. In 1986 for example, three tractors, 15 disc ploughs, five harrows and four 
planters were delivered well after the end of peak season demand for farm 
mechanisation.^*^ As indicated earlier, the project did not acquire its first tilling 
equipment until 1986.
In the final analysis, despite early growth, PTHU failed to realise its development
Christensen, Final Report, p. 63.
Ibid.; Naik, ‘Commercial Services’, pp. 52-53. 
EAADP, Internal Completion Report, p. 89.
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potential. The unit is believed to have missed commercial opportunities in road 
construction because it lacked appropriate equipment for road works. Even less exacting 
demands by farmers were met only after substantial delays. At Igede, one respondent 
explained that he reverted to manual preparation of land because PTHU-induced delays 
had proved too expensive for his operations.This is clearly necessary evidence of 
inefficiency in view of capital underutilisation suggested by the foregoing analysis. 
Similar experiences, or their prospect, may have deterred many more aspirant farmers. 
The same consideration may also provide a partial explanation for the decrease in demand 
for PTHU’s services after EAADP’s expatriate managers left Nigeria in 1984.
8.7 Conclusion
Mechanisation is at the cutting edge of the oft-cited link between global agribusiness and 
small-scale farming in developing co u n t r ie s .A s  such, it offers broader scope for 
cross-national analysis of macro-economic and sectoral policies than other IRD 
programme components. This chapter has examined the general social context and policy 
environment of successful mechanisation in Asian and Latin American countries since the 
1960s to highlight the mix of policy measures that promoted mechanisation. The chapter 
also evaluated Nigeria’s experience since the 1920s, emphasising specific schemes in the 
old Oyo Division in Western Nigeria’s savanna belt in the 1970s and in the Ekiti-Akoko 
area in the 1980s.
Clearly, mechanisation has been far more successful in Asia and Latin America than in 
Nigeria, and in the former Oyo Division than in Ekiti-Akoko. The common denominator 
in all three cases has been policy support or the lack of it - in the form of subsidies on 
capital costs, repairs, maintenance, assured markets or price guarantees that ensure 
minimum return on investment. But although it has been, and will probably remain a key 
element, policy support is but one small part of the complex processes of change that 
successful mechanisation constitutes. Policies are by definition reactive statements of 
intent which feed on existing experiences and perceived potential to generate preferred
Interview with Samuel Ogar, 15 April 1992.
See, e.g., Barbara Dioham and Colin Hines, Agribusiness in Africa (1983).
335
outcomes from future behaviour. The success of mechanisation programmes depends, 
therefore, on more elemental, pre-disposing circumstances, especially natural factor 
endowments like land-labour and capital-labour ratios, vegetation, soil profiles, and 
rainfall distribution. An appropriate mix of these factors, as in closely-settled districts in 
Asian and Latin American countries in the 1960s, and to some extent in northern Nigeria, 
could justify the opportunity costs of mechanisation in the medium and long terms. 
Otherwise, subsidies merely distort the economy, substituting a cheap input with an 
expensive one without necessarily providing credible alternative uses for existing factors 
in the immediate or short terms or guaranteeing substantial returns in the long term.^*^
Within this context, Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s mechanisation drive was a demonstration 
exercise per excellence. Its value lay not in providing ‘immediate or direct economic 
returns or yield[ing] quick and visible results’, but in intensifying existing distinctions and 
contradictions between labour and capital-intensive farming and creating the foundations 
for expanded use of mechanised services in the long term.^ ®^  Effective demand for the 
labour-saving components of its service packages was nil. Private interest in tractors was 
also non-existent, but the project’s tractor hire unit did expand demand for tractor 
services after 1982. Overall demand remained too low, however, to sustain an 
economically viable tractor hire unit. The reasons for this lacklustre performance lay in 
intra-project difficulties as well as in local factor endowments, but the experience also 
highlights mechanisation’s ambiguous prospects in a land-surplus peasant economy.
In Western Nigeria, mechanized farming schemes have existed as islands in a sea of 
indigenous, low-technology farming methods. That Western Nigeria has had to skip 
animal traction may at first seem like an advantage, since tractors are more efficient than 
animals. But ‘stage-jumping’ also distorts the evolutionary process. The absence of 
draught animals means Western Nigeria has been unable to employ less encompassing, 
intermediate technical equipment but moved from one end of the spectrum to another.
185 Cf. Binswanger, Mechanisation, p. 185,
Dennis A. Rondinelli, Development Projects and Policy Experiments (2nd ed, 1993), p. 119; cf. 
Amit Bhaduri, The Economic Structure o f Backward Agriculture (1983), p. 139.
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The wide hiatus between manual and mechanised farming techniques has been shown to 
make learning more difficult and to increase the economic and social costs of adopting 
new technology.
High tree-stump densities have made the transition to the plough less cost-effective in 
forest-fallow and bush-fallow systems, such as the Ekiti-Akoko area, than in areas with 
lower tree densities, as in northern Nigeria. As Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger remarked, 
the removal of roots and stumps is ‘a far more arduous task than clearing away the 
vegetation at the surface’, requiring additional labour overheads and further increasing 
the cost of, and disincentive to, mechanisation.^** In the 1950s, the Western Region 
Government abandoned a grouped farm at Irele/Oke-Ako, within Ekiti-Akoko project 
area, because the machinery broke down incessantly from the strains occasioned by 
stumping, and because ‘the farm was 200 miles from the nearest spares and repairs depot, 
imposing excessively high transport costs.’ *^^  Lack of access to repairs was most 
certainly less potent in EAADP’s case, but the risk of frequent, vegetation-induced 
breakdown of equipment and associated operating and maintenance costs had not receded 
substantially in the 1980s.
Mechanisation still represents real ecological danger to savanna soils. Reference has been 
made in chapter 5 to the World Bank’s admission that Ekiti-Akoko soils are not 
particularly suitable for mechanized cultivation. Acute observers of Nigerian agriculture 
have argued for much longer that land clearing and de-stumping by mechanical means 
often ‘lead..to an inversion of the soil [and] result...in loss of fertility’ or soil 
erosion. Unlike forest soils, savanna soils have thinner vegetational cover and are 
prone to more ‘intense oxidation, leaching and accelerated soil erosion due to exposure
Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural, pp. 30-35.
35; p. 31.
WRN, Annual Report o f the Department o f Agriculture, Western Region for the Year 1952-53 
(Ibadan, 1957), p. 11,
M. I. Kolawole, ‘The Land Clearing and Stumping Problem: Nature, Causes and Some Solutions’, 
Savanna, 7, 1 (1978), p. 49.
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to rainfall and r a d i a t io n .T h e  removal of cover vegetation, which often results from 
the use of heavy equipment, generally disrupts the regenerative process in savanna soils 
and could reduce their productivity. Extensive land clearing by mechanical means also 
leaves the roots of weeds untouched, encourages quick regrowth, increases weeding 
requirements and pushes up labour costs. In short, the social costs of mechanisation - for 
example, lower carrying capacity of local soils, erosion, and environmental damage - are 
high and could outweigh relatively short-term output and productivity gains in particular 
circumstances.
Land-population ratios are also emphasised in the mechanisation literature. 
Experience has shown that mechanisation expands rapidly when the land-labour ratio is 
decreasing on account of acute urbanisation, or where tenurial arrangements allow 
landlords to meet commercial demand for land at the expense of smallholders. In the 
Ekiti-Akoko area, on the contrary, access to farmland is limited mainly by labour supply 
than by supply constraints. As shown in chapter 6, the land-labour ratio has not shifted 
significantly enough to make tractorisation a preferred option by smallholders, making 
middle peasants and businessmen-farmers more viable targets for mechanisation. Few 
ambitious small-farmers have been discouraged, however, by delays occasioned by 
administrative or operational difficulties in available THUs. Yet, since land fragmentation 
and smallholdings are not likely to change overnight, widespread use of mechanical 
power by Ondo State’s small farmers is not feasible until mechanisation’s generalised 
benefits have been shown to be realisable and worth the risks at individual farm 
level.
A. H. Kassan and J. M. Kowal, ‘Productivity of Crops in the Savanna and Rain Forest Zones of 
Nigeria’, Savanna, 2, 1 (1973), p. 49.
Cf. Binswanger, Mechanisation, pp. 5-7; Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger, Agricultural 
Mechanisation, pp. 147-151.
Clayton, Agriculture, p. 163; Ahmad, ‘Implications’, pp. 18-20; pp. 28-29.
Cf. IBRD, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D C., 1981), p. 53.
Faulkner and Mackie, Agriculture, p. 7.
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The question, therefore, is whether it is worth it socially and economically to pursue a 
programme of mechanisation in Ondo State, or indeed in Nigeria’s circumstances in the 
1980s. There is much to be said in favour of experimental schemes like EAADP’s, more 
so if they could address Ondo State’s food shortage problem through output and 
productivity increases. As the analysis showed, however, available technical packages 
would require further redesigning or scaling-down to suit small-farmers’ socio-technical 
circumstances. Otherwise, state policy would be supporting a systematic retrenchment of 
labour, the most important resource in small-scale agriculture to date, at the same time 
as prospects for alternative employment opportunities in industry or even construction 
look dim, at least in the medium term.
Above all, investment on tractors is a high-risk venture with very low return potential in 
the short term. This raises the question of subsidies, a central theme in the Asian 
mechanisation miracle, as shown in section 5.2. Clearly, the Nigerian economy could not 
have afforded massive subsidies in the 1980s, a period marked internally by declining oil 
incomes and rising debt obligations^^ and externally by largely negative attitudes to 
state activism in Africa and the developing world. Moreover, widespread use of 
mechanical power in Nigeria’s small farm sector could increase domestic fuel 
consumption by up to one-third, reducing the volume of oil sales in foreign markets or 
increasing the volume of imported refined fuel. The one implies lower earnings in from 
oil sales and the other additional expenditure - both cutting deep into government’s in 
foreign exchange revenue (currently about 90% dependent on oil rents) as well as the 
economy’s import capacity. Given the uncertainties of the global oil market, and 
Nigeria’s record of domestic mismanagement, the economy is not likely to be able to 
absorb subsidies on mechanisation or large-scale farming generally in the short and 
medium terms. In the Ekiti-Akoko area, as elsewhere in Nigeria, mechanisation’s 
prospects in the small farm sector lay in the long term.
Binswanger, Mechanisation, p. 185.
On Nigeria’s experience, see A. O. Olukoshi (ed.). Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy 
(Lagos: JAD, 1991).
Cf. John Toye, Dilemmas in Development (Oxford, 2nd ed. 1993).
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
This thesis has examined state policies and programmes since the 1940s to expand capital- 
intensive agriculture and market-based socio-economic relations in rural Western Nigeria. 
The analysis emphasised how shifting conjunctures of local history and changing rural 
perceptions, regional and national policies and politics, as well as international economic 
forces have affected agriculture and rural society in Ondo State in general and Ekiti- 
Akoko ADP’s operations in particular. What remains is to put Western Nigeria’s 
experience in a wider context and to discuss its implications for agrarian policy and 
analysis in Africa and the developing world generally. This concluding chapter undertakes 
the task alongside a summary of the study’s main findings.
The unifying theme of the analysis has been that in Nigeria, as elsewhere, the state’s 
economic role has evolved in a creeping, incremental manner. As chapter 1 showed, four 
major functional-analytical categories have been emphasised in the literature on the 
Nigerian state. These are benign spectator or ineffectual ring-holder between opposing 
commercial interests at the turn of the 19th century; manager between the 1920s and the 
1940s; entrepreneur with a finger in every major economic pie in the 1950s and early 
1960s; and, since the mid-1960s, ‘the chief appropriator of agricultural surplus’  ^ that 
initially alienated the very producers of the surplus that fed it until the advent of oil 
incomes in the 1970s, and ultimately became a self-sustaining obstacle to ‘disciplined 
national growth’^  in and outside agriculture. The main analytical lesson in this is two­
fold. The first is that étatism dates back to early colonialism and had been well 
established by the 1950s, when nationalist control of policy-making became significant. 
The second follows closely: the simple, bi-polar conception of economic development as 
state interventionism or the lack of it, so prevalent in the anti-state literature of the 1980s,
‘ Sara Berry, ‘Oil and the Disappearing Peasantry: Accumulation, Differentiation, and 
Underdevelopment in Nigeria’, in Michael Watts (ed.). State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, 
1987), p. 206.
 ^Michael Watts and Thomas Bassett, ‘Crises and Change in African Agriculture: A Comparative Study 
of the Ivory Coast and Nigeria’, ASR, 28, 4 (1985), p. 4.
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is unrealistic and mistaken.^
Academic perceptions however constituted only a small part of the story. State presence 
in rural Western Nigeria has intensified since the 1950s, not least because the fabian 
inclination of the region’s first post-colonial government has translated to widely shared 
preferences for interventionist regimes. The empirical account of small-farmer responses 
to EAADP and ODSADEP’s programmes in the 1980s also suggested that capitalist- 
inclined production has been expanding, slowly and haphazardly but surely, in the food 
sub-sector. However, overall results have fallen far short of stated targets and may have 
been inversely related to public expenditure on agriculture. Western Nigeria’s experience 
has been consistent with the poor development record of the nation-state in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Indeed, the view of the nation-state as the presumed remedy that induced even 
more social decay, the medicine that killed the patient, has acquired credibility in and 
outside African studies."*
Three broad explanations of the mixed outcomes from Western Nigeria’s post-colonial 
development experience have been supported directly and indirectly by this study. The 
first is that relations within Nigeria’s state system as well as between it and respective 
social groups have been, and remain, afflicted by deep historical, structural and moral 
problems. These problems are themselves attributable partly to colonialism and partly to 
the negative effects on domestic processes of international economic and political
 ^A view best exemplified, perhaps, by Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 
1981). The 1980s literature is reviewed in Richard C. Cook, ‘Farmers and the State’, in Douglas Rimmer 
(ed.). Rural Transformation in Tropical Africa (1988), pp. 116-139. An early critique of the state’s 
economic role in West Africa and example of ‘bi-polarity’ is Peter Bauer, West African Trade (Cambridge, 
1954). On state-market relations, see Mrinal Data-Chaudhuri, ‘Market Failure and Government Failure’, 
JEP, 4, 3 (1990), pp. 25-39; and contributions in Dieter Helm (ed.), The Economic Borders o f the State 
(Oxford, 1989); and in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). State and Market in 
Development (Boulder, 1992).
“ Theo Mars, ‘State and Agriculture in Africa: A Case of Means and Ends’, IDS Bulletin, 17, 1 (1986), 
pp. 16-21; Robert Shenton, The Development o f Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (1986); chp. 7; Basil 
Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden (1992); Jean-François Bay art. The State in Africa (1993); Peter Evans, 
‘The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change’, in Stephen 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.). The Politics o f Economic Adjustment (Princeton, 1992), pp. 139- 
181; Odin Knushen et. a l., ‘Redefining the Role of Government in Agriculture for the 1990s’, World Bank 
Discussion Paper N® 105 (Washington, 1990). For a slightly different view, see John Sender and Sheila 
Smith, The Development o f African Capitalism (1986), chp. 4.
341
influences/ But they are, above all, the cumulative result of the persistent failure of state 
efforts to mediate value and goal conflicts in economic relations between local and 
foreign interests, and at the domestic level between urban and rural elites on the one 
hand, and rural producers on the other/
Second, and following from the above, state agrarian initiatives have been founded upon 
unrealistic assumptions about, or utter contempt for, the socio-technical circumstances of 
small, cash-poor farmers. This applies as much to the farm settlement schemes of the 
1960s as to the IRD programmes of the 1980s. Finally, and not surprisingly, state 
policies and programmes on agriculture and rural development have often met with 
considerable scepticism, and in some cases outright cynicism by small-farmers, their 
intended beneficiaries. Once again, the above attributes are shared by many African 
countries.^ But the co-existence in Nigeria of substantial, untapped agricultural potential 
and recurrent food shortages, localised since the 1930s and nation-wide since the 1970s; 
and limited agrarian successes in arguably less-endowed countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire 
and Zimbabwe,* point to a uniquely deep structural malaise in post-colonial Nigeria’s 
urban-rural relations.
However, rural scepticism need not be a completely negative and ‘unchanging’ social 
force pitting supposedly pre-capitalist peasants against capitalist-inclined policies.^ This 
study has provided support for a slightly different, historical definition of rural scepticism 
as structure and as process. In its structural form, scepticism has been the peasant’s
 ^ Cf. James Scarritt and Shaheen Mozaffar, ‘Change and Continuity in the British Colonial State in 
Africa: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives’, in Edward Greenberg and Thomas Mayer (eds.), Changes 
in the State (1990), pp. 149-166.
® Cf. Dickson Eyoh, ‘Structures of Intermediation and Change in African Agriculture: A Nigerian Case 
Study’, ASR, 35, 1 (1992), pp. 17-39.
’ See, e.g., Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, CSSH, 
17, 1 (1975), pp. 97-115; and Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, ‘Why African States Persist: the Empirical 
and the Juridical in Statehood’, WP, 35, 1 (1982), pp. 1-24.
* Jermifer Widner, ‘The Origins of Agricultural Policy in Ivory Coast 1960-86’, JDS, 29, 4 (1993), 
pp. 25-59; Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle o f the Market (Cambridge, 1989); Carl Eicher, ‘Zimbabwe’s 
Maize-Based Green Revolution: Preconditions for Replication’, WD, 23, 5 (1995), pp. 805-818.
’ Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (1980).
342
rational response to poor articulation, or in some cases outright mis-specification, of state 
policies in post-colonial Nigeria. As a process, scepticism can be likened to a tactical 
‘holding operation’ by small farmers seeking sufficient time to accumulate experiential 
evidence on the costs and benefits of adopting new farming implements and methods. In 
the structural sense, small-farmer scepticism may increase or decrease according to the 
extent and depth of recursive linkages between agrarian policies and the rural farming 
population. In the process sense, farmers may adopt recommended practices, in part or 
as a whole, irrespective of whether the new tools and techniques originally fitted rural 
socio-technical circumstances. This could result from socio-economic and attitudinal 
changes at the personal level, from expanded commercial opportunities, or from shifts 
in the long-term in land-labour and/or labour-capital ratios. Whichever it is, farm-level 
responses to state initiatives have reflected changes in the history and structure of 
economic opportunities and exemplified the possibilities for capitalist production in small- 
scale agriculture. As Bhaduri has remarked in a different context.
Developments in agrarian social history are shaped through a continuous process of 
interaction between accumulation and the relations among the agrarian classes. In this 
interactive process, neither the nature of accumulation nor the class relations remain 
immutable; rather, the very process of agrarian change from a historical point of view 
consists of interrelated changes in both these aspects in a simultaneous manner over 
time.*°
Above all, rural responses have often pointed up the strengths and weaknesses of state 
policies and strategies and, to this extent, constitute a largely untapped source of 
performance-improving ideas.
Small-farmer scepticism in post-colonial Nigeria has been deeper and more pervasive in 
food than in export-crop production. One reason for this is that food farming has been 
the near-exclusive preserve of smallholders since earliest times. Colonial authorities also 
stayed well away from food production, except for forays into green manuring and mixed 
farming in the 1920s and 1930s. This largely hands-off approach continued until the 
1970s, with public policy concerned primarily with export agriculture because of its
Amit Bhaduri, The Economic Structure of Backward Agriculture (1983), p. 127; cf. pp. 127-128; and 
pp. 138-139.
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direct bearing on international commerce and state revenue. The result has been two-fold. 
First, small-scale food production has been, and remains, less intensely integrated into 
the formal economy at regional and national levels, and even less so to external markets, 
than export crop production. Second, food growers have had greater room for manoeuvre 
in the policy arena than export-crop growers. The food-export crop balance, and the 
extent of peasant autonomy, has been shaped in each case by local history and by the 
timing and circumstances of incorporation into wider commercial relations.
In these terms, Tate development’ in present-day Ondo State has resulted from a number 
of historical and structural factors (chapter 2). First, north-eastern Yoruba communities, 
now divided between Ondo State, where they presently constitute about half of the 
population, and Kogi State, lost much of their development potential between the 14th 
and 19th centuries, when they served as slave fields and theatres of war to military 
suzerains from Benin, Ibadan, Ilorin, and Bida.^  ^ Second, formal colonialism merely 
superimposed a new political order on the existing structure of urban-rural relations. This 
added yet another layer to the externally-oriented commercial economy without affording 
present-day Ondo State’s agrarian communities any greater control over the terms of 
trade for their produce. Colonialism also formalized the policy framework in which 
Nigeria’s rural producers have borne a disproportionately high share of development 
costs, directly in the form of the higher incidence of taxation and indirectly in the form 
of lost opportunities occasioned by the transfer of real wealth from rural to urban areas 
and by the urban orientation of development spending.
In short, state-induced urban bias in Western Nigeria did not begin with the advent of 
statutory export monopolies in 1939, as is generally accepted in the development 
literature. On the contrary, state-induced urban bias had flourished in pre-colonial Yoruba 
society, one of the many structural effects of the collapse of old Oyo empire.State  
formations in 19th century Yoruba society certainly lacked the sophistication and
" s. A. Akintoye, ‘The North-Eastern Yoruba Districts and the Benin Kingdom’, JHSN, IV, 4 (1969), 
pp. 539-553,
Toy in Falola, The Political Economy o f a Pre-Colonial State (Ile-Ife, 1984).
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complexity of their colonial or even post-colonial counterparts. But they were founded 
on an intricate administrative system which transferred productive capital, including 
human beings, from rural areas to urban imperial and commercial centres as tribute, 
mandatory military or social provisioning, or part of the unequal trade between Lagos and 
the Yoruba hinterland. The general inference from chapter 2, therefore, is that changes 
in the forms of state rule and role over the years have not transformed the substance of 
urban-rural relations in Western Nigeria. The main articles of trade have varied, from 
slaves and oil palm up to the 1890s to cocoa since the 1920s, but rural Ondo State has 
remained a net exporter of primary and intermediate goods to urban Western Nigeria and 
a net importer of foodstuff since the 1930s.
In 1954-77, for example, cocoa farmers lost between one-tenth and two-thirds of their 
annual potential incomes to a variety of government taxes .These  ratios were the 
highest in those very days when export produce constituted Nigeria’s single largest source 
of foreign exchange. Yet, when world market prices were declining in the 1960s, 
government not only reduced producer prices but also sought to increase per capita tax! 
The result was the Àgbékôyà riots, of which Professor Adedeji remarked as follows:
Why is it that the farmers’ unrest came into the open,.,when...it did appear that their 
economic situation in terms of income available to them was being improved? I think two 
answers come to mind...The first is the way government spends the resources made 
available by the marketing boards...The farmers are not seeing direct benefit from the 
way the government spends the resources which it takes away from them.. .The second 
issue...is the failure of government, after two decades of dependence on the marketing 
board for a considerable proportion of their resources, to call on the growing urban 
population to bear an increasing proportion of the burden.*^
Bolanle Awe, ‘The Ajele System- A Study of Ibadan Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century’, JHSN, 
III, 1 (1964), pp. 47-60; S. A. Akintoye, ‘The Economic Foundations of Ibadan’s Power in the Nineteenth 
Century’, in I. A. Akinjogbin and S. O. Osoba (eds.). Topics in Nigerian Economic and Social History (Ile- 
Ife, 1980), pp. 55-65.
Annual Report on the Southern Provinces o f Nigeria for the Year 1927 (Lagos, 1928), p. 52; C. 
Rowling, Report on Land Tenure in Ondo Province (Lagos, 1952), p. 72; Reuben Udo, ‘Food-Deficit Areas 
of Nigeria’, GR, 61, 3 (1971), pp. 415-430; S. A. Olusuyi, ‘Some Farmers’ Problems that must be 
attended to before Farmers can play their rightful Role in Economic Viability of Ondo State’, in G. T. 
Fatunla (ed.). Economic Viability o f Ondo State (Akure, 1984), p. 38.
Bates, Markets, pp. 138-139.
A. Adedeji, ‘Comments on the Paper by Professor Olakanpo and Dr. Teriba: 3’, in H. M. A. Onitiri
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The net burden of cocoa-induced tax must have been higher in Ondo State than in say, 
Ibadan or Ilaro, partly because Ondo State’s share of total output increased coincidentally 
with rising taxes, and partly because the state’s share of development expenditure was not 
commensurate with its financial contribution. Still, the Àgbékôyà riots had little explicit 
support in Ondo State because of false conceptions of cocoa-induced prosperity and 
government patronage. Unlike in Ibadan and Ijebu areas, or western Yoruba country 
generally, agricultural enterprise has been predominant and commercial investment 
opportunities few and far between in Ondo State. As such, Ondo State’s cocoa growers 
had no reason in the 1970s to share their Ijebu and Ibadan counterparts’ opposition to 
state ‘interference with [farmers’] efforts to accumulate and exclusion from state- 
controlled resources and opportunities outside the agricultural e c o n o m y E v e n  now, 
farmers’ responses to state intervention are likely to differ more in degree than in kind. 
As noted in chapter 1, popular perceptions of big government have not changed 
significantly in Ondo State since the 1970s. Moreover, Nigeria’s market-oriented 
structural adjustment programme of the 1980s has occasioned increases in producer prices 
(denominated in local currency) and probably encouraged new investment in cocoa farms.
However, present-day Ondo State has had its own share of Yoruba trading networks, 
even if they have been less remarked in the historical literature.^* But, as in cocoa­
growing, Ondo State’s trading networks probably emerged after the field had been 
covered, as it were, by Ibadan, Ijebu and possibly Ilesa traders.Lacking the 
organisational reach and possibly financial clout of their older, better established 
counterparts in Western Yoruba country, Ondo State’s trading networks most probably 
suffered more disruption from the expansion of the colonial state into Yoruba country 
since the 1890s, and have been less able to benefit from the commercial fall-outs from 
increased public sector spending after 1945. For example, in Ilaje and Ikale, two
and Dupe Olatunbosun (eds.), The Marketing Board System (Ibadan, 1974), p. 208.
Berry, ‘Disappearing Peasantry’, p. 206.
** See, e.g., S. A. Akintoye, ‘The Ondo Road Eastwards of Lagos c. 1870-95’, JAH, X, 4 (1969), pp. 
581-598; and C. O. Akomolafe, ‘The Establishment of British Administration and its impact on Owo-Akoko 
Relations 1919-1935’, JHSN, X, 1 (1979), pp. 65-85.
See, e.g., J. D. Y. Peel, Ijeshas and Nigerians (Cambridge, 1983).
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communities on the riverine fringes of present-day Ondo State, strong communal and 
commercial traditions, including nascent ship-building and fishing industries, dating back 
to river-bome traffic between Lagos and the hinterland in the 19th century had collapsed 
by the 1970s .O ne  reason for the decline was the communities could not participate 
in export-crop agriculture for natural reasons, but the post-colonial government also 
seemed to have perceived the communities as a latent threat to its urban-inclined, export 
oriented development strategy, and was to this extent uninterested in more focused 
remedies. Ilaje and Ikale have been excluded, therefore, because they were located 
outside the geographical ‘catchment areas’ of cocoa-based development spending on 
infrastructure, especially roads, after 1950.^  ^ Many more communities in rural Ondo 
State may have had similar experiences, but there is as yet no sufficient evidence to that 
effect.
What is not in doubt is the resilience of Nigeria’s urban-inclined development strategy. 
This is attested to by Ondo State’s status as a principal cocoa-producing area since the 
1950s, its dependence on yams and grains imported from neighbouring areas since the 
1920s, and the co-existence of local food shortages with a substantial trade in yam and 
cassava with urban markets (chapter 2). Even in the 1980s, while Nigeria was 
implementing a standard structural adjustment programme, ODSG established a Farmers’ 
Congress to collect a ‘development levy’ from cocoa farmers. Proceeds from the levy 
were then used to fund, among other purposes, the construction of a five-star hotel and 
secretariat complex in Akure, the state capital.Congress’ operations thus constituted 
a blatant revival in the 1980s of the rent-based urban development strategies of the 1940s 
and 1950s. Jamal and Weeks’ argument that urban bias no longer existed in sub-Saharan 
Africa by the 1980s is therefore false and stands rejected.
20 Stanley Barrett, The Rise and Fall o f an African Utopia (Waterloo, 1977),
Paul Richards, ‘Landscape of Dissent- Ikale and Ilaje Country 1870-1950’, in J. F. A. Ajayi and J. 
D, Y. Peel (eds.). People and Empires in African History (1992), pp. 161-183.
Olufemi A. Akinola, ‘The Politics of Farmer Organisation in Ondo State, Southwestern Nigeria in 
the 1980s’, paper presented at the International Conference on Cocoa and Economic Development in the 
19th and 20th Centuries, London, September 1993.
Vali Jamal and John Weeks, Africa Misunderstood or Whatever Happened to the Rural-Urban Gap?
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In Ondo State, as elsewhere in and outside Nigeria, the key to small-farmer manoeuvring 
has been the control of access to productive resources, especially land. Illife’s statement, 
that ‘land [has been] too easily available to permit the intensive exploitation of free 
cultivatorsapplies to rural Ondo State today as it did much of 19th century Nigeria, 
To be sure, social differentiation has increased along with economic opportunities outside 
agriculture in all parts of Nigeria. Their effect in predominantly agrarian Ondo State has 
been to discourage peasant reproduction and scuttle agricultural intensification. Still, the 
analysis pointed to what Jane Guyer has called ‘small change’^  ^ in rural attitudes to 
agricultural development.
Such change could be discerned on at least two levels. First, arable land has been shifted 
from yam to cassava cultivation, the latter often of the improved variety. This confirms 
the view that cassava is more resource-efficient generally, and that farmers in land- 
abundant economies have often increased returns to labour by varying their enterprise 
combinations and promoted ecological regeneration by growing crops with lower fertility- 
depleting attr ibutes.In the present case, cassava’s labour-saving capacity has been far 
more important than its contribution to land fertility. Secondly, there were odd examples 
of individual efforts to cross the threshold between family and technology-based 
commercial agriculture. Precise statements on the social background of the individuals 
concerned and the sources as well as direction of their efforts require more extensive 
fieldwork than that undertaken for this study. Chapters 5,6,  and 7 suggest, nonetheless, 
that traditional land tenure systems are by themselves less inhibitive of agricultural 
development.^^
(1993).
John Illife, The Emergence o f African Capitalism (1983), p. 12.
“  Jane Guyer, ‘Small Change: Individual Farmwork and Collective Life in a Western Nigerian Savanna 
Town, 1969-88’, Africa, 62, 4 (1992), pp. 465-489.
Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (1985), p. 109. Cf. William Jones, ‘Manioc: An 
Example of Innovation in African Economies’, EDCC, V, 2 (1957), pp. 97-117.
See Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha, ‘Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa’, WBRO, 2, 2 (1987), pp. 143-169; and John W. Bruce, ‘Do Indigenous Tenure 
Systems Constrain Agricultural Development?’, in Thomas Bassett and Donald Crununey (eds.), Larui in 
African Agrarian Systems (Madison, 1993), pp. 35-56.
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A more substantive constraint has been small-farmers’ attitudes to the socio-technical 
imperatives of capitalist agriculture. Analysis of project data in chapter 7 suggested 
clearly that HYV seeds could increase land productivity with or without fertilizer while 
marginal yields from HYV seeds could be as much as 40% higher on fertilized than on 
non-fertilized plots. The question remained, however, whether a 40% yield margin is 
large enough to offset the social and financial risks associated with small-farmer adoption 
of fertilizer; and whether the institutional environment, including market distortions 
occasioned by government policies, in fact encouraged small food-farmers to cross the 
threshold from near-subsistence to commercial production. Answers to these questions 
are negative in the present case, not least because policy instability, the structure of 
access to factor markets, and the impact of both of food-crop prices stack the odds 
against smallholders. In the case of livestock production, project technology was well 
beyond the absorbing capacity of the local economy.
Above all, labour scarcity has remained a major constraint to the growth of agricultural 
output even in the small-farm sector (chapters 6 and 8). The reasons are not hard to seek. 
In rural Ondo State, as in other land-surplus economies, rural labour markets have been 
grossly underdeveloped or non-existent, in spite or because of pseudo-proletarianization 
occasioned by migration to urban centres. Labour has often been difficult or near­
impossible to obtain at peak-season because available labour power, including that of 
occasional part-time farm workers, is almost always dedicated to growing food for 
individual and family consumption, and, increasingly, for sale. One way of overcoming 
peak-season labour supply difficulties has been to retain privileged access to labour 
through sharecropping or patronage of migrant workers. However, both options often 
involve social support and infrastructure costs beyond the reach of typical small farmers. 
Higher wage levels for farm labour could also mean that peak-season weeding or 
harvesting operations are delayed or undertaken haphazardly, occasioning losses to 
farmers who cannot afford to pay the going rates or offer non-wage incentives to labour 
and possibly discouraging those on the fringes of new factor combinations. Moreover, 
wider African experience has suggested that sharecropping and migrant labour have 
created avenues for avoiding capitalist relations and intensifying pre-capitalist forms of
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production. 28
State policies on food-crop production in post-colonial Nigeria have consistently 
emphasised large-scale farming, and by implication at least, property rights in farmland. 
Even the ‘Operation Feed the Nation’ campaign, embarked upon initially to encourage 
garden-type food farms, became engrossed in large state-owned farms worked by 
vacationing students.State officials have also sought to convince rural dwellers that 
potential gains from higher capital-labour ratios could be realised in the small-farm 
sector. This is in spite of severe institutional weaknesses, including poor access to market 
information and price fluctuations from bumper harvests; competition from imported 
foodstuff; poor incentives structure, and even poorer administration or outright diversion 
of input subsidies. Market collapse has resulted from low crop specialisation or from 
bumper harvests occasioned, for instance, by the intermittent state campaigns to boost 
arable-crop production. The emphasis on property rights, or the speed and intensity of 
its enforcement, has proceeded further in northern Nigeria than in the south, reflecting 
different traditions of access to farmland, and by implication, varying degrees of 
divergence and convergence between policy-induced changes since the 19th century and 
extant practice. Policy emphasis on northern Nigeria’s centralised control of access to 
farmland has encouraged a slightly determinist analysis of state-peasant relations since 
the 1970s, as in State, Oil and Agriculture, edited by Michael Watts.However, such 
analytical schemes have excluded a wide variety of peasant manoeuvres in land-surplus 
rural Western Nigeria, such as those described in this study, and by implication, 
overstated the potential for peasant ‘capture’ by and through oil-based spending on 
ADPs.3'
Illife, Emergence, pp. 34-35.
See Abiodun O. Falusi, ‘Agricultural Development: Operation Feed the Nation’ in Oyeleye Oyediran 
(ed.), Survey o f Nigerian Affairs 1976-77 (Lagos, 1981), pp. 55-68. On a parallel experience, see Jane 
Girdner et. al., ‘Ghana’s Agricultural Food Policy: Operation Feed Yourself, FP, 5, 1 (1980), pp. 14-25.
30 The clear exceptions are the chapters by Sara Berry and Robert Shenton.
Cf. Sara Berry, ‘Inconclusive Encounters: Farmers and States in the Era of Planned Development’, 
in her No Condition is Permanent (Madison, 1993), pp. 43ff.
350
Political motives, bureaucratic in-fighting, and administrative confusion have been part 
of policy-making on Nigerian agriculture since early colonialism (chapter 2). In fact, 
apolitical public policy-making is a contradiction in terms, more so in Africa’s 
contradiction-ridden colonial r eg im es .A  peasant-led agrarian strategy was preferred 
in early colonial Nigeria because it promised (and eventually delivered) revenue to the 
colonial state while precluding social unrest and the loss of the people’s ‘goodwill’ 
through ‘indirect rule’.^  ^ Government’s attempt in the 1930s to close the food gap in 
export-crop producing areas also collapsed because of inter-departmental jurisdictional 
disputes and the outbreak of Second World War hostilities (chapter 2). In Kenya in the 
1950s, where a settler strategy had occasioned widespread anti-colonial unrest, a social 
buffer (i.e. ‘progressive farmers’) was created between white settlers and landless African 
peasants through the million-acre scheme.
By the 1950s in Nigeria, virtually all middle class opposition to the colonial order had 
been co-opted or absorbed ‘into the leadership or policy-determining structure of the 
colonial system as a means of averting threats to its stability or e x i s t e n c e I n  short, 
contrary to what has been implied in the 1970s and 1980s by ex-post facto analysis, there 
was hardly a credible support constituency for alternative policy options in the 1950s. It 
is therefore ahistorical to suggest, as Bates has done, that agrarian policies which 
delivered political pay-offs at the expense of increased efficiency and output date only 
from late colonialism or the post-colonial era.^  ^ Bates’ underlying assumption, that
Fred Cooper, ‘Africa and the World Economy’ [with new ‘Postscript’], in Cooper et. al.. 
Confronting Historical Paradigms ( ^ 2A\son, 1993), pp. 122-131. Earlier version published in A5/?, 24, 2/3 
(1981), pp. 1-86.
”  Memo dated 1 June 1936 by L. G. Shenton, CSO26/31071, NAI., p. 43. For wider analysis, see 
Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, Africa, 62, 3 
(1992), pp. 327-355; and Anne Phillips, The Enigma o f Colonialism (1989), chp. 6,
^  Christopher Leo, ‘The Failure of the ‘Progressive Farmer’ in Kenya’s Million-Acre Settlement 
Scheme’, JMAS, 16,4 (1978), pp. 619-638; Enc Cission, Agriculture, Poverty and Freedom in Developing 
Countries (1983), p. 199f.
G. Wasserman, ‘The Politics of Consensual Decolonisation’, The African Review, V, 1 (1975), p. 
5; cf. Olajide Aluko, ‘Politics of Decolonisation in British West Africa, 1945-1960’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi 
and Michael Crowder (eds,). History o f West Africa, Vol. I (3rd. ed., 1985), pp. 693-735.
^  Bates, Markets', cf. Manfred Bienenfeld, ‘Analyzing the Politics of African State Policy: Some
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Africa’s post-colonial states have always had the capacity to institute and manage far- 
reaching social engineering is equally too sanguine, a 1980s version of the high 
expectations from the post-colonial state in the 1950s and 1960s.^  ^As Ghana’s economic 
record in the 1950s and 1960s has shown clearly, Africa’s most feasible option in the 
immediate post-independence period was a gradualist strategy within the colonial 
framework.
If Nigeria’s agrarian strategies in the 1950s and 1960s foundered on price collapse in the 
export-crop market, those of the 1970s and 1980s appear to have sought to take politics 
out of agricultural change. Regional control of agricultural policy, and the variety of 
approaches that resulted therefrom, had ended with the advent of military rule in Nigeria 
in 1966.^  ^ But the new policy framework in which state governments were compliant 
partners or trait-takers did not emerge until the mid-1970s, when oil-based incomes gave 
the federal government unprecedented economic clout and nearly absolute control of 
policy-making."^ More fundamental pressures for structural uniformity have been 
exerted on Nigeria’s small-farm sector, however, by and through ADPs, which have been 
probably the World Bank’s ultimate exemplars of blueprint development.
The present study has made two distinct contributions to the analysis of ADPs. First, 
further empirical support has been provided for the general view that Nigeria’s ADPs 
have, in effect, displaced or at least undermined small-farmer production by channelling 
subsidised inputs, credit, and other forms of assistance to middle peasants, businessmen-
thoughts on Robert Bates’ Work’, IDS Bulletin, 17, 1 (1986), pp. 5-11,
D. K. Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-80 (1986), pp. 234ff; Piotr Dutkiewicz and Gavin Williams, 
‘All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty Together Again’, IDS 
Bulletin, 18, 3 (1987), pp. 39-44.
See Elliot Berg, ‘Structural Transformation versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast’, in Philip Foster and Aristide Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and the Ivory Coast 
(Chicago, 1971), pp. 187-230. For more recent views, see Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire 
State in Africa (Trenton, 1992); and Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor (Oxford, 1992).
Cf. Allison A. Ayida, ‘Basic Issues in Financing Nigerian Agriculture in the Seventies’, in his 
Reflections on Nigerian Development (Lagos, 1987), pp. 108-118.
^  S. E. Oyovbaire, Federalism in Nigeria (1985), pp. 231-232.
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farmers, and civil servants with access to politically-strategic decision points/^ Put 
differently, ADPs have reinforced existing policy biases for low-risk, directly 
unproductive activities through a blatant diversion of productive resources from cash-poor 
rural producers who really need official assistance to relatively well-off people with 
greater interest in commerce and windfall profits than agricultural production. This partly 
explains why Nigeria’s food situation has improved only marginally since the 1970s, 
despite massive oil-based expenditure on input subsidies (chapter 7)."^ ^
In Ekiti-Akoko’s case, such transfers are likely to have taken place less directly between 
Ondo State’s peasants and non-peasants than between local functionaries and middlemen 
and traders with access to northern Nigeria’s lucrative input markets. This situation has 
certainly reflected low input demand (chapter 7) and the slow pace of change in 
traditional farming methods as well as attitudes to official extension in Ondo State 
(chapters 5 and 6). But it also betrayed EAADP’s dismal record in social institution- 
building (chapter 4). Unlike its northern counterparts, EAADP did not engage in explicit 
social engineering. For example, Lafia ADP had established committees at village and 
district levels to recommend individuals for credit and provide informal links between the 
project and its farming public.These committees comprised middle-ranking peasants 
rather than typical small farmers, and to this extent, merely articulated project interests; 
but Lafia ADP had at least attempted to open new lines of communication with its 
primary public."^ In contrast, EAADP neither formed community associations nor 
provided explicit support for existing bodies. Until 1986, cooperative societies were 
ousted from credit administration by extension staff more used to dealing with ‘temporary
World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1981), p. 53.
Paul Clough and Gavin Williams, ‘Decoding Berg: The World Bank in Rural Northern Nigeria’, in 
Watts, State, pp. 168-201; Gavin Williams, ‘The World Bank in Rural Nigeria, Revisited’, ROAPE, 43
(1988), pp. 42-67. On fertilizer subsidies, see G. Evbuomwan, ‘A Review of the Federal Government 
Fertilizer Subsidy Scheme in Nigeria’, EFR, 29, 3 (1991).
Dickson Eyoh, ‘Reforming Peasant Production in Africa: Power and Technological Change in Two 
Nigerian Villages’, DaC, 23, 2 (1992), pp. 37-66.
^  Ibid.
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banding together of farmers for the expediency of securing credit p a ckages th an  
societies obliged by law to observe standard accounting procedures. This was another 
instance in which extension officers’ proclivities prevailed over expressed project policy.
Secondly, the study has highlighted the far-reaching impact on social responses and 
project performance of local resource circumstances, including political factors; and the 
analytical limitations of some generalisations on Nigeria’s ADPs, especially those 
predicated on the north’s resource profile, the unifying impact of military rule and the 
macro-economic climate of the 1970s. Like its antecedents, Ekiti-Akoko ADP was 
designed under a military administration, while Nigeria’s international liquidity rating was 
at its highest. The one-year delay of its start-up because of 1978’s oil-price shock meant, 
however, that EAADP commenced operations under an elected civilian administration 
with different political priorities and opposing agricultural development programmes. The 
seeming lack of political commitment to the ADP concept in Ondo and other states not 
controlled by the party that formed the federal government in 1981-83, and Nigeria’s 
worsening macro-economic conditions after 1981, meant that ODSG’s financial and 
policy support for Ekiti-Akoko ADP was lacklustre. Poor local funding also blocked the 
disbursement of World Bank credit under the counterpart rule (chapter 3). In effect, 
EAADP’s intended role as a spearhead of market-based policies in small-scale food 
farming was scuttled by local factors, the very attributes that project blueprints have often 
ignored.
Ekiti-Akoko ADP’s financial difficulties, and subsequent attempts by the World Bank to 
assure prompt financial disbursements by state governments suggest three wider 
inferences. One is that references to the state as though it is and has always been a 
unitary behemoth in real life is apolitical and misleading, especially in federal societies 
like Nigeria. The state almost always operates as a system of relationships, with 
considerable possibilities for conflict and cooperation between and within its sub-systems 
or institutions.'^^ Second, IRD projects would probably be more successful, and certainly
Eyoh, “Structures’, pp. 23-24.
^  Cf. Robert Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Tropical Africa (1983).
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more easily sustainable, if their design and implementation attracted support 
constituencies cutting across local political and quasi-ideological divisions. Above all, 
EAADP’s fortunes have highlighted the Bank’s lack of executive power; its helplessness 
in the face of chronic political-economic instability in host countries; and the defects of 
blueprint planning where, as in EAADP’s case, plan design and implementation are 
separated by important cultural and socio-economic variables.
The last point deserves further comment because of its implications for the future of IRD 
programmes in Nigeria. As chapters 4 to 8 showed, the seeds of EAADP’s operational 
failures were watered by its blueprint. To start with, EAADP had been promoted as an 
opportunity for local farmers to obtain their share of increasing global and local 
expenditure on food-crop production. This erroneous view encouraged unrealistically high 
expectations by the farming public and inclined small farmers against the strictly 
commercial orientation of EAADP’s programmes. The training and visit system is also 
likely to have been adopted more as part of the project package than as a result of a 
dispassionate review of reasons why experiments with earlier extension organisation 
frameworks had failed to meet expectations."^® Training and visit has in any case been 
criticised as one of those precision formulae which have proved difficult to replicate or 
sustain because their external orientation has imposed excessive demands on available 
resources.
Similarly, the decision to make EAADP autonomous of the state’s administrative 
machinery perhaps created more problems than it solved. Local senior civil servants, 
some of whom had expected to hold directing project positions, regarded EAADP’s 
expatriate managers with contempt; in turn, the latter undermined the understudy scheme 
and effectively denied access to the Staff Appraisal Report and to operational decision­
making by local personnel! Double standards in the setting of staff conditions in Nigeria’s
Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, 1995), chp. 4; Emery Roe, 
‘Development Narratives, Or Making the Best of Blueprint Development’, WD, 19, 4 (1991), pp. 287-300.
48 Cf. IBRD, Agricultural Research and Extension (Washington, 1985), p. 105
John Mullen, ‘Training and Visit System in Somalia: Contradictions and Anomalies’, 7/D, 1, 1 
(1989), pp. 145-167.
355
IRD projects also meant that the most senior Nigerian in EAADP’s team earned only 
37% of expatriates’ lowest basic pay. Apart from its implications on staff morale, this 
experience supports the general view that IRD projects have often promoted the supply 
interests of aid donors or creditor countries better than they have fostered self-fulfilment 
in host countries.
Staff secondments from existing agencies, intended to reduce recurrent personnel costs 
to EAADP, probably cost the project more in staff time lost to competing loyalties 
(chapter 3). Conflicting conceptions of farmers’ groups between seconded staff from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Cooperative Societies Division hampered the 
administration of project credit. Relations with the public were not helped either by the 
prevailing conception of the extension agent ‘as the enlightened leader of a backward 
p e o p l e A n  experiment by DARUDEC to employ as extension agents people with 
hands-on experience in farming, but with minimum formal education, was also terminated 
in 1984 and blamed for the low quality of village-level personnel and for some of the 
failures in project extension. Its collapse raises deeper questions, however, about whether 
Ondo State’s typically illiterate food farmers could have internalised extension skills and 
techniques on which their slightly more educated contemporaries could not provide 
effective instruction and advice. My estimates of the extension staff-farmer ratio in the 
1980s suggested, anyway, that the potential for direct contact between the average small- 
scale farmer and extension agents was lower after project take-off than before the 
immediate pre-project period.
Finally, seconded staff developed incompatible loyalties and spent precious time trying 
to maintain contacts with their departments of origin. The ensuing feeling of insecurity 
of tenure energized a ‘back to ministry lobby’ which resisted EAADP’s autonomous 
status, probably leaving the project with greater losses in staff and management time than 
it saved on the salaries and wages of seconded staff. All this is consistent with project
Hans Gsanger, The Future o f Rural Development (1993), p. 7; G. Honadle and Jay K. Rosengard, 
‘Putting ‘Projectized’ Development in Perspective’, PAAD, 3, 4 (1983), p. 302.
O. T. Faulkner and J. R. Mackie, West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1933), p. 78.
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experiences elsewhere,and Nigeria has since the late 1980s sought to return projects 
to departmental line structures. In Ondo State, the extension department has been moved 
over from the Ministry of Agriculture to ODSADEP, making the latter responsible for 
the state’s extension programme in its entirely. Staff secondments to the Oyo State ADP 
have also been stopped, those who moved over having transferred their services to the 
ADP. These moves may have strengthened project control over staff, but their impact on 
the diffusion of new farming techniques remains to be seen.
A number of speculative points can be made about the future of agriculture and rural 
development in Nigeria. First, it is difficult not to be pessimistic, but it is not helpful 
either to dismiss the future on the strength of historical and sociological evidence. 
According to an acute observer of the landscape.
[t]he future of Africa does not lie with small-scale capitalism to benefit the peasantry, but 
with medium- if not large-scale capitalism, promoted partly by the property-owning 
bourgeoisie, partly by the state, and partly by international capital. If the aim of this 
process and sometimes its general result are to increase production, another result- as 
since the eighteenth century has always been the case, at least in the rural areas, in all 
countries in the course of industrialization, has been to make a proletariat of the country 
dwellers and to encourage their flight to the cities.
Coquery-Vidrovitch’s view is instructive and nearly self-evident. This study has shown 
how the benefits of government programmes, including subsidies, have been denied to 
small-scale farmers, either because of design problems, or because powerful urban and 
rural interests have diverted or hijacked such benefits. In 1963, the government of 
Western Region had expressed concern about the massive movement to the cities by rural 
youth, or the lack of peasant reproduction in rural Western Nigeria. This trend has been 
confirmed by Sara Berry’s Fathers Work for their Sons.
However, Coquery-Vidrovitch has in effect dismissed the peasantry and/or implied a 
future without them, perhaps unwittingly articulating the polar opposite of Hopkins’
Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, 2nd ed. 1995), pp. 153-159.
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Africa: Endurance and Change South o f the Sahara, trans. David 
Maisel (Berkeley, 1988), p. 133.
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merrie Africa or Hyden’s economy of affection. Yet, Africa’s continuing agricultural 
crisis has been caused partly by the mistaken assumption in previous policies and 
strategies that the peasantry could somehow be wished away through conscious social 
engineering or by more blatant support for large-scale capital-intensive fa rm ing .As 
this and several studies of Nigeria’s post-colonial experience have shown, this position 
is neither feasible nor sustainable.^^ Large-scale farming requires heavy investments 
which neither a majority of farmers nor Nigeria’s economy could afford. Besides, the 
strictly economic benefits of large-scale farming must also be considered alongside its 
social costs. As Abalu and D’Silva have concluded.
[e]ven if [Nigeria] could afford the heavy investment that would be involved [in large- 
scale agriculture], the tendency would be to create a landless class by displacing original 
owners of land and replacing them with fewer but more powerful and more wealthy 
individuals. In the absence of alternative employment opportunities, the result would be 
abject poverty in rural areas as well as in urban areas - which would experience heavy 
migration from the rural areas. The economy would end up, not only with a diminished 
purchasing power from the consumption sector, but also with a constrained rate of growth 
of the non-agricultural sector (and hence the economy as a whole).’®
In any case, neither the capitalist nor the socialist development model has come up with 
a credible alternative to peasants’ primary role as providers of surplus in economic 
development. The debate on the place of peasants in economic development has been less 
about whether they could be replaced and more about the net burden and overall effect 
of their contribution in individual c a s e s .A  more feasible, if less clear-cut, option is 
that future agrarian strategies take greater account of indigenous knowledge, peasants’
On Nigeria’s experience, see Akin L. Mabogunje, ‘The X-Factor: Peasants and Nigeria’s 
Development Process’ in NES, Nigeria’s Developmental Problems (Lagos, 1986), pp. 41-57; ‘The 
Demobilization of the Nigerian Peasantry’, in R. P. Misra and Nguyen Tri Dung (eds.). Third World 
Peasantry (1986), pp. 230-244. For wider analysis, see Gavin Williams, ‘Why is there no Agrarian 
Capitalism in Nigeria?’, Journal o f Historical Sociology, 1, 4 (1988), pp. 345-398.
”  K. D. S. Baldwin, The Niger Agricultural Project (Oxford, 1957); Dupe Olatunbosim, ‘Western 
Nigeria Farm Settlements: An Appraisal’, JDA, 5, 3 (1971), pp. 417-428.
G. 0 . 1. Abalu and B. D’Silva, ‘Nigeria’s Food Situation: Problems and Prospects’, FP, 5, 1 (1980),
p. 56.
See, e.g., Wyn Owen, ‘The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture’, AER, LVl, 1 (1966), 
pp. 43-70; Robert Brermer, ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of neo-Smithian Marxism’, 
NLR, 104 (1977), pp. 25-93; R. Holton, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (1984); and Richard 
Grabowski, ‘The Agrarian Roots of Economic Expansion’, PS, 19, 2 (1992), pp. 93-110.
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demographic strength and productive potential without turning their back on real 
advantages offered by technical change/^ New initiatives must combine sectoral and 
project-based programmes if they are to strike the difficult balance between small, 
medium, and large-scale farming.
Secondly, in spite of its dismal record, the state has been and remains the one social 
mechanism with the potential institutional reach and capacity to co-ordinate any 
programme of economic development in the rural a reas .There  is much to be said in 
favour of ‘bottom-up’ approaches and about the involvement of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in rural institution-building. Still, the proliferation of NGOs and 
protestations about ‘top-down’ approaches in the 1970s and 1980s reflected widespread 
frustration with centrally-directed change in Africa and elsewhere and the attendant anti- 
state ferment of that period more than a desire to supplant the state.^ In practice, , as 
Uphoff has noted, ‘ "top-down" efforts are usually required to initiate and even to sustain 
"bottom-up" capacities.’®^ NGOs require a stable macro-economic and political 
framework, both provided by the state, to achieve their development objectives - whether 
these be in agricultural extension and rural economic institution-building®^ or in the 
more directly political civic education and empowerment.®^ The signal lesson of 
experiences with structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s is that a de-activated 
state could be as problematic as an over-extended state, at least for purposes of effective
Gsanger, Rural Development-, Robert Chambers, ‘The State and Rural Development and an Agenda 
for the 1990s’ in C. Colclough and James Manor (eds.), States or Markets? Neo-liberalism and the 
Development Policy Debate (Oxford, 1991), pp. 260-278.
Lloyd G. Reynolds, ‘The Spread of Economic Growth to the Third World: 1850-1980’, JEL, XXI, 
3 (1983), pp. 941-980. On Nigeria, see Charles Jarmon, Nigeria: Reorganisation and Development since 
the Mid-Twentieth Century (Leiden, 1988).
“  John H. Hamer, ‘Preconditions and Limits in the Formation of Associations: The Self-Help and 
Cooperative Movement in Africa’, ASR, 24, 1 (1981), pp. 113-132; cf. contributions in W. B. Stohr and 
D. R. Fraser Taylor (eds.). Development From Above or Below? (New York, 1981).
Norman Uphoff, ‘Assisted Self-Reliance: Working With, Rather Than For the Poor’ in John P. 
Lewis (ed.). Strengthening the Poor (New Brunswick, 1988), p. 47.
“  Cf. Kate Wellard and James G. Copestake (eds.), Non-Govemmental Organisations and the State in 
Africa (1993).
® Michael Bratton, ‘The Politics of Govemment-NGO Relations in Africa’, WD, 17, 4 (1989), p. 570.
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and efficient macro-economic policy management.^ What is required in Africa is a 
reconstructed state in which popular empowerment by autonomous groups, including 
formal NGOs and quangos (quasi-NGOs) as well as less formally structured farmers’ 
associations, goes side by side with a strengthening of state capacities on macro-economic 
and strategic management.
Gow and Vansant have argued that attempts to promote popular participation in rural 
development will invariably face formidable resistance from existing bureaucratic 
structures and from the sheer force of cultural and historical experience.^ This is 
especially so in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, where state-society relations in general 
and policy-making processes in particular, have been founded on state activism and 
authoritarian rule.^  ^ Wider experiences have shown, however, that development 
initiatives do work with less comprehensive planning and centralised control, the type 
associated with Nigeria’s ADPs and World Bank projects generally up to the 1980s.
A beginning could be made, therefore, by adapting project design and implementation 
more closely to their host communities and immediate ecological environments, and more
^  F. Stewart, ‘Are Adjustment Policies in Africa Consistent with Long-run Development Needs?’, 
DPR, 9, 4 (1991), pp. 413-436; and Simon Commander (ed.). Structural Adjustment and Agriculture
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specifically, by adopting smaller-scale projects with less ambitious objectives and 
ta rge ts .A t  a wider level, social groups generally and rural groups in particular could 
be provided with access to policy-making through informal channels, as in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Kenya.^° But the ultimate objective must be to develop open, accountable, 
democratic structures at all levels of society and to encourage countervailing sources of 
power and leverage over policy, for example, through autonomous farmers’ pressure 
groups.Either  way, the quest for participatory rural development in Nigeria, like 
capitalist agriculture itself, could only be a long-drawn, crises-ridden process.
Norman Uphoff, ‘Fitting Projects to People’, in Cemea, Putting People First, pp. 467-511; and 
Dennis Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments (2nd ed,, 1993), pp. 154-188. Cf. Goran 
Hyden, ‘Beyond Hunger in Africa - Breaking the Spell of Mono-Culture’, in Ronald Cohen (ed.). Satisfying 
Africa’s Food Needs (1988), pp. 47-78.
Jennifer Widner, ‘Single Party States and Agricultural Policies: The Cases of Ivory Coast and 
Kenya’, Comparative Politics, 26, 2 (1994), pp. 127-147.
For wider experiences, see Matthias Stiefel and Marshall Wolfe, A Voice for the Excluded (1994).
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Appendix: Questionnaire
Below are the questions asked from 164 farmer-respondents in Ayede, Igede, Ilafon, and Imojo. In many 
cases, respondents volunteered or were encouraged to provide more information on their personal 
experiences than are implied by these questions. These were also supplemented with informal interviews 
with farmers in and outside the survey area.
Department of Economic History 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
United Kingdom.
12 March 1992.
Dear Sir/Madam,
The questionnaire below is part of a research project which assesses the socio-economic impact of 
agricultural an rural development policies and strategies in Ondo State. Infirmation obtained from all 
respondents will be used for strictly academic purposes, and for seeking improvements in policies relating 
to agricultural production and rural development.
You are requested to please, provide answers to all questions. Thank you very much for your attention. 
Yours sincerely,
Olufemi A. Akinola.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
1. Name of Respondent
2. Sex M/F
3. Age Group 1. Up to 25 2. 25-35 3. 36-45
4. 46-55 5. 56-65 6. 66 and over
4. Place of birth 1. Present village 2. Other village in LG A
3. Other LG A 4. Other state in Nigeria
5. Elsewhere
5. Reason for moving to village 1. With parents 2. Marriage 3. Better job/income
4. Other  5. Never moved.
6. N® of years in village 1. Up to 5 years 2. 6-10 years 3. 11-15 years
4. 16 years and over 5. Not applicable.
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7. Marital status 1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced
8. N® of wives (enter actual number)
9. N® of children
Total bom Total alive/ 
present todav Of whom (N® aged) 
0-5 6-14 15-h
9.1 Male children
9.2 Female children
9.3 Male dependents
9.4 Female dependents
10. Highest level of education
1. Primary 2. Partial secondary 3. Complete secondary
4. Post-secondary/academic 5. Vocational/commercial 6. Agricultural
7. Other.
B. OCCUPATION AND INCOME
11. Major occupation (i.e. occupation that takes most of respondent’s time)
1. Farming 2. Driving 3. Crafts 4. Teaching 5. Office work
6. Petty trading 7. Housewife 8. Hunting 9. Agricultural labour
10. Not working. 11. Other.
12. Secondary occupation (enter code number as in question 11)
13. Cash income from major occupation (Naira per annum)
1. Up to 500 2. 501-1,000 3. 1,001-2,500 4. 2,501-5,000
5. 5,001-7,500 6. 7,501-10,000 7. 10,000 and over.
14. Cash income from secondary occupation (Naira per annum)
(Enter code as in question 13)
C. LIVING/SOCIAL CONDITIONS (Indicate the most ‘modem’ or advanced)
15. House Ownership 1. Owned, inherited
4. Rented/leased
2. Owned, purchased 3. Owned, built
5. Pledged 6. Other (specify)
16. Type of housing
17. Water Supply
18. Power supply
1. Seasonal 2. Wood/mud, thatched 3. Wood,mud, zinc roof 
4. Cement block/brick/zinc roof 5. Other
1. Tap, house connection 2. Tap, public standpipe 3. Well, in-house 
4. Well, elsewhere 5. Well, public 6. Other
1. National/mral electricity grid 2. Generator (private)
3. No electricity 4. Other (specify)
19. Major cooking fuel 1. Firewood 2. Kerosene 3. Gas
4. Electricity 5. Any combination 6. Other
20. Ownership of means of transport 1. Bicycle 2. Motorcycle 3. Car
4. Lorry 5. Other 6. None
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21. Radio/TV ownership 1. Radio only 2, TV only 3. Radio/cassette recorder
4. Radio and TV 5. TV, radio/cassette player 6. None
D. FARM ASSETS INVENTORY (Enter number of units)
22. Grain store 23. Crib 24. Sheller 25. Mill
28. Water pump 29. Tractor 30. Tractorized equipment
E. LIVESTOCK HUSBANDRY (Enter number of heads)
32. Oxen 33. Cattle 34. Sheep 35. Goats
37. Poultry 38. Rabbits 39. Others
26. Planter 
31. Other
36. Pigs
27.
F. AGRICULTURAL LAND
40. of fields
Total N® cultivated last season N® not cultivated last season
41. Land tenure
41.1 N® of fields inherited
41.2 N® of fields purchased
41.3 N® of fields rented
41.4 N® of fields pledged
41.5 N® of fields under other category (specify)
42. Form of rent 1. Cash 2. Kind 3. Mixed
43.1 Size of cash rent per year
43.2 Components of 42.2
44. Pledgee(s) 1. Community 2. Friends/neighbours 3. Government
4. Employer 5. Other__
G. MAIN CROPS (Enter codes for first six)
45.1 Field/Arable Crops 1. Yams 2. Cocoyam
5. Cassava 6. Cowpea 7. Soyabean
3. Rice 4. Maize 
8. Other
45.2 Tree Crops 9. Cocoa
13. Cashew
10. Banana/plantain 11. Kolanut 12. Citrus
14. Mango 15. Other_____
46. Main Source of Seeds/seedlings
1. Own crop from previous year 2. Bought from ADP/FSC
3. Bought from market/dealer 4. Obtained from friends 5. Combination
6. Other
47. Use of fertilizer
47.1 Frequency 1. Always 2. Usually
4. Not needed
3. Sometime
47.2 Type of fertilizer used last season
1. Compound 2. Ammonium sulphate 3. Calcium Ammonium Nitrate
4. Urea 5. Triple Super Phosphate (TSP) 6. Combination
7. Other  8. None- too expensive 9. Don’t know
47.3 Source of fertilizer used last season
1. ADP/FSC 2. Market/dealer/agent 3. Co-operative
4. Combination 5. Other
364
48. Use of Chemicals
48.1 Frequency 1. Always 2. Usually 3. Sometime
4. Never- not needed 5. Not available
48.2 Tvpe of chemicals used last season
1. Fungicide 2. Insecticide 3. Herbicide 4. Seed dressing
5. Storage chemicals 6. Combination 7. None- too expensive
48.3 Source of chemicals used last season
1. ADP/FSC 2. Market/dealer/agent 3. Co-operative
4. Combination 5. Other
49. Use of familv labour last season
1. Respondent only 2. Wife/wives 3. Children/dependents
4. Relatives/friends 5. 1,2,3 only 6. All 7. Other
50. Use of hired labour
50.1 Frequencv 1. Always 2. Usually 3. Sometime
4. Never- not needed 5. Never- too expensive
50.2 Availabilitv/supplv
1. Always 2. Usually 3. Sometime 4, Never
50.3 Cost last season
1. Highly expensive 2. Average 3. Fair 4. Indifferent
51. Credit Facilities
51.1 Frequency 1. Always 2, Usually 3. Sometime
4. Not needed 5. Not available
51.2 Tvpe
1. Institutional 2. Informal 3. Both 4. Other
51.3 Source of Institutional Credit last season
1, ADP 2. Co-operative 3. Bank
4. Combination 5. None needed 6. None available
51.4 Source of Informal credit last season
1. Esusu 2. Relatives 3. Friends/neighbours 4. Money lender
5. Combination 6. None needed 7. None available
51.5 Size of Institutional Credit last season (Naira')
1. Up to 200 2. 201-300 3. 301-500 4. 501-1,000
5. 1,001-2,000 6. 2,001-5,000 7. 5,001-10,000 8. 10,000 and over.
51.6 Size of Institutional Credit last season (Naira)
(Enter code as in 51.5)
H. MARKETING: For the major crops given in question 45, please indicate the following:
52. FIRST CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
52.1 Proportion sold 1. Quarter 2. Half 3. Three-quarters
4. Whole 5. None sold
52.2 Time of sale 1. Before harvest 2. Immediately after harvest
3. Sold in small quantities after harvest 4. Kept in store and sold during lean period
5. Other (specify)______
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52.3 Main Point of Sale
1. Farmgate 2, Own village market 3. Other village market
4. Roadside/panbuyer 5. Farm Service Centre 6. Co-operative 7. Urban market
8. Buying agent depot 9. Combination 10. Other_____
53. SECOND CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
53.1 Proportion sold (Enter code as in question 52)
53.2 Time of sale -ditto-
53.3 Main Point of sale -ditto-
54. THIRD CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
54.1 Proportion sold (Enter code as in question 52)
54.2 Time of sale -ditto-
54.3 Main point of sale -ditto-
55. FOURTH CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
55.1 Proportion sold (Enter code as in question 52)
55.2 Time of sale -ditto-
55.3 Main point of sale -ditto-
56. FIFTH CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
56.1 Proportion sold (Enter crop as in question 52)
56.2 Time of sale -ditto-
56.3 Main point of sale -ditto-
57. SIXTH CROP (Enter code as given in question 45)
57.1 Proportion sold (Enter code as in question 52)
57.2 Time of sale -ditto-
57.3 Main point of sale -ditto-
I. EXTENSION AND FARM MANAGEMENT
58. Form of contact
1. Someone in household is contact farmer
2. Someone in household is part of extension group
3. Someone in household is part of any other form of extension contact
4. Extension not required
5. Extension available, but household never contacted.
59. Frequencv of visits of Extension Agent
1. Very frequent, regular (once in two weeks)
3. Sporadic, irregular
5. Other (Specify)______
2. Frequent, regular (once in a month)
4. Very seldom
60. Extension Messages applied
1. Land cultivation techniques
3. Use of fertilizer/other chemicals
5. Combination (1-4)
7. Fish farming
2. Use of improved seed varieties
4. Harvesting techniques
6. Storage and processing techniques
8. All 9. None applied
61. Participation in Extension Group Activities
1. Yes, attend regularly 2. Yes, attend irregularly
3. No, not informed 4. No, none available
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62. Visits to Demonstration Plots
1. Yes, attend regularly 2. Yes, attend irregularly
3. No, not informed 4. No,none available
63. Participation in Co-operative Society Meetings
1. Yes, attend regularly 2. Yes, attend irregularly
3. No, not informed 4. No, not a member
5. No, none available
64. Participation in Farmers' Congress Meetings
1. Yes, attend regularly 2. Yes, attend irregularly
2. No, not informed 4. No, not a member
5. No, none available
65. Participation in Community Development Association (Egbe Ilosiwaiu/Ibile) Meetings 
1. Yes, attend regularly 2. Yes, attend irregularly
3. No, not informed 4. No, not a member
5. No, none available
66. Do you belong to any other farmers’ or rural development association? If yes, specify.
67. Which of these groups gave you most of the things you expected?
1. ADP 2. Co-operatives 3. Farmers’ Congress
4. Community Development Association 5. Combination
6. They are the same 7. Other (specify)
68. Extension Pamphlets and Broadcast
1. Listen to radio programmes 2. Watch television programmes
3. Read pamphlets 4. Any combination 5. None of the above.
69. In what areas do you expect increased government assistance?
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